The development of universal telephone service in Ireland 1880-1993 by Flynn, Roddy
"The Development of Universal Telephone Service 
in Ireland 1880 - 1993"
Submission for Doctor of Arts
by
Roddy Flynn B.A., M.A.
Dublin City University 
School of Communications
Supervisor: Dr. Paschal Preston
January 1998
Declaration
I hereby certify that this material, which I now submit for assessment on the 
programme of study leading to the award of Doctor of Arts is entirely my own work 
and has not been taken from the work of others save to the extent that such work has 
been cited and acknowledged within the text of my work.
Signed:   ID No: 92700811
Date:
A bstract
This research examines the development o f universal service in Ireland over the period 
from 1880 to 1993. Universal service is a key element o f telecommunications policy. Its 
precise meaning is the subject o f dispute between differing political outlooks buts its 
objectives are essentially understood as socially-oriented, promoting the diffusion o f  
telecommunications technologies beyond that achieved by the market, and facilitating 
access to those same technologies at affordable rates.
Differences over the precise meaning o f universal service are also the result o f  the long 
history o f universal service. Although the term itself is a twentieth century one, it has been 
argued that its fundamental tenets are embodied in particular policy objectives and in 
particular the long established concept o f public service.
Thus this research has examined the history o f  the concept in Ireland over t he period o f  a 
century with a view to understanding how the current working definition o f universal 
service has been arrived at. The research looks in depth at the development and diffusion 
of the telephone across Ireland. It describes how the telephone network has expanded from 
the cities to reach the entire geographical extent o f Ireland. It also examines the factors 
which have driven and the factors which have constrained the development o f the 
telephone network: the overall economic condition o f the country, the respective influences 
o f industry, agriculture and society at large, the development o f new telecommunication 
technologies and the perception o f the role o f the telephone on the part o f those with the 
greatest influence on its expansion: the private companies, governments departments and 
state agencies which have been charged with the operation o f the telephone service. In 
short this research seeks to identify the specific political, economic, social and 
technological factors that shaped the development o f the telephone system in Ireland.
in the final chapters, the research describes universal service as it is in Ireland o f the 
1990s, concluding that ultimately the scope o f universal service policy in Ireland has been 
severely constrained both by economic factors (the cost o f providing the service) and a 
political unwillingness to effectively recognise the social role o f  the telephone. Thus whilst 
the research considers how new information and communication technologies will affect 
future conceptions o f universal service, it argues that the philosophy underlying the
provision o f the “plain old telephone service” in Ireland falls far short o f the ideal o f  
universal service.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 The concerns of this thesis.
Universal Service is a concept which has been applied to the provision o f  broadcasting and to 
those services provided by public utilities. This research however is concerned with universal 
service only as it relates to telecommunications.1 In this context universal service is generally 
taken to represent an obligation placed on the national telephone operator (be it privately or 
publicly owned - Telecom Eireann in the case o f Ireland) to offer a telecommunications 
service on equal terms to all applicants regardless o f  their geographical location within that 
operator’s service area. Indeed the status o f a protected monopoly, that until recent decades 
was enjoyed by most national telephone operators, was/is implicitly (and on occasion 
explicitly) conditional on the operator's undertaking o f this commitment.2
Why has this obligation been placed upon national telephone operators? The answer lies in the 
definition o f what universal service is. This issue is covered in detail in chapter 2, but in brief, 
universal service has been defined and justified on two grounds: the politico-philosophical 
approach and the economic good approach. The politico-philosophical approach argues that 
access to telecommunications is a prerequisite for full participation in modern societies and as 
such is a right rather than a privilege. The economic good approach argues that the overall 
utility o f each individual telephone increases as more subscribers are added to the telephone 
network3 and that it is thus in the interest o f all users that the number o f subscribers be raised 
to the highest level possible.
To seek a more concrete definition o f what universal service is it is necessary to engage with a 
debate which has been ongoing since the invention o f electrical means o f communication 
Although individual countries/organisations have adopted specific criteria by which universal
1 Except to the extent that the major argument in favour of universal telephone service - the 
citizenship thesis - also informs rationale for a universal public broadcasting service. See Chapter 2 
for a discussion of the various objectives of universal service.
2 The notion of "common carrier" that was applied to AT&T in the United States following the 1934 
Communication Act contained an explicit statement of this condition.
3 This is also related to the now virtually abandoned assumption that the telephone service was a 
natural monopoly: if all subscribers could be served by a single infrastructure, then there was no 
need for competing infrastructure. Indeed to permit competing infrastructures would have driven up 
the cost of service provision unnecessarily. Hence telecoms infrastructures were considered natural 
monopolies.
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service may be measured, there is no universally accepted definition o f  the concept. The 
specific political, economic, historical and social backgrounds in different countries have lead 
to differing national conceptions. Furthermore, recent (i.e. the last two and a half decades) 
technological developments have, by changing the very definition o f the term 
“telecommunications”, further complicated the process o f arriving at a definite conception o f  
universal service. Whilst by the start o f the 1970s in the US, it could reasonably be said that 
“universal service” referred to the universal provision o f a basic piece o f  equipment - the 
rotary dial handset and the provision o f a basic service (the ability to make telephone calls 
transmitting voice signals) - the development o f digital technology together with improved 
carrier systems (optical cable replacing copper wire for example) has expanded the 
information transmitting capacity o f the telecommunications infrastructure. This has lead 
directly to the emergence o f advanced telecommunications services accessible over telephone 
lines. As these technologies become more prevalent, there is an emerging concern that society 
may become divided into those with access to such new technologies and those without, 
described as the 'info-haves' and 'info-have-nots1. This prompts the question o f  whether the 
universal service concept should be adjusted to take account o f these new technologies, an 
issue which is taken up in the closing chapter o f  this thesis.
In short, at a time o f enormous technological, political and economic change, universal service 
is no longer a fixed concept (if indeed it ever was), nor definable as a technical standard.4 
Rather it is a politicised and therefore flexible concept, the definition o f which varies 
according to the political economic environment in which the subject is being debated.
The research on which this thesis is based seeks to examine the development and evolution of 
universal service provision in Ireland over the past century or more. In Ireland the concept of 
universal service is, and has been, at best opaque. Conceptions o f universal service which are 
taken as given in other western countries often simply do not apply in Ireland.5 Thus one o f
4 A fact acknowledged in the 1996 US Telecommunications Act which describes universal service 
as an "evolving level of telecommunications services." (Italics added) See the US 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Section 254 (C), paragraph 1
5 For example, a discussion which followed a paper delivered by this researcher at a meeting of the 
EMTEL Research Network in May 1996 at the University of Sussex, indicated that many at the 
meeting took for granted that the conception of universal service which dominated in their area of 
Northern Europe (basically common carriage) was a generally accepted definition. After some debate
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the major goals this research has simply been to arrive at a description o f  what that 
conception consists o f in the Irish context. The term is not mentioned in any piece o f national 
legislation relating to telecommunications (despite the fact that the major piece o f legislation 
governing Irish telecommunications today was written in 1983 - nearly fifty years after the 
passing o f  the 1934 US Communications Act, which is widely held to have extended the 
concept o f universal service to telephone service provision).6 Thus in the Irish case, as I will 
indicate in subsequent chapters, any conception o f universal service that does exist can only 
be inferred.
This research has sought to do this by identifying those political, economic, historical, social 
and technological factors which have shaped the conception o f universal service that is 
specific to modem Ireland. It traces the development o f universal service from the 
establishment o f  the first telephone exchange in Dublin in 1880 until September 1993, the 
point at which Telecom Eireann introduced the most substantial changes in the telephone tariff 
structure for 7 years. These changes were largely driven by Telecom Eireann's stated policy of 
“rate-rebalancing”. As the following chapter on definitions o f universal service will indicate, 
the introduction o f such rebalancing, which typically reduces the cost o f long-distance calls 
and increases the cost o f  local calls, has critical implications for the future financing o f the 
universal service obligation, and thus for the universal service concept itself. Despite this, the 
September 1993 changes failed to engender any public debate on universal service in Ireland. 
To this tune, has there never been such a debate in Ireland.7
the meeting concluded that in fact "definitions" of universal service were in fact culturally and 
indeed temporally specific.
6 Even the most recent piece of Irish telecommunications legislation, the Telecommunications 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1996, fails to use the term "universal service" despite the fact that 
one of the major objectives of the Act was to establish a regulatory authority independent of 
government.
7 To some extent this reflects an element of Irish political culture noted by several analysts: a low 
level of "subjective competence" (the sense of having the capacity to influence the political process) 
on the part of Irish citizens. Surveyed in 1976, only 53% felt they could do something about unjust 
local legislation and only 43% about an unjust national law. Rather than simply reflecting a lack of 
self-confidence however, it might be argued that this simply reflects the reality of Irish political 
structures. See Raven, John, C.T. Whelan, Paul A. Pfretscherer and Donald M. Borock (1976), 
Political Culture in Ireland: The Views of Two Generations (Dublin: Institute of Public 
Administration), p. 26.
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Thus to sum up, the research reported by this thesis examines three areas:
(i) To what extent has universal service, or the notion that access to telecommunications 
services is a citizenship right, emerged as an explicit element in Irish telecommunications 
policy? Furthermore, how and why did the conception o f  universal service alter over the 
course o f the last century?
(ii) What, in practical, concrete terms does universal service refer to with regard to the 
modem Irish telecommunications service? What philosophy currently underlies the provision 
of universal telephone service in Ireland and is there/has there been a gap between theory and 
practice at various stages o f the history o f telephony in Ireland?
(iii) Finally, looking at both the past and present o f universal service in Ireland, what 
implications may be drawn about not merely the future o f universal service in Ireland, but also 
about the future role o f  communications in Ireland? Will the “information society” in Ireland 
actually mean anything for society as opposed to the economy?
1.2 The approach adopted
It is nnportant to stress that for the bulk o f  the period covered by this research, the specific 
term “universal service” has had little meaning in the Irish context (although the phrase was 
coined as early as 1907 by Theodore Vail, then president o f American telecommunications 
giant, AT&T). This renders problematic any project to trace the development o f  the concept. 
Although there is an emerging acknowledgement that as the national telecommunications 
operator, Telecom Eireann has responsibility for the provision o f  “universal service”,8 there is 
not now nor has there ever been any explicit or measurable definition o f  what universal 
service is or should be in Ireland. Indeed, as I will argue below, the legislation which covered 
telecommunications in Ireland through most o f the period covered by this research - the 1869 
Telegraph Act - placed no obligations whatsoever on the national telecommunications 
operator. Instead it merely placed the exclusive privilege o f providing telecommunications
8 See for example, Sean McMahon (1995), "Competition and Telecommunication Infrastructure in 
Ireland", Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 19, No. 4, p 302.
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services in the hands o f  the state 9 Only the introduction, in 1983, o f the Postal and 
Telecommunication Services Act forced Irish legislators to reconsider the role and duties o f  
the national telecommunications operator. Whilst assigning some duties to the state-sponsored 
body (Telecom Eireann) which took over the provision o f telecommunications service in 
Ireland in 1984, this Act nevertheless failed to place any specific, measurable public service 
obligations on the new company. Indeed it appears that the same act specifically protects the 
Irish PTT from the consequences o f failing to provide service.10 Irish legislation is not unique 
in this respect: the difficulty in pinning down a definition o f  what constitutes universal service 
has made it difficult if  not impossible to legislate a fixed standard by which one could judge 
whether or not universal service had been achieved.11
One possible method o f measuring the development o f the universal service concept would be 
to decide at the outset on measurable technical criteria and to assess the extent to which those 
criteria have been achieved. This would involve some work o f definition which, as has been 
pointed out above, is a complex (and arguably impossible) task. Furthermore, there is a risk 
o f carrying out unhistorical research by applying contemporary criteria to historical 
situations: the danger o f saying “once X% penetration has been achieved, universal service 
has been established. Anything short o f this is not universal service”.
In this research I have adopted an alternative approach. I have sought to establish general 
dimensions associated with the universal service concept and to examine the development and 
diffusion o f the telephone service with regard to these. They comprise:
a) Affordability
b) Geographical spread o f  the network infrastructure in terms o f  access to the system.
9 Although in practice, the privilege was licensed to private companies until the nationalisation of 
the telephone service in 1911.
10 See Section 88, subsection 1 of Postal and Telecommunications Services Act, 1983: "...the 
company shall be immune from all liability in respect of any loss or damage suffered by a person...by 
reason of... failure or delay in providing, operating or maintaining a telecommunications service." 
This will be discussed in more detail in the relevant chapters.
11 This lack of specificity in terms of a universal service objective in Ireland has lead to a pragmatic 
rather than ideological approach towards the provision of the telephone in Ireland: one of the central 
theses of this research.
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c) Growth in number o f i) residential ii) business subscribers (and by extension, some 
consideration o f telephony in relation to changing consumption norms).
d) Growth in the level o f household penetration o f the telephone.12
e) Quality o f service (including continuity o f service).
At the same time a series o f  related questions have underpinned the body o f  this work. Have 
there been competing conceptions (implicit or otherwise) o f  the role o f telephone service over 
the last century? Has the telephone service been conceived o f as a social service, an 
infrastructural service, part o f a military communications network or in some other manner? 
Which o f these conceptions has had the most influence on Irish telecommunications policy? 
What factors have influenced this conception? To what extent was it perceived as a luxury, 
non-essential item or one central to the conduct o f every day life? In short: who and what 
was/is the telephone for?
Finally, since the telephone service lay in the hands o f the state for the greatest length o f the 
period covered by this research, how the telephone service was conceived o f by the official 
decision and policy-makers o f the state will be o f most critical interest to this research. The 
state, after all, decided how far universal service would actually go regardless o f any abstract 
concepts o f what universal service should be.
This research on the development o f universal service provision and policy is based on the 
case o f  Ireland, a later developing nation, situated on the western periphery o f the European 
continent. As such according to some (albeit contested) theories o f the role o f  
telecommunications, Ireland may be more dependent than most other European countries on a 
developed international communications network, in order to lessen the vicissitudes o f  
geographical location. One point to stress from the outset is that, despite the emphasis placed 
on maintaining external links for reasons o f economic growth (especially from the 1960s), 
there has been remarkably little debate on the development o f telecommunications in Ireland. 
Only when the service reached a crisis bom o f rapidly growing demand and waiting lists, long 
waiting periods and an increasingly expensive service in the late 1970s was there any kind of 
sustained debate in the public sphere regarding the telephone service. This is perhaps not
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unusual given that political traditions in Ireland do not readily encourage public debate 
regarding strategic policy-making (under which definition telecommunications comfortably 
falls). Irish decision-making structures are highly centralised and the policy-making process 
cloaked in secrecy.13 Thus public debates have tended in Irish history to focus on questions o f  
morality, religion, politics (as opposed to policy) and indeed history itself
The fact that this research sought to cover a long time period meant that o f necessity it would 
have to rely on historical documents for, at the very least, the earlier time period covered. In 
addition, at the outset o f the research, the possibility o f conducting direct interviews with 
persons working in the area o f telecommunications or telecommunications policy in Ireland 
was considered, with a view to elucidating what conception o f universal service informs recent 
and current Irish telecommunications policy. In fact several informal mterviews were 
conducted with Telecom Eircann personnel, former Posts and Telegraphs personnel, and 
officials at the Department o f Communications on the understanding that they would not be 
quoted. While these were helpful in confirming or refuting several o f  my initial tentative 
hypotheses, they ultimately confirmed that there was little o f  any substance to discuss on the 
subject o f universal service in Ireland. Since, as this research will indicate in late chapters, the 
concept was either unheard o f  or vaguely defined, it was difficult if  not impossible to conduct 
a discussion on the subject, as interviewer and interviewee frequently brought quite different 
conceptions o f the tenn to any such discussion. Furthermore, it was clear that the very act of 
raising the subject to some extent prompted interviewees to directly address the topic for the 
first time. Thus the actual act o f conducting the research was in part shaping the subject under 
consideration, giving rise to the researcher’s suspicion that the content o f  answers were 
influenced by what the interviewees felt was the “correct” rather than accurate answer.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the political sensitivity o f  the sub ject meant that it 
was, almost by definition, impossible to convince the interviewees to go “on the record” with 
accurate personal opinions as to what universal service actually consisted o f in the Irish 
context.
12 In fact it seems to be generally agreed that household penetration is the key marker of universal 
service achievement.
13 Reflected for example in the absence of published ministerial diaries giving accounts of how 
cabinet discussions take place in Ireland - there have been only two in the last 25 years - both 
detailing the same administration (At the Cutting Edge by Gemma Hussey and All in a Life by 
Garret Fitzgerald).
As a result, since this research was ultimately more interested in what universal service 
actually consisted o f rather than what interviewees with a stake in the industry would like to 
believe (or more accurately, would have liked me to believe), the decision was taken to rely on 
documentary materials, outlining basic data on key indicators such as geographical diffusion 
o f the telephone and levels o f penetration, and relating these to public or private statements o f  
official telecommunications policy.
Hence at the commencement o f  this work, this researcher carried out a detailed review of  
political, cultural and social histories o f Ireland in the late 19th and 20th centuries. The total 
absence o f  any explicit reference to the role o f  telecommunications in Irish society, culture or 
the economy therein reflected the scarcity o f public debate on telecommunications policy in 
Ireland. Furthermore there have been very few histories o f communication focusing 
specifically on Ireland. Those that have, have focused on transport (rail and roads) or the 
mass media (print, broadcasting, cinema) to the almost complete exclusion o f  
telecommunications. For this reason, this research has had to depend almost exclusively on 
primary documents to put together a picture o f telecommunications in Ireland over the last 
120 years. These included British Parliamentary debates, Dail Eireann Debates from 1922 
onwards, National Archive Documents (largely internal Department o f  Posts and Telegraphs 
memos), trade union records, business organisation records, and where appropriate newspaper 
articles. These have been augmented with secondary material - largely on the subject of 
universal service and on Irish social and economic history since 1880.
1.3 The m otivation for this w ork
From the outset it should be stated that this research has been unable to find very much by 
way o f published substantial English-language histories o f universal service provision or 
policy development or related concepts. Thus one o f the motivations for the research was to 
contribute something towards filling this gap - examining how the conception o f universal 
service has changed in a single country and seeking to isolate the factors influencing changes - 
with a view to offering some basis for comparison to other researchers on the same topic.
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Universal service has become a critical issue over the last decade as a result o f changes in the 
political economy o f telecommunications (which in themselves were influenced by changes in 
the more general political-economic climate - in particular the emergence o f  neo-liberalism as 
the dominant political ideology). O f most direct relevance to Ireland have been developments 
in European Union legislation relating to telecommunications, influenced in turn by the three 
major telecommunication industries deregulations/privatisations o f the early 1980s, those o f  
NTT in Japan, AT&T in the United States and British Telecom in the UK. The European 
Community, in its legislation dating from the Green Paper on telecommunications in 1987, 
appears to have accepted the political-economic orthodoxy which prompted these 
deregulations/privatisations, i.e. that state monopoly control o f  national telecommunications 
industries was inherently inefficient, leading to unnecessarily high charges and delaying the 
development o f  new telecommunications services. Accordingly, the cure for these ills has been 
the introduction o f  competition into all European telecommunications markets. For the 
Commission this would serve to deepen and promote the process o f  EU economic and 
industrial integration. Certainly competition has gradually been introduced into the national 
markets o f Europe, commencing with the end o f state telecommunication monopolies on the 
provision o f telecommunications equipment, and then spreading to service provision (although 
basic voice telephony will not be open to competition until 199814). Even the field o f basic 
telecommunications infrastructure (be it cabled or wireless) is opening up to competition.15
This acceptance o f the primacy o f the market in deciding the future o f national and 
international telecommunications coincides with a growth in the role o f private companies in 
the telecommunications markets o f the world. A glance at the top 40 international
14 Ireland initially secured a 5 year extension on this date ori the grounds that as a peripheral 
economy with a small telecommunications sector, it would need this breathing space to prepare for 
full competition. It is no longer clear, however, how much of the derogation Telecom Eireann will 
avail of: in June 1996, Telecom Eireann entered a "strategic partnership" with KPN/Telia, which 
involved selling 20% of Telecom to the new partners. The deal also permits KPN/Telia to purchase 
an additional 15% for not less than £IR200 million by 1999. Logically the longer Telecom avails of 
the derogation, the more valuable it will become (since it will retain an effective monopoly on fixed 
voice telephony). However, the securing of the derogation is predicated on the fact that Telecom 
needs time to prepare for competition - it has been argued (in particular by potential competitors in 
the fixed voice market, Esat Telecom) that Telecom Eireann already has one of the most advanced 
telecommunications infrastructures in Europe and that it doesn't therefore need the derogation.
15 For example, Esat Digifone, winner of the (disputed) second mobile phone licence in Ireland 
entered into a £100 million deal with LM Ericsson to build an infrastructure of mobile telephony
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telecommunications carriers in the world as o f 1993 indicates that 16 o f them are either 
entirely in private hands or have the majority o f their shares in private hands (mcluding 7 of 
the top 10).16 Telecom Eireann, a company with an annual turnover o f  just under £1 billion,17 
ranks 35th.18 Telecom Eireann itself has gone down this route: in June 1996 the Government 
agreed the sale o f 35% o f the company to a KPN/Telia consortium in a deal characterised as 
allowing Telecom Eireann to both reduce some o f its debt burden and to establish a 
partnership with an established international telecommunications operator (both KPN and 
Telia are members o f  Unisource, an international telecommunications network).
The consequences o f  European legislation for Irish telecommunications will be considerable. 
Most PTTs have argued that the introduction o f  competition also introduces the possibility o f  
“cream-skimming” by new competitors.19 Thus new competitors will enter the market but 
since they seem unlikely to face the same universal service obligations faced by incumbent 
PTTs they will be able to pick and choose their customers. This would almost certainly mean 
an exclusive focus on the most lucrative customers (typically commercial clients with a high 
traffic volume20). This may threaten the method o f funding that hitherto has typically financed 
the apparently loss-making universal service obligation, since in the past the funds earned 
from these more lucrative routes have been used to subsidise the losses resulting from the 
provision o f service to high-cost customers. Although it should be noted that the claim that the 
fulfilment o f universal service obligations is necessarily a loss-making proposition is a 
contested one,21 Telecom Eireann has nonetheless argued that in a fully competitive market it
base stations that would compete with the Eircell's (A subsidiary of Telecom Eireann) existing 
infrastructure. (See Irish Times Business page, 2/5/96).
16 Telecommunications Industry Task Force (1995), Telecommunications. Employment and 
Growth. (Dublin: Forbairt), p. 47.
17 Telecom Eireann (1995), Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ended 30 March 1995. p. 29. 
Exact figure is £979 million.
18 Telecommunications Industry Task Force, (1995), Telecommunications. Employment and 
Growth, (Dublin: Forbairt), p. 47.
19 In fact this is more than a possibility: in the fixed (as opposed to mobile) telephony market, 
Telecom Eireann have faced limited competition in international/long distance voice and fax 
telephony from Esat Telecom and TCL Telecom, both of whom have exclusively looked for corporate 
customers (since December 1992 in the case of Esat and November 1994 in case of TCL).
20 This would certainly describe the clientele of the two companies currently permitted to compete 
with Telecom Eireann for bulk customers, Esat and TCL.
21 Although it is frequently asserted that long-distance traffic cross-subsidises local calls, it has been 
argued that the process of ascribing costs to long-distance and local calls is far from objective and 
involves some normative decision-making. Indeed the “stand-alone” costing approach pioneered by
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will be doubly disadvantaged vis-à-vis new competitors since a) it will still have to provide 
what it characterises as loss-making services to some customers as a result o f the universal 
service obligation and b) its ability to cover those losses through cross-subsidisation will be 
undermined.22 Indeed the Irish Government has, on behalf of Telecom Eireann, appealed to 
the European Commission for a derogation on the liberalisation of the Irish voice telephony 
market on precisely these grounds.23 Prospective entrants to the Irish telecommunications 
market argue that as the incumbent telecoms provider, Telecom Eireann would still enjoy a 
substantial advantage over any new competitor as a consequence of its history o f service 
provision and its possession o f an extant telecommunications network. This contention is 
undermined by two factors: a) in global terms, as has been pointed out above, Telecom 
Eireann is very small when compared its prospective international competitors24 and b) the 
ONI’ (Open Network Provision) principles integral to all EU telecommunications legislation 
since 1987 are designed to ensure that extant and future telecommunications infrastructures in 
Europe will be accessible to all telecommunications service providers. As a consequence, new 
entrants to the industry would not be forced to construct a parallel infrastructure. Hence the 
possession by incumbents o f extant telecommunications infrastructure does not necessarily 
constitute any real advantage.
In short, Telecom Eireann as the incumbent provider, “saddled” with the universal service 
obligation will find that obligation harder and harder to finance, unless the current method of 
doing so is radically altered. Yet there has been no public discussion in Ireland o f how 
universal service will be affected by the liberalisation of the national market. Where debate
William Melody (amongst others) in die 1970s, argued that if services were allocated costs according 
to what they would cost if provided seperately, then local services subsidised other services. See 
Geoff Mulgan (1990), “The Myth of Cost-Based Pricing”, Intermedia, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 21 - 27.
22 In fact Telecom Eireann argue that this is already occurring as a result of the limited competition 
from Esat and TCL, both private companies which lease lines from Telecom Eireann and offer 
service to bulk users. In the 1994 Annual Report Telecom Eireann Chairman Ron Bolger 
complained: “Having invested in and built our networks over the last ten years, we now see our 
competitors cherry picking the more lucrative areas of our business.” Telecom Eireann Annual 
Report and Accounts for the year ended 31 March 1994, p. 8.
23 See CEC (1996), Decision o f  27 November 1996 concerning the additional implementation 
periods requested by Ireland for the implementation o f  Commission Directives 90/388/EEC and 
06/2/EC as regards fu ll competition in the telecommunications markets. EC OJ No. L 41, pp. 8 -2 1 .
24 Which has also been used as part of the justification for selling off of part of Telecom Eireann 
into private hands: in an internationally competitive telecoms market, Telecom Eireann will need to 
be in partnership with, rather than competition with, at least one of the global-scale operators (e.g. 
AT&T) or consortiums (e.g. Unisource).
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has occurred it has focused on the employment consequences for Telecom Eireann of 
competition. Successive Irish governments have appeared to accept (by virtue of their silence 
on the issue) that EU legislation will safeguard the universal service objective. This is 
indicative of Ireland's general approach towards the EU which may be characterised as highly 
dependent and reactive (as opposed to proactive) in relation to EU policy developments. Given 
the relatively limited financial and knowledge resources of the government communications 
department in one of the European Union's smallest member states, this approach is 
understandable. Yet the resulting complacency with regard to universal service seems 
particularly dangerous, in light of the criticism that references to universal service in EU 
documents serve mainly to placate those concerned that the introduction of competition will 
threaten the public service objectives of telecommunications.25 Hence a primary aim for this 
research is to provide a theoretical basis from which to proactively formulate a view, from the 
perspective of a smaller EU nation, on what shape universal service should take in the 
European context.
Yet, there is a more general reason why the study of universal service has become a key issue 
in the mid-1990s. When this research commenced in 1993, universal service was (particularly 
in Europe) merely one issue amongst many in general debates on telecommunications policy. 
Since then however, the term has been increasingly foregrounded as debate has intensified on 
what shape the Information Society will take.26 That we are moving towards such a society is 
taken as a given in these debates, which tend to be informed by a technologically determimst 
outlook. Voice, text, video and data can now all be coded into digital bits and transmitted via 
the same distribution systems, be they twisted copper pairs, co-axial cable, or fibre optic 
cable. This has speeded up the convergence of previously separate industries 
(telecommunications, broadcasting and computing) that arguably commenced in the 1870s.27
25 See for example Sean O'Siochru (1995), Universal Service in the Global Information Society: 
Problems and Prospects. Paper delivered at the ITU TELECOM '95 conference.
26 For example: "Fair access to the infrastructure will have to be guaranteed to all, as will provision 
of universal service, die definition of which must evolve in line with the technology." High Level 
Group on the Information Society (1994), Europe and the global information society (The 
Bangemann Report), (Brussels: CEC), p. 6.
27 See Ithiel de Sola Pool (1983), Technologies of Freedom, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap 
Press), chapter 3. Pool argues that the infant Bell company sought to offer two services - telegraphy 
and telephony - over the same infrastructure but were blocked by anti-trust laws.
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Media conglomerates offer visions of “electronic hearths”28, single technology platforms 
placed in the domestic environment, which combine the function o f the television, telephone 
and personal computer. These platforms will, it is promised, offer individuals a hitherto 
unimagined level of access to information and increased opportunities to participate in the 
democratic process. Both the National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
(NTIA) in the United States and the European Union are promoting this information 
superhighway/infobahn (ISH/IB) in terms o f how it will facilitate the very process o f being a 
citizen and more generally improve the quality of life.29 Thus, presented as a public good (as 
the telephone was before) the ISH7IB, raises many of the same issues as the telephone before 
it. Key amongst these is universal service.
The fact that the discussion of universal service now occurs in the realm o f the Information 
Society, however, raises the stakes. In the debate over the universal provision of the telephone, 
it has always been possible to make an argument that citizenship (that is membership of a 
given society) and phone ownership were not coterminous.30 This argument is significantly 
harder to make when talking of an Information Society, i.e. a society where citizenship is 
conceived of actually being constituted by access to information and information technology. 
In this context, if  one does not have access to that technology then, by definition, one cannot
28 See for example Evan I. Schwartz (1995), "People are supposed to pay for this stuff', Wired (UK 
Edition, No. 1.04, July/August 1995.
29 See for example The Bangcmann Report: "The widespread availability of new information tools 
and services will present fresh opportunities to build a more equal and balanced society and to foster 
individual accomplishment. The information society has the potential to improve the quality of life 
of Europe's citizens, the efficiency of our social and economic organisation and to reinforce 
cohesion." (p. 6.). Speaking at a conference in October 1995 in Bremen, James McConnaughey of 
the NTIA commented, "Given the technological convergence of computers and communications, and 
the emergence of information as a means of fostering economic and social well-being, the traditional 
reliance on telephone penetration may now be inadequate as a metric ofuniversal service... A 
fundamental goal of the Clinton Administration is to expand the universal service concept to ensure 
that information resources are available to all at affordable prices". From "Universal Service" by 
James McConnaughey, in The Social Shaping of the Information Highways - Comparing the Nil and 
the EU Action Plan. (Report on an international conference at Bremen, October 5th - 75th, 1995), p 
81.
30 Largely because of the fact that the telephone took so long to become a ubiquitous instrument in 
the Western World. Looking at Ireland in 1945 when a population of just under 3 million people was 
served by just over 30,000 main phone lines, it would have been hard to argue that citizenship 
depended on access to the telephone. However as the phone became more ubiquitous and possession 
of a telephone became taken for granted, society began to be ordered according to that assumption. 
See for example Philip Dyer’s figures indicating the role of the telephone in accessing information
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be part of that society. Thus if the Information Society, as it has been marketed, is to include 
everyone now considered to be part of society, then it will be necessary to mandate by law- 
guaranteed universal access to information and communication technologies: particularly as 
the hardware necessary to access the ISH/IB (personal computers) is significantly more 
expensive than that required for the technology currently most associated with universal 
service: the telephone (and there is plenty of evidence that income is a deciding factor in 
preventing people from becoming subscribers to what is, compared to personal computing, a 
relatively cheap technology31). In short, it is already considered necessary to legally mandate 
universal telephone service, in a society where it is nonetheless possible to argue that 
telephone access is not a prerequisite for societal participation. Given this, how much more 
important will it be to mandate universal service with regard to a relatively expensive 
technology (PCs), access to which will be considered a prerequisite for functioning as a 
citizen in that society?
At government level at least, Ireland has embraced the notion o f the Information Society32 and 
it is this fact which makes a detailed examination of universal service as it currently stands in 
Ireland critically important. Despite vague references to the socially transformative powers of 
an Information Society (usually couched in terms of a process of increased “démocratisation” 
of society), both the NTLA. and EU agree that the Information Society should be driven by the 
market.33 The contradiction inherent in this line of persuasion - that social transformation will 
be brought about by the representatives o f that institution (capitalism) which would appear to 
have a vested interest in maintaining the societal status quo - is not addressed. Yet, critical 
theorists such as Herbert Schiller have long adverted to the inherent contradiction of having 
the development of a public good driven by the needs of the private sphere (business).
relating to social welfare rights in Re-Thinking Telephony. The Social and Spatial Consequences of 
Non-Connection (Centre for Urban Geography Studies, University of Newcastle).
31 See for example: Jorge Reina Schement, (1995),"Beyond Universal Service: Characteristics of 
Americans without Telephones, 1980 - 1993", Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 19, No. 6. pp. 477 - 
485.
32 "...We cannot escape the information age, even if we wanted to - and I can assure you that the 
Government has no wish to do so but rather to espouse it." Ruairi Quinn, Minister for Finance at the 
ICTU Conference on "Preparing Ireland for the Information Age": 22/3/1996. From the text of a 
press release issued by the Government Information Services.
33 The very first line of The Bangemann Report is "This Report urges the European Union to put it's 
faith in market mechanisms as the motive power to carry us into the Information Age", High Level
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Referring to the increasing economic importance of the ICT industries, Schiller has argued 
that:
“Contrary to the notion that capitalism has been transcended, long prevailing 
imperatives of a market economy remain as determining as ever in the 
transformations occurring in the technological and informational spheres.”34
The point is that unless one accepts the economic good conception o f universal service,35 there 
is little reason to believe that commercial interest will seek to promote universal service 
objectives. Yet if we are to rely on the EU to protect the universal service obligation we are 
depending 011 an institution which wishes to let precisely the needs o f the market drive the 
Information Society. Even in looking at Irish pronouncements on the Information Society, it's 
apparent that the needs of commerce outweigh those of citizenship. The Department of 
Industry and Commerce-appointed Information Society Secretariat (18 of whose 20 members 
were from “the business community”) sought submissions on “Ireland and the Information 
Society” explicitly couched in terms of the “context of the economy”. There's no reference to 
any sense of what new technologies and information transmission systems might have for Irish 
“society” in the more general sense o f the word.36 Even when such pronouncements do 
address the issues relating to the exclusion and the Information Society, they still often use
Group on the Information Society (1994), Europe and the global information society (The 
Bangemann Report). (Brussels: CEC), p. 3.
34 Herbert Schiller (1981), Who Knows?: Information in the Age of the Fortune 500 (Norwood.
New Jersey, Ablex), p. xii. Indeed it might be argued that the very notion of the Information Society 
found its genesis in the fact that marketing of new technologies has moved from the sphere of work 
into the home (as the business market nears saturation). Thus the notion of the "Information Society" 
becomes simply a marketing tool, designed to encourage the purchasing for use in the domestic 
environment of technologies originally designed for business applications. For Schiller to consider 
that the Information Society is anything odier than simply the latest phase of capitalism is incredible 
since it is illogical to expect the very forces that have generated information and IT to be superseded 
by what they have created. See chapter on Schiller in Frank Webster (1995), Theories of the 
Information Society. (London: Routledge).
35 And as this research points out in the closing chapter there is a danger to so doing even if it does 
achieves a universal telephone provision.
36 Of course exactly what "society" is raises difficulties: the Penguin Dictionary of Sociology offers 
the "commonsense category in which society is equivalent to the boundaries of nation-states, "(p.
395). But in talking about sociology it refers more to the "study of the bases of social membership"
(p. 396). Whatever the definition it seems fair to suggest that "economy" and "society" are not 
coterminous in their meanings.
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language which undermines this intent: citizens are addressed as “clients”37 and 
“customers” .38
Hence there is a need to examine the conception o f universal service that prevails with regard 
to the telephone in Ireland at present since it may have determining effect on how universal 
service is conceived in an “information age” . The risk for society is that universal service now 
and in the future may be conceived in such a way as to see citizens as consumers rather than 
citizens, undermining the very fabric of political society. Hence universal service is of key 
policy importance at present.39 This research then seeks to examine how the definition that 
currently prevails in Ireland was arrived at and how it might be affected by current and future 
developments.
1.4 S tructure and outline of thesis and chapters.
This research is divided into ten chapters. Chapters two and three offer a literature review and 
basic theoretical underpinning of the main body of the thesis (chapters four to eight). Chapter 
two reviews the basic conceptions and theories of universal service, tracing the development 
o f the concept from the late 19th century, and examining the changing conceptions of 
universal service in the 1980s and 1990s. Chapter three offers a basic political and economic 
history of Ireland from 1880 to 1993, with a view to contextualising telecommunications 
policy (particularly in relation to economic policy).
37 Ruairi Quinn, then Minister for Finance at the ICTU Conference on "Preparing Ireland for the 
Information Age" 22/3/1996. From page 8 of a press release issued by the Government Information 
Services.
38 Ibid., page 10. See also the Irish government internet site at http://www.irlgov.ie. As of June 
1996, the Taoiseach had written in his page "The Internet offers my Government colleagues and I an 
exciting and new opportunity to communicate with a rapidly growing number of users in Ireland and 
abroad. Delivering a quality customer service is a priority for my Department." This use of language 
has been picked up in the national press: "A customer service? The language of shopping malls and 
customer service has replaced that good old-fashioned term - citizens." See Michael Cunningham, 
"The State We're In" Irish Times, May 27, 1996.
39 Schement argues that universal service is not simply a single government policy, rather "it is the 
guiding principle of the information society." Jorge Reina Schement (1995), "Beyond Universal 
Service: Characteristics of Americans without telephones, 1980-1993", Telecommunications Policy 
Vol. 19, No. 6, pp. 477-485.
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As noted above, the main body of the research is contained in chapters four to eight. These 
chapters trace the historical development of universal service in Ireland from 1880 to 1993 in 
periods of roughly twenty years (although chapter four covers 1880 to 1921 whilst chapter 
eight focuses on the thirteen year pexiod up to 1993). Each chapter commences a general 
description o f the evolution of the telephone service in the period covered, describing the 
physical state o f the network and relating this to key developments in the political, 
organisational, personnel, and legislative frameworks within which the sendee progressed. 
Each chapter will also trace the conception both of the telephone as a communications 
technology in Ireland and of the role of the organisation providing service (i.e., whether a 
commercially or socially oriented service). These will be integrated together at the close of 
each chapter into a conclusion assessing what “definition” (if any) of universal service 
prevailed in each period. (Furthermore, the primary data contained in the appendices is an 
important part of the “story” told by this research. The appendices may be used to 
contextualise the conclusions reached in individual chapters.)
Chapter nine summarises the previous five chapters, drawing together the main themes of the 
research and identifying the key factors and historical moments in the development of both the 
Irish telephone service and the universal service concept. This will also offer an outline of the 
historical shape of universal service over the period covered by this research.
Chapter ten takes the conclusions of the previous chapter and considers them in the light of 
ongoing changes in Irish and European telecommunications policy. It stresses the importance 
of developing a coherent philosophy not merely of universal service but also of the role of 
communications in a modem society, in advance of changing the legislative/regulatory 
framework within which the “plain old telephone service” and new information 
communications technologies are provided. Failure to do, it argues, will allow the logic of the 





"universal adj. 1. of or typical of the whole of mankind or nature. 2. common 
to or proceeding from all in a particular group. 3. applicable to or affecting 
many individuals, conditions or cases. 4. existing or prevailing everywhere...
service n. 1. an act of help or assistance. 2. an organised system of labour and 
material aids used to supply the needs of the public, telephone service. 3. 
something that is used in serving food and drink. 4. the state of availability for 
user by the public..."
From Collins Concise Dictionary,
2nd Edition, 1988.
"Perhaps no other regulatory goal has been so extensively discussed without an 
established definition as universal service."1
Establishing the meaning of universal service is a semiotic nightmare. If  a language system is 
strictly defined as a set o f arbitrary but agreed signs and signifiers, then the term "universal 
service" is practically without meaning. Dictionary definitions o f "universal" and "service" 
have little to do with the operational definition: the service may not exist everywhere and may 
not supply the needs of the public. Two individuals may debate the subject of "universal 
service" but hold quite different conceptions of what "universal service" refers to. Equally two 
individuals may use different terms - "universal service" and "public service" - but refer to the 
same concept. (The significance of the distinction between "universal service" and "public 
service" for understanding differences in US and European approaches to telecommunications 
policy is discussed below.) Language systems are not immutable, however - the interpretations
1 Larry Pressler & Kevin V. Schieffer (1987), "A Proposal for Universal Telecommunications 
Service", Federal Communications Law Journal, Vol. 40, No. 3. The same quote starts two sections, 
both entitled "Defining Universal Service" in Frederick William (1991), The New 
Telecommunications: Infrastructure for the Information Age. (New York: The Free Press), p. 202 
and John D Borrows, Phyllis A. Bernt & Raymond W. Lawton (1994), Universal Service in the 
United States: Dimensions of the Debate, Diskussionsbeitrag Nr. 124. (Bad Honnef: 
Wissenschaftliches Institut für Kommunikationsdienste), p. 4.
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of words or phrases are frequently the site of dispute as opposing groups struggle for control 
of meaning and thus the boundaries within which debate can occur. The struggle to "define" 
universal service is a perfect and politically significant example o f this. As universal service 
policies and practices have evolved over the course of a century, the term itself has 
increasingly become a site of conflict between right and left wing political viewpoints and 
political economic models. These opposing viewpoints offer different rationales for "universal 
service" based alternately on the logic of economic efficiency and the social role of 
communications. The result is different "definitions" of the concept. Since it is precisely these 
competing conceptions that this research seeks to examine in the Irish case, with a view to 
ascertaining which notions have implicitly or explicitly informed the diffusion of the telephone 
here, there is little value in attempting to arrive at a single definitive version of universal 
service. Nonetheless there is a need to mark out the territory under discussion.
2.2 M apping the territo ry
One statement on which there is general consensus can be made to the effect that universal 
service is a public policy goal that "exist(s) in every developed country."2 Beyond that the 
various "definitions" of universal service are situated on a continuum stretching from 
minimalist to maximalist interpretations of the concept: at the minimalist end, universal 
service simply means guaranteeing access to telecommunications facilities on an equal basis. 
A maximalist definition, however, would encompass the requirement to provide an affordable 
(possibly subsidised), continuous telecommunications service o f an agreed minimum level o f 
quality to all citizens regardless of their geographical location.
The minimalist definition, although frequently described as "universal service" is actually 
closer to the concept of "common carriage". Whilst the two terms are not synonymous,3 they
2 Eli Noam (1994), "Beyond Liberalisation III: Reforming Universal Service", Telecommunications 
Policy, Vol. 18, No. 9, pp. 687-704. See also Michael Tyler, William Letvvin & Christopher Roe
(1995), "Universal Service and Innovation in Telecommunications Services", Telecommunications 
Policy, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 3-20: "...most countries recognise some concept of universal service as a 
policy goal." (p. 4.)
3 "...'universal service obligation1, is the requirement of a carrier to reach every willing user and 
desired destination, wherever located, while common carriage refers to service obligations toward 
users given a physical plant." Eli Noam (1994), " Beyond liberalisation II: The Impending Doom of 
Common Carriage", Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 18, No. 6. pp. 435-452, p. 436.
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do share some common features. Common carriage refers to service obligations towards 
users, in the case where physical plant is already extant:
"Common carriage principles...(are) intended to guarantee that no customer seeking 
service upon reasonable demand, willing and able to pay the established price, 
however set, would be denied lawful use of the service or would otherwise be 
discriminated against."4
Common carriage might thus simply be described as a fonn of consumer protection or 
citizenship right, seeking to ensure that a given company treats different customers on the 
same basis. However in the field of telecommunications, the role of common carriage 
obligations may be somewhat more significant for it requires that, as hi the original 
conception of universal provision in the case of the postal service, a telephone service provider 
offer service to a given subscriber at the same rates as other subscribers, regardless of the 
actual cost to the service provider of providing service. Hence despite the fact that the cost of 
providing service to an urban subscriber and a rural subscriber may be quite different (given 
that connecting the rural subscriber is likely to require the laying of more cable), the service 
provider must charge both subscribers the same rental.
Compared to the fairly passive nature of common carriage, the maximalist version of 
universal service takes a far more proactive approach. At this point the political significance 
o f universal service becomes clear - the minimalist approach requires relatively little state 
intervention and thus tends to appeal to a more conservative political and economic outlook. 
The maximalist approach would require the identification of telephone service provision as an 
element of social welfare policy and a great deal of state intervention since a "perfect" version 
of universal service (i.e. 100% telephone penetration) would have to include the following 
standards:
1. Geographical ubiquity. Service would have to be provided regardless of the distance of the 
applicant from the nearest exchange and o f the effect of local terrain.
4 Ibid., p. 436.
22
2. Affordable tariffs. Service would have to be provided regardless of the income level of the 
applicant. (Implicitly this means that service might have to be provided free-of-charge for 
certain categories of users).
3. Quality of service. This can be interpreted in several different ways and clearly depends 
upon prevailing technological standards and consumption norms. But in the 1990s context and 
given an ideal world it would include: a set maximum fault tolerance, set length of repair 
times, set waiting times, access to any service beyond POTS (ISDN etc.) and detailed 
information on the working of the telephone service (itemised billing, access to phone 
directory and instruction on the use o f more complex/enhanced services).
4. Continuous service (24 hour). This is included to take account of the argument that public 
telephones provide universal access to the phone. However if one accepts the social 
justification for universal telephone service (see below) that in a modem society, access to 
telecommunications service is "essential for full membership o f the social community",5 then 
not merely must the individual have access to the telecommunications network but others must 
be able to access that individual via the network. Since a public phone box fulfils only half 
that requirement, the implication may be that the individual must have access to a phone in 
their own residence.6
Were the conditions above to be fulfilled, truly universal service would exist for everybody, 
everywhere at any time. It should be noted that in some cases the maximalist definition of 
umversal service may require that the core concept of minimalist universal service - equity - 
be dispensed with. This is a necessary corollary of guaranteeing service regardless of the 
subscriber's income. Unless the service provider were to agree to provide the service at no cost
5 OECD (1991), Universal Service and Rate Restructuring in Telecommunications. Information 
Computer Communication Policy Document No. 23, p. 25.
6 There are three further points against the argument that public telephones fulfil universal service 
obligations. One, in rural areas in particular, there is no guarantee that there will be a phone within 
walking distance. Two, given that it's less secure than a domestic phone, a public phone box is 
significantly more likely to be out of order. Three, the move in Ireland to replace coin-operated call- 
boxes with public phones that will only accept a special phone card (or less frequently a major credit 
card), although likely to reduce the level of vandalism, restricts access among those on a low income, 
"unable to tie up their discretionary spending in advance of making a call". See Graham Murdock & 
Peter Golding, (1989), "Information Poverty and Political Inequality: Citizenship in the Age of 
Privatised Communications", Journal o f  Communication, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 180-195, p. 186.
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(the only way in which affordability can be guaranteed) to all subscribers, free or subsidised 
service would have to be provided on a selective basis, probably based on means testing.
Since, however, those receiving the phone for free would be receiving it on more favourable 
terms than other subscribers, not all citizens would receive equal treatment. Hence equality of 
treatment is not necessarily a feature of the maximalist definition.
2.3 W hy Universal Service in the Case of Telecommunications?
Perhaps a more useful question than ‘what is universal service?’ is ‘why is it a goal o f public 
policy?’ Once we understand the various rationales underlying the universal service concept, 
we can better understand what the concept of universal service with regard to the telephone 
might refer to in a real world context.7
There are two strands of thought underlying the justification of universal service with regard 
to the telephone. Although both can be discussed separately, at some point it becomes 
impossible to discuss one in isolation from the other. These two strands are the unique 
characteristics of a two-way communications network as an economic good and the social role 
of any telecommunications system.
2.3.1 The Unusual Qualities of Telecommunications Networks as Economic Goods.
Hadden & Lenert8 argue that of their nature, switched or wired networks, such as the 
telephone network, should be considered a shared resource of the public community. They 
argue that at a very basic level, such networks use facilities owned by the public (hence the 
need for service providers to acquire right-of-ways for their wire or cable networks). 
Furthermore, noting that economists "call goods 'public' whose utility for one is not infringed
7 ft is important to note that the concept of universal service has also been applied to the output of 
Public Service Broadcasting - that is, it should be possible for all citizens to receive public service 
broadcasting. As this chapter argues, however, radio and television exhibit a different diffusion 
pattern from the telephone due to inherent differences in the two technologies. There is, thus, little 
insight to be gained from applying the PSB concept of universal service to that of communications.
8 Susan G. Hadden, & Edward Lenert (1995), "Telecommunications Networks are Not VCRs: the 
Public Nature of New Information Technologies for Universal Service", Media, Culture and Society, 
Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 121-140.
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by other's use", they argue that telephone is "a still more public kind of good, whose utility is 
actually increased by others' use."9
They continue that telecommunications networks also constitute infrastructure, which may be 
defined as "the basic facilities...and installations needed for the growth and function of a 
country, community or organisation."10 That is to say, infrastructure facilitates the efficient 
running of the economy and the functioning of the social system. As such infrastructure 
creates positive externalities or "good effects" that occur as a result of the infrastructure. 
Thus, whilst the builders of a telephone infrastructure may have set out to simply build an 
infrastructure they have also made it possible for other businesses to exist and operate. 
Obviously those who created the original infrastructure would prefer to capture and sell these 
positive externalities. In practice, however, this is often impossible with infrastructure. As a 
result, the infrastructure provider has no incentive to make a socially optimal level of 
investment, that is a level of investment that will result in overall benefits for society as a 
whole. Thus the potential presence of positive externalities may result in underinvestment in 
infrastructure. To take a US example:
"We all benefit from the legacy of our interstate highway system, which provided 
money to pave roads in New York and North Dakota alike. Consider what would 
have happened if we had not established a national highway policy after World War
II. Instead, let's say we just licensed right of way to entrepreneurs, as was done in the 
1980s with cellular telephony. We would have gotten some kind of interstate highway 
system, built by entrepreneurs. Granted, maybe it would have been built for less 
money. But the pricing and national coverage o f this highway system would have 
resembled today's cellular telephone network. Certain parts of the country, such as the 
north-east megalopolis, would have developed four lane roads fairly quickly. Other 
regional roadways such as the 1-5 corridor linking Seattle to Los Angeles, would have 
developed organically as well. But less well trafficked areas would probably have 
been served by gravel roads for many years."11
9 Hadden & Lenert, op. cit., p. 13 f.
10 American Heritage Dictionary (1979). Cited in Hadden & Lenert, op. cit., p. 128.
11 Rob Glaser (1995), "Universal Service Does Matter", WIRED (US Edition) 3.01.
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To put this in simpler terms, the existence of a telephone infrastructure is generally held to be 
a part of the general infrastructure that is a prerequisite for economic development in any 
given country .12 Some researchers hold that, to improve the nation's general economic well­
being it makes sense to invest in the development of the telecommunications infrastructure. 
This is particularly held to be the case if that nation is geographically peripheral in the context 
of an increasingly international/global economy. Yet despite the strong correlation between the 
level of telephone penetration and Gross National Product, it is difficult to state definitively 
which causes growth in the other. (The issue has been much debated in the communication 
and development research field and the chain of effects is still in dispute.) Nonetheless there is 
an intimate link so that, at least in the context of a country like Ireland in the 1980s or 1990s, 
it would be possible to say that any ongoing general economic growth is unlikely to continue if 
the telephone network does not also develop, (especially in light o f the identification by the 
Irish Industrial Development Authority (IDA) of telemarketing and teleservices as 
employment growth areas'3).
In short, some of the relevant research literature suggests that, looked at from a holistic 
societal perspective, a socially optimal level of investment in telecommunications will lead to 
a larger overall return to that society.14 Since this will not happen if a private profit-oriented 
firm builds the infrastructure, public participation in its creation is justified.
However if one accepts that the telephone network constitutes infrastructure, then its unique 
characteristics as an economic good in fact actively militate against its receiving the socially 
optimal level o f investment in the absence of a universal telephone service policy. To 
understand why, and what these unique characteristics are, it is necessary to briefly refer to 
classic diffusion theory.
12 See for example: Heather Hudson (1984), When Telephones Reach the Village. (Norwood, New 
Jersey: Ablex Publishing Company). Hudson's work argues that telecommunications can lead to 
improvements in health and education facilities in lesser developed countries.
13 Paul O'Kane, "Telecom sector could provide 9,000 jobs", Irish Times, 18 July 1995.
14 Cronin and Hebert embark on an ambitious attempt to model the effect of the development of the 
telecommunications network on the costs of American industry, seeking to measure the positive 
externalities accruing from telephone development. They argue that between 1963 and 199J, per- 
unit production cost in American industry dropped by up to 8% in some sectors as a result of the 
development of telecommunications networks. To the extent that the resulting saving was passed 
onto their customers, the drop in business costs constituted a society-wide benefit. See Francis J.
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2.3.2 Diffusion Theory and the Telephone.
At some level, any discussion of universal telephone service is a discussion of the diffusion of 
the telephone. The orthodox model outlining how innovations diffuse, advanced by Everett M 
Rodgers,15 posits that an imiovation "is communicated through certain channels over time 
among the members o f a social system".16 A few innovative members o f that society ("early 
adopters") adopt the new technology and prompt others to follow. These in turn encourage 
still others to adopt the new technology. "Since each additional individual who adopts the new 
technology has more contacts, the rate of adoption can be predicted to increase 
geometrically."17 Rodgers' basic diffusion curve exhibits precisely this characteristic flattening 
out as it reaches 100% diffusion18 ("the last few holdouts"19). (See diagram overleaf.)
Cronin & Paul L. Hebert (1994), "Inequities in the benefits and costs of telecommunication across 
stakeholder groups", Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 306-320.
15 Everett M. Rodgers (1983), Diffusion of Innovations (3rd Edition), (New York: The Free Press).
16 Ibid., p. 11.
17 Susan G. Hadden & Edward Lenert (1995), "Telecommunications Networks are Not VCRs: the 
Public Nature of New Information Technologies for Universal Service", Media, Culture and Society, 
Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 121-140, p. 124.
18 Rodgers, op. cit., p. 11.
19 Hadden & Lenert, op. cit., p. 124. In fact with the exception of a dip in the 1930s the diffusion 
curve for telephone penetration in the US between 1920 and 1990 almost exactly mirrors the 
"natural" trajectory postulated by Rodgers' general diffusion model. For this author this might 
suggest that the pursuit of universal service objectives can make the telephone and other wire- 
networked, interactive technologies diffuse along the lines of standard goods. See Jorge Reina 
Schement (1995), "Beyond Universal Service: Characteristics of Americans without Telephones, 
















Rodgers' model, identifying as it does the cumulative actions of many individuals as the mam 
engine o f diffusion, is a classic statement of Adam Smith's dictum that the invisible hand of 
the market guides the economy. Thus if classic diffusion theory were applied to the telephone 
it would suggest that its failure to achieve the kind o f levels of penetration enjoyed by some 
consumer goods such as the television (and the substantial differences in the historical 
patterns of telephone diffusion between countries) is simply due to a lack of consumer demand 
(the "invisible hand"). However, Rodgers' model of diffusion is predicated on the assumption 
that the nature of the innovation is such that the individual consumer can, in isolation, decide 
whether or not to acquire a new technology.20 Thus it assumes that such an instrument can be 
adopted "almost simultaneously by many people"21 regardless o f external forces.
The telephone, however, differs from most technologies in two unique but critical ways.
Firstly it is a (predominantly wired) networked technology. Secondly, it is an interactive 
technology. As a result of these features, the telephone would, if left to diffuse according to 
the logic of the invisible hand of the market, exhibit a diffusion curve quite different from that 
postulated by Rodgers. Why?
Hadden and Lenert make the point that technologies that rely on a wired network can only 
spread incrementally: each new part of any network must branch from an existing part. Thus 
in Ireland o f the 1880s, for example, it would have been impossible to comiect a potential 
subscriber living in one of the counties surrounding Dublin without first laying cable to reach 
that customer. Yet the economics of wired networks make it unlikely that service providers 
will extend their infrastructure simply on demand. The initial or "sunk" costs o f establishing a 
network (cable laying and exchange-building) are high - therefore in the initial phases of 
network development it makes sense to build this infrastructure in the most densely populated 
areas (cities) since there's a large potential customer base in the vicinity of the extant 
infrastructure. Here the marginal cost of adding subscribers already close to the extant 
infrastructure will be low.
20 In fact there is surprisingly little discussion of the role that characteristics inherent to a technology 
might play in shaping its own diffusion. Instead Rodgers tend to focus on questions of: whether the 
technology will be perceived as better than existing technologies performing roughly the same 
function; whether the functions of the technology will be compatible with the functions of the society 
that may or may not adopt it; and how complex the technology is. See Rodgers, op. cit., pp. 15-16.
21 Ibid. pp. 15-16.
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On the other hand the marginal cost of connecting a more remote customer before the network 
had reached him/her via "natural" expansion would be high since the same fixed costs 
mvolved in connecting many subscribers in a densely populated area will have to be expended 
to reach perhaps just one subscriber. In fact in the case where there is only one potential 
subscriber, fixed costs are also the marginal costs. From the service provider's perspective, 
this would mean a high outlay for a limited return. Thus in the absence of any requirement to 
provide service, the service provider is, in this case, unlikely to agree to provide service on 
demand.
Thus unlike, say, the television, the decision to install a telephone is not solely in the hands of 
the potential subscriber. A prerequisite is that the network bypasses his/her house, a decision 
that lies in the hands of the service provider. In short, that the geographical diffusion of the 
telephone occurs gradually22 rather than instantaneously is largely technologically determined 
(especially with regard to wired telephone networks).23
Moving to the significance of the interactive nature of telephone: it is conceivable that a 
consumer in a remote area (as in the example above) could pay the substantial capital cost of 
extending the network his/herself. This is unlikely since any individual who pays to have the 
network extended will bear the entire once-for-all cost of extending the network to that area: 
any later adopters in the same area will not face the same costs. The rational economic actor 
will therefore wait until someone else in the same area has a phone installed.
Nonetheless perhaps the potential customer will consider the telephone so useful that they will 
accept the fact that others would later benefit from their initial expenditure. Yet the fact that 
the telephone is an interactive medium makes this extremely unlikely: Eli Noam notes that "an 
increasing number of subscribers adds to the positive utility o f the network - the more people
22 For example, in the case study examined by this research, it took 50 years to extend even the most 
threadbare network to every Irish county. Even when this was achieved, it's unlikely that service was 
available in more than 20%-25% of the physical area of the state.
23 Clearly a political decision to could be immediately taken to universally extend the geographical 
reach of the telephone regardless of cost but given the enormous cost of implementing such a 
decision together with the fact that in its early stages the telephone is unlikely to be perceived as 
sufficiently useful to justify such expenditure, such a decision is unlikely.
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can be reached, the more useful is the network."24 The corollary of this however is that the 
utility o f the phone will be relatively low for Rodgers' early adopters: the fact that the 
infrastructure does not bypass the home means that the network as a whole is likely to be still 
in its infancy (i.e. there will be few subscribers for the new subscriber to call). The relative 
unattractiveness o f being connected is thus likely to slow the initial diffusion o f the network.
In short in its initial phase of development, the fact that the telephone is a wire-networked, 
interactive technology is likely to act as a block to its expansion. In fact these characteristics 
might stop the network from ever reaching the "critical mass" o f subscriber numbers and 
geographical spread critical to the network achieving a socially optimal level of development. 
Hence there is an economic justification for pursuing universal telephone service as a public 
policy goal.
For a fuller explanation, it might be useful to examine a model of how the phone might 
diffuse. The section above argues that applying the standard model of the diffusion of 
innovations does not make sense in the context o f an interactive networked technology. The 
utility of the telephone network to early adopters is relatively low, whilst the cost of joining 
the network is relatively high. Both militate against rapid diffusion. Given that, how will the 
network diffuse? (See diagram overleaf.)
24 Eli Noam (1994), "Beyond Liberalisation III: Reforming Universal Service", Telecommunications 







Figure 2.2: Eli Noam’s Network Diffusici Curve
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(Source: Eli Noam (1994), "Beyond Liberalisation III: Reforming Universal Service." 
Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 18, No. 9, pp. 435-452.)
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Given the high fixed cost o f building the network, the average cost o f connecting a single 
customer at the outset when there are only a few subscribers is relatively high. Meanwhile the 
small number of total subscribers means that the utility of the network for subscribers in the 
early days is relatively low. The goal then is to add more customers to both amortise the cost 
for the company (whilst reducing the average cost for the customers) and to increase the 
overall utility o f the network. To this end the phone provider could either a) charge early 
adopters a below-cost price to artificially stimulate demand (anticipating that as subscribers 
joined, the average cost of connection would drop to the initially artificial price25) or b) find 
users who will find the telephone instrument valuable even when linked to only one or a few 
other sets.26 Either strategy will see the network grow gradually, leading to both a reduction in 
average costs and an increase in the utility o f the network. This will continue until the number 
of subscribers reaches what Noam calls a "critical mass point",27 where the average (per 
subscriber) cost of service falls below the utility (or value) of a single telephone instrument. In 
short the value o f the telephone will be greater than its cost. Thereafter, as Noam points out, 
the network will essentially grow on its own. As it does so the average cost will continue to 
drop, encouraging still more new subscribers to become connected. Thus the value of the 
network will continue to increase as will the gap between average cost and utility.
At some point, however, as the network continues to expand into less densely populated areas, 
the per capita cost o f connecting new subscribers will begin to increase. This point in the 
development of the network, the point at which the gap between average cost and utility is the 
widest, is the private optimum - the point at which the network offers the best value for money 
for the existing subscribers. Left to its own devices the network will not expand beyond this 
level. I f  however the service provider is faced with some imperative to continue expanding the 
service (such as the requirement that it pursue universal service objectives), it can continue to
25 This precisely the approach adopted by France Telecom when launching their uniquely successful 
Minitel service. Initially terminal equipment was distributed for free until the market "reached the 
critical mass for developing autonomously." See European Information Technology Observatory
(1996), EITO Annual Report ’96. (Germany: E1TO), p. 158.
26 It might be argued that the former strategy, by reducing the cost to that level at which demand can 
become effective, will lead to more rapid growth than the latter tactic. In point of fact, however, 
history indicates that most early service providers followed the second path. Itliiel de Sola Pool 
argues that "the natural clients" of most companies promoted the phone in its early phase were 
"Businesses or professional people who had to maintain regular communication among limited 
operating points..." Itliiel De Sola Pool (1983), Forecasting the Telephone: A Retrospective 
Technology Assessment of the Telephone. (Norword, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation).
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do so without making a loss by raising the average price charged for service provision (i.e., 
cross-subsidisation). However expansion of the network (in terms of both subscriber numbers 
and physical infrastructure) beyond the private optimum will only continue until such time as 
the utility o f the network measured in financial terms is equivalent to the average cost. After 
this point, if  the service provider finances continued expansion by means o f continued cross­
subsidisation, the average cost of the telephone will exceed its value (utility), prompting 
existing subscribers to seek to circumvent the existing network (perhaps by looking to another 
service provider). Thus expansion of the network after this pomt is only likely to contmue if 
the average cost to the service provider (and thus to the existing subscribers) is kept at an 
artificially low level by direct subsidy. The fact that non-connection at this point is more likely 
to be a result o f low income rather than infrastructural underdevelopment emphasises the need 
for subsidy. If  this is forthcoming, however, 100% per cent penetration should eventually be 
achieved.’8
This then is a theoretical model of the diffusion of the telephone. It suggests that market 
provision alone will not lead to universal service. On the contrary, the logic o f the market 
would see the expansion of the network stop long before it reached anything like ubiquity.
Thus there is a need for the state to intervene where the market fails if  universal service is to 
be achieved. Yet it is at this point that the question of why any state should pursue universal 
telephone service arises and where in answer to that question second justification for pursuing 
universal service with regard to the telephone as public policy enters.
(Before continuing, however, -it should be noted that there is a second element that might also 
be termed an "economic" justification or universal service - the economic benefits that accrue 
to the universal service provider. Although this may seem contradictory given the assumption 
that the universal service is an obligation precisely because it must be provided at a loss, there 
is nonetheless evidence that the direct cost of providing universal service may be partially 
obviated by the indirect benefits o f doing so. For example, the 1995 Analysys Report for Oftel 
- "The Costs, Benefits and Funding of Universal Service in the UK" - argues that British 
Telecom receives intangible benefits as a result of its universal service obligation. The Report
27 Noam, op. cit., p. 688.
28 Actual 100% penetration may never occur since there may be an element of the population which 
actively chooses to remain unconnected, regardless of their financial position.
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suggests that BT's corporate reputation is enhanced as a result of its perceived commitment to 
society through pursuing universal service objectives.29 Furthermore, the Report argues that 
universal service activities strengthen marketing and brand recognition for BT: the fact that 
BT is required to pursue universal service means that potential customers know they can order 
the telephone service wherever they may be, a marketing advantage which would be weakened 
"if it became known that service is not available to everybody."30 Perhaps the most interesting 
aspect of the economic benefits deriving from universal service provision results from the fact 
of changing customer life-cycles. Analysys point out that even if BT were able to calculate 
which customers were uneconomic in a given year, that they would have no way of telling 
which o f these would remain uneconomic in future years: "For example, a family's residential 
line could cross the line from loss to profit as a result of children growing up and starting to 
use the telephone more".31 The report notes that in other businesses, notably banking, it is 
accepted that up 40%32 o f customer accounts may be uneconomic at any given time.
Despite these benefits, however, the report nonetheless concludes that BT still faces a net cost 
of somewhere between £4 million and £40 million33 in serving uneconomic customers and 
proceeds to consider mechanisms whereby BT might be compensated for these losses. The 
report thus falls far short of suggesting that it is financially in BT's interests to pursue 
Universal Service objectives.)
2.4 The Social Role of the Telephone
Whilst the section above makes it clear that it is possible to argue for universal service policy 
support on the grounds o f economic efficiency, it is nonetheless the case that in much of the 
literature, the argument for universal telephone service has stressed the growing social role of 
the telephone.34 Thus the economic rationale offered above is often put forward as a secondary
29 Analysys Ltd. (1995), The Costs, Benefits and Funding of Universal Service in the UK. (London: 
OFTEL), p. 9.
30 Ibid., p. 10.
31 Ibid. p. 11.
32 Ibid., p. 26.
33 Ibid., p. iii.
34 See for example Hadden & Lenert op. cit.; Dyer op. cit.; Graham, Cornford & Marvin, op. cit.: 
Murdock & Golding, op. cit.; Murdock op. cit.; Robert S. Fortner (1995), "Excommunication in the 
Information Society," Critical Studies in Mass Communication, Vol. 12, lune 1995, pp. 133-154.
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justification for universal service, explaining why this technology will not diffuse widely of its 
own account. O f itself the economic rationale fails to justify the maximalist (100% 
penetration) version o f universal service. The social rationale outlined below, however, argues 
that any universal telephone service policy should not simply seek to apply equal standards to 
the current subscriber base but that those without telephones should be actively sought out 
and connected to the network. Furthermore the social argument implies that in the absence of 
any other means of funding, telephone access should, as with any other social service, be 
centrally funded out o f tax revenue.35 While Eli Noam's model (above), for example, justifies 
the pursuit of universal telephone service in order to achieve a socially optimal level of 
penetration (i.e. making an investment to achieve a net gain for society as a whole36) that 
social optimum is below 100% penetration. Are there socially oriented grounds upon which to 
justify further expansion of the telephone network?
In a lanuary 1997 report for DG XIII of the European Commission, the research company , 
Analysys, conclude that that there is broad agreement amongst not merely consumer groups 
and regulatory authorities but also incumbent telecommunication operators and their 
competitors, that a fundamental principle of universal service be that the service is essential .37 
For these groups “essential” means that the service:
“should have a high penetration among the population (penetration of at least 75% 
was suggested by a number of interviewees); and being without that service would 
constitute a social or economic disadvantage.” 38
35 A conclusion ultimately shared by such relatively conservative research organisations as 
Analysys. See C. Blackman & M. Denmead (1996), A New Era for EU Telecoms Regulation. 
(London: Analysys Publications). Quoted in Analysys (1997), The Future of Universal Service in 
Europe. (London: Analysys Publications), pp. 135-136.
36 Hadden & Lenert cite a study carried out by accountants on the positive externalities resulting 
from the existence of telecommunications infrastructure in New Jersey, USA. The study identifies "a 
wide range of benefits in education, health care and related essential public activities", all of which 
indirectly facilitate the efficient functioning of the economy. Hadden & Lenert, op. cit., pp. 129-130. 
Study cited: Deloitte and Touche (1991), New Jersey Telecommunications Infrastructure Study. 
(Jan.): 1-21/1-24.
37 Analysys (1997), The Future of Universal Service in Telecommunications in Europe. Analysys 
Report Number 97013, (London: Analysis Publications), p. v.
38 Ibid.
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These are basically the same principles that this research argues are prerequisites for 
comprehendmg the social role of the telephone:
a) understanding the extent to which the telephone is already a “consumption norm”,
(i.e., a pervasive technology), and
b) given a), understanding the possible social, economic and political effects o f lack of 
access to such a taken-for-granted technology.
Looking at the social function in more detail, Graham et al39 argue that access to the telephone 
is vital for "intrinsic reasons",40 facilitating the connection of friends, relatives and fam ily4' 
This function is particularly critical in an increasingly mobile society where changing work 
patterns contribute to the increasing geographical dispersal of families. The telephone’s 
function as an extension of "informal networks of support"42 has long been recognised - as 
early as 1933, a U.S. study on contemporary social trends, noted that the telephone 
contributed to social cohesion by augmenting a sense o f community for both rural and urban 
dwellers: thus "To be without a telephone or a telephone listing is to suffer a curious social 
isolation in a telephonic age."43 Furthermore as the general level of telephone penetration in 
mainstream society increases, so the relative isolation o f "the unphoned" increases.
The detrimental effects of non-connection extend beyond the family unit. Graham et al note 
that non-connection "tends to compound other disadvantages related to poverty, 
unemployment and access to goods and services."44 Since the telephone might facilitate a way 
to escape this, non-connection because of low-income will tend to contribute to an ongoing 
low level o f income.45 Again, as telephone penetration increases, the gap between the
39 Stephen Graham, James Cornford, & Simon Marvin (1996), "The Socio-economic Benefits of a 
Universal Telephone Network: A demand-side View of Universal Service," Telecommunications 
Policy, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 3-10.
40 Ibid., p. 6.
41 According to Graham et al, (op. cit., p. 6) these calls account for 75% of all domestic calls.
42 Graham Murdoch (1986), "Poor Connections: Income Inequality and the 'Information Society'", in 
Peter Golding (ed.) Excluding the Poor. (London: Child Poverty Action Group), pp. 70-83.
43 President's Research Committee on Social Trends (1933), Recent Social Trends in the United 
States. (New York: McGraw-Hill), p. 198. Cited in Hadden & Lenert, op. cit.
44 Graham, Cornford and Marvin, op. cit., p. 7.
45 Noting that “almost 12% of unemployed adults (in the US) do not have telephone service”, the 
chairman of the US Federal Communications Commission, Reed Hundt, has argued that “this makes
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connected and the unconnected becomes relatively more significant, contributing to the 
development of a two-tiered society. In a society where access to the phone is increasingly 
taken for granted, the phone is increasingly considered as the physical infrastructure of 
society. The unconnected are thus literally disconnected from society.46 Thus Robin Mansell 
notes: "If telecommunication networks are regarded as being analogous to the nervous system 
of society, then in principle, they should be all-pervasive, just as oral and paper-based 
networks of communication have been."47
Yet while the promotion of social cohesion is in itself a worthy motive for pursuing universal 
telephone service, there is an even more compelling socially-oriented reason for so. This may 
be termed the politico-philosophical justification or the "citizenship thesis". A 1991 OECD 
report48 discussing the various ways of defining universal service described access to 
telecommunications services as a basic right of all citizens, "essential for full membership of 
the social community, and a basic element o f the right to freedom of expression and
ii 49communication .
But what role does the telephone play in facilitating the "full membership of the social 
community" or citizenship? To answer, one must first briefly consider what citizenship is. 
T.H. Marshall's classic study, "Citizenship and Social Class",50 identifies three basic 
dimensions to citizenship - civil, political and social. The first, civil, is largely concerned with 
the right of the individual to freedom of action within the sphere of civil society. The second, 
political, focuses 011 the right of citizens to participate in the exercise o f political power, that
it infinitely more difficult to seek employment.” Speech by Reed Hundt, Chairman FCC to the 
Deloitte and Touche Consulting Group at Telecompetition ’95, December 5, 1995.
46 Research carried out by Mueller and Schement in Camden, New Jersey provides direct evidence of 
this. Examining non-subscribers, the researchers divided their survey group into a) those who had 
had a phone but had been disconnected and b) those who had never had a phone. Although the 
second group valued the telephone less than the television, a log of their daily activities indicated 
that this group tended to be "less active and interconnected with the surrounding society." Milton 
Mueller & Jorge Reina Schement (1995), A Profile of Telecommunications Access in Camden. New 
Jersey: A Report Prepared for Bell Atlantic, p. 16. Submitted to the NTIA Notice of Inquiry on 
Universal Service June 21, 1995.
41 Robin Mansell (1993), The New Telecommunications. (London: Sage), p. 1. This language recalls 
that of Marshall McLuhan especially in the subtitle to Understanding Media: "The Extensions of 
Man".
48 OECD (1991), Universal Service and Rate Restructuring in Telecommunications. Information 
Computer Communication Policy No. 23.
49 Ibid., p 25.
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is in the decision-making process. Marshall then points to a third set of citizenship rights, 
which he argues are a product of the 20th century- social rights, "the struggle to secure a 
basic standard of life and well-being for all through the institutionalisation o f the welfare 
state."51 For Marshall, the securing of social rights, is a prerequisite for the exercise o f civil 
and political rights smce "poverty is a powerful mechanism for excluding people from these 
entitlements."52
For many commentators access to communications and information facilities should be 
included among these social rights. Murdoch and Golding identify three main kinds of 
relations between communications and citizenship:
"First, people must have access to the information, advice and analysis that will 
enable them to know what their rights are in other spheres and allow them to pursue 
these rights effectively. Second, they must have access to the broadest possible range 
of information, interpretation and debate on areas that involve political choices, and 
they must be able to use communications facilities in order to register criticism, 
mobilise opposition and propose alternative courses of action. And third, they must be 
able to recognise themselves and their aspirations in the range o f representations 
offered within the central communications sectors and be able to contribute to 
developing those representations."53
As a corollary, Murdoch and Golding argue that any communications and information system 
should "guarantee universal access to the services that can ensure the exercise of citizenship 
regardless o f income or area of residence."54 Yet as information is increasingly codified, more 
and more services, both public and private, are now available over the telephone.55 It might be 
claimed that access to this information, advice and analysis is not dependent on the telephone,
50 T.H. Marshall, (1949), Citizenship and Social Class. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
51 Murdoch & Golding, op. cit., p. 182.
52 Ibid., p. 182.
53 Ibid., p. 184.
54 Ibid., p. 184.
55 To take a British example (since none are available from Ireland). An Information Providers 
Survey conducted by LB Newham in an unidentified UK City Council, noted that of a total of 
742,320 queries made to the Housing Department, 470,175 were made by phone. Figures from Draft
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that, for example, face-to-face contact is substitutable for telephone contact. Graham et al 
argue, however, that "Access to all information, goods and services is increasingly being 
geared to people with access to telephones in the public, private and voluntary sectors."S6 
Murdoch and Golding agree:
"The telephone is...a major point of access to the professional information services of 
organisations like Citizen's Advice Bureaus, voluntary and community groups, and 
welfare rights agencies. Indeed as public funding for these organisations has been 
steadily whittled away, forcing some to close branches or limit their hours, telephone 
access has become more important than ever.1,57
Yet as Murdoch and Golding point out, it is precisely those low income groups which are 
most likely to need to make enquiries of such organisations, that are least likely to be able to 
afford access to the phone.
That there is a strong correlation between income and access to the phone is not merely 
intuitive but inarguable.58 In one American case study59 Mueller and Schement cite household 
income as the principal factor  accounting for different levels o f telephone penetration between 
different groups. In a more widespread examination of the relationship between income, 
ethnicity and telephone penetration, Schement notes that of those households earning $5,000 
or less per annum, the level of penetration was between 63.9% and 79.5% (depending on the 
race of the household in question). O f those households earning $75,000 or more per annum, 
the level of penetration was between 98 .9% and 100% (again depending on the race of the
report on Project ATTACH Information Providers Survey conducted by LB /Newham Leisure 
Services. Data provided by Maren Hartmann, EMTEL Research Network, University of Sussex.
56 Graham, Cornford & Marvin, op. cit., p. 6. See also Graham Murdock (1986), "Poor connections: 
income inequality and the 'information society'", in Peter Golding (ed.) Excluding the Poor.
(London: Child Poverty Action Group), pp. 70-83.
57 Graham Murdoch & Peter Golding (1989), "Information Poverty and Political Inequality: 
Citizenship in the Age of Privatised Communications", Journal o f Communication Vol. 39, No. 3, 
pp. 180-195.
58 In point of fact some American research indicates that there is also a correlation between race and 
levels of telephone penetration. Given that this research is focused on the Irish context, arguably the 
most racially homogenous society in Western Europe, it has not been considered useful to pursue this 
dimension in this thesis. See Milton Mueller & Jorge Reina Schement (1995), A Profile of 
Telecommunications Acccss in Camden. New Jersey: A Reporl Prepared lor Bell Atlantic, p. 7, 
Submitted to the NTIA Notice of Inquiiy on Universal Service June 21, 1995,
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household in question).60 He concludes: "Telephone penetration is directly correlated with 
income. . .a family's ability to stay above the poverty line significantly increases its chances of 
staying connected to the telephone network."61 In any case even if  it were possible to argue 
that the telephone is not essential to access citizenship information, there remains the 
argument that it is the most cost-efficient means of doing so- thus the non-connection o f those 
social groups most reliant on welfare services, increases the economic costs of service 
provision faced by social service providers.62
In effect then access to the information that facilitates citizenship is mcreasingly dependent on 
telecommunications technology, the provision of which is increasingly in the hands of private 
companies and thus provided according to the logic of the market: thus "political rights are the 
victim of the vicissitudes of the marketplace and its inegalitarian structure."63
There is a still larger issue at stake in considering the citizenship thesis. Speaking in the 
American context, Schement argues that:
"Universal service derives its significance from a promise rooted in the nature of the 
political system. All Americans are issued equal access to basic channels of 
communications because the citizens of a democracy need to be able to communicate 
in order to avail themselves of the information necessary to make reasoned political 
choices. And, given the communication orientation embedded in that conception of 
democracy articulated by the founding fathers, the pledge o f equal access is not only 
logical, but absolutely necessary to the conduct of a free and open society ."64
59 Mueller & Schement, op. cit., pp. 8-9.
60 Jorge Reina Schement (1995), "Beyond universal service: Characteristics of Americans without 
telephones, 1980-1993", Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 19, No. 6. pp. 477-485, p. 482.
61 Ibid., pp. 479-480. Looking at the UK, Analysys quote UK Central Statistics Office figures which 
adds weight to the theory that income and telephone penetration levels are causually related. Only 
69.6% of those households in the lowest decile (10%) income group have telephones compared to 
99.7% of those in the highest decile. See CSO (1995), Family Spending Suivev. 1994-95 , (HMSO: 
London). Quoted in Analysys (1997), The Future of Universal Service in Telecommunications in 
Europe. (London: Analysys), p. 156.
ul See for example Graham, Cornford & Marvin, op. cit., p. 9 : "...there is often an inverse 
correlation between the reliance of social groups on welfare services and their access to telephones. 
As well as creating social costs, this creates economic costs for social service providers .."
63 Murdoch & Golding, op. cit., p. 193.
64 Schement, op. cit., p. 484.
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As the telephone becomes increasingly ubiquitous, it is increasingly part of that process of 
communications necessary for full participation in the decision-making processes that 
characterise any democracy, hi short, it becomes a novel but increasingly important 
component of what Jurgen Habermas characterised as "the Public Sphere", that public space 
where all citizens can rationally discuss the public issues of the day with a view to influencing 
the actions of government. To the extent that "unconnectedness" keeps any citizen outside the 
public sphere, especially in relation to the practical enjoyment and pursuit o f many citizenship 
rights or entitlements in the late 20th century', anything short o f universal telephone service is 
a failure o f democracy.
Nor does access to the telephone simply become increasingly critical for the purposes of 
exchanging political information: it also becomes more necessary for many other forms of 
exchanges and communications between society's members defined as citizens, workers, 
employees, members of families and many other forms of communities and collectivities.
If  one accepts this, then the process of defining universal service is somewhat altered - no 
longer is it about deciding on what technical standard should and shouldn't be included 
Rather the focus shifts to a different question: what level of service is necessary to ensure the 
operation o f an equal and democratic society? Thus, this research favours a maximalist 
conception of universal service, one which justifies connecting all members of a given society 
to the telephone network on the grounds that the "unconnected" will otherwise become 
increasingly detached from full participation in that society and since they will find it 
increasingly difficult to access information on their rights as citizens, effectively be excluded 
from that society.
2.5 W orking Definitions
As noted above, for practical purposes there is no "correct" definition of universal service. It 
is a dynamic concept that must be related to changing technological conditions and 
consumption norms as well as social networking and political contexts. Despite the existence 
o f partisan conceptions o f what universal service should be, working definitions (i.e. what
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universal service actually consists o f in any given country at any given time) tend to be 
compromises between "the goal of efficiency defined in the neo-classical way and social policy 
measures."65 Given this initial dimension of the conception guiding this research, it is now 
useful to address the evolution o f the concept and its related practices and policies. In 
particular, what were the circumstances in which the concept o f universal service emerged and 
how did it shape the working definition of universal telephone service?
2.5.1 The Growth and Development of Universal Service 1876 - 1970.
The phrase ’’’universal service” first appeared in print in 190766 when Theodore Vail, then 
president o f AT&T, introduced it as the company's primary corporate goal. Yet Vail's original 
concept of universal service, shaped by the specific techno-economic and political framework 
in which the telephone developed in the United States, is quite different from the modern 
"expression of liberal egalitarianism".67 The dearth of capital available to the infant Bell 
Company lead the company (then headed by Bell's father-in-law Gardner Hubbard) to 
franchise the rights to develop the telephone to companies across the United States.6ii As a 
consequence the American telephone "network" initially developed as a series of unconnected 
islands of communication.69 Change came in 1885 when Vail jomed the Bell Telephone 
Company as general manager. Looking at Western Union's dominance of the U.S. telegraphs 
industry, he ascribed its commanding position to its being the first to develop a nationally 
interconnected network. Thus Vail embarked upon the interconnection of the existing Bell 
Company franchisees with a view to constructing a nationally intercomiected telephone
65 Johannes M. Bauer (1994), "Conceptual Frameworks for the Design of Telecommunications 
Policy" in Steinfield et al (eds.) Telecommunications in Transition, (Thousand Oaks, California: 
Sage), p. 27.
66 AT&T Annual Report 1907, pp. 17-18. Cited in Milton Mueller, "Universal Service in Telephone 
History", Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 17, No. 5, p. 353.
1,1 Mueller, op. cit., p. 353.
,x "Five years after the telephone patent had been issued to Bell, there were local telephone 
companies throughout the Northeast, the South and the Midwest, in cities, towns, villages and 
farms." Herbert Dordick (1990), "The Origins of Universal Service", Telecommunications Policy, 
Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 223-231, p. 230.
69 "Anyone with $200 and a talent for tinkering was given a licence to construct a telephone system." 
Ibid., p. 229.
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network: in the sense that he was seeking to build a geographically ubiquitous network, Vail 
began to push for a specific form of "universal" telephone service as early as 1885.70
The concept was further refined as a result of Vail's manoeuvring to secure monopoly status 
for the Bell Company (now AT&T) in the 1900s and 1910s. The expiration of the original 
Bell patents in 1893 and 1894 had seen a plethora of independent service providers enter the 
market. Following the Bell Company's refusal to permit interconnection with its existing 
network, the independents switched to a strategy of competition: since the value of any single 
telephone network lay in the number of subscribers available to it, the independent telephone 
companies sought to surpass the Bell Company's subscriber base, expanding rapidly into 
those smaller and medium size towns which the Bell network had hitherto ignored. The Bell 
Company was forced to respond, vastly increasing its own rate o f establishing exchanges. 
Milton Mueller convincingly argues that the dramatic increase in the rate of American 
telephone diffusion between 1895 and 1920 (from 251,994 telephones in 1895 to 13,411,400 
in 1920, a growth rate of over 5,300%) was due to the quarter century of "access competition" 
between the Bell company and non-interconnected telephone companies.
In 1907 however, Vail began to espouse the "universal service doctrine" in AT&T's annual 
reports. As Mueller notes, these were as much political pamphlets as business documents, sent 
to thousands of newspapers and opinion leaders: "In the reports Vail hammered away at the 
thesis that only a system that was universal, interdependent and intercommunicating could 
realise the telephone's potential."71 Competition amongst service providers, argued Vail, would 
lead to competing technical standards, blocking interconnection and reducing the overall 
utility of the network to individual subscribers.72 Thus we arrive at Vail's understanding of 
universal service - universal technical standards, enabling all telephone users (i.e. those who 
already had a phone) to communicate with one another. Thus in its original incarnation,
70 "To Vail at this time, “universal service” was the interconnection of these local exchanges; 
“universal” implied everywhere rather than everyone." Dordick, op. cit., p. 230.
71 Mueller, op. cit.. p. 363.
72 This is part of the "natural monopoly" debate - those who argued for a Post Office take-over of the 
United Kingdom telephone system in the 1880s and 1890s argued that competition in service 
provision would mean an imnecessaiy duplication of infrastructure, leading in turn to unnecessarily 
high prices for subscribers. This was again informed by the fact that in die UK as in the US, 
telephony developed as a series of isolated islands communications - in the absence of trunk lines,
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universal service meant system compatibility and interconnection of systems rather than any 
socially-motivated commitment to extend service to everyone.
In essence Vad successfully argued that telephone service provision was a natural monopoly, 
and that AT&T was best placed to become the mandated monopoly service provider. Natural 
monopoly refers to an industry that, owing to economies o f scale, is more cost-efficient if run 
by one large monopoly service provider rather than several competing companies. If  that 
monopoly operates under government regulation, (so as not to abuse its position), the 
assumption is that the benefits of the monopolist's greater cost efficiency will be passed onto 
the consumer in the form of lower charges than would be the case in a competitive market.7' 
hi the case of telephone service provision, the standard logic holds that competition in service 
provision means competition in infrastructure provision. Since, however, the same 
infrastmcture could serve all customers, the construction of competing infrastructures will 
unnecessarily raise the costs of competing firms, a cost which would be passed onto 
customers.
The United States Congress accepted Vail's argument, permitting AT&T to absorb the 
independents through sublicencing, and passing the Willis-Graham Act in 1921 to protect the 
resulting monopoly from anti-trust legislation. Thus, Frederick Williams notes that early 
regulation of telecommunications in the U.S. was seen as "a means to consolidate the industry 
and avoid wasteful and inefficient resource allocation."74
Until the early to mid 1980s, much of the debate on universal service took as a given that 
monopoly telecommunications service provision was a prerequisite for the pursuit of the 
universal service objective "with the monopolist's profits used to support some o f its end
one city could not speak to another - hence competition was more likely to be localised rather than 
companies attempting to dominate in niche areas of a single national market.
73 "The reason most generally advanced for monopoly provision of the telephone service is that 
customers benefit from the cost savings that occur. The source of these savings is the economies of 
scale and scope. Economies of scale occur because production gains increase with size such that one 
firm can provide service to an area at a lower cost than two or more (smaller) firms." John D. 
Borrows, Phyllis A. Bernt & Raymond W. Lawton (1994), Universal Service in the United States: 
Dimensions of the Debate. Diskussionsbeitrag Nr. 124. (BadHonnef: Wissenschaftliches Institutfxir 
Kommunikationsdienste), p. 47.
u  Frederick Williams (1991), The New Telecommunications: Infrastructure for the Information age. 
(New York: The Free Press), p. 203.
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users, especially residential and rural customers."75 But given Mueller's convincing thesis that 
the only thing guaranteed by AT&T with regard to universal service between 1907 and 1975 
was "the interconnection of all localities and telephone users into a single system" (system 
compatibility), there is room to question the extent to which monopoly service provision 
contributed to universal telephone service.
The 1934 US Communications Act is most frequently cited as the basis for the modem 
construction of universal service objectives, its pre-amble calling for government regulation 
"to make available, so far as possible, to all people o f the United States, a rapid, efficient, 
nation-wide, and world-wide, wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at 
reasonable charge."70 Milton Mueller has noted, however, that the Act makes no reference to 
the term universal service and has thus argued that "there is nothing in the text of the Act 
which can be construed as mandating or even suggesting a policy o f subsidising telephone 
penetration."77 Yet looking at the substance o f the Act, Mueller's contention appears 
somewhat wide o f the mark. The 1934 Act designated RCA, AT&T and Western Union as 
"common carriers" in their respective fields of radio, telephony and telegraphy, as a trade-off 
for guaranteeing them a monopoly position in their markets. As noted above, common 
carriage requires that service providers offer all customers their services at the same price 
regardless of the cost of service provision. Furthermore the Act established the Federal 
Communications Commission as a regulatory body to ensure that the designated common 
carriers fulfilled their obligations.78
The net effect was that AT&T charged for service on the basis of average costings - "Thus 
high-cost residential customers explicitly benefited from an average price that was made 
possible only by the inclusion of low-cost customers in the 'cost pool "l79 hi effect, high-cost
5 Eli Noam (1994), "Beyond Liberalisation III: Reforming Universal Service", Telecommunications 
Policy, Vol. 18, No. 9, pp. 687-704, p. 687.
75 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.A. 151 et seq.
77 Mueller, op. cit., p. 354.
78 Although to some extent, how the 1934 Communications Act should have been interpreted is a
moot point. The fact remains that initiatives such as the U.S. Rural Electrification Administration's 
decision to fund (via subsidised loans) telephone service in from 1949 onwards are in keeping with 
the objectives set out in die preamble of the Act.
79 John D. Borrows, Phyllis A. Bernt & Raymond W. Lawton (1994), Universal Service in the United 
States: Dimensions of the Debate, Diskussionsbeitrag Nr. 124. (Bad Honnef: Wissenschaftliches 
Institut fur Kommunikationsdienste).
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subscribers (typically rural) were cross-subsidised by low-cost subscribers (typically urban).80 
De facto then, the 1934 Communications Act together with the fact that telephone service 
provision was in the hands of a monopoly, played a critical part in the development of 
universal service, establishing as it did the basis for funding the universal service objective - 
cross-subsidisation of high-cost customers by a service provider operating m a monopoly 
market, with the supernormal profits earned from low-cost customers. Thereafter, "rapid 
efficiency gains in long-haul telecommunications provided an opportunity to shift costs from 
local service (constituting the bulk of residential calls) to long-distance without substantial 
increases in long-distance rates."81 Consequently local rates dropped, bringing 
"telecommunications to those who could not otherwise afford it."82 Thus by the early 1950s, 
universal service policy in the United States consisted of the following:
"Within this giant regulated monopoly (AT&T) it was possible to have a structure of 
cross subsidies. Rate-averaging for rural customers could be supported by urban 
funds. Funds from long distance and business-use funds could keep residential rates 
low."83
A similar history in the European context is harder to present, not merely because one must 
consider the development of the concept across many countries but also because a different
80 "One factor which seems to have an effect on the cost of providing telephone service is the density 
of subscribers. Other things being equal, it costs more to provide service the lower the density of 
subscribers. Thus rural areas, where density is generally low, have higher costs of providing service 
on average than urban areas." Joseph P. Fuhr (1990), "Telephone subsidisation of rural areas in the 
USA", Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 183-188, p. 183.
81 Francis J. Cronin & Paul L. Hebert (1994, "Inequities in the benefits and costs of 
telecommunications across stakeholder groups", Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 18, No. 4. pp. 
306-320, p. 307. Milton Mueller, amongst others regards the "Ozark plan", implemented in 1971, as 
a particular significant example of this, shifting, as it did, "ever-larger portions of the local non- 
traffic sensitive plant to be recovered from interstate (long-distance revenues)." See Mueller, op. cit., 
p. 355.
82 Cronin & Hebert., op. cit., p. 308.
8i Frederick Williams (1991), The New Telecommunications: Infrastructure for the Information Age. 
(New York: The Free Press), p. 205. It should be acknowledged that this is not an uncontroversial 
view of the history of universal service. In a March 1997 article, Milton Mueller again argued that 
the 1934 Communications Act did not mandate any universal service obligation and furthermore that 
cross-subsidies within AT&T had only a marginal impact on telephone penetration: “Jurisdictional 
separations did not begin to have a real impact on local telephone rates until 1965. Household 
penetration was already 80% around that time, and was growing by several percentage points each 
year.” See Milton Mueller (1997), “’Universal service’ and the New Telecommunications Act: 
Mythology Made Law”, published in the March 1997 issue of Communications o f  the ACM.
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term has traditionally been used in Europe to describe a similar concept. Lucien RappS4 
argues that "universal service" is an Anglo-Saxon construct which "correlates to the 
commercial objective set by American operators with respect to the high level of coverage of 
the American territory at rates and with a quality satisfactory to the user."85 In short universal 
service is only an objective in a commercially oriented market. Since most European states 
either acquired or established state telecommunications monopolies around the turn of the 
century86 (typically after a disappointing experience with private operators1'7), the European 
telecommunications industry has, for the bulk o f the 20th centuiy, been in the hands of 
publicly owned operators for whom commercial objectives were (in theory at least) secondary 
to those of public service. In considering the history of universal service in Europe up till the 
1970s and 1980s then, one must consider "public service" objectives.
In general the same principles that underpinned universal service in the US until the 1970s - 
natural monopoly and the cross-subsidisation of high cost customers by the profits earned 
from low cost subscribers - largely shaped the development of public service in Europe.88 
However, whilst the Anglo-Saxon "universal service" concept has always been sufficiently 
concrete to permit some assessment of the extent to which the universal service obligation was 
being fulfilled, the same was not true of the European public service obligation. As the role of 
the state expanded over the course of the 20th Century, the duties implicitly placcd upon the
84 Lucien Rapp (1996), "Public service or universal service," Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 20, 
No. 6, pp. 391-397.
85 Ibid., p. 395. Rapp credits Jills Hills with the description of universal service as a social construct, 
citing a reference to her work in Jacques Arlandis, (1993), Communication & Strategies, Vol. 10, 
No. 38.
86 Although there are exceptions - in Denmark, the State Telephone company (P&T) co-existed with 
private companies serving mutually exclusive regions until 1990. See: Mads Christoffersen, (1994), 
"Development of Telecommunications in Denmark 1881-1994." Paper presented at COST 248 
workshop, Lund, Sweden, 13-14 April 1994.
87 Charles Steinfield (1994), "An Introduction to European Telecommunications" in Steinfield et al 
(eds.), Telecommunications in Transition. (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications), p. 5. 
Although Steinfield stresses that the belief that publicly owned operations would provide a better 
service titan had hitherto been experienced as the main reason for nationalisation he also points to 
considerations of national security and to the fact that a telecoms monopoly would provide a secure 
source of revenue.
88 With regard to natural monopoly, as early as 1890 the Duke of Marlborough had argued that: 
"There is also the question whether, if this work is to be given to any public company, it is to be 
made the subject of competition. If so, there must be some limit to the competition, otherwise you 
will have numerous lines running side by side. . . Even if you are going to have two companies, you 
will have one person who is a member of one company and another person who is a member of
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IPTOs by virtue of the fact that they were state organs, increased concomitantly. Yet while 
there has been a general acknowledgement that state monopoly providers have had a duty to 
develop the telephone network beyond that level that would be justified by market demand 
alone, precise measures of what public service entailed have rarely been articulated.89 This is 
precisely bccause the service provider is (albeit sometimes indirectly) the state which is, by 
definition, held to represent the best interests o f all citizens. The amorphous concept o f 
"public service" with which European Public Telephone Operators (PTOs) were charged with 
providing was not necessarily synonymous with universal service. Rather the precise 
definition of public service altered according to "changing political and/or administrative 
priorities and perceptions."90 As one Commission document acknowledged in 1993:
"As long as telecommunications services were provided under direct State authority 
and as long as the TO, in dealing with users, benefited from certain legal immunities 
under national law, a definition in general terms, even though imprecise, of the notion 
of universal service could appear to have been sufficient."91
The implications of the distinction between universal service and public service are manifold 
and varied. Arguably the fact that standards must be both defined and met in order to fulfil the 
universal service obligation makes it preferable to the vagaries of public service. Yet Lucien 
Rapp makes the point that universal service is passive compared with public service. He 
argues that universal service seeks to make public intervention to correct social and economic 
inequalities unnecessary by “striving to obtain a price affordable to all, whatever one’s 
particular situation.”92 Yet implicit in the notion of affordable rates is the assumption of a 
universal minimum income level sufficient to pay for service provision. Since there’s little 
evidence that the process of calculating social welfare payments (theoretically the minimum
another company desiring to communicate...(but)...unable to do so because drat person belongs to a 
different company." Hansard's Parliamentary Debates 3rd Series, Vol. 342, p. 846. 14/3/1890.
89 There is a certain irony in the fact that the need to establish regulations governing the operations 
of a private telecommunications service monopoly may result in a far more explicit description of 
universal service objectives than would be (he case witir state provision where classic state theory 
basically states that whatever the state is doing must, by definition, be in the best interests of the 
people.
90 Ibid.
91 CEC (1993), Developing Universal Service for Telecommunications in a Competitive 
Environment, COM(93) 542 Final, p. 6.
92 Rapp, op. cit., p. 394.
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income level in any given society93) includes the cost of telephone service, such an assumption 
appears incorrect. Against this, Rapp argues that public service acknowledges real-life 
economic mequalities amongst citizens and actively seeks to provoke discriminatory rates 
amongst users "so as to even things out in order to encourage access to the service by the 
largest number and to compensate for substantive disparities."94 Understanding these 
distinctions is critical for understanding the emergence since the 1970s of universal service in 
European telecommunications regulation.
2.5.2 Universal Service in a competitive telecommunications m arket.
Until the 1970s, universal service was not a major issue in telecommunications policy debates 
in either the U.S. or Europe. Hadden & Lenert note that prior to the AT&T divestiture in 
1982, "the policy of universal telephone service was neither complicated nor controversial."95 
Given the vagueness (or non-existence in Europe) of the concept up to that point this is hardly 
surprising. When considered at all, the general assumption appears to have been that levels of 
telephone penetration would simply continue to gradually increase. The issue came to 
prominence as a result o f the global changes in telecommunications markets, regulatory 
environments and technologies over the course of the 1970s and 1980s. The development of 
many new electronic technologies and service possibilities coupled with the growing 
perception that telecommunications represented a "new frontier" for profitable investment in 
an expanding information economy, has, in an increasingly neo-liberal political context, 
prompted major regulatory change in telecommunications markets across the world since the 
1970s. the introduction of liberalisation (i.e. the introduction o f competition) and 
privatisation96 (the selling off o f public utilities on the stock market). And it is the introduction 
of competition into telecommunications service provision which has, by undermining the basis 
upon which the universal service objective has been pursued, forced a major re-examination of 
the concepts of universal and public service.
93 “Theoretically”, since there are those who fall outside the social welfare net - vagrants, indigents, 
etc.
94 Rapp, op. cit., p. 394.
95 Hadden & Lenert, op. cit., p. 121.
96 Between 1984 and 1996 44 former PTOs were privatised. See ITU Telecommunications 
Privatisations Database at “http://www.itu.int/ti/publications” .
50
It is ironic that the very innovation cited as threatening universal service is precisely what has 
prompted (indeed required) the search for a more concrete definition o f universal service and a 
reconsideration of what logic underlies universal telephone provision: "Competition forces us 
to redefine a concept hitherto containing very little substance."97 Doubt had been cast on the 
validity of the thesis that telecommunications service provision was a natural monopoly from 
the 1950s. By the 1960s it was clear that AT&T's equipment wasn't quite as vulnerable to 
foreign attachments as the company argued,98 undermining the logic underlying the company's 
natural monopoly status. The development of satellite communications in the 1950s and 1960s 
raised the possibility that perhaps even the core of the AT&T monopoly - infrastructure 
provision - might not necessarily be a natural monopoly.
It wasn't until the emergence of neo-liberalism as the dominant western political-economic 
ideology in 1970s, however, that telecommunications regulation was altered to permit new 
seivice providers (lead in the US by MCI99) to make inroads into AT&T's monopoly on 
service provision. Free of the requirement incumbent on AT&T to contribute to the retention 
of the local network, MCI and other new entrants were able to undercut AT&T in the long- 
line market, the market which AT&T (under the approving eye o f the Federal 
Communications Commission) had increasingly used over the course o f the 20th centuiy to 
cross-subsidise the local service.100 Thus the funding via cross-subsidisation of "universal
97 Marc Dandelot (1993), Documentation Française. Cited in Jacques Arlandis, (1993) "Universal 
Service: key issues for the next decade". Paper presented at Euro CPR, Octobcr 20-22, 1993, 
Scotland.
98 To take die example of Husli-a-phone. AT&T's monopoly had been originally justified on the 
grounds that only one company could ensure universally compatible technical standards. Thus 
AT&T had a monopoly throughout the field of telecoms service provider, including the provision of 
terminal equipment (that is the actual phone instruments themselves). However in the 1960s the 
Hush-a-phone company patented and began to market a plastic cup-like device which fitted over the 
standard AT&T telephone receiver, reducing the level of noise extraneous to the speaker's own voice. 
AT&T took the Hush-a-phone company to court on the grounds that their monopoly had been 
infringed.
99 In 1971 the FCC permitted MCI to offer unregulated data transmission for private use. In 1976 
customers selling spare capacity on lines leased from AT&T were permitted to interconnect with the 
public network. Finally in 1978, the FCC removed all regulatory blocks to MCI's entry into the field 
of long-line voice transmission.
100 Mueller, op. cit., p. 355. For Mueller it was the advent of competition that lead to the modern 
egalitarian interpretation of universal service, as AT&T sought to defend their monopoly position on 
the grounds that only monopoly provision could enable the cross-subsidisation of connecting and 
providing service to high-cost users: "The challenge of new entry forced die system, to develop an 
explicit rationale for the system perspective in order to defend itself in the political arena. In the
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service... could not withstand the strain o f competition m the long-distance market."101 Indeed 
concern that AT&T would respond to long-line competition by using profits from its 
monopoly in the local loop to cross-subsidise low long-line rates, resulted in the 1982 decision 
to force AT&T to divest itself of its 22 wholly owned local operating companies.
The "inevitable" outcome of competition in long-line service provision was to make 
increasingly untenable the essentially political decision to ascribe the costs of maintaining the 
local network to charges on long-line services. AT&T successfiilly put it to the FCC that to 
continue to cross-subsidise the local network with long distance charges would give heavy 
telecommunications users the incentive to bypass the public network, thereby leaving both the 
long-line companies and the previous Bell operating companies with a declining customer 
base, making it even harder to fund universal service. Thus the deliberate "substantial 
inefficiencies"102 imposed upon the long-line network gave way, under pressure from 
competition, to a move towards a mechanism that "better aligned costs with prices".103 With 
the subsidy from long distance gone, there was a need to find a new way to recover the cost of 
local service. The solution put forward by the FCC was the imposition of a subscriber lure 
charge (SLC), a non-traffic sensitive, flat-rate fee, charged to the customers "as payment for 
access to a long-distance carrier".104 Thus individual subscribers were effectively made 
responsible for the cost of the local loop.
The introduction of a flat-rate fee favoured heavy users (generally businesses) of long­
distance lines, since the reduction in long-line tariffs, made possible by switching the cost of 
maintaining the local loop to individual subscribers, meant that their overall costs were 
reduced. For the residential subscriber who typically made less use o f long-distance lines, the 
introduction o f the SLC generally meant an increase in their overall costs. This was 
particularly significant for low-income subscribers, who tended to be infrequent users of long­
distance lines: the imposition of the SLC, far from being offset by the reduction in long­
distance rates, actually threatened their financial ability to stay on the network. It was in
struggle the concept of universal service was reconstructed and linked to the practices of a regulated 
monopoly." Mueller, op. cit. p. 366.
101 Cronin & Hebert, op. cit., p. 308.
102 Ibid., p. 308.
103 Ibid.
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response to this that in 1984, the FCC introduced the Lifeline programme, which offered a 
reduction in the SLC to those households that met state-defined criteria for those in need of 
assistance.105 Three years later the FCC offered an additional programme called Link-Up to 
provide funds to offset the connection charge to low-income users.106
There remained a problem however - the contribution from the SLC to those local companies 
with high Non-Traffic- Sensitive costs relative to the number of subscribers they had 
(typically those companies serving areas with a low population density) was not sufficient to 
cover the costs of service provision. Thus the FCC instituted Common Carrier Line (CCL) 
charges and the Universal Service Fund. Both CCL charges and the USF are funded by 
interexchange carriers (the charges are usage sensitive). The funds are deposited with the 
National Exchange Carrier Association which dispenses funding to those local companies 
with higher-than-average NTS costs (USF funding goes to those companies with very high - 
defined as in excess 115% of the national average - NTS costs).107
The net effect in the United States of the introduction of competition and the re-regulation o f 
universal service provision is difficult to state conclusively. US data suggests that 92.4% of 
American households had telephones in 1983: 93.6% had in 1991. In real terms, this means 
that nearly 5 .8 million American households did not have a telephone in 1991. Given the rate 
of growth in the ten years up to 1983, this represents a definite slowdown in the increase of 
penetration. Nonetheless it is difficult to definitively state whether this is due to effects 
associated with the introduction of competition or whether penetration was simply hitting a 
"natural" barrier. As with any commercially offered service, it will become harder to maintain 
the take-up rate of the telephone as all but the lowest income households acquire service. Thus 
"the closer a state's penetration level is to 100%, the less response the state is likely to get
106 Ibid. In their New Jersey case study, Mueller and Schement note however that "not a single 
respondent" to their suivey had ever heard of the Linkup programme. Furthermore it's efficacy was 
related to the level of funding provided by individual states. The $20 reduction (from $40) in the 
connection fee was not considered significant, particularly in light of the fact that the $20 was 
recovered gradually over the following 12 months - in effect the Linkup programme was reduced to a 
advance credit scheme. Mueller & Schement, op. cit., p. 15.
107 Much of this data is based on the account given in Cronin & Hebert, op, cit., pp. 308-309.
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through programs (sic) to promote telephone subscription."108 Nonetheless it does rather 
undermine the European Commission's optimistic but rather insubstantial argument that 
competition can augment universal service.109
It was the 1985 European Court of Justice decision that telecommunications services were 
subject to EC competition law under Article 59 of the Treaty of Rome that forced the 
European Commission to consider the impact o f competition. The Commission’s outlook on 
the subject became public in June 1987 with the publication o f the seminal Green Paper on 
Telecommunications which offered a detailed blueprint for the deregulation/liberalisation of 
the European telecommunications market. (It also marked the beginning of the European 
Union’s - and in particular the European Commission’s - dominance of national 
telecommunications policy-making in the EU member states.110) The main objective o f the 
Green Paper was the "development of market conditions that would provide European 
consumers with more extensive and higher quality services at a lower cost."111 For some, 
however, the real significance of the Green Paper on telecommunications lay in the evidence it 
provides that the Commission, not national governments, was “in the drivmg seat on 
telecommunications.”112 One writer argued in 1989 that the extent to which the objectives of 
the Green Paper were achieved would “be an indication o f how far governments and business 
in the EC really are committed to following through the logic (and advantages) of the internal 
market.”113 Subsequent EU telecommunications legislation suggests that the commitment is 
whole-hearted: successive directives, communications and resolutions have gradually whittled 
away at national telecommunications monopolies to the extent where even basic voice
108 Brooks Albery (1995), “What level of dialtone penetration constitutes 'universal service' ?”, 
Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 19, No. 5, pp. 365-380, p. 368.
109 European Council (1994), Council Resoludon of 7 February 1994 on Universal Service Principles 
in the Telecommunicadons Sector. (94/C 48/01. OJ C 48/1, 16.2.94) This is particularly the case in 
US context where a growing number of households means that although the overall percentage level 
of connecdon has increased, the actual number of households without telephone service has 
remained static since 1984.
110 See for example, Preston, Paschal (1995), “Competition in the telecommunication 
infrastructure”, Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 253-271. The question of EU versus 
nation state influence in the field of telecommunications policy and regulation - in particular the 
Post-Maastricht impact of subsidiarity - is considered in more detail in chapter three and chapter 
eight.
111 Raymond Akwule (1992), Global Telecommunication - The Technology. Administration and 
Policies. (Boston: Focal Press ), p. 134.
112 Margaret Sharp (1989), "The Community and New Technologies" in Lodge, Juliet (ed.), The 
European Community and the Challenge of the Future, (London: Pinter.), p. 212.
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telephony and infrastructure (originally left as monopolies in the Green Paper) will, as of 
1998, be opened to competition.
Although quick to embrace liberalisation, the European Commission and the member states 
were slow to address the implications of liberalisation for the pursuit o f  public service 
objectives. It is important to note that the logic underlying the creation of a common European 
policy on universal service was to ensure agreement on a universal understanding (and 
practical application) of universal service so as to avoid the situation whereby some operators 
in a single European telecommunications market were required to provide a level of service 
more onerous than their competitors (thus undermining their competitiveness). As one EU 
document notes: "The creation of an environment in which operators can compete on an equal 
basis presupposes a comparable level of universal service obligations throughout the 
Community."114 Incumbent PTOs were unwilling to bear sole responsibility for what they 
suggested was a costly public service obligation whilst new market entrants “cherry-picked” 
the profitable markets. The PTOs thus sought a levelling of the telecommunications playing 
field, demanding either that they receive some subsidy for fulfilling the public service 
obligation or that the obligation be shared with the new entrants. Inevitably this meant 
defining what public service actually constituted and what it cost.
hr Europe the move to universal service was not without its growing pains. In the US, the 
existence of some conception of universal service prior to the introduction of competition 
meant that the shift towards guaranteeing universal service provision in a competitive market 
was to some extent a technical issue addressable by programmes such as those outlined above 
(Universal Service Fund, Lifeline Fund, etc.). The EU however had to develop a conception of 
universal service from scratch. Thus whilst in America, AT&T’s long history as a regulated 
private monopoly meant that a framework for calculating the costs of universal service 
(separations and settlements payments) preceded the introduction of competition, the absence 
of any detailed regulatory oversight for European PTOs meant that the relationship between
113 Ibid.
114 Proposal for a Council Resolution on Universal Service Principles in the Telecommunications 
Sector. Attached to: CEC (1993), Developing Universal Service for Telecommunications in a 
Competitive Enviromnent COM(93) 542 Final, p. 6.
55
service costs and tariffs had largely been a matter "for internal consideration.""5 Indeed to the 
extent that the costings were subject to government approval, their allocation was effectively a 
political decision,"6 a practice that was, by definition, incompatible with a liberalised 
telecommunications market. In short the Green Paper’s introduction of competition demanded 
a major shift in the “culture” of the European PTOs, away from the theoretically limitless 
obligations of public service towards the more finite and therefore “costable” universal service 
obligation.
Furthermore that conception had to be designed in such a way as to be applicable in all 
member states, despite the fact that hitherto, the pursuit o f public service obligations had 
resulted in very different levels of service: for example, whilst by 1975 household telephone 
penetration in Ireland had only reached 22%, in Sweden the figure was already 108%.117 
Whilst these disparities began to even out in the 1980s there remained substantial differences 
between penetration levels in member states when the Green Paper was published.
The inevitable consequence was that initial efforts at defining universal service obligations 
resulted in requirements that were "essentially passive,"118 and did very little to place any 
measurable obligations on the shoulders of service providers. For example, the description 
contained within the 1987 Green Paper, essentially did no more than describe the status quo, 
suggesting only that basic telephone service be:
1, Provided with general geographic coverage.
2. Provided on demand to all users on reasonably the same
115 Ibid., p. 13.
116 See for example: Jill Hills (1989), "Universal Service: Liberalisation and privatisation of 
Telecommunications", Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 129-144, p. 130.
117 ITU Stars Database, July 1996 release. Cited in Analysys (1997), The Future of Universal 
Service in Telecommunications in Europe. (London: Analysys), p. 155.
118 An OECD assessment of the Green Paper in 1991 criticised its failure to address die question of 
affordability in considering universal service. See OECD (1991), Universal Service and Rate 
Restructuring in Telecommunications, Information Computer Communication Policy, No. 23, p. 26.
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terms regardless of the users' location within the service providers 
territory or franchise area and the cost of connection to the 
network."119
Yet the increasing influence of liberalisation - in particular the pressure "to move toward a 
greater cost orientation of tariffs,"120 prompting the "rebalancing" of telephone tariffs across 
Europe, and thus undermining the funding of universal service - along with pressure from both 
the European Parliament and the Council o f Ministers,121 forced the European Commission to 
take a more considered approach. However, rather than develop specific universal service 
legislation, the Commission sought to superimpose universal service on existing legislative 
proposals, namely those concerning Open Network Provision (ONP) principles. ONP 
prmciples, however, were originally intended to ensure that competing service providers did 
not throw up artificial obstacles to the interconnection of their networks. Since they were not 
designed to proactively encourage access, the European Commission’s application of them to 
universal service was unlikely to do anything but reinforce the passivity of the Green Paper’s 
conception of universal service obligations. This is evident in the Commission’s first major 
Communication on universal service, D eveloping Universal Service fo r  Telecommunications 
in a Competitive Environment, which takes ONP principles as a starting point for universal 
service.
The Communication followed the decision of June 16 1993 by the Council of 
Telecommunications Ministers to fully liberalise the voice telephony market by 1998. In doing 
so, however, the 12 ministers had also "underlined the importance of maintaining universal 
service."122 Thus the main purpose of the Communication was to initiate a process of agreeing
119 Universal Service and Rate Restructuring in Telecommunications. Information Computer 
Communication Policy, No. 23, OECD 1991, p. 28.
120 Included in a Council resolution on the development of the common market for 
telecommunications services and equipment. Johannes M. Bauer & Charles Steinfield, 
'Telecommunications Initiatives of the European Communities", in Steinfield et al (eds.) 
Telecommunications in Transition. (Thousand Oaks, California: London), p. 55.
121 With regard to EU negotiations on telecommunications liberalisation and ONP between 1987and 
1990, Bauer and Steinfield note that “whereas the Commission argued in favour of open markets, 
influential members of the telecommunication Council of Ministers placed a higher weight on public 
service goals.” Johannes M. Bauer & Charles Steinfield, “Telecommunications Initiatives of the 
European Communities", in Steinfield et al (eds.) Telecommunications in Transition. (Thousand 
Oaks, California: London), p. 58.
122 "Green light for liberalisation of vocal telephony, " XIII Magazine News Review, No. 2/93.
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a universal service definition. The resulting document is interesting largely because it (perhaps 
unwittingly) draws attention to, but fails to reconcile, some of the inherent contradictions 
faced by EU member states in seeking to move from public service to universal service. In its 
general discussion of the rationale for universal service, the Communication advances both an 
economic justification for maintaining and expanding universal service and incorporates 
aspects of the politico-philosophic approach, stating that universal service is an "essential 
condition" not merely "for maximising the contribution of the telecommunications sector to 
overall economic growth," but also for "social well-being and cohesion in the Community".123 
Furthermore, the Proposal for a Council Resolution attached to the Communication adds that 
“the essence of universal service” is “access to and the provision o f a defined minimum 
service of specified quality to all users at an affordable price, irrespective o f their 
geographical location."124
Yet when the Communication comes to a practical definition o f what the universal service 
concept includes “on the basis of ONP”125, the socially oriented language disappears and is 
replaced by the following list:
1. the basic provision o f service;
2. quality of service;
3. tariff-principles i.e. cost-orientation o f tariffs, combined with tariff 
flexibility
(which allows, for example, specially targeted tariff schemes for low 
income groups);
4. dispute resolution mechanisms;
5. Special public service features (for example operator services and
emergency services);
6. Certain Community-wide service features.”126
123 CEC (1993), Developing Universal Service for Telecommunications in a Competitive 
Environment COM(93) 542 Final.
124 Proposal for a Council Resolution on Universal Service Principles in the Telecommunications 
Sector. Attached to Ibid.
125 CEC (1993), Developing Universal Sendee for Telecommunications in a Competitive 
Environment COM(93) 542 Final, p. 7.
126 Ibid.
58
The most notable absence is the question of the scope of universal service. References to 
“basic provision of service” and “quality of service” are meaningless without some reference 
to the extent to which service must be provided. Indeed, overall it’s hard to see anything in the 
list above that would not be considered normal commercial service requirements.
Furthermore, when setting out the basic elements of universal service elsewhere in the 
document, the wording consistently refers to the rights of “users.” “Users should have a right 
of access to and use o f the service. Users should have a contract specifying the service to be 
provided.”’27 (Italics added). Yet this appears to ignore those who are not yet users and may 
be excluded from the telephone network. Thus the Commission’s conception of universal 
service here is the minimalist common carriage conception: equal rather than universal access 
All those who pass that financial threshold sufficient to enable them to become a subscriber 
will be treated equally, but no account is taken of those below. In effect then the Commission 
conception here seems to ignore the politico-philosophic approach, a fact the same document 
explicitly draws attention to when it describes as “fundamental objectives of a public service 
policy” (Italics added) the following:
"Universality i.e. access fo r  all at an affordable price 
Equality i.e. access independent of geographical location 
Continuity i.e. continuous provision, at a defined quality."128 (Italics added)
The msistence on retaining ONP as the basis for USO since the 1993 Communication has 
ensured that a more proactive public service orientation to universal service has not appeared 
in any EU legislation. Looking at that EU ONP legislation which arguably has most relevance 
for universal service129 - the December 1995 Directive on the Application o f Open Network
127 Proposal for a Council Resolution on Universal Service Principles in the Telecommunications 
Sector, p. 21. Attached to Developing Universal Service for Telecommunications in a Competitive 
Environment COM(93) 542 Final, 15th November 1993.
128 Ibid., p. 19.
129 The subsequent Commission Communication Universal Service for Telecommunications in the 
Perspective of a Fully Liberalised Environment, arguably the Commission’s most detailed discussion 
of universal service points to the ONP Voice Telephony Directive as the source of the “current 
concept of universal service.” See CEC (1996), Universal Service for Telecommunications in the 
Perspective of a Fully Liberalised Environment COM(96) 73 Final, p. 3.
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Provision (ONP) to Voice Telephony130 - there is little in the directive itself that requires 
service providers or national regulatory agencies to actively promote access to the basic 
telecommunications services. Article 3 of the directive simply requires the provision o f a fixed 
public telephone network and a voice telephony service so that users may “obtain on request a 
connection to the fixed public telephone network.”131 Where questions o f actively facilitating 
access do arise, the directive simply acknowledges the right of individual national regulatory 
agencies to impose requirements aimed at achieving universal access if they so wish 
(reflecting the subsidiarity principle established in the EU’s Maastricht agreement). For 
example:
“Without prejudice to application of the principle of cost orientation, national 
regulatory authorities may impose on telecommunications organizations tariff 
constraints relating to the objectives o f universal telephone-service accessibility, 
including town and country planning aspects.”132
Simply leaving national regulators such options is some distance from actually promoting 
universal access principles. In short, both the theory and practice of ONP have severely 
limited the possibility of expanding the scope and meaning of universal service in EU 
legislation.
In general, the European Commission expresses the view that liberalisation is not 
incompatible with the provision of universal service, and that in fact its provision is best 
guaranteed by “market forces...in most cases.”133 EU documents (including the 1993 
Communication on Universal Service Principles discussed above) argue that even the move to 
cost-oriented tariffs, which typically increase local call costs, will help to shore up universal 
service. Furthermore, the EU decision to adopt an approach of gradual (as opposed to 
immediate and total) liberalisation of the European telecommunications market, is intended "to
130 Directive 95/62/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1995 on the 
Application of Open Network Provision (ONP) toVoice Telephony. EC Official Journal No. L.321, 
pp. 6-24.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid., p. 14.
133 Proposal for a Council Resolution on Universal Service Principles in the Telecommunications 
Sector. Attached to CEC (1993), Developing Universal Service for Telecommunications in a 
Competitive Environment COM(93) 542 Final.
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guarantee the financial viability of existing telecommunications administrations m order for 
them to fulfil their public service obligations."134 Yet, despite these assurances, what is most 
notable about the status of EU documents on universal service is their status compared with 
documents on introducing competition into various areas o f the telecommunications markets. 
(Indeed, as noted above, ensuring a level playing field in the competitive market is one of the 
major reasons for arriving at a common European policy on universal service). With regard to 
liberalising the telecommunications services market and implementing the ONP provision, the 
Commission or Council will usually opt for a Decision or a Directive, legal instruments, 
which legally bind member states to implement the policy objectives contained within through 
national legislation. In contrast, the most comprehensive documents on universal service have 
been non-binding Communications, which have left actual implementation o f measures to 
protect the universal service objective to the discretion of individual member states. The 
difference in status says much about the relative priorities of introducing competition and 
protecting universal service in the eyes of the Commission.135
2.6 Conclusion
It may seem ironic that it is precisely at the point in time when the telephone begins to 
approach universal household penetration, (80% and upwards) in most of the developed 
world, that universal service should become a key issue of telecommunications policy Yet 
while it has been generally argued that changing market conditions undermining the cross­
subsidisation of universal service have brought the issue to the fore the very fact that 
penetration rates are nearing 100% increases the importance of the issue.
As the level o f telephone penetration increases, and as the phone thus becomes more 
ubiquitous, so the relative isolation resulting from non-connection becomes all the more acute.
134 Laurence Caby and Charles Steinfield in "Trends in die liberalisation of European 
Communications" in Steinfield et al Telecommunications in Transition., (Thousand Oaks,
California: Sage Publications), p. 40.
135 For example: whilst the preamble to the December 1995 ONP directive, acknowledges that “voice 
telephony has become important for social and economic reasons, and eveiyone in the Community 
should have the right to subscribe to this service,” the Directive itself, as noted above, does not 
follow through the logic of this statement. See Directive 95/62/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 13 December 1995 on the application of open network provision (ONP) to voice 
telephony, Official Journal of the European Communities, No. L.321, p. 6.
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(This relationship between the extent of the telephone’s diffusion and its social significance is 
implied by the 1997 Analysys report referred to in section 2.4 above.) Thus, from a socially 
oriented perspective, universal service would have been significantly less of an issue at a point 
when penetration was at a low: looking at Ireland in 1935, for example, it would have been 
difficult to speak in terms of social exclusion as a result of non-connection to the telephone 
service when there were only 24,000 (approx.) subscribers (three quarters o f which were 
businesses).136
More significantly, however, it is perhaps inevitable that as the telephone approaches ubiquity 
it will become harder and harder to attract new subscribers. The upward curve of Everett 
Rodgers' model of diffusion referred to above, flattens out as it approaches 100%, as "the last 
few holdouts" reluctantly submit and acquire the item in question. However this model 
implicitly classifies this group as having decided not to acquire the technology (implying that 
it was within their financial means to acquire it). In the real world, the fact remains that, as 
with any commodity which costs money, it will be harder for those on a low income to afford 
telecommunications services than those on a higher income, It is undeniable that there are 
enormous income differentials in modern society. Thus, as all but the lowest income groups 
acquire the phone, it will become harder to maintain annual increases in the level of 
penetration. Schement, for example, notes that between 1946 and 1970, telephone penetration 
in the US grew by 39%, reaching 90% in 1970. Between 1970 and 1994 it grew by 4%. Thus, 
he concludes that "Clearly there are difficulties involved in reducing the last 10%."137
Hence before proceeding to consider the history of universal telephone service in Ireland, it is 
important to consider that the nature of non-comiection may be changing. Much of the debate 
on universal service still assumes that it is primarily an issue of connecting rural subscribers 
distant from the nearest exchange. Although this doubtless continues to account for a 
substantial proportion o f the unphoned, there is increasing evidence that the "unconnected" are
136 Jill Hills makes the point that, in its infancy, the telephone far from fostering social cohesion, 
reinforced exishng residential class patterns "because only those with sufficient income could afford 
the telephone". , Jill Hills (1989), "Universal service: Liberalisation and privatisation of 
telecommunications”, Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 129-144, p. 133,
137 Schement, op. cit., p. 482. Obviously it would have been impossible to sustain the growth rate of 
the previous 24 years between 1970 and 1994 since this would mean a penetration rate in excess of 
100%. (Technically possible if homes were to have more than one line but far in excess of universal 
service).
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no longer primarily located in remote areas, cut off from the network by virtue of distance. 
Increasingly the "unphoned" are likely to be situated in low-income urban areas, where the 
network infrastructure is actually at its densest.138 However, constructing the problem of 
achieving universal service as one of connecting rural dwellers remote from an exchange, will 
see solutions offered that address that particular construction o f the problem. Hence, two 
authors from DG XIII o f the European Commission offer that:
" Alternative technical solutions are often employed by innovative companies to bring 
about dramatic reductions in the costs of providing service. A case in point is the 
application o f mobile technology to rural telephony, and this promises new 
approaches to solving universal service problems."139
Similarly, US Vice-President A1 Gore has argued that.
“Constellations of hundreds of satellites in low earth orbit may soon provide 
telephone or data seivices to any point on the globe. Such systems could make 
universal service both practical and affordable.”140
In effect the problem of providing universal service is rendered a technical puzzle - what new 
technology will permit the service provider to offer service to subscribers distant from the 
exchange at a reasonable cost? Yet as noted above, as near total penetration is achieved, the 
problem of providing service becomes less a technical one and more one related to the income 
levels of the unconnected. Indeed the distant rural customer approach implicitly constructs the 
universal service obligation as one of simply offering a geographically ubiquitous service. 
Although this is an element of the universal service obligation, it ignores the question of
138 "...die geographical and social extent of the unphoned phenomenon is now, quite clearly, a key 
problem in our marginalised urban areas." Dyer, Philip The Guardian 8 June 1995.
139 Cor Berben and Bernard Clements (1995(, "The European framework for competition in 
telecommunications: The benefits for peripheral countries", Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 19, 
No. 4. pp. 273- 283, p. 276. A similar argument is made by Michael Tyler et al (1995), "Universal 
service and innovation in telecommunications services", Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 19, No. 
l,pp. 3-20.
140 Al Gore (1994), “Forging a new Athenian Age of Democracy”, Intermedia, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 4-
7.
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A POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
3.1 Introduction
National infrastructure development does not occur in a vacuum. Any attempt to outline a 
history of the development of the telephone in Ireland without first outlining the political 
culture and economic context could not offer any real understanding or useful insights about 
that development. This chapter considers the specificities o f Irish politics and the Irish 
economy since the 19th century. It traces the health of the economy and how different elements 
of the economy have been prioritised at different points in time. This chapter also draws 
attention to some features o f Irish political culture which, although not unique to Ireland, have 
given a particular cast to telecommunications development. It offers a brief overview of the 
history of the administration of Ireland but also examines the general policy-making process, 
specifically considering the influence of clientalism and Ireland’s membership o f European 
Union on that process. Based on this initial review, the chapter concludes by suggesting some 
hypotheses about how the specificities of Irish politics and the economy may have shaped the 
diffusion of the telephone network in Ireland and the development o f universal service.
3.2.1 Ireland 1880 - 1922
The defining influence on the Irish economy and Irish politics until at least 1922 was the 
relationship with Britain (even after 1922 the UK remained the dominant external influence on 
Ireland). Although nominally under English control since the Norman conquest in the 12th 
century, Ireland only finally became an English province with the Tudor subjugation of 
Ireland in the 16th century and the plantations - the introduction of English and Scottish 
settlers - that followed in the 16th and 17th centuries. As a result, from medieval times Irish 
politics and economic and cultural life have been “dominated by, and oriented to, England.”1 
Effectively a colonised nation, Ireland was the periphery to the British core. Peripherality was 
a function of geography anyway - Ireland is situated on the fringe of the British Isles, which in 
turn is on the edge of Europe. But this geographical peripherality has long been mirrored by 
an economic peripherality. Chubb concludes that Ireland evolved “within a sub-region in the
1 Basil Chubb (1992), The Government and Politics of Ireland. (3rd edition) (London: Longman), 
p. 4.
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shadow of a powerful centre,”2 and as a consequence its “economic development remains 
incomplete.”3
Despite its peripheral position, Ireland nonetheless underwent “a period of sustained, rapid, 
socio-economic development”4 between 1660 and 1820. In this context, the 1800 Act of 
Union which, in addition to making a single political unit of Britain and Ireland, effectively 
established a free trade area between the two countries, seemed a reasonable deal for Ireland. 
Yet most of the industries which had driven earlier economic growth went into a terminal 
decline in the 19th century, especially in the latter half. The conclusion of the Napoleonic 
wars brought economic recession to the entire British Isles. Yet whilst mainland Britain 
emerged from recession by 1819, “the Irish economy remained stagnant.”5
Although there may have been structural deficiencies in the Irish industrial economy - Ireland 
was not favoured with “the essential minerals of the industrial revolution,”6 and the 
population expansion of the first half of the 19th century occurred in the absence of any 
growth in national income - its decline in the 19th centuiy owed much to the political and 
economic proximity to a British mainland that was going through the Industrial Revolution. 
“The development of an industrial society in the British Isles touched such (remote) areas last 
and least; the further west, the more delayed and smaller were its effects.”7 As “early, 
mercantilist, cottage-industry capitalism”8 progressed into factory capitalism in the UK, scale 
of production became of critical importance to the success or failure o f a given industry. 
Many of the small towns in pre-Famine Ireland had extensive industries: breweries, 
distilleries, ropeworks and tanneries were numerous, whilst paper mills and ironworks 
operated in large towns. However these industries, geared towards the needs of the domestic
2 Ibid., p. 2.
3 Ibid., p. 2.
4 Raymond Crotty (1979), “Capitalist Colonialism and Peripheralisation: The Irish Case” in Dudley 
Seers, Bernard Schaffer and Maija-Liisa Kiljunen (eds.), Underdeveloped Europe: Studies in Core - 
Periphery Relations. (New Jersey: Humanities Press).
5 E.R.R. Green (1968), “Industrial Decline in the Nineteenth Century” in L.M. Cullen (ed.) The 
Formation of the Irish Economy, (Cork: Mercier Press), p. 92.
6 Chubb, Government, p. 11.
7 Ibid., p. 11.
8 Crotty, op cit., p. 226.
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market, could not compete with the economies of scale o f those industries at the core.9 
Increasingly, imports from Britain depressed Irish non-export industries and industrial 
production in the United Kingdom of Britain and Ireland, was increasingly concentrated at the 
core (England),10 whilst the Irish economy increasingly focused on land intensive production, 
particularly cattle-rearing.
The development of a communications network in 19th century Ireland initially exacerbated 
the deleterious effects of the British Industrial Revolution on the Irish economy. The spread of 
the railway network contributed to a commercial revolution outside Dublin, bringing goods 
relatively cheaply to provincial retailer and wholesalers. The effect on local industry, however, 
was ruinous
“Goods from farther afield entailed stiffer competition faced by local industrial firms 
and crafts. The railway was bound therefore to reveal the existing weakness o f small 
industrial firms, and, once crafts elsewhere were converted to a factory basis, to 
quicken the decline of the surviving crafts in small Irish towns. The industrial base in 
the small town was therefore in danger.”11
In many European economies the railway was regarded as “a powerful engine of economic 
development,”12 allowing local firms to develop an export capacity. By the time the railways 
began to introduce competition to Irish provincial areas in the 1850s, however, there was 
already a concentration of large-scale firms on the British mainland. Already in a position of 
having to play “catch-up”, the population collapse from 1845 to 1851 meant declining sales,13
9 Although economies of scale made goods imported from Britain cheaper, in some cases the 
Industrial Revolution had a more direct effect on Irish industiy. In textiles, which was the first major 
Irish industiy to decline in the 19th century, the rise of flax-spinning by power and the 
cotton-weaving by powerloom meant that it was difficult for Irish firms simply to get supplies of yarn 
and cotton. See Green, op cit, pp. 94-95.
10 “The headlong pace of development in England was rapidly concentrating industiy in areas where 
coal and iron were available and with ready access to markets.” Green, op cit, p. 92.
11 L.M. Cullen (1987), The Formation of the Irish Economy Since 1660. (London: B.T. Batsford), 
p. 144.
12 J.J. Lee (1968). “The Railways in die Irish Economy”in L.M. Cullen The Formation of the Irish 
Economy. (Cork: Mercier Press), pp. 79-80.
13 Although usually seen as a predominantly rural catastrophe, the Famine did have a knock-on 
effect on urban dwellers. Mary E. Daly points out that in the aftermath of the Famine, farmers 
enjoyed two decades of relative rural prosperity as the size of holdings increased. Urban workers did
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reducing the availabdity of investment capital that smaller Irish firms would have needed to 
expand their operations to benefit from anything like the economies of scale that firms based 
in England’s industrial heartland benefited from. As Lee again puts it: “Before 1850 economic 
development had been hindered by an underdeveloped transport network. Since 1850 Ireland 
has been an underdeveloped economy with a highly developed transport system.”14
Those firms that did survive were, as a rule, export-oriented. Development of export markets 
allowed some industrial firms to reach a scale of production which would make their costs 
competitive, and hence enable them to survive on the home market against foreign 
competition.
When economic prospects picked up again in the 1890s, it was export industry that continued 
to perform the best. Industry, by 1907, contributed roughly a third of the total net output of 
Irish agriculture and industiy, making Ireland a relatively industrialised country by 
contemporary standards. The bulk of net output rested, however, on a narrow base: three 
categories - linen spinning and weaving, brewing, distilling and aerated waters, shipbuilding 
and engineering - which accounted for eighty per cent of total net industrial output. Such 
industry was increasingly concentrated on the east coast of the country: isolated firms in small 
Irish towns lacked direct foreign contact; local facilities for the specialist needs of financing, 
insuring and handling export consignment did not exist; and the arrangement of such services 
for small or irregular consignment proved expensive. Even in the declining milling industry, it 
was the large-scale firms emerging in the ports that were able to withstand competition from 
imported flour. The port mills had an advantage over inland mills where exports were 
concerned. A similar story was evident in brewing - Dublin brewers (themselves increasingly 
dominated by Guinness) produced about 75% of the total Irish output, and accounted for 96% 
of exports at the outset o f the 20th century .15
not experience a similar windfall: instead since Irish industry (largely based in towns) was mainly 
geared for the domestic market, the effect of the Famine was to reduce that market from 8.5 million 
to 6.5 million people in a six year period (1845-1851). The population then dropped by a further 2 
million between 1851 and 1911 to 4.5 million, largely due to emigration. Mary E. Daly (1981) A 
Social and Economic History of Ireland Since 1800. (Dublin: Educational Company), p. 85
14 Lee, op cit., p. 87.
15 Cullen, Ireland Since 1660, pp. 156-157
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Thus, only firms in Dublin and Belfast and isolated large-scale firms elsewhere found it 
practicable to enter the export field. The position o f Belfast is worth emphasising since the 
city itself and surrounding hinterland had been the site o f a remarkable expansion in the 19Lh 
century. In 1800, Belfast’s 20,000 inhabitants made it one quarter the size o f Cork but by the 
1890s, Belfast was larger than Dublin with over 400,000 inhabitants.16 This growth, due 
initially to the development of the linen industry, was consolidated in the 1890s and 1900s by 
the spectacular success of the city’s shipyards (which led in turn to a further increase in 
Belfast’s population to 600,000 by 191 l) .17By the turn of the century, probably one third of 
Irish net industrial output originated in Belfast or its immediate hinterland as did roughly two- 
thirds of total industrial exports including processed food and drink. In 1907, £19.1 million of 
the total Irish exports of non-food manufactures o f £20.9 million, were in categories 
predominantly produced in the Belfast region.”18 Even in food manufacturing exports, Belfast 
occupied a dominant position in tobacco, whiskey, aerated water, milling exports and ham.
In short then, over the course of the 19th century, small-scale industrial production located 
outside Dublin and Belfast declined dramatically to the extent where, as Maiy E. Daly notes, 
the character o f most Irish towns in the late 19th century was non-industrial: “the bank, the 
post office, the police station and the school and shops determined the town’s character.”19 
The development of industry in the North-East in particular meant that when Ireland was 
partitioned in 1922, agriculture would inevitably have become the dominant part of the Irish 
economy. But what was the shape of agriculture in the 19th century?
3.2.2 Agriculture in the 19th Century
The effect o f the 1845 - 1847 Irish famine on the rural population and the structure of Irish 
agriculture was to be profound. The diminution by starvation and emigration o f the pre­
famine population from nearly 8.5 million to 6.5 million by 1851, was disproportionately felt
16 Maiy E. Daly (1981), A Social and Economic History of Ireland Since 1800. (Dublin: Educational 
Company), p. 101.
17 Indeed Cullen argues that widiout shipbuilding, Belfast might have undergone the same decline 
that afflicted Derry from the 1880s onwards, as the shirt-making industry on which local Derry 
industrial activity was based, collapsed. Cullen, Ireland Since 1660. pp. 161-162..
18 Ibid., pp 160-161.
19 Daly, op cit., p. 112.
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in the rural counties o f Ireland, a fact exacerbated by the post-famine process o f internal 
migration from rural to urban areas, primarily Dublin and Belfast. Furthermore these dual 
processes continued long after the famine: the population o f the 32 counties dropped from 5.2 
million in 1881 to 4.4 million in 1911, whilst the fraction of the population living in towns 
increased from one eighth to one third between 1841 and 1911.20 The corollary of this across 
Ireland, but again disproportionately in rural areas was a low and dropping population 
density. Between 1881 and 1911 Ireland’s population density dropped by 16% to 51.9 people 
per square kilometre in Ireland. Yet whilst Dublin experienced a 14% increase in population 
density to 520.6 persons per square kilometre between 1881 and 1911, in the western province 
of Connaught it dropped 25.8% over the same period to 33.9 persons per square kilometre.
The virtual extinction of the smallholding cottier class in the wake of the famine,21 had 
resulted in larger farms with less dependants. Many landlords encouraged the consolidation of 
holdings which offered a more secure livelihood in the hope of avoiding a recurrence of the 
Famine. As a result, the 1891 census placed 44.4% of the population in the agricultural 
occupation class, a reduction of less than 7% from the pre-famine figure (although in real 
terms taking into account population decline this meant that the agricultural occupation class 
had dropped from just over 4 million people to just over 2 million). This contrasted sharply 
with figures for England and Wales where manufacturing industry had occupied a 
progressively higher percentage of the population since the Industrial Revolution. There, the 
1881 census classified only 16.6% of the population as engaged in agriculture.
The greatest shift in 19th century Irish agriculture was from high output per acre tillage to 
low output pasture. Again the after effects of the Famine were responsible. Along with 
cottiers, farm labourers had been the hardest hit class during the Famine while land under 
pasture increased by two million acres between 1851 and 1901.22 Crotty points out that Irish 
cattle exports remained static between 1665 and 1805. Between 1805 and 1875, however, 
they increased “nine-fold” . O’Toole puts it another way:
20 F.S.L. Lyons (1973), Ireland Since the Famine. (London: Fontana), p. 101.
21 This class had in any case already been undermined by the advent of factory spinning and later 
factory weaving, since in addition to eking out a living from small-holdings, it had looked to 
domestic (i.e. home-based) industiy as an income support.
22 Fintan 0 ’Toole(1995), Meanwhile Back at the Ranch: The Politics of Irish Beef. (London: 
Vintage), p. 10.
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“Between 1841 and 1981, the population of the twenty-six counties of the Republic of 
Ireland declined from 6.5 million to 3.4 million. Over the same period, the number of 
cattle increased from 1.8 million to 6.9 million.”23
Once the land had been cleared by emigration, the depopulated grassland was given over to 
pasture. Cattle prices increased at a faster rate than all other farm prices from the early 1800s 
onward, as demand for meat from both the increasingly populous mainland Britain,24 and 
outposts of the Empire increased, making the profit from low output cattle production greater 
than the profit from other, higher output, farm enterprises.25 The trend has continued mto the 
1990s - 90% of Irish agricultural land is now under pasture.26
In summary then, by the start of the 1920s, Ireland remained a predominantly agriculture- 
oriented economy. What industry did exist was almost entirely concentrated in Belfast and 
Dublin.
3.2.3 Post-Independence Economic Policy
The establishment of the Free State in 1922 brought home the degree of imbalance in the Irish 
economy. The development of agriculture in the 19th Century assumed the existence o f a 
market covering the entire British Isles. As a consequence, “agriculture insofar as it was 
market-orientated, was wholly geared to British needs. Banking, insurance, industry and trade 
were largely British dominated and almost wholly British-orientated and only slowly became 
centred upon Dublin.”27 Even in a 32 county Ireland, agriculture had accounted for two-thirds
23 Ibid., p. 11.
24 The population of England and Wales rose from 8.9 million in 1801, to 15.9 million in 1841, 25.9 
million in 1881 and reached 32.5 million by 1901. R.M. Punnett (1987), British Govermnent and 
Polidcs (5th Edition), (Hampshire: Gower Publishing), p. 4.
25 Crotty, op cit., p. 227.
26 O’Toole, op cit., p. 10.
27 Chubb, Government.. pp. 6-7.
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the combined net output of Irish agriculture and industry. The loss of the industrialised North- 
East exaggerated the relative importance of agriculture.28
Given that the first independent Irish administration, William Cosgrave’s Cumann na 
nGaedhael (1922-1932) had emerged from the ashes of Arthur Griffith’s Sinn Fein, it might 
have been expected that the party would adopt the central tenet o f Sinn Fein’s economic 
policy. “Economic nationalism”29 argued that Irish political independence would be 
undermined if  the nation remained economically dependent on Britain and required the 
erection of tariff barriers behind which both native industry and agriculture could develop.
That a tariff policy was not pursued by the new government was not overly surprising 
however. Economic nationalism assumed that Ireland’s inclusion within the UK had stultified 
the country’s economic development and that an independent Ireland would undergo a 
spontaneous industrial recovery. Given the fait accompli of an economy dominated by 
agriculture and the inherent conservatism of the new administration, however, “the new 
national government, like the old British one, saw in agriculture the basis of the country’s 
existence and addressed itself at once to the problems of that key sector.”30 The official 
outlook was that industrial protection would harm the state’s agricultural exports by raising 
costs,31 thus precluding the pursuit of a general tariff policy. It was believed that agricultural 
prosperity, if  unimpeded, would gradually stimulate wider economic development; hence state 
intervention was kept to a minimum. In practice farmers were to be aided not through price 
control but through reducing their costs to a minimum. This was reflected m 1920s economic 
policy which sought to minimise budget expenditure and thus the need to impose the burden of 
additional taxes on farmers. In short, as Lee points out, “the government relegated industry to 
second place behind agriculture.”32 Underlying economic trends seemed to justify the cautious
28 Figures for the value of exports of manufactured goods in 1907 show that “£19.1 million of the 
total non-food manufactures of £20.9 million were in categories predominantly produced in the 
Belfast region.” See Cullen, Ireland Since 1660. p. 161.
29 Terence Brown (1985), Ireland: A Social and Cultural History. 1922 to the Present. (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press).
30 Lyons, op cit., p. 600.
31 Furthermore, there was a concern that such the introduction of tariffs on industrial imports might 
provoke retaliadon against Irish agricultural exports.
32 J.J Lee (1987), Ireland 1912 - 1985: Politics and Society. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), p. 119. This research makes no attempt to go over previous debates on the “correctness” of 
this policy since it will not significandy affect the policy decisions that were actually taken. It’s
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economic policies o f the Cumann na nGaedhael government. Irish exports did relatively well 
in the world economic recovery of the second half o f the 1920s.
The coming to power in 1932 of the Eamonn De Valera’s first Fianna Fail administration 
(which was to maintain an unbroken hold on government until 1948) together with the effects 
of the Great Depression brought about a reassessment of economic nationalism or 
protectionism as it became known. Given the global move to protectionism it seemed 
inevitable that the Irish Free State would move in the same direction. The new Minister for 
Industry and Commerce, Sean Lemass, was particularly impressed by the possibilities of 
protectionism which in any case fitted the “dominant ideology in the countiy”33: the 
achievement and maintenance of self-sufficient Irish independence. Self-sufficiency implied 
the creation of new Irish industries to provide domestically what had previously been 
imported: hence a drive to industrialisation was part of the Fianna Fail platform on taking 
office in 1932 34
In the shortterm  protectionism did accelerate industrialisation. Irish industrial employment 
went from 1 10,588 in 1931 to 166,513 in 1938,35 whilst industrial output rose 40% between 
1931 and 1936.36 Yet the small size of the domestic market limited the prospects of expansion 
whilst at the same time the country’s few manufacturing export industry’s fared badly. “Once 
the more obvious possibilities of industrial expansion had been exploited, new opportunities 
were likely to be few.”37 After expanding by 40% between 1931 and 1936. industrial output 
rose by 4'A per cent between 1936 and 1938.38 Theoretically the new wave o f indigenous 
industry was to come from “import-substitution” but private capital frequently proved
worth noting Ronan Fannings assertion however, that any commissions and committees of the L920s 
and 1930s on economic and industrial policy were, given the concern with the survival of the state 
rather than the condition of the economy, likely to endorse rather than question extant economic 
policy. Ronan Fanning (1984), “Economists and Government: Ireland 1922 - 52” in Antoin E. 
Murphy (ed.) Economists and the Irish Economy. (Dublin: Irish Academic Press).
33 Brown, op cit., p. 146.
34 Ibid., p 142.
35 Cullen, Ireland Since 1660. p. 178.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., p. 179.
38 Ibid,, p. 179.
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unwilling to invest in Ireland.39 Thus Lemass was forced to introduce public capital, creating 
the Industrial Credit Corporation, Irish Sugar Co., and Aer Rianta (as well as a further 10 
between 1932 and 193940) using the same mechanisms that had facilitated the creation of the 
Agricultural Credit Corporation and the Electricity Supply Board in 1927.41
During the war Ireland pursued a policy of neutrality. To be workable as a foreign affairs 
policy, neutrality required self-sufficiency as a domestic economic policy. Yet at the same 
tune that lip service was being paid to this policy in the 1930s, 90% of Irish foreign trade was 
being carried on with precisely the nation that Ireland was most seeking to be independent of. 
The apparent contradiction of fostering industries that depended on imports as a means of 
achieving self-sufficiency was not unduly emphasised in the 1930s, but the contradiction was 
made manifest by the degree to which both the agricultural and industrial economies were inn 
down in the almost complete absence o f imports during the war.42
After the war, the economy expanded rapidly, but its underlying weakness showed itself in the 
export sector. Stagnation in agricultural output kept agricultural exports at a relatively low 
level, whilst any expansion in industrial output was destined largely for the home market.
Thus whilst exports remained low the volume of imports rose to record proportions. Inevitably 
there were recurrent crises in the balance of payments, prompting severe credit restrictions 
after the large deficits in 1951 and 1955.”43 National income, which had risen by, on average,
1 per cent per annum between 1938 and 1958, grew by less than 0.5% per annum between 
1952 and 1958 despite the fact that the rest of Europe was experiencing the greatest sustained 
period of economic growth since the Industrial Revolution. Since things were clearly better 
elsewhere, emigration soared throughout the 1950s, reaching its highest level since the 1880s.
39 This appears to have been the general problem from the 19th centuiy onwards. Cullen points out 
that from the 1870s and 1880s, Irish capital investment began to move overseas. By 1914 total Irish 
investment abroad was some £150 million. See Cullen, Ireland since 1660. pp. 169-170.
40 F.S.L. Lyons provides a fuller list of these: the Industrial Alcohol Board, the Dairy Disposal 
Company, Aer Lingus, Milk Boards for Dublin and Cork, Irish Life Assurance Company, Bord 
Failte, Hospitals Trust and die Mcdical Research Council. See Lyons, Ireland, p. 618.
41 Lyons makes the point that the fact that even a government so financially cautious as Cosgraves 
(the national debt in 1932 was only £35 million, a remarkably low figure) was driven to create state 
bodies in those “sectors of the economy into which private capital had been unable or unwilling to 
intervene” (Lyons, Ireland, p. 608) says a lot about the state of the Irish economy in this era.
42 Cullen, Ireland Since 1660. p. 181.
43 Ibid., pp. 181-182.
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Virtually every commentator writing on the subject has noted that, until the 1950s, Irish 
politics was dominated by the same issues that had lead to the Civil W ar split. As a result 
“Ireland became a thoroughly conservative society whose leaders untd the mid-1950s hardly 
attempted to tackle many of its social and economic problems, let alone solve them.”44 Yet the 
crisis of the 1950s, and in particular the economic downturn of 1956-8 made manifest the 
limitations of the economic orthodoxy that had prevailed since the 1930s. At the same time, 
the 1950s also saw a new generation o f politicians and civil servants emerge, including T.K. 
Whittaker, the new and relatively youthful Secretary of the Department of Finance and Sean 
Lemass, another Civil War veteran who, having stood in De Valera’s political shadow for the 
previous forty years, became Taoiseach in 1959. Several initiatives and documents associated 
with both or either presaged a shift towards a more open Irish economy: for example the 1949 
establishment of the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) and subsequent 1955 decision to 
allow it attract foreign industry with grant aid. Furthermore the 1956 Finance Act had 
provided for the remission of part of the tax, for a period of 5 years, on profits derived from 
new or increased exports.
All the above paved the way for the November 1958 White Paper: Programme for Economic 
Expansion, the content of which was largely derived from T.K. W hittaker’s 1957 pamphlet, 
Economic Development: “Ireland,” Whittaker argued for “power, transport facilities, public 
services, houses, hospitals and a general infrastructure was on a scale which was reasonable 
by Western European standards and which would support a higher population and intensity of 
economic activity than at present.”45 Missing was a “more ‘productive superstructure’ to 
improve standards of living at home, provide more employment and stem emigration” .46 This 
meant in practice a move from protectionism to an open economy. In 1958, the Control of 
Manufactures Acts of 1932-4, which had erected protectionist tariff barriers in the 1930s, 
were relaxed for export business; in 1964 they were repealed in their entirety.
44 Chubb, Government, p. 8.




The 1958 Programme o f  Economic Expansion sought to steer investment into directly 
productive channels and to raise the annual increase in national income to 2 per cent in real 
terms. The programme assumed that agriculture remained the engine o f the national economy, 
that industry’s health was to some extent dependent on agriculture. In the event real incomes 
rose by 4% per annum between 1959 and 1963. The bulk of this growth, however, derived 
from the expansion of industry. By the close of the programme in 1963, it was clear that, 
relative to industry, agriculture was not pulling its weight with regard to the targets set out for 
it in the Programme. Meanwhile the volume of industrial output rose by 82 per cent between 
1959 and 1968 due largely to the rise in exports of manufactured goods.47 As a consequence, 
a second Programme o f  Economic Expansion, commencing in 196 3 48 explicitly identified 
industry as the engine o f growth. The long-term influence of this shift in economic thinking 
has been substantial: the percentage of the population engaged in agriculture fell from 36 per 
cent in 1960 to 17% in 1983 and agriculture’s share of GDP fell from 22% in 1960 to 12% in 
19 8 3.49 Meanwhile industrial exports which were only 6% of total exports in 1956 accounted 
for over 60% of the total by the mid-1980s.50 The successful outcome o f the Programmes, 
argues Cullen, was less a consequence of planning than of the remarkably high level o f world 
activity in this period and of the move in Irish policy from a closed economic system to a more 
open one. Recognition of Irish dependence on external markets, was initially expressed by the 
fact that Irish economic policy in the 1960s was guided by the paramount need for entiy to 
EEC if Britain was admitted as a member, but as the 1970s and 1980s progressed, external 
factors had a constantly increasingly effect on the health o f the Irish economy.
Growth continued, unabated, throughout the 1960s, creating the conditions whereby, for the 
first time this century, Ireland recorded a population increase due to net immigration. Chubb 
notes that “the standard of living of most people was transformed”51 the increase in the 
“visible indices”52 of television, car and telephone ownership, pointing to a substantial rise in 
prosperity since the 1960s.
47 Cullen, Ireland Since 1660, p. 183.
48 And originally scheduled to run till 1968. In the event the programme petered out and an 
envisaged third Programme was never put into effect.
49 Cullen, Ireland Since 1660. p. 190.
50 Ibid.
51 Chubb, Govermnent. p. 24.
52 Ibid.
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3.2.4 Ireland from the 1970s to the present.
After the growth of the 1960s, Ireland coped badly with the global economic crises of the 
1970s, which emphasised that decisive changes of fortune in an open economy, closely 
reflected substantial swings in terms of trade. The period from just before the first Programme 
for Economic Expansion in 1958 to 1972 had seen Ireland's terms of trade increase by 24% 
but the energy crises of 1973 and late 1979 swiftly reversed this trend. Cumulatively, the 
terms of trade fell by 25.6% between 1973 and 1981.
Irish governments of the 1970s failed to understand the extent to which the economic crises 
had their roots in factors outside the Irish economy (the 1973 oil crisis was particularly 
harmful to a country lacking its own energy supply) and sought to unilaterally spend their way 
out of recession with borrowed capital. Irish gross capital formation (a measure of the level of 
government investment) averaged over 30% in the 1970s, a scale rare in individual countries, 
hi the short term this had the desired effect: gross output in stable prices rose quite sharply 
between 1970 and 1981 at an average rate of 4% per annum as did industrial output: between 
1970 and 1978 the rate of growth o f Irish exports was exceeded among industrial countries 
oidy by lapan.53 Finally Irish GNP/GDP grew by 3.7% on average between 1973 and 1979, 
0.7% higher than the OECD average.54
Government investment did not however kick-start a self-sustaining economic recovery and by 
the close of the 1970s the consequences of a decade of borrowing were evident. The national 
debt had risen from 64.8% of GDP in 1971 to 87.7% in 1980. Particularly damaging was the 
foreign component of the debt which rose from approximately 8% of the total in 1971 to an 
almost unmanageable 28% (equivalent to £1089 million55) of total borrowmg by the start of 
1980.56
53 Cullen, Ireland Since 1660, p. 188.
54 Lars Mjoset (1992), The Irish Economy in a Comparative Institutional Perspective. (Dublin: 
NESC), p. 318.
55 J.J. Lee (1989), Ireland 1912 - 1985: Politics and Society. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), p. 500.
56 Mjoset, op cit., p. 321.
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Part o f the optimism on the part o f successive governments in the 1970s that recession could 
be bought off was based on the promise held by Irish entry to the EEC in 1973: access to the 
European market for Irish products and higher agricultural prices than then available in the 
main UK market. However whilst both industrial output and exports expanded rapidly, by the 
1980s:
“jobs lost in older or traditional industries exceeded new jobs created. Second, export- 
oriented industry has come largely from foreign firms attracted to the country and a 
dichotomy has developed between export-oriented industry, foreign owned, and home- 
produced industry still reliant on an increasingly open home market.”57
By contrast the farm sector initially benefited considerably from EEC entiy, per capita real 
incomes in agriculture increased by 72% between 1970 and 1978.58 But net output stagnated 
after 1975 and subsequent domestic inflation meant that input (imports) prices outstripped 
output (exports) prices. Furthermore some of the EEC’s Common Agricultural Policy benefits 
proved illusory - guaranteed prices for agricultural produce encouraged an enormous boost in 
agricultural output in other EEC members states, increasing agricultural self-sufficiency in the 
more industrialised regions and actually reducing the EEC market for Irish agricultural 
exports.
Decisive action to correct the nation’s finances might have been expected at the start of the 
1980s. In January 1980, then Taoiseach Charles Haughey announced in a televised broadcast 
that the nation had been living beyond its means and insisted on the need for cuts in 
government expenditure.59 Yet Haughey’s first two budgets in 1980 and 1981 confounded this 
statement: both projected enormous budgetary deficits which in any case were exceeded by the 
order o f 50% (leading to actual deficits o f £547 million and £800 million in 1980 and 1981 
respectively60).
57 Cullen, Ireland Since 1660. p. 190
58 Ibid.
59 Lee, Ireland 1912 - 1985, p. 501.
60 Lee, Ireland 1912 - 1985, p, 502.
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After three elections in an 18 month period in 1981 and 1982, a Fine Gael/Labour coalition 
entered government in November 1982 where it would remain until 1987. The situation it 
inherited with regard to public finances would be the key focus o f politics throughout the 
administration, although different aspects were focused on during periods: the scale of current 
budget deficits, the size of public sector borrowing, the size and ongoing growth of the 
national debt, the proportion of the national debt in foreign currencies and increasing cost of 
debt service. At the same time the more visible indices of the health of the economy also 
continued their decline, in particular the unemployment rate which rose from 8% to 18% 
between 1980 and 1985. Given this situation the coalition government had little scope for 
corrective action: reducing the size o f the national debt for example, would have required 
earnings from economic growth yet the open Irish economy was adversely affected by the 
generally poor international economic context: as a result real GNP/GDP in Ireland actually 
declined in 1982 and 1983 and again in 1986. Consequently with regard to public finances 
“the pattern over the first half of the 1980s was one of deterioration up to 1983 and standstill 
or limited progress thereafter.”61
Thus a 1987 assessment of the condition of the country gloomily concluded that:
“The structure of the country is still such that it is properly to be regarded as standing 
somewhere between an industrial and a less developed country. Not only is its 
agricultural population relatively much larger than in industrial countries but it has 
fallen more slowly. The population is divided, moreover, between relatively developed 
regions and disadvantaged regions whose poor living standards can be paralleled only 
in the most disinherited areas of the Mediterranean. The birth rate is not only high 
but, until the fall in incomes in the 1980s began to be felt, has fallen surprisingly 
little. This ensures, along with the costs of disadvantaged sectors and regions, that 
much capital investment will be absorbed in low-retum infrastructural expenditure.”62
Unsurprisingly, after five years of recession under the coalition parties, Fianna Fail moved 
back mto government after the 1987 election. Having consistently criticised the coalition’s
61 Forfas (1996), Shaping Our Future: A Strategy for Enterprise in Ireland in die 21s' Century. 
(Dublin: Forfas), p. 71.
62 Cullen, Ireland Since 1660. p. 194.
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tight fiscal policies whilst in opposition, Fianna Fail was in a difficult position as the crisis in 
public spending had reached the point of no return and needed dramatic action: by 1987 the 
national debt accounted for 136.6% of GDP and over 40% of that debt was based on foreign 
borrowings.63 The government response then was the 1987 Programme for National 
Recovery, an agreement between the social partners, which included wage restraint and tax 
reform as part of an effort to “spur recovery by means of consensus.”64 However the huge 
deficits and debt placed strict limits on the extent to which reforms could be afforded - 1987 
saw the introduction of savage cuts in public expenditure and the introduction of an even more 
austere fiscal outlook than had prevailed in the first half of the 1980s.
At this point, external factors for once conspired in Ireland’s favour. International growth, 
especially in Europe, boosted the Irish economy, hitemational interest rates dropped, directly 
affecting Irish public finances by reducing the cost of debt servicing. Furthermore the drop m 
interest rates also had the effect of increasing discretionaiy incomes, and thus domestic 
demand, fuelling growth in the economy. From an average growth of less than 2% in the first 
half o f the 1980s, GNP growth averaged 4.5% in the later half o f the decade,65 aiding “rapid 
and sustained progress”66 towards the reduction of fiscal imbalance without prompting a 
recession. Only unemployment remained relatively unaffected by the improvements in other 
areas of the economy: although it did drop from the 18% high in 1987 to 14% in 1990, this 
remained amongst the highest rates in the OECD.67
The fiscal rectitude of the late 1980s contributed to the transfonnation of the Irish economy m 
the 1990s into the so-called “Celtic Tiger.” As of 1997 borrowing has fallen to “almost 
nothing,”68 with the result that public debt has fallen from its 1988 high of 141.3% of GDP69 
to less than 80% in 1997,70 permitting a slight easing in budgetary restraint. Thus the 1990s 
has seen some easing of the Irish tax burden, kick-starting domestic demand “which has been
63 Mjoset, op cit., p. 321.
64 Ibid., p. 383.
65 Forfas, op cit., p. 71.
66 Forfas, op cit., p. 71.
67 Mjoset, op cit., p. 384.
68 “Green is Good”, The Economist, 17/5/97.
69 Mjoset, op cit., p. 321.
70 “Green is Good”, The Economist, 17/5/97.
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the dominant source of growth in recent years.”71 External factors have also been critical - the 
U.S. economy has experienced persistent growth throughout the 1990s whilst European 
growth, although more erratic has generally been positive. As a result growth in Irish GNP 
between 1990 and 1996 averaged 5% per annum, more than three times the EU average in the 
same period.72 Indeed of the key economic indicators, only unemployment, which has hovered 
between 12% and 13% in the mid-1990s, has failed to exhibit a dramatic improvement.
The other remarkable feature of the Irish economy in the 1990s is the extent to which it can no 
longer be regarded as Irish. In most countries, GNP and GDP are largely interchangeable as 
measures of national growth. Such has been the success of the IDA in attracting foreign 
investment since the 1960s, that it is estimated that foreign-owned firms now account for 30% 
of the economy.73 Repatriation o f the profits of these firms has meant that Irish GNP has been 
consistently lower than GDP over the last three decades, perhaps by as much as 12% in the 
mid-1990s.74 As such the Irish industrial economy is now effectively divided into two discrete 
sectors: a foreign-owned high technology sector which accounts for 70% of all Irish 
manufacturing exports and a relatively unproductive indigenous sector. Critically, however, 
the last decade has seen a slight shift within new foreign investment: whilst new overseas 
investment has continued in the “traditional” foreign investment areas of pharmaceuticals and 
computer manufacturing, there has also been a shift towards more services-oriented 
investment, particularly in telemarketing, back-office data processing for American financial 
institutions and other international financial services:75 in short services dependent on the 
presence of highly developed communication systems.
3.3 Irish  political culture: T he P re-Independence A dm in istration  o f Ire lan d
As noted above, the dominant influence on any Irish policy for the first half century covered 
by this research is the UK. The Act of Union in 1800 merged the Irish and British parliaments 
into a single institution, meeting at Westminster. Ireland’s allotment of 100 MPs in a 600 seat 
Westminster parliament that was otherwise a two-party system, meant that only in the event
71 Forfas, op cit, p. 72.




of either the Liberals or Tory party failing to gain an absolute majority, were Irish MPs able 
to exercise any effective influence on policy measures debated in Westminster. On the few 
occasions where this did happen, the efforts of Irish National Party MPs, who accounted for 
between 80% and 90% of the Irish seats in Westminster from the 1870s to the 1910s, were 
largely focused on advancing ‘the national question’.
Whilst most issues relating to the administration of Ireland were thus decided in the UK, there 
was also a need for day-to-day administration of Ireland. This was centred in Dublin Castle 
around the figurehead of the Viceroy at the Vice-Regal Lodge in the Phoenix Park and more 
hands-on figure of the Chief Secretary, (usually a fairly senior member of the Cabinet) at 
Dublin castle. The scale of administration was fairly small: speaking of the office of the Chief 
Secretary, Chubb notes that “the scale of the administration was so modest, Dublin so small 
and compact, and the senior officials so homogenous and used to meeting one another at their 
clubs that George Wyndham, Chief Secretary from 1900 to 1905, found that the government 
of Ireland was ‘conducted only by continuous conversation’“ .76 Nonetheless the Irish civil 
service developed “pari passu”77 with that of England from the beginnings of administrative 
reform in 1855 up to independence in 1922.
With independence secured, it might have been expected that the new Irish government would 
replace or at least overhaul the administrative system. Instead the Free State simply took over 
the extant Whitehall model of administration ensuring that the influence of Britain upon Irish 
politics remained pervasive at a core level:
“That the political institutions then established and the services then taken over 
continued largely unaltered in basic design was due, first to the conservatism of the 
community and its leaders; second, to the continued cultural impacts of British 
contacts at almost as high a frequency as hitherto; and third, to a long-continuing 
ignorance of the experience of other countries.”78
75 Ibid.
76 Chubb, Government, p. 213.
77 T.J. Barrington (1967), “Public Administration 1927 - 1936” in Francis MacManus (ed.) The 
Years of the Great Test 1926 - 39, (Cork: Mercier Press), p. 82.
78 Chubb, Government, pp. 6-7.
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Continuity was maintained even to the extent of personnel. O f the 21,000 strong Irish Civil 
Service in 1921 “less than a thousand decided in the first few years not to continue to 
serve.”79 Thus the bulk o f the Free State’s senior Civil Service advisers were steeped in the 
British tradition, seeing no need for changes in administrative structures or practices.
As a result, in the early years of the state (indeed until the 1950s), policy-making lay in the 
hands of two groups for whom radical policy change was anathema. Quoting the British Civil 
Service maxim (“Clear sight over short distances”) Barrington argues that the Irish Civil 
Service inherited an unwillingness to engage in long term thinking, resulting in a lack of 
overall concern for the performance of the system as a whole, as distinct from its day-to-day 
operation. Nor was there likely to be much in the way of radical policy innovation from 
government. Despite their recent past as revolutionaries, the new leaders of the country were 
political conservatives. Furthermore the emergence of any radical left-wing party (that might 
have led Irish politics to split along the left and right axes characteristic o f the political 
structures of most European countries) was smothered by the split along Civil W ar lines and 
the consequent focus of Irish politics on the politics of nationhood.80
As a result argues Barrington, “In the 1920s the main aim of administration seems to have 
been the pursuit of ‘efficiency’ in the narrow sense - that is avoidance of waste.”81 Similarly, 
J.J. Lee contrasts the developmental role that present day governments o f Lesser Developed 
Countries feel they should pursue in their societies with that o f the first Free State 
Government, which broadly adopted the classic liberal view that “the state should do as little 
as possible”.82
An essentially Victorian administrative system based on a dual system of central and local 
government was, however, unable to cope with the demands o f a changing Irish society and, in
79 Barrington, op cit. p. 80. In point of fact the continuity of personnel isn’t very surprising - Chubb 
notes that by the end of the 19th century, die combination of increased state intervention the Home 
Rule movement, engendered on the part of the British government “a desire to associate Irish people 
more closely with the administration of their own public services.” Chubb, op cit., p. 213.
80 Although a Labour Party did emerge in 1921, it has remained the third party in a three party 
political system throughout the history of the state.
81 Barrington, op cit., p. 81.
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particular, the rapid growth in the size of government in the 20th century. A more adaptable 
administrative form was needed, one capable of coping with the ever-growing variety of 
quasi-commercial, regulatory, social service and developmental activities that the state 
become involved. The answer came in the form of the state-sponsored body, commencing in 
1927 with the establishment of the Electricity Supply Board. Writing in 1959, Sean Lemass 
noted that in contrast to some countries where “similar State-sponsored organisations have 
been created as a part of a deliberate policy of State socialism, they developed in this country 
in a haphazard way to meet particular needs and opportunities as they arose, when no other 
course appeared to be practical.” 83 In consequence little attention was paid to the need to 
provide them with clear mandates or to spell out the exact extent of ministerial and 
parliamentary control. To a very large extent this remains the case today.
By the 1960s there was an increasing demand to end the stasis in Irish administrative 
structures, especially in the wake of the first Programme for Economic Expansion.84 In 1961, 
Sean Lemass, the Taoiseach, urged departments to see themselves as development 
coiporations, but voiced his doubts about the ability of the Civil Service to act in that 
capacity:
“I think it is true to say that in some government departments there is still a tendency 
to wait for new ideas to walk through the door. It is perhaps the normal attitude of an 
administrative department o f government to be passive rather than active, to await 
proposal from outside, to react mainly to criticism or to pressure of public demand, to 
avoid the risks of experimentation or innovation and to confine themselves to vetting 
and improving proposals brought to them by private interests and individuals rather 
than to generate new ideas themselves.”85
82 Lee. Ireland 1912-1985. p 92.
83 Sean Lemass (1959) “The role of State-Sponsored Bodies” in Basil Chubb and Patrick Lynch 
(cds.) Economic Planning and Development. (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration).
84 The thinking behind the Programme was largely based on T.K. Whittaker, the Secretary of the 
Department of Finance’s own document Economic Development, which was originally intended as 
internal department document. Whittaker himself has played down his own role in the change in 
direction in economic policy, arguing that the real impetus came from Lemass who avoided 
appearing too radical by implying that it was the work of a civil servant. It should be stated that, 
given the shape of the Irish, the Programme was merely a common-sense response to economic 
stagnation. There was nothing particularly revolutionary about the Programme.
85 Cited in Chubb, Government, p. 238.
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This prompted the establishment between 1966 and 1969, of the Public Service Organisation 
Review Group, the report of which published in 1969 has become known as The Devlin 
Report, (after the Group Chairman, Liam St. John Devlin). The Group’s basic conclusion was 
that the “centralisation of detailed business in ministers was clogging up centres of decision 
and interfering with the special task of the higher civil service, which was to advise ministers 
on the formulation of policy.”86 Given this, the Group arrived at the Aireacht/Executive 
concept, an administrative mind/body split: the Aireacht, composed o f the minister and senior 
civil servants, would focus on the business of policy-making, whilst the Executive would 
implement it. Despite widespread concurrence with the Group’s analysis, little in the way of 
public service reform occurred until the 1980s. “Its reception,” notes Lee, became “a saga in 
itself unhappily confirming the Devlin diagnosis of the widespread ‘built-in resistance to 
change’ in the (civil) service.”87
Although public service reform has remained an issue, the question of improving public 
administration has been approached by seeking to improve the quality of decision-making on 
the part of politicians themsel ves. To this end the Dail committee system was expanded in the 
mid- 1980s, with a view to allowing the executive to pursue its own interests and to, in effect, 
let government govern. This has however only partially been successful: although it has made 
some contribution to improving the level of knowledge of politicians, the committees remain 
under-resourced and only the Committee on Public Expenditure is entitled to a Dail debate on 
any report it produces. Reports from other committees tend to fall victim to the shortage of 
government time. Furthermore the clientalist mode of Irish political culture (see section 3 .4.2 
below) does not encourage Dail Members to engage in political activity which to all intents 
and purposes is private (since committee work rarely attracts the attention devoted to Dail or 
even Seanad debates).
86 T.J. Barrington (1980), The Irish Administrative System, (Dublin: Institute of Public 
Administration), p. 27.
87 Lee, Ireland 1912-1985. p. 548.
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3.4. Policy-m aking in Ire land : Process and influences
Although policy-making in Ireland has been described both as pluralist and corporatist, both 
models offer three-stage model of public policy-making in Ireland. The first stage, ‘influences 
on policy-making’, includes political parties, pressure/lobby groups, the mass media, public 
opinion, the European Union and the public service. The second stage, ‘proximate policy­
makers’, includes the government,88 government advisers (e.g. party programme managers) 
and civil servants (the corporatist model includes trade unions and employer bodies under this 
heading). Finally, the third stage, ‘implementers’, includes government departments, public 
authorities and again in the corporatist model, trade unions and employer bodies.89
The actual decision-making is carried out by the ‘proximate policy-makers’. Thus in 
examining the Irish policy-making process the focus comes to rest on cabinet and thus on the 
interaction between ministers and the civil service.90
Traditionally, public administration and political science have approached the issue of 
minister - civil servant relationships in terms of the Wilsonian dichotomy: thus the job of the 
civil service is the apolitical application of technical competence to politically defined ends.91 
That is, the minister takes a decision and the civil service implements it. This model is 
reflected in the persistence in Irish government of the ‘corporation sole’, the constitutional 
requirement that a given minister be held to be responsible for every action carried out by his 
department (a practical impossibility). As Dunne points out, however, political science now
88 This category could also include the two houses of the Oireachtas since constitutionally the right 
to legislate is their sole prerogative. De facto, however, legislation emerges almost exclusively from 
the cabinet - only one private members bill has been passed into law in the last three decades - Fine 
Gael TD, Alan Shatter’s Adoption Bill.
89 See Chubb. Government, pp. 156-157 for diagrams oudiningboth the pluralist and corporatist 
models.
90 Although Ireland has experimented with a corporatist approach to policy-making it’s impact on 
telecommunications policy has been limited. The one long-term application of corporatism was in 
the series of national wage rounds and agreements commencing in the 1960s but abandoned in the 
1980s in favour of more comprehensive agreements on policy-making between the social partners. 
There’s scant evidence tiiat die most recent example of this, the PESP (Programme for Economic 
and Social Partnership), has had any direct influence on Irish telecommunications policy.
91 John Duime (1989), “The Politics of Institutional Reform in Ireland: Lessons of the 1982-87 
Government”, Irish Political Studies No. 4.
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recognises that “there is a considerable measure o f polite fiction in this master - servant 
stereotype.”92
Hence Chubb’s statement that it is difficult to distinguish between the respective contributions 
of ministers and civil servants in policy-making.93 He notes the distinction between ‘climate 
setting’ (the identification of major objectives and priorities), on the one hand, and decisions 
on specific policies (such as what steps are to be taken to achieve major objectives) on the 
other.94 The first he feels provides the framework within which policy is to be made. As such 
it should be the preserve of politicians.
Once this framework is established, measures are formulated and choices made to produce an 
operational policy that the department or other public authority can implement. “Policy- 
production” may be broken down into two distinct phases. The first entails “collecting and 
appraising data, analysing problems, defining issues, and identifying and evaluating possible 
courses of action . . . The second phase involves making policy decisions.”95 In theory the 
minister has the last and authoritative say and makes the critical ruling, given the element of 
responsibility inherent in the ‘corporation sole’ concept, ministers must in some sense be able 
to say that the policies they defend are “their own.”96
Given the above, why should there be any question that policy derives from ministerial 
decisions and that those decision are their own? The answer lies in the growing scale and 
scope of Irish government, particularly in the second half of the 20th century. Modem 
political society is increasingly “tom between two conflicting forces - on the one hand, the 
demands of technology for increasing specialisation, interdependence, expertise and 
bureaucratic systems and, on the other, the need for political accountability and participation 
. . ,”97 In other words, policy decision-making has become increasingly technocratic, relying 
on specialised information: it is no longer sufficient to simply base decisions on general 
political principles.
92 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
93 Chubb, Government, p. 159.
94 Ibid.
95 Chubb, Government, p. 161.
96 Chubb, Government, p. 161.
97 Dunne, op. cit., p. 4.
Given that ministers are unlikely to be specialists in the area covered by the ministry,98 the 
civil servant’s comparative mastery of a subject offers “significant opportunities for him or 
her to generate an independent “political” power base”.99 It does not necessarily follow from 
this that civil servants will seek to use this power base. Yet Chubb without ascribing any 
sinister motives to the civil service makes the following argument:
“Almost inevitably (civil servants) will be greatly (perhaps 
overwhelmingly) influenced by the traditions and attitudes of their own 
small and intimate professional world, especially in the departments they 
work in and perhaps have always worked in. They will also know the 
views of the state-sponsored bodies for which their ministers are 
responsible. It is they who use the resources of the departments to gather, 
process and present the material they think is relevant to any problem 
under review. In the course of this information gathering and appraisal, the 
civil servants involved will, as they must, frame generalisations and draw 
conclusions, many of which their senior colleagues and politician masters 
are not likely to question. Critical centres of . . . ‘uncertainty absorption’ 
are inevitably deep inside departments and some are way down in the 
departmental hierarchy. They are almost certainly coloured by service and 
department perceptions and attitudes. The civil-servant advisers of 
ministers are at the confluence of a great flow of information and 
conclusions from which they distil the essence for transmission to their 
masters. All of it is expert, but some o f it may well be service - and
98 Furthermore their chances of becoming specialists are limited due to time pressures. This is 
particularly the case in Irish polidcs where ministers cannot afford to lose sight of the fact that they 
are also constituency TDs. The proportional representation electoral system means that sitting TDs 
will face competition from not merely other parties at the next election but also from other 
candidates from their own party. Thus whilst a particular party might have a safe seat in a given 
constituency, there’s rarely such thing as a safe seat for a given individual. Take, for example, J. J. 
Lee on the 1977 General Election: “(Conor Cruise) O’Brien and (Paddy) Cooney probably lost their 
seats more through neglect of their constituencies than for ideological reasons.” Both men were 
Ministers in the Fine Gael/Labour coalition government of 1973-1977. Lee, Ireland 1912-1985, p. 
484.
99 Dunne, op. cit., p. 4.
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department - flavoured. In any case, most o f it will have to be 
accepted.”100
Thus the capacity of the politician to assert the “priority” of his or her concerns must be 
called into question. As Chubb puts it, “ In some cases, a minister reading a file will see only 
one possible course o f action, but this might be due to the way in which the matter is 
presented.”101
It is perhaps impossible at present to state definitively how the process of policy-making 
occurs in Ireland although its seems safe to state that the role of the civil service is 
increasingly important.102 Public discussion of the political role of the public service in 
Ireland is generally avoided by senior politicians and public servants alike.103 Despite the fact 
the policy-making is, at its simplest, the making of decisions for and on behalf o f the citizenry 
or public, the critical phases of that process are conducted largely in private.104 However it 
would be logical to conclude that the more technically complex the area covered by a 
department, the less likely it is that a minister will be able to independently arrive at policy 
initiatives. Thus in so far as the minister/civil servant relationship in policy-making is a zero-
100 Chubb, Government, pp. 164-165.
101 Chubb, Government, p. 161.
102 Having noted that the traditional ‘Wilsonian” view of government/civil service relations fails to 
offer a full account of that relationship, John Dunne (op. cit.) points to three other models. All three 
suggest that the role of the civil servant is “evolving based on emerging expertise.” Dunne, op. cit., 
p. 3.
103 “Issues of this kind are rather difficult to explore in Ireland, partly because of a tradition of 
stifling secrecy in government which derives in part from the practices of the old British system, 
partly from the conspiratorial style of the Irish Republican government and partly from a general 
secretive streak in the political culture. Some of the Irish governmental archives, for example, were 
kept closed to die public for 70 years after independence, a level of secretiveness that is almost Soviet 
in its intensity.” Tom Garvin (1992), “Democratic Politics in Independent Ireland”, in John Coakley 
and Michael Gallagher, (eds.) Politics in the Republic of Ireland. (2nd Ed) (Dublin: PSAI Press), p. 
228.
104 Furthermore there has been no tradition in Ireland, unlike in other countries, of ministers 
publishing political memoirs. In fact this research has only come across two. Gemma Hussey’s At 
The Cutting Edge (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1990) and Garret Fitzgerald’s All In A Life 
(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1991) both of which give an account of the 1982-1987 Fine 
Gael/Labour coalition government. In comparison with, for example, the terrifying honesty of former 
UK Minister for Defence, Alan Clark’s Diaries (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1993) - “We had 
one of the Public Expenditure Survey preliminaries today. First time I’ve done one of these, and I 
was totally out of my depth.” (P. 39), neitiier Hussey’s nor Fitzgerald’s offer any useful insights into 
the actual process of policy-making.
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sum game, it seems reasonable to suggest that in the more technical departments such as 
Communications, civil servants play a relatively large role in policy-making.105
There are, however, two major influences on the Irish policy-making process which fall 
outside the discussion above but which nonetheless are critical for understanding both 
historical and current policy formation in Ireland, particularly with regard to 
telecommunications. They are clientalism and the European Union:
3.4.1 C lientalism : C onsequences fo r N ational Policy M aking
No survey of Irish political culture is complete without reference to the role o f clientalism - 
the perception that “political life is mediated through persons, rather than offices, and the 
conviction that political decision and actions are functions of personal reciprocities” ,106
Although only officially constituted as a Republic from 1949 on, Irish nationalism has 
always, at least nominally, been informed by a commitment to Republicanism; a conception of 
the citizen/state relationship which promotes the creation of a public sphere wherein the 
individual citizen stands in direct relation to political authority, unmediated by a hierarchical 
authority structure. In short Republicanism promotes universalistic democratic structures 
wherein the main end of politics is to attain the good o f the body politic as a whole.
Yet arguably, within Irish democratic structures, republican ideals remain ideals. Several 
commentators surveying Irish political culture have identified both authoritarianism 
(“collective disposition to defer to decisions from those in a superior position in a power
hierarchy”107) and personalism (“a pattern o f social relations in which people are valued for 
who they are and whom they know - not solely for the teclinical qualifications they
105 Personal contacts with officials of the Department of Communications appear to confirm this 
opinion.
106 Jeffrey Prager (1986), Building Democracy in Ireland: Political Order and Cultural Integration in 
a Newly Independent Nation. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 220.
107 See both Prager, op. cit., and John Coakley (1992), “Society and Political Culture”, in John 
Coakley and Michael Gallagher, (eds.) Politics in the Republic of Ireland, (2nd Ed), (Dublin: PSAI 
Press).
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possess”108) as characteristic of Irish democracy. Neither are conducive to “a universalistic 
politics based on the individual citizen.”109
An explanation for the emergence of personalism is to be found in the argument that Irish 
political life has, since 1932, been “dominated by populist politics”110 a political form 
characteristic o f late-developing countries lacking both a strong working class and a strong 
bourgeoisie from which class-based parties can emerge. In consequence, party support must 
be sought from a cross-class base. Since the various constituencies are unlikely to share 
common interests, it becomes necessary to address them at a ‘local’ level (in the sense, not 
just of geography, but also of the issues relevant to that constituency).111 Hence clientalism 
(or personalism or particularism) emerges as the logical corollary of populist politics.
The success of the Fianna Fail party machine’s localisation and personalisation of politics in 
the 1920s and 1930s definitively established the pre-eminence o f clientalism in Ireland. A key 
feature was (and is) the close relationship between Fianna Fail TDs and their local party 
organisation. As TDs increasingly connected their political success to the power of the local 
organisation, they came to see their own role as ambassadors to the Dail (and to the national 
government and the various bureaucracies) on behalf of their constituents. At the same time, 
TDs were viewed (and viewed themselves) more and more as brokers for their constituents, 
representing the community in vying for the resources o f the state. The TDs’ charge, as Basil 
Chubb expressed it, was to ‘(go) about persecuting civil servants.”112
Given Fianna Fail’s electoral success of the basis of this pattern of representation, the 
competitive party system demanded that other parties follow suit. Thus, the increasingly local 
character of public representatives came to be a feature of all parties. This, accordmg to
108 Ibid., p. 32.
109 Prager, op. cit., p. 217.
110 Peadar Kirby (1997), Poverty Amid Plenty: World and Irish Development Reconsidered. (Dublin: 
Trocaire/Gill and MacMillan).
111 The difficulties associated with populist politics were manifest in Fianna Fail’s relationship with 
the Irish beef trade during the 1930s - despite a commitment to placing people back on the land (and 
implicitly taking cattle off it), Fianna Fail was also faced with the reality that cattle was a major 
contributor to the nadon’s international creditor status. Faced with the irreconcilable, Fintan 
O’Toole argues that Fianna Fail “dealt” witii the problem by simply ignoring it. See Fintan O’Toole 
(1995), Meanwhile Back at the Ranch: The Politics of Irish Beef.. (London: Vintage).
112 Cited in Prager, op cit., p. 222
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Prager, “altered the character of national political life,”113 the local figure - centrally located 
in the district but often unknown nationally - becoming and more common in the Dail. And 
hence the predominance of communal style of politics in Ireland today.
What are the effccts of communal politics on Irish policy-making? Although a politics based 
on cross-class support is not necessarily problematic, Kirby notes that it may hinder the 
progress of national policies, such as an economic development drive “when it runs mto 
opposition from vested interests.”114 For a party dependent on cross-class support there are 
potentially a huge number of such vested interests that need to kept happy. In consequence, 
argues Kirby, state resources are less likely to be used for long term universally applicable 
policies than for the “short-term satisfaction of different constituencies.”115
In short a clientalist ethos contradicts the ideal features of the democratic state, undermining 
the ability of the state to function in a universalistic manner. Irish politics, it has been argued, 
suffers from “a surfeit of the communal in its culture, its style, and in its influence on the 
organisation and processes of politics.”116 In consequence, political discourse on major issues 
is often minimal and decision-making, particularly in regard to the economy, is rendered 
ineffective. “Communal-style politics, though an excellent harvester o f the marginal influence 
that counts in elections, is unable to handle the problems of a modern (industrial) society . . . 
which necessitates wide acceptance of forms o f organisation which transcend the 
community.”117
3.4.2 T he E uropean  Union - effect of m em bership  011 Irish  telecom m unication policy and 
policy-m aking.
Ireland finally signed the Treaty of Rome in 1973 after the electorate agreed by referendum to 
amend Article 29.4 of the Irish constitution, thus allowing for the Treaties and Acts governing
113 Prager, op. cit., p. 222.
114 Peadar Kirby (1997), Poverty Amid Plenty. (Trocaire/Gill & McMillan), p. 198.
115 Ibid.
116 J.P. O’Carroll (1987), “Strokes, Cute Hoors and Sneaking Regarders: The Influence of Local 
Culture on Irish Polidcal Style”, Irish Political Studies, No. 2.
117 Ibid., p. 89.
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the European Communities to become binding on the Irish State.118 In effect, the Community 
treaties became a second Irish constitution and Community Acts and law became Irish 
domestic law. On occasion the two legal frameworks have been mutually incompatible. 
Successive interpretations of the treaties (EEC Treaty, Single European Act and Maastricht), 
however, by the European Court of Justice have emphasised the precedence of EU law over 
national provisions, a supremacy never seriously questioned by Irish courts.
There are no set limits to EU competencies - each of the treaties is considered a framework 
treaty, a treaty that “not only lays down rules b u t . . . provides institutions and machinery by 
which new legal measures may be adopted”.119 Thus the boundary between exclusive EU 
powers and national powers is a shifting one which until the introduction of the concept of 
subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty had exclusively moved in the EU’s favour. Only the 
initial rejection of that treaty by referendum in Denmark and its narrow endorsement in France 
in 1992 saw any to reconsider the balance of powers between the EU and its members 
states.120 Thus in the name of bringing EU decisions as close as possible to its citizens, the 
final version of the Maastricht treaty included the concept of “subsidiarity.” Thus whilst for a 
penod after the Single European Act there appeared to be no clear legal limits to the EU’s 
freedom for manoeuvre, article 3 b of the Maastricht Treaty (as later defined at the December 
1992 meeting of the European Council), stated that the EU could oidy act where it had treaty 
power to do so. Furthermore the same article stipulated that the Community should, in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity only take action:
“in so far as the objectives o f the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
the Member States can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved by the Community.121
118 Necessitated by the fact that Article 29.6 of the 1937 Irish Constitution states that no 
international agreement shall be part of the domestic law of the State save as may be determined by 
the Oireachtas.” Thereafter the European Communities Act (1972) provided that the Treaty of Rome 
and EEC acts, were binding on the State and shall be part domestic law.
119 Chubb, Government, p. 307.
120 Michael J. Baun (1996), An imperfect Union: The Maastricht Treaty and the New Politics of 
European Integration. (Oxford: Westview Press), p. 114.
121 Treaty on European Union, Article 3b. Quoted from Clive C. Church and David Phinnemore 
(1994), European Union and European Community: A Handbook and Commentary on the post- 
Maastricht Treaties. (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf), p. 65.
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In effect, with regard to Community regulations, a member state may declare that it considers 
the matter “sufficiently achieved” at the national level. Yet the practical interpretation of the 
concept of subsidiarity remains to be seen, however. Largely hit upon as modus vivendi to 
save the Maastricht Treaty, the concept has been criticised as vague and ambiguous and as a 
consequence unjusticiable.122 Furthermore it has been argued that subsidiarity, rather than 
simply bringing power back to the member states, increasingly focuses it in the dominant 
members: small states invoking the principle would effectively be excluded from:
“further input into policy decisions that will have an impact on their own policy 
flexibility nevertheless. Because of theses dangers of two-tiered Community 
development... weaker member states in particular can hardly risk being left out of 
decision by which their dominant partners want to forge ahead. They have to go along 
with whatever the dominant nations decide or face the danger of being left behind.”123
In effect subsidiarity may be of limited use to smaller/peripheral EU member states.
In any case, in looking at Ireland and the EU, it has been commented that the Oireachtas (the 
Irish Parliament) pays scant attention to EU affairs. Since the actual implementation o f EU 
legislation is generally in the hands of the civil service, bypassing TDs, Chubb argues that for 
most Irish politicians, the EU is seen as “over there” . This is in part informed by geographical 
peripherally but also because Community ideals and spirit are not embedded in Irish political 
culture. Thus for practical purposes, Ireland’s proactive involvement with the EU has been 
limited to economic rather than political issues; concentrating on the CAP; maximising 
Ireland’s take from the EU and preserving Irish neutrality whilst (implicitly at least) relying 
on the defence shelter provided by the rest of Europe.
Ireland has attempted to deal with EU law within the confines o f her existing political culture. 
But Ireland and Europe have different cultures. In Ireland the core political institutions are the 
government and Oireachtas : the relationships between them and their relationships with the
122 Ibid., pp. 70-73.
123 Baun, Imperfect Union, p. 52.
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people define the character of the Irish political system. In Europe however, the core 
institutions are the Commission and Council of Ministers (and more recently the European 
Council). EU decisions are generally the result of Commission - Council dialogue. Meanwhile 
the European parliament is, even in comparison with the Dail (far from an ideal of 
representative democracy), peripheral to the policy-making. Despite some increase in 
influence by the close of the 1980s, as public opinion became uneasy about the EU's 
democratic deficit, it still lacks the power or status of a national parliament, both because it 
does not determine the makeup of the “government” of the EU (i.e. the Commission) and 
because it lacks the power to initiate legislation.
Furthermore the increasing breadth of EU activity has limited the capacity of the Irish 
administrative system to evaluate the extensive flow of legislative proposals from the 
Commission and the balance within and between policy sectors. Not only is Irish 
administration segmented, with departments defending their areas of competency (thereby 
limiting the possibility for co-operating on areas that might require shared competencies), but 
there has been little systematic development of co-ordinating institutions or procedures for 
long-term, strategic policy evaluation or formulation. Despite the requirement in the 1972 
European Communities Act that a report informing the Oireachtas on EU activities be debated 
every six months these have generally been delayed and are infrequently debated. When they 
are, the standard o f debate in the eyes o f most commentators has been poor and ill-informed.
As a result, by the mid 1990s there has been little evidence of systematic thinking amongst 
Irish political leaders or civil servants about the top level Community Agenda, includmg the 
functions and powers of the EU, (particularly the issue of the relatively minor role o f the 
European Parliament), the impending extension of membership and the development of 
economic, monetary and political union. Except in the specific areas mentioned above, Ireland 
has tended to simply accept EU legislation as a fait accompli rather than seek to try and 
influence its shape - to some extent, the imposition of legislation from outside is seen as the 
trade-off for the inflow of EU moneys into Ireland in the shape of grants and subsidies.
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3.5 Summary
Having considered the material above, it is possible to make the following general 
observations and to tentatively suggest hypotheses regarding how the Irish economy and 
political culture have shaped the development of the telephone in Ireland.
Whilst the Irish economy has over the last century shifted from an agriculturally based 
economy to one driven by manufacturing and services,124 the shift occurred much later than in 
most other western nations. Given the emphasis placed by development theory on the 
importance of telecommunications as an infrastructural prerequisite, the persistence of the 
perception that agriculture was or should be the main driver o f the Irish economy until the 
1950s, might have seen telecommunications development focused where it best served the 
needs o f agriculture. Against this, given that telecommunications has not traditionally been 
perceived as playing a major role in agricultural development, it might therefore be expected 
that the development of the telephone in Ireland would remain slow until the emergence of a 
substantial manufacturing base.
The concentration of what industry there was in the late 19lh and early 20th centuries in Belfast 
and Dublin might have militated against the spread of a telecommunications network. This 
could have been exacerbated by the population decline and reduction in rural population 
density in the wake of famine. As noted in chapter two, low population density by increasing 
the marginal cost of connecting new subscribers, militates against the diffusion of any 
networked technology. Thus the diffusion of the telephone outside the relatively few urbanised 
areas in Ireland might have been expected to be veiy slow.
Moving to the 1920s, the pursuit of a fiscally conservative economic policy might reasonably 
have been expected to have made anything greater than minimal expenditure on the telephone 
unlikely. Against this the pursuit o f self-sufficiency in the 1930s might have generated a 
different approach, perhaps developing the network to aid Irish industry, although the absence
124 This research is conscious, however that the oft-noted shift from the dominance of manufacturing 
to that of services is problemadc, especially with regard to the definition of different types of work. 
See for example, the critique of Daniel Bell’s post-industrial society thesis in Frank Webster (1995), 
Theories of the Information Society. (London: Routledge).
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of imported materials during the second world war should have made any substantial 
development impossible. The shift from a focus on agriculture as the basis o f the Irish 
economy, towards a more open, industrialised economy in the late 1950s and early 1960s (and 
ever since) should have prompted a substantial expansion of the telephone network, although 
the recession of the mid-1980s would have seen spending reduced.
Finally considering the late 1980s and 1990s: given the encouragement on the part of the state 
of service type industries which explicitly depend on comprehensive telecommunications 
networks - teleservices, data-processing etc. - it would be reasonable to expect a greater 
emphasis on the direct importance to the economy of the telecommunications systems along a 
shift towards the provision of new ICTs and their related infrastructures.
Moving to consider Irish political culture: the tendency noted above for civil servants to act as 
“absorbers of uncertainty” might be expected to give them unusual influence in the more 
technically-oriented government departments, under which heading the Department of Posts 
and Telegraphs may safely be considered to fall. Allied with the observation above that the 
Irish civil service has historically been economically conservative and reactive rather than 
proactive, this might suggest that telecommunications development in Ireland would be driven 
less by a “conscious” government policy and more by the need to cope with demand as it 
arose.
With regard to the influence of clientalism: since the primary drive of communal/clientalist 
politics is the satisfaction of local wants and needs, national policy-making is likely to take a 
back seat. Yet there are some policy areas for which anything less than a national approach is 
insufficient - since the telephone is a networked system, improving the quality of service in 
one area was often a prerequisite for improving the quality of service in another. The 
predominance o f chentalist style politics in Ireland has a possible further consequence for 
telephone development since it favours a short-termist approach to policy-making: the lengthy 
lead times between the decision to invest in telecommunications development and the results of 
that investment actually being felt may have encouraged a short-term approach to 
telecommunications development.
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Finally with regard to the European Union on Irish policy-making: given the absence o f Irish 
pro-action in other policy areas there’s little reason to think that the case will be any different 
with regard to telecommunications. Thus, subsidiarity notwitstanding, it might be expected 
that Irish telecommunication policy has been effectively dictated by the EU since the 1987 
Green Paper on Telecommunications.125
These then are the hypotheses informing this thesis with regard to the effect o f specificities of 
the Irish economy and political culture on the development of the telephone and by extension, 
universal service in Ireland.
125 CEC (1987), Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecom mu nicalions 





4.1 G eneral Telephone Policy in the U nited K ingdom , 1880 - 1922.
On May 13th 1880, after ten months o f competition, the two major private telephone 
companies operating in the London area, the Telephone Company Limited (Bell) and the 
Edison Telephone Company of London, amalgamated to become the United Telephone 
Company (UTC). Between them, they controlled the critical telephone patents. Thus, until the 
early 1890s, when the patents expired, the UTC and its successor the National Telephone 
Company (NTC) were effectively able to operate as a monopoly.
Based in the London Metropolitan area, the UTC adopted the policy in 1880 of forming 
separate companies to service the Provinces. Sir Charles Gray, a member of the board of the 
Irish subsidiary, explained the relationship between the parent UTC and the subsidiaries thus:
. . not wishing to work all the telephones in the Kingdom, they gave concessions to 
various subsidiary companies in England, Scotland and Ireland. The arrangements 
with those companies were that the United Telephone Company should give them a 
user (sic) of its telephone for their districts, they contracting on the one hand, to pay 
the United Telephone Company a certain rental per instrument, and that Company 
contracting on the other hand, to give to the local Companies a monopoly of the use of 
the instruments in their respective districts, and not to sell or permit to be used therein 
any other telephones than those supplied to the companies.”1
From the outset, telephone development faced regulatory constraints in the UK. Claiming that 
his monopoly rights under the Telegraph Act of 1869 were being infringed., the Postmaster 
General (PMG) had instituted legal proceedings against the Edison Telephone company 
immediately that company commenced trading in 1879. In 1880, the court upheld the 
Postmaster General's complaint - defining the telephone as a telegraph for legal purposes.2 
Thus telephone exchange business could only be carried out by the Postmaster General or by 
a third party with his consent.
1 Hansards. 3rd Series, Vol. 288, p. 1056, 22/5/1884.
2 Attorney General v. Edison Telephone Company, 6 Q.B.D., 244. (1880)
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The PMG, Henry Fawcett, sought Treasury sanction to establish a comprehensive telephone 
exchange system, but the Treasury, still smarting from the experience of taking over the 
telegraphs industry in 1870, was reluctant either to fund the building of a second telephone 
network or to sanction the expense of purchasing the private telephone operators and 
thereafter of running the system.3 Contemporary political opinion in any case strongly 
favoured free-trade.4 Thus, in return for an annual royalty of 10% of their gross revenues, the 
Postmaster General licensed the UTC and their subsidiaries (plus any other company willing 
to accept the terms of the licence) to operate in limited areas across the UK - in a 5 miles 
radius around London and a 2 mile radius around provincial cities.5 The licence was to expire 
at the end o f 1912. At the same time, to strengthen the hand o f the Post Office when 
negotiating with the UTC, the Treasury permitted the Post Office to establish a limited 
competing network.6 A year later, the Postmaster General effectively added a new clause to 
the licence when he announced that he would issue no more licences unless the licensees 
agreed to sell telephones.
By 1884 it was becoming clear that the licence conditions were limiting the growth o f the 
business and competition: o f 78 applications to operate a telephone service between 1881 and 
1884, only 8 of the applicants had accepted the conditions attached to the licence. Responding 
to public complaint, in October 1884 the PMG announced the issuing of new licences 
removing the area limitations, permitting the erection of trunk lines connecting cities and 
allowing the opening of public call offices. At the same tune the PMG dropped the
3 The nationalisation of the telegraphs in 1870 had been a financial disappointment - the total price 
paid for the telegraph system (£10 million including the cost of purchasing rights from railways and 
international cable companies) was four times the original estimate, whilst the extension of the 
system into those areas which die cartel had not found profitable to serve had increased capital costs. 
In short, as Hills (op. cit.) again argues, "the envisaged economies of scale did not materialise" and 
in the first decade of state operation of the telegraphs, the service broke even only once.
4 For example: R. Biddulph Martin, M.P. for Tewkesbury to Fawcett, June 1882: "Does the Post 
Office intend purchasing a telephone company and thus creating a public monopoly which would 
deprive the public of the benefit of healthy competition?" Hansards, Series 3, Vol. 269, p. 1093, 
5/6/1882.
5 Encyclopaedia Brittanica 11th Edition (1911).
6 Throughout the 1880s the Post Office made "no attempt , to compete seriously with the pioneer 
companies," initially limiting its activity to installing telephones in premises that already had an 
ABC telegraph. By 1892, the Post Office had 35 exchanges giving service to 4961 subscribers. In 
comparison, the UTC and its six subsidiaries had by 1887, five years earlier, 18,912 subscribers and
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requirement that licensees sell telephone instruments to the Post Office on demand. Licensees 
still had to pay the 10% royalty to the Post Office and a new clause was added empowering 
the Post Office to buy out the UTC in either 1890, 1897 or 1904. Nonetheless, the new 
licences allowed the private telephone companies to plan their development with some 
confidence for the future.
On May 1 1889, the UTC and two of its subsidiaries, the NTC and the Lancashire and 
Cheshire Telephone Company, merged to become a single business unit.7 The decision was 
prompted by several factors: the expansion of the trunk network through the 1880s had 
created a physical connection between most of the UTC subsidiaries (although not the TCI). 
Furthermore, the original Bell and Edison patents, held by the UTC, were due to expire in 
1890 and 1891. Hence competition was anticipated: amalgamation would both facilitate the 
development of a coherent company strategy to face competition and allow the company to 
reduce the cost of service, (since it was assumed that competition would bring lower prices).8 
Thus by July 1889 the NTC was engaged in negotiations to amalgamate all the telephone 
companies.9
1890 saw the first deadline for a Post Office purchase of the private telephone companies pass 
without government action. It also saw the expiration of the UTC's patents, prompting the 
establishment o f a new wave of competing companies. As had been the case throughout the 
1880s, however, the UTC/NTC met all competition by either purchasing, amalgamating or in 
some way subsuming the new market entrants. Noting that the amalgamation of 13 o f the 
UTC's former subsidiaries had rendered competition impossible, and hinting that the Post 
Office's telegraphs revenue was increasingly under threat from the telephone’s competition, 
the PMG (Fergusson) moved to take control of the looming threat by mtroducing a new 
Telegraph Act in 1892.
219 exchanges. F.C. G. Baldwin (1925), The History of the Telephone in the United Kingdom. 
(London: Pitman), pp. 121-133, & Tables page 655.
7 Stricdy speaking the subsidiary company, the NTC, bought out the UTC (its parent) and the 
Lancashire and Cheshire. The original intention had been that the three companies would 
amalgamate but the PMG objected, arguing that "combination was never anticipated when the 
respective licences... were granted" (Baldwin, op. cit., p. 191). The NTC purchase of the other two 
was apparently sufficient to quell his fears.
8 J.H. Robertson (1947), The Story of the Telephone. (London: Pitman), p. 42.
9 Duke of Marlborough, Hansards Vol. 337, p. 1429, 3/7/1889.
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Despite public calls for the Post Office to take over the service, the Treasury remained 
unwilling to sanction such expenditure. Thus the 1892 Telegraph Act proposed a compromise: 
that the workings of the trunk lines be nationalised and operated by the Post Office, while the 
NTC retained control of the local exchange areas. Thus the threat of a “private monopoly 
against the public interest”' 0 was to be replaced by co-operation between the Post Office and 
the phone companies in developing the telephone system of the United Kingdom. Competition 
within given exchange areas was also encouraged, facilitated by the improved wayleave rights 
of private companies under the new act." Fergusson expressed his confidence that the 
changes in the structure of ownership would see the development of the service “proceed at a 
rate hitherto unknown.”12
At the same tune, within exchange areas, lasting private competition for the NTC remained 
conspicuous by its absence: the Post Office's 4961 subscribers and 35 exchanges in 1892'3 
provided scant competition for the NTC (which together with its non-amalgamated 
subsidiaries had 40,000 subscribers by 1890).14 The greatest block to private competition 
came from local municipalities which, seeking to enter the field of telephony themselves in 
competition with the private companies, generally refused to approve the wayleave rights 
sought by private companies (the 1892 Act had placed the power to veto the granting of 
wayleave rights to local authorities).
A final stab at competition emerged in the late 1890s - from local corporations. As noted 
above, the municipal corporations (Glasgow being the most vociferous) had campaigned to be 
allowed compete with the NTC in providing service. Despite the conclusion of a Treasury 
Commission in 1897 that municipal funds “ought not to be applied for the benefit of a limited
10 Hills, op. cit., p. 193.
11 Private companies sdll lacked the power to compel private landowners to permit the erection of 
telephone poles and wires but in the event that a landowner refused permission, the onus to explain 
why was placed on him or her.
12 Fergusson, Hansards 3d Series, Vol. 356, p. 170, 29/3/1892.
13 Ibid., p. 133 p.a. 5.
14 Charles R. Perry (1977), in "The Bridsh Experience 1876-1912: The Impact of the Telephone 
During the Years of Delay." in Itiiiel De Sola Pool (ed.) The Social Impact of the Telephone. 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), Appendix I, p. 91.
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class of citizens,” '5 by the following year R.W. Hanbuiy, parliamentary representative in the 
House of Commons of the PMG, began to advocate the granting of licences to local 
authorities. A select committee was established that same year to consider “whether the 
telephone service was calculated to become of such general benefit that as to justify its bemg 
undertaken by municipal and other local authorities and if so under what conditions.”' 6 
Condemning the telephone companies failure to sufficiently develop the telephone, the 
committee argued that increased competition from a really efficient Post Office telephone 
service was the best way to improve development. In the absence of such a service, either the 
government or local authorities should be immediately allowed to step in and provide 
competition.17
The Telegraph Act o f 1899 was passed in pursuance of the Select Committee's 
recommendations - a loan of £2 million was sanctioned to allow the Post Office to develop its 
own exchange business (which, by 1899, offered service to only 8,800 subscribers as 
compared with the 200,000 serviced by the NTC)18 and to empower local authorities to enter 
upon telephone business. Expenditure under the Act focused on the development of the urban 
telephone service at the expense of rural development, however: London in particular was 
given 1st charge on the £2,000,000. David Lloyd-George, amongst others, criticised the Act 
on these grounds, stating that by 1911 there would be “an excellent service in the larger towns 
. . . but there would be no extension of the service to rural districts at all,” and calling for a 
government to buy-out of the NTC.
In the event, municipal telephony was not a success - although 60 coiporations and local 
authorities had expressed an interest in providing service initially, only 6 went so far as to 
secure a licence and actually provide service. O f these only Hull and Portsmouth Corporations 
were still in operation by 1907 - 2 in fact had been bought out by the NTC
15 Report to the Treasury by Sheriff Andrew Jameson on the Glasgow Telephone Enquiry. The report 
concluded that the NTC rates in Glasgow were reasonable and that whilst die service was adequate 
but inefficient, much of the inefficiency in fact stemmed from the Glasgow Corporation's 
"unreasonable witiiholding of facilities."
16 Select Committee on Telephones 1898. (383) XII. 1
17 Ibid.
18 Perry, op. cit., Appendix I, p. 91.
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As a result, the 1899 Act was ultimately important not for the introduction of municipal 
telephony but for the impetus it gave to the expansion o f the Post Office service, representing 
the beginning of the last phase in the move towards complete state control. In January 1901, 
the Post Office Telephone system gave service to only 2026 exchange lines, of which only 117 
were in London19 yet by the end of the year they had agreed terms with the NTC to purchase 
the latter's London plant on the termination of the company's licence in 1911. Furthermore, the 
1899 Act specifically limited the future activities of the NTC to those areas it was operational 
in at the time the act was passed.
Four years later, the Post Office contracted to buy and run the rest of the NTC's plant 
(including the Irish operations) from 1911. When the network was actually passed over to the 
Post Office in 1911, however, it was found to be extremely run-down, the NTC having seen 
no profit in its maintenance after 1905. Thus, whilst attempting to make up for seven years of 
underinvestment, the Post Office did attempt between 1912 and the start o f W.W.I. to extend 
the network, building 450 exchanges across the UK in 2'/z years.20 As the finances of the 
nation were increasingly directed towards war aims, however, development of the network 
virtually ceased until 1918 (indeed a £4 surcharge was imposed on all new applications - the 
equivalent of a connection fee - to dampen demand).21 After the war, pent-up demand 
reasserted itself but the Post Office, faced with a dearth of both staff and materials,22 was 
unable to fully satisfy demand. It was the 1920s before development began to return to its pre­
war levels.
19 See Baldwin Chap XV, page 386-387. The Post Office's largest exchange at the time was in 
Newcastle-on-Tyne, with 650 lines.
20 Baldwin, op, cit., Ref. 22, p. 629.
21 Hansards 5th Series, Vol. 114, p. 2041, 9/4/1919.
22 PMG to Sir K. Wood on post-war telephone development. Hansards series 5, Vol. 112, p. 979, 
19/2/1919.
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4.2 Development in Ireland 1880 - 1922.
The first telephones in Ireland were private wires, that is wires directly connecting two places 
without going via an exchange. Typically the renters provided their own telephone apparatus 
whilst the Post Office erected the connecting wires.23 Surviving Post Office Work Orders from 
the period between 1878 and 1880 relating to private telephone wire installations give some 
sense of who the earliest private subscribers were and where they were located. O f the 13 
subscribers referred to by Wall, all were businesses and all were located either in Belfast or in 
Dublin.24
The first actual telephone exchange in Dublin was opened by the (Bell) Telephone Company 
in Easter 1880 and was taken over by the UTC when the Bell and Edison companies merged a 
few weeks later. The first Belfast exchange appears to have opened within weeks o f its Dublin 
counterpart, operated by the Scottish Telephonic Exchange.25 Dublin started with 5 
subscribers.26 hi Belfast, however, the tactic of initially offering 3 months service free to 50 
firms succecdcd when all but 2 or 3 27 took up subscriptions.
For a brief period Belfast was the site of conflict between two competing service providers, 
(the only competition in the Irish market until the 1990s) as some months after the STE 
established their exchange, the UTC opened their own.28 That there was an awareness of the 
consequences of non-interconnection between competing exchanges is evident from the 
following editorial:
23 Wall, Thomas, (1992). Some notes towards a history of telecommunications with particular 
reference to Ireland. Unpublished manuscript
24 Ibid., pp. 74-75.
25 This company was not a UTC subsidiary but was a separate company which claimed to be using 
instruments that did not infringe the Bell or Edison patents. See Letters to the Editor from J. G. 
Lorrain, General Manager of the STE, Belfast Newsletter, 28/4/1880.
26 A.J. Litton (1961) in "The Growth and Development of the Irish Telephone System”, Journal of 
the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, Vol. 20, Part 5, pp. 79-115, p. 81.
27 F.G.C. Baldwin (1925). History of the Telephone in the United Kingdom. (Pitman: London),
p. 108.
28 There is no exact date available for die opening of this exchange but judging by advertisements 
placed in the Belfast Newsletter, it appears to have been in October 1880. See Belfast Newsletter 
16/10/1880 and 23/10/1880.
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“When in one town, as was recently pointed out by a correspondent o f the Pall Mall 
Gazette, there are two separate companies at work, each with its own circle of 
subscribers, it follows that if a person wishes to have telephonic relations with two 
other persons being subscribers to different companies, he is compelled to join both at 
a double expense . . .  if competing companies continued to increase in number, 
intercourse by the telephone would soon become too expensive to permit of its being 
generally adopted. In their own interest and that o f their patrons, the companies which 
have been formed for the purpose of instituting telephonic exchanges should devise 
some means of meeting this difficulty.”29
The danger of non-interconnection passed (forever as it emerged) with the UTC decision to 
form subsidiaries to work the UK outside London: in March 1881 the Scottish Telephone 
Exchange operation in Belfast was taken over by the National Telephone Company (to which 
the UTC had assigned responsibility for working Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire and some parts 
of Scotland as well as the 9 counties of Ulster). Just over a year later (May 1882) the UTC 
had sold their Dublin operation to another subsidiary, the newly-formed Telephone Company 
of Ireland (TCI) which was to work the telephone in those areas not included in the NTC's 
area - Leinster, Connaght and Munster.
In Ireland, the 1881 licence conditions (specifically the limits on radius of operation,30 and the 
requirement that licensees sell telephones on demand to the Post Office) were to initially limit 
the spread o f the private telephone operators to Dublin and Belfast. Given the company's lack 
of certainty about its own future,31 it made little sense to invest in areas other than would 
guarantee a speedy return: tiius any quick expansion to lesser population centres was rendered 
unlikely by the company's primary duty to its shareholders. By mid 1882 there were only 400 
TCI and NTC telephone subscribers in Dublin and Belfast respectively. Nor did the 
Treasury's decision to sanction expenditure for a limited Post Office telephone system have 
much impact in Ireland: although in 1881 the Post Office advertised its own willingness to
29 The Northern Whig, 26/4/1880.
30 Although it's evident that from the outset the TCI secured a four mile operating licence as opposed 
to the standard two-mile radius.
31 "The companies had a maximum of 25 years in which to make as much money as possible." Hills,
op. cit., p. 191.
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“establish telephonic communication”32 in Irish newspapers and post offices, this was limited 
to a handful of private wires in Dublin.33 In 1882 the Post Office established three exchanges 
in Cork, Limerick and Waterford, but a lack of subscribers (contributed to by the Treasury's 
refusal to permit the Post Office to actively market its services)3'1, saw all three Post Office 
exchanges close “within a few years”.35
Within its limited field of operations, the TCI sought to target those institutions which the 
company felt were most likely to derive maximum utility from the relatively limited 
geographical area in which the company could operate. Although as section 4.3 below argues, 
the company’s general advertising was aimed primarily at commercial customers, the 
company also engaged in direct marketing to a number of civic institutions, offering service at 
reduced rates to variously: the Dublin Fire Brigade,36 the Dublin Metropolitan Police,37 
various offices of Dublin Corporation (City Hall, Mansions House, City Architect’s Office ")
and each of the Dublin Hospitals.39 The company’s persistence paid off: by the close of 1883,
all the aforementioned institutions had consented to become subscribers. (Nor, it might be 
added, did the company ignore the fact that its chairman Edmund Gray was also owner of The 
Freeman’s Journal, then one of the best-selling daily papers in Ireland. The adoption on 7 
May 1883 by Dublin Corporation of an agreement to allow the TCI to connect several of the 
Corporation’s departments was lauded in a Journal editorial as a “great public convemence 
and.., a real economy... saving the time of officials... Each (subscriber) will now be able, in 
case of fire... instantly to give the alarm by word of mouth to the Central Fire Brigade 
Station.”40)
By 1884 it was becoming clear that the licence conditions were limiting the geographical 
expansion o f the business: in order to extend the Dublin network to the suburb of Dun
32 Fawcett to Edmund Dwyer Gray in Hansards Series 3, Vol. 258, p. 765, 14/2/1881.
33 By 1891, the Post Office had only 34 privates wires in Dublin, all but three of which were 
"Government Service". From Report of Post Office Telephones in Dublin, 19th August 1894. Cited 
in Wall, op. cit., p. 93.
34 Hills, op. cit., p. 195.
35 Wall, op. cit., p 86.
36 Mr. Arthur Porter, UTC Superintendant to Dublin Corporation Paving Committee, letter dated 6 
October 1880, Cited in Wall op. cit. p, 76.
37 Edmund Gray, TCI Chairman in The Freeman’s Journal, 8/9/1883.
38 Dublin Corporation Minutes 1882, pp. 434-435. Cited in Wall, op. cit., p. 83.
39 Edmund Gray, TCI Chairman in The Freeman’s Journal, 19/5/1883.
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Laoghaire (then called Kingstown), the TCI had been forced to seek permission from the 
PMG to extend their radius of operation from 4 to 5 miles. The PMG had acceded to this 
request. However, a Spring 1883 attempt by the TCI to secure a licence to establish and 
operate an exchange business in Cork was thwarted, despite a parliamentary intervention on 
the TCI’s behalf in May 1884 by Charles Stewart Parnell.41 The PMG had demanded that the 
TCI agree to sell their telephone instruments to the Post Office, a condition which was, as 
Parnell pointed out, “absolutely out o f their power to accept. ” 42 As the directors concluded at 
the first general meeting of the company in May 1885: “They (the TCI) had no instruments to 
sell which settled the matter.”43
The new licences issued across the UK in 1884 by the PMG had the immediate effect in 
Dublin of prompting the opening of 6 call offices at each of TCI's existing exchanges, thus 
making the telephone available to non-subscribers for the first time. The removal of the 
limitations on expansion seems to have had little effect on trunk development, however. The 
TCI had discussed the establishment of a Dublin-Belfast trunk line as early as 188344 and had 
entered negotiations with the NTC in Belfast in 1885 with a view to co-operating on the 
erection o f a Dublin-Belfast trunk line. By 1889, however, the scheme seems to have been 
abandoned, the TCI blaming the NTC's decision to concentrate its expenditure on the English 
side of its operations.45 Nonetheless, while negotiations were still ongoing, the TCI opened the 
first private exchange outside Dublin and Belfast in Dundalk in April 18 8 6.46 New exchanges 
in Cork and Limerick respectively followed in 1889 and 1890, where the TCI had observed 
the poor performance of the Post Office exchanges for some 7 or 8 years. By 1889 the Post
40 Freemans Journal 8/5/1883.
41 Hansards 3rd Series, Vol. 288, pp. 418-419, 15/5/1884.
42 Ibid.
43 "Sometime ago the company applied for a licence to extend their system to Cork but the 
Postmaster General made it a condition that they should sell him their telephone instruments at a 
certain rate." E.D. Grey (Chairman of the TCI). Report on the Telephone Company of Ireland's first 
ordinary half-yearly meeting - Freemans Journal 19/5/1883.
44 Report of the general meeting of the Telephone Company of Ireland, 7/9/1883. Reported in The 
Electrician, 15/9/1883.
45 Report of the 10th general meeting of the Telephone Company of Ireland, 6/4/1889 - Freemans 
Journal 8/4/1889.
46 The Irish Times 13/4/1886. It's apparent that this exchange closed sometime before 1891 since at a 
TCI Board meeting in 1892, the Chairman expressed the company's intention to re-open the
exchange. (See The Irish Times 19/8/1892)
110
Office exchange in Cork was serving only 30 subscribers.47 Within a year the competing TCI 
exchange had 295 subscribers (indeed it was the success of the Cork exchange that cemented 
the decision to open the Limerick exchange).48 Thus by the close of 1891, the TCI had 1538 
“wires” in Ireland as a whole.49
In 1893, the TCI became the last of the original UTC subsidiaries to amalgamate with the 
NTC. Before doing so, however, the TCI considered another option - acquiring the NTC 
operation in Ulster. Yet even had the NTC been willing to consider the suggestion, the TCI's 
lack of capital (a proposal to open an exchange in Waterford in 1893 had been abandoned for 
want of capital), made such a venture unlikely. Eventually the company concluded that the 
share-holders’ long-term interests were best served by amalgamating with the NTC.50 The 
transfer was completed by July 1893.51 Thus a year later the amalgamated TCI/NTC systems 
had approximately 3,000 subscribers in Ireland, roughly a thousand each in Dublin and 
Belfast, 300 - 400 in Cork, plus around 100 subscribers each in Limerick and Derry.
The nationalisation of the UK trunk network in 1892 coincided with the building of the first 
permanent trunk line in Ireland in 1893. The TCI and NTC had completed an experimental 
Dublm-Belfast trunk line m April 1892, but it's evident that it only operated for a few 
months.52 Dublm-Belfast telephonic contact was re-established in 1893 when the Post Office 
trunk line on the same route opened for service Despite appeals from Irish MPs to further 
extend the trunk system to the South and West,53 this remained the only Irish trunk line until 
1897, when Cork and Lnnerick were connected with Dublin. The following August (1898) a 
third trunk route opened from Waterford to Dublin via Wexford, Arklow and Wicklow.
In Ireland, nothing substantial came of municipal telephony despite the Dublin Corporation 
Improvement Committee's conclusion in 1902 that “in view o f the extremely unsatisfactory 
nature of the service given by the NTC in Dublin, the establishment of a municipal exchange
47 Wall, op. cit., p 91.
48 Telephone Company of Ireland, Director’s Report for the year ending 31st December 1889 
Quoted in The Electrician 29/3/1889.
49 The Electrician 26/8/1892, p. 470.
50 The Irish Times 20/5/1893.
51 The Electrician 26/5/1893, p. 111.
52 Wall, op. cit., p. 132.
53 See for example, Dr. Kenny to PMG, Hansards Series 4, Vol. 16, p. 1715, 1/9/1893.
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would be in the best interest of the public.”5'1 Belfast Corporation went further, securing a 
licence to provide a service, but the corporations of both cities chose to follow the experience 
of other corporations before embarking on service provision themselves. The conspicuous lack 
of success elsewhere ensured that municipal telephony never became a reality in Ireland.
Compared to development in the rest of the UK, Ireland remained slow through the 1890s. By 
the close of the decade only the major towns were receiving service. To the already existing 
exchanges in Dublin, Belfast and Dundalk were added: Drogheda and Derry in 1893, Galway 
in 1897, Wexford and Waterford in 1898 and Mullingar in 1899.55 A large part of the slow 
development seems to have been predetermined. With the passing of the Telegraph Act in 
1892, the NTC was forced to surrender its general operating licence and to accept instead 
licences for specific areas of operations known as “exchange areas” . In Ireland 10 cities and 
towns were so designated: Derry, Belfast, Dundalk, Drogheda, Dublin, Wexford, Waterford, 
Clonmel, Cork and Limerick.56 The complete absence of any exchange area in the west of 
Ireland made it clear that the Post Office simply did not anticipate any growth in that area and 
was thus unwilling to licence the NTC to work there. (Nor could it. be argued that the 
exchange areas simply reflected those areas where service already existed since several of the 
towns had not received any exchange service.)
However, the lack of development also lay in the fact that the policies of the TCI and the Post 
Office were actively at odds with each other. At the 1892 general meeting of the TCI in 1892, 
the Chairman of the company, Alderman V.B. Dillon, outlined the following plan on 
extending their exchanges:
“ . . . so soon as the Government carried out their proposals of connecting other cities 
such as Waterford, Kilkenny, Galway and other large towns in the West and South of 
Ireland, the Company tnisted to open exchanges in these places, and to give them the 
facilities of inter-communication, not only with towns in Ireland, but so soon as the
54 Dublin Corporation Reports 1901, Vol. 3, pp. 243-246. Cited in Wall, op. cit., p. 98.
55 There are references to telephones in other areas before this point - the Freemans Journal 
30/3/1885 refers to a thief being caught near Ballinasloe in Galway as a result of a telephone call to 
the police - but these seem to have referred to private wires.
56 Anon “HMPMG and the NTC Ltd. Agreement as to Trunk Lines.” 25/3/1896.
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development foreshadowed by the Post Office takes place, with towns in England and 
Scotland.”57
However as Hills points out, in the wake of the nationalisation o f the trunk lines in 1892, the 
UK Treasury refused to sanction the extension of the trunk lines in anticipation of demand. 
The consequence of this policy for Ireland was made explicit by the PMG in 1898, in reply to 
a request that the trunk line be extended to the west and midlands of Ireland: “There are few 
directions in the west and midlands where the expense would be justified. The development of 
the trunk system depends on the development of local exchanges.”58 Thus a Catch-22 situation 
emerged: exchanges in new localities would only be built after trunk lines reached those 
localities, whilst new trunk lines would only reach those new localities that already had an 
exchange to guarantee that the extension would be remunerative for the Post Office (and in 
turn the Treasury). In practice, as is evident from development of exchanges and the trunk 
network (which itself almost exclusively followed the path of railway lines, the easiest source 
of wayleave rights)59, the extension o f the latter was often a prerequisite for the establishment 
of the former.60 Thus exchanges tended to follow the development of the trunk network. 
Unsurprisingly then, given the conflicting policies of the Post Office and die private company, 
development remained slow.
The absence of either subscriber or trunk development figures relating to Ireland in the 1900s 
makes it difficult to accurately track development in this period. Nonetheless, figures for the 
number o f exchanges - from 56S1 (PO and NTC combmed) in 1900 to 118f’2 NTC and PO 
exchanges in 1908 - do point to some growth:63 by 1908 only Mayo and Laois were entirely
57 Telephone Company of Ireland, General meeting of the company shareholders. Quoted in The 
Electrician 26/8/1892.
58 Hansards 4th Series, Vol. 56, p. 1536, 29/4/1898.
59 Litton, op. cit., p. 83.
60 Although this wasn't necessarily the case - Galway received exchange service in 1897 but had to 
wait until 1914 to be connected to the trunk network.
61 Litton, op. cit., p. 80.
62 National Telephone Journal Vol. 3 1909, pp. 238-239. Cited in Wall, op. cit. p. 106.
63 Litton, op. cit., p. 84. Unfortunately figures here are highly untrustworthy. The National 
Telephone Journal (1909) gives figures of 254 NTC and 79 PO exchanges by close of 1908 in 
Ireland. This research has given more credence to Litton's figures, based as they are on Post Office 
and NTC telephone directories. Nonetheless it does point up the difficulty of obtaining accurate data 
for this period in Ireland.
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without telephone exchanges.64 Nonetheless, it remained the case that the Treasury's 
unwillingness to sanction money for trunk development in advance of demand resulted m 
demand to connect up the network o f exchanges not being met. Around the turn o f the century, 
there was a  marked increase in the number of demands put to the PMG by Irish MPs to 
extend the trunk network, but requests to extend the three trunk lines - from Dublin to 
Mullingar,65 Cork to Tralee, Killamey, Youghal, Mallow, Fermoy, Dungarvan and 
Waterford66 and Limerick to West Clare via Ennis67 - were all turned down. In the case of 
Mullingar, Tralee and Ennis, it was considered unlikely that the extension would be a paying 
proposition for the Post Office: thus extension could only occur if it was guaranteed against 
loss locally (the other areas mentioned did not actually have telephone exchanges at the time).
By 1902 then, just 13 towns in Ireland were connected to the trunk network: Dublin, Belfast, 
Balbriggan, Drogheda, Dundalk, Newry, Banbridge, Cork, Limerick, Waterford, Wexford, 
Wicklow, and Arklow. O f these, Newry and Banbridge had required a guarantee of £65 
against loss which had been provided by the NTC. It was noted, however, that of the entire 
network, only the Dublin-Belfast trunk line had proved remunerative, steeling the resolve of 
the Treasury against sanctioning further expenditure.68
From 1904 onwards, however, once it became clear that the N TC’s Irish operations would be 
nationalised hi 1911, the company ceased to “incur any expenditure on which there was not an 
immediate return.”69 Thus the development o f new NTC exchanges in the 1900s tended to 
focus on those areas in and around Cork, Dublin, Belfast and Limerick where the company 
already had a presence. The Post Office on the other hand appears to have been more willing
64 Gunston, W.H., (1909). "Geographical Development of the Telephone as at the end of 1908" in
National Telephone Journal, Vol. 3, p. 238.
65 C. Hayden (MP for Soutii Roscommon) to PMG, Hansards 4tli Series, Vol. 75, p. 78, 29/7/1899.
66 M. Healy (MP for Cork) to PMG, Hansards 4th Series, Vol. 78, p. 288, 1/2/1900. In fact Cork and 
Waterford could already communicate telephonically via Dublin to which they were both connected. 
It was based upon the low level of communication between Cork and Waterford via this line 
(approximately 2 messages a day) tiiat it was concluded that a direct link between the two cities 
would not be remunerative.
61 William Redmond (MP for East Clare) to PMG Hansards 4tli Series, Vol. 79, p. 1447, 1/3/1900.
68 Chamberlain reply to Marquis of Hamilton (MP for Londonderry) Hansards 4th Series, Vol. 114, 
p. 1109, 1711/1902.
69 Wall, op. cit., p. 106.
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to locate new exchanges in relatively remote areas70 (although growth was still largely limited 
to the north-east and south o f the country).
The bulk o f Post Office spending on exchanges, however, remained focused on London. The 
£4,300,000 voted for telephones by the Telegraph Acts of 1892, 896, 1898 and 1899, had 
been spent as follows.
T able 4.1 T elegraph Acts 1892-1889: H eads of Spending
1. Trunk Lines: £2,180,000
2. London Exchanges: £1,495,000
3. Provincial Exchanges £262,000
4. Stock: £233,000
The situation might have improved in March 1904 when the PM G introduced a formal 
resolution seeking a further £3,000,000 to extend and amplify the telephone service. He stated 
that he wished to extend the Post Office Telephone Service in districts where it was urgently 
required and demanded and where they were unable to provide the service owing to lack of 
funds.71 Yet the focus of spending was unchanged:
T able 4.2 1904 T elegraph  A ct: H eads of Spending
1. Trunk lines: £1,300,000
2. London Exchanges: £1,500,000
3. Provincial Exchanges £200,000
Some trunk line extension did occur in Ireland in the wake of the resolution - two lines were 
extended to Coleraine, Limavady and Londonderry72 and to Mallow and Tipperary73 - but
70 See (Appendices) for the list of exchanges opened by the Post Office and NTC! respectively in 
1908.
71 Hansards Series 4, Vol. 132, p. 417, 22/3/1904.
72 Hansards Series 4, Vol. 130, p. 8, 20/1/1904.
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these had all been approved prior to resolution's passage. Furthermore, they were relatively 
short extensions. A request to erect a Dublin to Galway Trunk Line in April 1904,74 on the 
other hand, was again refused unless guarantees were provided.
The question of guarantees was partially addressed in 1906. By 21 June 1906, the system was 
in place whereby the Post Office itself assumed 2/3 liability for any guarantees given: 
henceforth localities would only have to bear 1/3 of the loss where a guarantee had been 
requested by the Post Office.75 Nonetheless, a fundamental problem remained with the 
guarantees for long-distance trunk lines: they were only as good as the weakest potential 
guarantor. Hence a 1910 proposal to extend a trunk line to Cavan (from presumably Newiy 
or Dundalk) via Clones foundered owing to the failure to secure a guarantee for the Clones 
extension.76 (A similar fate befell a 1909 proposal to extend a trunk line from Dublin to 
Galway when no guarantor could be found beyond Athlone.77) Given these conditions, rapid 
deployment of trunk lines became even less likely.
The fmal sustained attempt, pre-Independence, to extend the telephone into the rural areas of 
the UK and Ireland occurred between 1911 and 1914. In May 1911 the Postmaster General, 
H. Samuel Samuel expressed his intention to revive the party line system in county  districts. 
If  at least 5 farmers (or indeed any country dwellers living within a set radius o f each other) 
came together for one party line, they could have unlimited use o f the telephone for £3 per 
annum each.78 Despite a reasonable level of success in Britain (1,000 rural residents were 
using the line by 24 April 1913, with a further 500 in the process of being connected), the 
party line never took off in Ireland, even after the scheme was revised in March 1912.79 It was 
1913 before the first Irish application for party line service was made.80
73 Hansards Series 4, Vol. 131, p. 590.
74 Hansards Series 4, Vol. 133, p. 1302, 22/5/1904.
75 Hansards Series 4, Vol. 159, p. 430, 21/6/1906.
76 Hansards Series 5, Vol. 14, p. 563, 28/2/1910.
77 Hansards Series 5, Vol. 3, p. 1119, 6/4/1909.
78 Hansards Series 5, Vol. 25, p. 2180, 18/5/1911.
79 On 11 March 1912, the Treasury agreed to revise the party line scheme such that lines would be 
provided for only three subscribers, provided an average of two or more subscribers to the mile could 
be obtained. With three subscribers to the mile the charge would be £3 per annum, with two to the 
mile, £3 10s per annum.
80 Hansards Series 5, Vol. 51, p. 993, 8/4/1913.
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The failure of the party line in Ireland may be ascribed to two factors: the first, that the lack 
of privacy inherent in the party lme appears to have a particularly sensitive issue in Ireland, is 
difficult to back up with documentary evidence. Nonetheless, given the (admittedly over­
generalised) argument that the Irish character, particularly in the post-famine era, was a 
begrudging one wherein life was a zero-sum contest with one’s neighbour, it was perhaps 
unlikely that a shared communications technology would be a success. (Furthermore, lest it be 
thought that such assessments are predominantly made by outsiders it should be noted that the 
most damning descriptions of the national character usually come from Irish writers:
“In a stunted society, one man’s gain did tend to be another man’s loss. Winners 
could flourish only at the expense o f others. Status depended not only on rising 
oneself, but on preventing others from rising. For many, keeping the other fellow 
down offered the surest defence of their own position.”81
Hardly the breeding ground for the adoption of a telecommunications technology that relied on 
mutual co-operation).
The second problem was particularly acute in Ireland: party-line service would only be 
provided in the vicinity of existing telephone exchanges or where there was enough telephone 
business to justify the establishment of new exchanges and their connection with the general 
telephone system of the country.82 Another Catch-22: rural development could only occur 
where there was already development. When Irish MP, J.C. Lardner, complained that as a 
result of these conditions the low population density in Ireland meant that “in effect there 
would be no rural party lines in Ireland,” the assistant PMG, Norton, answered that the Post 
Office couldn't simply cover the entirety o f the U.K. with a costly network o f phones.83 Thus 
by January 1911, the 6,595 subscribers in Dublin and 7,267 in Belfast,84 accounted for the 
vast bulk of all Irish exchange lines.
81 J.J. Lee (1989), Ireland 1912-1985. Politics & Society, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), 
p. 646.
82 Hansards Series 5, Vol. 26, p. 1219, 1/6/1911.
83 Ibid.
84 J. Poole (1912), The Practical Telephone Handbook (5th Ed.) (London: Pitman), p. 608. Cited in 
Wall, op. cit., p. 106.
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Litton and Wall agree that between 1912 and 1924, there was not just scant development of 
the network but also little was done to maintain the existing plant much of which was “life- 
expired. ”85Schemes to provide additional underground plant and exchange equipment in 
Dublin and other exchange areas were completed in 1913, and it is apparent that expenditure 
for further development was approved the same year, but it is impossible to ascertain where 
this development would have occurred. There is a reference in Hansards to the fact that in 
early 1914, a general plan to extend the telephone in Irish districts was being drawn up, but 
the advent of war apparently saw it shelved.86 In any case the majority of work in 1914 
related to the Post Office plan to establish an efficient and coherent national (i.e. Britain and 
Ireland) telephone system. Under the plan, the territoiy of the United Kingdom was divided 
into nine zones, centred respectively on London, Bristol, Cardiff, Birmingham, Cambridge, 
Manchester, Leeds, Glasgow and Dublin.87 These were to be connected by “direct trunk lines 
of the highest obtainable transmission efficiency.”88 Thus the focus o f activity in Ireland 
focused on the orientation of the Dublin zone to the British mainland rather than on expanding 
the network deeper into Ireland.
Most UK development work ceased during war years although it's evident that some 
development did occur in Ireland throughout the 1910s: the Post Office established 70 new 
exchanges in Ireland between 1911 and 1918. At the same time, however, the decision to quell 
the 1916 Rising in Dublin by shelling the central headquarters of the Irish Volunteers 
incidentally saw the hub of the Irish trunk network destroyed, since the Volunteers had 
strategically chosen the General Post Office in Dublin as their base. Fresh expenditure for 
development in Ireland was approved in 1920, but again the work was suspended during the 
War o f Independence (1919-1921).89
Thus, by the time the Post Office and the telephone service passed into the hands of the new 
Irish state in 1922, there were 19,218 telephones or 12,500 subscribers, served by 192 
exchanges in the 26 counties. That development over the previous forty years had been
85 Wall, p. cit., p. 114.
86 Land Commissioner of the Treasury (J. Parker) reply to E. Kelly, MP. Hansards Series 5, Vol.
154, p. 1939, 14/7/1919.
87 Wall, op. cit., p. 138.
88 Ibid.
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seriously skewed was obvious from the fact that approximately 6,400 o f those subscribers 
were in the Dublin area, at a time when Dublin accounted for 15% o f the population. 
Meanwhile, the counties of Mayo, Leitrim and Longford had no exchanges at all within their 
borders, whilst Roscommon and Westmeath had just the Athlone exchange between them.









Ireland (26 countiesj 212.
The net effect of this was that only 2.5% of the total geographical area of the country had 
service by 1922. Furthermore, a combination of the lack of supplies during the war, and the 
decimation of the trunk exchange network, meant that the first Engineer-in-Chief of the Free 
State Post Office inherited “a general shortage of underground plant and exchange equipment 
when he was appointed.”91
89 Selby (Head of Contract Section) to O’Hegarty, 30/8/30. NAD H 1438/34 Vol. 1 “Telephone 
Organisation: Reports on Staffing and Operation 1930.”
90 All data from Litton, op. cit., p. 84.
91 Selby (Head of Contract Section) to O’Hegarty, 30/8/30. NAD H 1438/34 Vol. 1 “Telephone 
Organisation: Reports on Staffing and Operation 1930.”
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4.3 Conception of the Telephone
In looking at the history o f the development o f the telephone in the UK and Ireland over the 
first 40 years of its existence, there’s little doubt that whatever argument might be made for 
its more widespread social utility, in practice it was considered by both the Post Office and 
the NTC as a business instrument. Furthermore, as the example o f Irish development, above 
confirms (section 4.2), the telephone was considered an urban as opposed to a rural 
instrument. Jill Hills has argued that the service initially offered by the private telephone was 
companies was biased towards “large business users” 92 as a result of the “evolution o f the 
telephone service out of the ‘private wires’ of the telegraph.”91 It might be argued that the 
private wire telephone business (i.e. directly connecting two points without the intermediary of 
an exchange) carried on by the private companies before the widespread introduction of 
telephone exchanges had a similar effect, since such a service was only likely to be usefiil to 
those subscribers needing some way to facilitate frequent communications.
The early marketing of the telephone reflected the expectation that users of the service would 
be of a commercial nature. In Belfast, for example, prior to the opening o f the first STE 
exchange, the company placed advertisements in the paper including the names of all the firm s 
that had pledged in advance to become subscribers - there was no suggestion that the 
telephone might have a social function.9'1 Subsequent marketing retained this focus. One UTC 
advertisement placed in the Belfast Newsletter in July 1880 assured potential subscribers that:
“ ... It is a fact now recognised by the business communities o f all our great 
commercial centres that the telephone is alike an incentive to the transaction of 
business and a safeguard against the loss of life and property.”95 (Italics added)
A second advertisement from the same company five months later could hardly have been 
clearer as to the expected market: “A telephone exchange is now established in Belfast
92 Jill Hills (1993), “Back to the Future: Britain’s 19th Century Telecommunications Policy”, 
Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 186-199.
93 Ibid.
94 Belfast Newsletter 26/4/1880, 28/4/1880, 30/4/1880.
Belfast Newsletter 23/7/1880.
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through which merchant, banker, brokers and businessmen generally, are put into instant 
communication with one another.” 96
The initial charging policy of both the UTC and TCI in Ireland reflected the expectation that 
commerce was the key market for telephony. A flat-rate rental o f £20 per annum for 
subscribers situated within one mile of the nearest exchange applied throughout Ireland for the 
greater part of the 1880s. Since the flat rate permitted the subscriber to make an unlimited 
number of calls, bulk users were clearly favoured. The practical effect in Ireland as in the UK 
was that the first exchange subscribers were exclusively drawn from the ranks o f commerce.
Consequently it was business customers (actual or potential) who drove demand during the 
early history of the telephone in Ireland. When in 1913 the Postmaster General established a 
series of Telegraph and Telephone Advisory committees across the UK and Ireland, to keep 
him informed of local conditions, the Dublin Committee - although established by Dublin 
Corporation and including the Lord Mayor and three Corporation employees - also included 
three representatives each from the Dublin Chambers of Commerce and the Dublin Mercantile 
Association. Furthermore, within five months of the committee’s establishment in August 
1913, the Chamber of Commerce appears to have established effective dominance of the 
committee, hosting the meetings at their premises and installing their President, William 
Martin Murphy as the President of the committee.97 In short, the only representative body for 
consumers of the telephone service was effectively controlled by business interests.
There is some evidence that in Ireland the telephone was seen not only as a useful tool for the 
busmess affairs of individual firms but also as serving a critical infrastructural role. In 1893, 
the Cork Industrial Development Association, at the time the only substantial body of its kind 
in Ireland, adopted a resolution to the effect that “lack of telephonic communication was 
seriously hindering Southern Irish Trade,”98 and ensured that its message was conveyed to the 
Postmaster General via the Cork MP, Captain Donelan. Indeed, requests from Irish MPs from 
1892 onwards, for the extension of the Irish trunk network were consistently couched in terms 
of the needs of business. Typical of this was Roscommon South MP, J.P. Hayden’s April
96 Belfast Newsletter 11/12/1880.
97 Dublin Corporation Minutes 1913, pp.392-393 & pp 535-536.
98 Captain Donelon, MP. Hansards Series 4, Vol. 127, p. 661., 10/8/1893.
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1898 complaint that “businessmen in the west and midlands of Ireland [sought] the 
establishment of a telephone trunk line to Dublin, in view of the fact that such communication 
was enjoyed by the principle towns o f the north and south.”
Yet, whilst predominantly considered a business implement in Ireland, this was not 
exclusively the case. From the outset in Dublin, the TCI actively identified residential users as 
a potential market. One advertisement from 1880 stated that private lines can be erected 
“between residences, offices, mills, mansions, stables &c, &c.”99 Perhaps as a result, as 
many as 47 of the 166 numbers listed in an early 1882 TCI Telephone Directory for Dublin 
are residential numbers.100 Furthermore, in a measure that was apparently unique amongst the 
UTC subsidiaries at the time, from 1886 the TCI introduced a special residence rate of £10. 
At that year’s April AGM, it was announced that:
“the directors are devoting their attention to the development of the business in the 
suburbs of Dublin, and with a view of (sic) its encouragement have adopted a special 
rate for domestic wires, which it is hoped may be the means of inducing a number of 
their existing renters to have their private residences placed in communications with 
the company’s system.”101
Despite the TCI’s efforts, however, it seems likely that residential telephones remained very 
rare in Ireland throughout the period under review. Rentals were gradually reduced over this 
period (dropping to as low as £4 in 1907102) whilst the flat-rate tariff was replaced by 
mcreasingly progressive tariff systems: the message rate (which included a set number of calls 
within the rental) and thereafter the measured rate (which charged a minimum rental and 
charged for each call thereafter). Notwithstanding this, F.C. Baldwin has noted that in general 
m this period residential telephony “was largely confined to ... the well-to-do at their private 
residences... on account of the high charge.”103 Exactly what ‘well-to-do’ means in terms of 
income is impossible to define but some sense of how expensive the telephone would have
99 Freemans Journal 25/3/1880.
100 Wall, op. cit., Appendix A, p. 221A. It is impossible, however, to definitively identify which 
subscribers were business and which residences since there was no charge differential.
101 “The Telephone Company of Ireland (Limited)”, Freemans Journal 3/4/1886.
102 A. J. Litton (1961), The Growth and Development of the Irish Telephone System. Journal of the 
Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, Vol. 20, Part 5, pp. 79-115.
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been for the vast bulk of the Irish population m this period can be gleaned from Perry’s 
comment that the telephone would have been considered expensive for a “young Edwardian 
couple living in a London apartment on £700 per year.”104 Although there is little in the way 
of reliable statistics on Irish wage rates pre-1922, there are some indicative figures which can 
throw the relative affordability of the telephone into some light. F.S.L. Lyons notes that by 
1901, per capita income amongst the Catholic population (approximately three quarters of the 
total) had just reached £12.4, although for the Protestant minority the figure was closer the 
region of £37.105 Either way from 1880 to 1920, the cost of telephone rental would have 
represented a substantial portion of the average annual wage.
In general then, the telephone was de facto a business instrument in Ireland throughout the 
period under review.
4.4 C onception of the  Telephone Service
The conception of the role of the telephone service provider between 1880 and 1911 is unique 
in the period considered by this research since one has to contend with the views both of the 
private companies and the Post Office. The former, however, can be dispatched reasonably 
swiftly. Given licences in 1884 that were to expire in 1911, the companies had “a maximum 
of 25 years in which to make as much money as possible. Since tariffs were not controlled 
they sought to recoup their investment quickly.”106 The key determinant o f the telephone 
company’s action was the need to find opportunities for investment that would be 
remunerative in the immediate or short-term. Thus, there was little point in establishing a 
tariff structure that would encourage widespread diffusion such as one based on rate- 
averaging. Furthermore, in contrast to the United States in the same period, (see chapter two) 
there was at no point between 1880 and 1920 any effective competition for the UTC/NTC. 
Effectively then a private monopoly, there was no inherent reason for the UTC/NTC 
companies to look beyond the profit motive in deciding on the development of the telephone.
103 F.C.G. Baldwin (1925), The History of the Telephone, (Pitman: London), pp 606-607.
104 Charles R. Perry (1977), "The British Experience 1876-1912: The Impact of the Telephone 
During the Years of Delay," in Ilhiel De Sola Pool (ed.) The Social Impact of the Telephone, 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press), p. 78.
105 F.S.L. Lyons (1973), Ireland Since The Famine. (Fontana: London), p. 100.
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Less easy to dispose of is the question of the Post Office’s conception o f the telephone. 
Brock107 argues that a key influence on early Post Office policy with regard to the telephone 
was the pre-existence o f the Post Office’s own telegraphs system. Having purchased the 
existing private telegraphs system at an apparently hugely inflated price in 1868, the 
government had sought to protect their investment by passing the Telegraph Act, 1869 which 
conferred the exclusive privilege o f transmitting telegrams on the Postmaster General. For the 
purposes of the Act, telegraphs were defined as “any apparatus for transmitting messages or 
other communications by mean of electric signals.”108 Brock argues that the Post Office thus 
moved to block the development of the telephone in this period so as to extend “the life of 
telegraph technology relative to the long-distance telephone technology.”109
Charles Perry110 suggests as a second shaping factor the fact that m its postal and telegraphs 
services, “Great Britain already possessed the finest communications system in the world.”' 11 
Thus, the Post Office considered the telephony a luxury for day-to-day communications. 
Nonetheless, Perry maintained that there was a constituency within the Post Office which 
believed that the Post Office itself was in the best position to offer a telephone service, stating 
that what it “could offer the public was an efficient system to meet the needs of customers, 
especially business customers.”" 2 As one Postmaster General put it:
“The chief essential of the telephone service was efficiency. Therefore, rates would
not be so low as to render the maintenance of a highly-efficient service impossible.”113
“Efficiency” did not however encompass the provisioning of a telephone in every house, and 
made it extremely unlikely that telephone rates should ever be subsidised from other taxes.
106 Jill Hills (1993), “Back to the Future: Britain’s 19th Century Telecommunications Policy”, 
Telecommunictions Policy, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 186-199.
I0/ Gerald R. Brock (1981), The Telecommunicadons Industry. (Harvard: Harvard University Press),
108 Telegraphs Act, 1869.
109 Gerald R. Brock (1981), The Telecommunications Industry, (Harvard: Harvard University Press). 
Chapter 5.
110 Perry, op. cit.
111 Periy, op. cit., p. 75.
112 Perry, op. cit., p.83.
113 Hansards Series 5, Vol. 28, p. 1653, 19/6/1911.
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To these, Jill Hills has added a further dimension, pointing to the restrictive influence of the 
Treasury on the Post Office’s freedom for action with regard to the telephone service. All 
three views point to the fact that de facto, Post Office’s approach to the telephone service was 
quite restrictive. Thus, whilst the Post Office considered losses on the postal and telegraphs in 
sparsely populated areas acceptable as long as the service as a whole remained in profit, 
Treasury’s influence ensured that exchanges might only be opened “when the projected deficit 
was three per cent” or less. Thus in June 1911, the Postmaster General stated that a key 
determinant of telephone charges was the requirement that “The telephone should pay its own 
way, independent of exchequer financial injections.”' M
The influence of such stringency in the UK was likely to have a disproportionate effect in 
Ireland especially in the early part of the 20th century. The Irish branch of the Post Office had 
consistently lost money since the jubilee year of 1897 at which point “far-reaching 
concessions . . . (had been) granted the public at the expense o f the public purse.”" 5 In the 
years immediately prior to the WWI the loss on Irish operations was in the region of a quarter 
of a million pounds per annum, increasing to £1,200,000 in the last year of the British 
Administration.116 A report of the Irish Finance Committee read into the minutes of House of 
Commons in May 1911 noted that:
“With a falling population in Ireland and with no very marked advancement in the 
general activities of the country, an increase of nearly 74% in 15 years of running the 
P.O. deserves an explanation . . .  it must be attributed . . .  to the fact that enlarged 
postal facilities entailing extra expense and augmentations of pay, both of which were 
considered to be required in Great Britain had, under the unified system of 
administration, to be extended to Ireland, notwithstanding the circumstances of 
Ireland taken by themselves would not under either head have justified such large 
addition to the cost of the establishment there: thus a financial part nership with Great
114 Hansards Series 5, Vol. 28, p. 1653, 19/6/1911.
115 DD Vol. 3, P. 2234, 21/6/1923.
116 Expressed in a 1922 Civil Service analysis of the Telephone System. See NAD 5049/22 Voi 1, 
"Transfer of Services 1922".
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Britain does involve in Ireland a scale of expense that is beyond her requirements and 
beyond the natural resources of the country itself.”" 7
In short, had it been taken as a separate unit, the Irish Post Office would have been financially 
insolvent from 1897 till the close of the period under review. Given then that the Irish service 
was already running a loss on the postal and telegraphs services, it was unlikely that the 
Treasury would be any less stringent when it came to sanctioning telephone development 
expenditure in Ireland than it already was in the rest of the UK. The evidence advanced in 
section 4.2 of this chapter suggests that indeed this proved to be the case
4.5 Sum m ary: Universal Service 1880-1921
By 1921, some forty years after the first telephone exchange had opened in Dublin, there were 
approximately 12,000 subscriber lines serving a population of just under 3 million (or 1 
telephone line for every 250 people). This is indicative o f the initial lack o f success o f the 
telephone in Ireland especially given that there were 986,000 telephones in the United 
Kingdom as a whole by 1920 (equivalent to 1 telephone line for eveiy 47 people"8). The Irish 
Free State would inherit a national system that by any standards was underdeveloped and 
which entirely failed to connect substantial areas of western seaboard and the north-west. This 
contributed to the enormous imbalance in the spread of service: Dublin accounted for more 
than 50% of all subscriber lines by 1922 despite the fact that the city area was home to only 
15% of the population.
To understand the reasons for this lack of development and diffusion in Ireland, one must look 
to a combination of political, economic and social factors and to a lesser extent, technological 
factors.
117 Report of the Irish Finance Committee. Quoted during 2nd Reading of die Govermnent of Ireland 
Act in the House of Commons. Hansards 5th Series, Vol. 38, p. 971, 7/5/1911.
118 Based on figures for number of telephones and UK and Northern Ireland population from 
respectively: Charles R. Perry (1977), “The British Experience 1876-1912: The Impact of the 
Telephone During the Years of Delay” in Ithiel De Sola Pool (ed.) The Social Impact of the 
Telephone, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) and R.M. Punnet (1987), British Govermnent and Politics. 
(5* Edition), (Hampshire: Gower Publishing), p. 5,
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Taking political influences first, the conception of the telephone at government level was a 
huge influence on the paucity of development. As Perry notes above, the prior existence of a 
cheap, efficient and ubiquitous public communications system based around the postal and 
telegraphs services made the telephone a luxury that the Post Office (or perhaps more 
accurately the Treasury) was unwilling to subsidise. In particular the attitude of the state to 
the telephone service must be understood in the light of how the telegraphs service was seen, 
particularly after the decision in the early 1880s to halve the minimum telegram fee to 6d. The 
reduction was explicitly aimed at making the service universally affordable and accessible."9 
Henry Fawcett, the Postmaster-General, advocated a reduction on the grounds that the “poor 
woman in London was as desperate to be informed of a sick daughter as the wealthiest in the 
land.”120 Following the reduction, the telegraphs service would consistently register a loss but 
this was explicitly tolerated on the grounds of its social utility.
However, telephonic communications permit two human beings to communicate and interact 
in their own voices in real-time. Arguably this augments the social potential of 
telecommunications. Given this, why was the telephone not also identified as deserving of 
state support and if  necessary subsidy? To answer one must consider how the state understood 
the concept of social communication in the late 1911' century. A comment from one MP, on the 
reduction of the telegram rates gives some insight into this question:
“At present the 1 shilling telegram is a luxury to people in (the working) class ... the 
fact is that the great bulk of these telegrams are simple - a family death - and require 
few words.”121
Social communication in the late 19th century was understood as referring to the content of a 
given communication medium rather than the form of that medium. Thus the telegraph could 
be considered a means o f social communication to the extent that it permitted the transmission 
of messages of a non-business nature. The inherently social nature of telephonic 
communications was not overly stressed in the initial marketing or the telephone (indeed
119 For example: Dr. Charles Cameron put it to the Postmaster General (Fawcett) in parliament that 
the exisdng minimum charge of one shilling was prohibitive not only to the working class but also to 
much of the middle class. Hansards 3rd Series, Vol. 277, p. 955.
120 Ibid.
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there’s evidence that telephone companies were often at pains to discourage such use as it was 
considered to a frivolous use o f a business instrument). Thus at Government level the 
telephone was not seen as significantly distinct from the telegraph but rather as an augmented 
data transmitting and receiving device. (The extent to which this perception prevailed m 
Ireland can be illustrated by the Dublin Metropolitan Police’s 1881 decision to reject an offer 
for a reduced rate telephone service from the Telephone Company of Ireland in favour of a 
Post Office installed ABC telegraph service.122) Given this, the telephone apparently offered 
no substantial social utility over the existing telegraphs systems and the state saw no social 
grounds on which to subsidise the service. Thus when the Post Office eventually became 
directly involved in telephone service provision it pursued a policy of cost-based charging. 
Ongoing concern that Post Office involvement in the telephone service might results in losses 
was evident from the fact that the Treasury insisted that the 1899 Telegraphs (Telephonic 
Communication) Bill included a clause permitting the Post Office to set a minimum charge to 
be observed by all participants in the business of telephones. The Financial Secretaiy to the 
Treasury, Hanbury, justified this decision on the grounds that not to do so invited the NTC to 
lower its rates to such levels as to force the Post Officc to set its own at an non-remunerative 
rate.123
Having decided that active state involvement in the telephone was undesirable (at least until 
the decision to nationalise the industry in 1911) However, the government was apparently 
unwilling to place any universal service type obligations upon the private service operators, 
who, at the same time, lacking any real confidence in their own future, adopted a short-termist 
development policy, aimed at earning the greatest possible profits in the shortest possible tune. 
This was achieved by two policies:
i) setting rental charges at the highest rate that the market would bear and
ii) focusing development in those areas that could be served at the lowest possible 
cost per customer.
As Appendix XXIVa makes clear rental charges in Ireland over the period under review
121 Mr. Shaw-Lefevre to die Postmaster-General (Fawcett). Hansards 3rd Series, Vol., 296, p. 1072.
122 Dublin Corporation Minutes 1881, p. 492.
123 Hansards Series 4, Vol. 75, p. 303, 25th July 1899.
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fluctuated enormously from the 1880 figure of £20 per annum to the £3 rental introduced in 
1902.124 Given that a 1910 survey of Dublin families (which were likely to be better off that 
those livmg in the provinces) suggested an average weekly income of 22/6125 for the entire 
family, even the lowest figure above placed the telephone beyond the means o f the great bulk 
of the Irish population. (Lyons makes the point that Dublin wages at this time were “from a 
quarter to a third less than those of their counterparts in Britain”126 suggesting that the relative 
levels of telephone penetration in Britain and Ireland at this time may have been related to 
overall national income levels). Nor did the state take-over in 1911 see any decrease in 
charges, which remained cost-based, set according to the potential subscriber’s distance from 
the nearest exchange. In consequence, whilst figures are not available for this specific period, 
the relative expense of the telephone in an economy which had experienced more of less 
permanent recession throughout the 19lh century, meant that only commercial/civic users were 
likely to be able to afford the telephone service: this is apparently borne out by the fact that at 
late as 1936, residential subscribers accounted for only 28% of all Irish exchange lines.
The second policy, economic service provision, required a certain population density to justify 
the initial capital expense of building an exchange. In consequence population density became 
a key determinant in how the system diffused in Ireland. Irish population density in the 19th 
century was shaped by two socio-economic factors: firstly, as noted in chapter three, Ireland’s 
failure to experience an industrial revolution in the first half of the 19th century and secondly 
the dramatic effects o f the famine. In Britain itself, the Industrial Revolution prompted an 
equally seismic social shift that saw populations move from rural to urban areas, such that by 
1851 “more Britons lived in town than country and almost one third of Britons lived in cities 
of over 50,000 inhabitants.”127 In the absence of such a key force in Ireland, the population 
remained predominantly rural throughout the 19th century. As late as 1911, less than 30% of 
the population of what would become the 26 counties, was classified as living in urban 
areas.128 Yet whilst the absence of any large-scale industrial development outside the north­
east ensured that there were virtually no major population concentrations in Ireland outside
124 A. J. Litton (1961), The Growth and Development of the Irish Telephone System. Journal of the 
Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, Vol. 20, Part 5, pp. 79-115.
125 F.S.L. Lyons (1973), Ireland Since the Famine. (London: Fontana), p. 69.
126 Ibid.
127 E.J. Hobsbawn (1969), Industry and Empire. (Harmondsworth: Penguin), p. 86.
128 Lyons, op. cit., p. 46.
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Belfast, Dublin and arguably Cork, the Famine of the 1840s ensured that the Irish population 
as a whole would decline continuously for more than 100 years. Yet within this overall 
decline, there were substantial regional disparities in population density. The western 
seaboard in particular lost people both to emigration and to internal migration towards the 
east of the country. This is illustrated in table 4.4 below which outlines not just the overall 
population decline but the substantial disparities in the pace of decline in the west (Munster) 
and the east (Leinster).
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Furthermore the chart above disguises far greater disparities in population density at country 
level, more evident in Appendix XXVIa. These disparities were exaggerated by Ireland’s 
political and economic orientation to the United Kingdom, a fact reflected by location of the 
largest administrative and commercial centres in Ireland on the east coast Bucking the 
national trend, the populations of both Dublin and Antrim (of which Belfast is the county 
town) increased after the famine reaching a population density of 487 and 149 people per 
square kilometre respectively. Most of the increase was accounted for by the two cities 
themselves rather than their respective hinterlands. Yet the experience of Dublin and Antrim 
was not necessarily shared by urban areas across the country: overall by 1911, the total 
population living in urban areas (920,000) was still substantially behind the corresponding 
figure for 1841 of 1 million. Consequently, it was initially only the two cities of Dublin and 
Belfast which offered both economic locales for service provision. These were likely to house 
those firms or civic institutions that would find a use for the new service during its initial 
development stages. The fact that both cities were also major ports and thus at the hub of the 
national economy clearly increased the utility of a speedy communications system in these 
areas.
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In consequence Dublin and Belfast bccame hubs of national development. Development 
outside these areas largely depended on the centre. Hence the first trunk line in Ireland 
connected both cities, consequently leading to the establishment o f new exchanges along the 
route o f the trunk. Furthermore, in 1902, the Galway City Chamber of Commerce felt it 
necessary to appeal to its Dublin counterpart for support before making its (unsuccessful) 
request to the Postmaster-General to extend the trunk service to the west coast.129 However, 
notwithstanding the fact that, as section 4.2 illustrates, there was substantial demand for 
telephone service outside the Dublin-Belfast axis, this demand was only satiated when either 
the TCI/NTC or Post Office adjudged the cost of service provision to be sufficiently low to 
justify expansion. Thus, as a consequence of the NTC and Post Office policies of loss 
avoidance and adoption of cost-based pricing (or more accurately that level of pricing which 
avoided a loss), a House of Commons Select Committee pointed out in 192.2 that as a result 
those living in urban areas near exchanges were greatly favoured whilst “rural development 
has little chance of taking place freely.”'30 In short NTC/Post Office policies actively militated 
againsL development in areas o f low population density, under which heading most of Ireland 
could be classed in the late 19th and early 20th century.
In any case, it might reasonably be asked whether the telephone could in this period have 
fulfilled any supervening social needs in Irish society. At a glance its function as a 
communications device, and thus as a means of maintaining familial or friendship links, might 
appear to have obvious applications in a society which throughout the 19th century 
experienced an unusually high level of emigration. Yet given the main recipients of emigrants 
had been mainland Britain and the US, it should be recalled that an Ireland-Britain link was 
not established until 1893, whilst the first successful transatlantic telephone cable was not laid 
until 1956 (although radiotelephony was possible from 1927). Furthermore, those areas on the 
western seaboard hit hardest by emigration were also the areas least likely to be remunerative 
for the early service providers, and thus least likely to receive service. Furthermore, the high 
cost of early cross-sea telephone communications unquestionably dampened demand. In this 
regard it also should be noted that the traditional means of emigrant-home communications - 
the letter - served a dual function: although such letters were prized for their news content, the
129 Dublin Corporation Minutes 1902, p. 248.
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remuneration of postal orders, something that coidd not be done over the telephone was also a 
critical function.131 In short the telephone appeared to fulfil no pressing social need for the 
bulk of the Irish people in the late 19th century and early 20th century, even if it had been 
affordable.
Nor did technological innovations, although ultimately key factors in aiding the diffusion of 
the telephone system, offer much in the way of overcoming the problems posed for the 
development of the network by the low population density outside Dublin, and the cost of the 
telephone relative to average income. Nonetheless, it can be argued that the introduction o f the 
first exchange in Dublin in 1880, the point at which this work commences, did make some 
contribution to reducing the cost of telephony (and thus to aiding the diffusion o f the 
telephone) by substantially reducing the cost of interconnecting subscribers. It has been noted 
that “the most urgent problem during the early days of the telephone was to ensure that any 
two telephones, wherever they were situated, could be connected together by wires.”132 The 
introduction of the telephone exchange - whereby subscriber interconnections were made by a 
centrally localed operator radier than connccting subscribers directly via dedicated wires - 
kept the system from becoming too complex, whilst also offering financial savings by 
significantly reducing the outlay on erecting new wires. Thus, whilst connecting new 
subscribers in the absence of the telephone exchange would result in increasing marginal 
costs, the introduction of the exchange ensured that marginal costs fell as each new subscriber 
was connected: for the cost of one extra wire connection to the central exchange the new 
subscriber could be placed in contact with all the existing subscribers.
However other innovations associated with declining telecommunications costs in this period, 
such as automatic exchanges or trunk carrier systems, simply were not introduced to Ireland 
until the establishment of the Free State. It should be noted however that this absence, rather 
than slowmg down the diffusion of the telephone, was actually a result o f the slow pace of 
growth. As has been noted with regard to the UK, the introduction o f automatic exchanges
130 Select Committee on the Telephone Service (1922), Report (London: HMSO), p 23.
131 “By the end of the century, countiy families, already long habituated to the postal order as a 
means of receiving remittances from emigrant members...” F.S.L. Lyons (1973), Ireland Since the 
Famine. (London: Fontana), p. 52.
132 Peter Zorkoczy and Duncan Campbell (1977), The British Telephone System (2ml Ed.), (Milton 
Keynes: Open University Press), p. 20.
132
from 1912 was prompted by the fact that operators at busy manual exchanges were unable to 
keep up with the demand placed on them by increasing subscriber numbers: Zorkoczy and 
Campbell have noted of the British telephone exchange system that “having become large it 
had to go automatic.”133 (Original Italics). The absence o f such stresses on the Irish system 
meant that automatic telephony would not become essential until the 1920s, some 30 years 
after the basic technology at die heart of automatic telephony - the Strowger Switch - was 
patented.
In sum, a combination of political, economic and social factors conspired to undermine the 
development and diffusion of the telephone in Ireland up to 1920. The failure to recognise the 
social potential o f the telephone on the part o f the state left the service in private hands until 
1911, hands which understandably pursued a profit-oriented business plan. In the Irish 
context, however, the relatively few large-scale population concentrations (especially in 
contrast with the British mainland) meant that any widespread diffusion of the network was 
likely to be unprofitable in the short term, and thus only likely to occur with a service provider 
willing to subsidise the service. As this chapter should have amply demonstrated, such 
subsidisation was unlikely throughout die period under review.
133 Ibid. p. 29
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5.1 General Development 1921 - 1932
A 1933 Civil Service document surveying the development of the Irish telephone service over 
the previous decade noted that “when handed over to the control o f An Saorstát it was in a 
most deplorable state of obsolescence and inefficiency.”1 The sequence of the Easter Rising, 
the Anglo-Irish War, and the Civil W ar shattered a telephone network that had in any case 
been handed over to the Post Office by the NTC in pretty poor form. A 1927 cabinet 
submission paper outlined the development o f the Irish telephone network in the previous two 
decades thus:
“(a) When the telephones were transferred from the National Telephone Company
to the Post Office in 1912 it was found that the Company's plant generally was 
inadequate and inefficient, the position in this regard being particularly marked in 
Ireland.
(b) The European War broke out before it was possible for the Post Office to 
undertake any extensive renewals of plant and caused all Schemes of the kind to 
be dropped or postponed. The British Government merely continued the practice 
o f the National Telephone company of patching up plant already obsolete.
(c) The destruction of the Dublin Trunk Exchange in 1916 (in the General Post 
Office) and the destruction of lines throughout the country from 1916 to 1922 and 
particularly in the last two years of this period, aggravated the already bad 
condition of the telephone system.
(d) During the Irregular activities in 1922 and subsequently there was what 
might be regarded as wholesale destruction of telephone lines. The damage to 
underground and distribution plant and to Exchanges, such as Cork, was also very 
considerable during this period.”2
1 Anonymous survey of the operations of the Irish Post Office from 1922-1932. Prepared in response 
to request from Diarmuid O'hEigceartuigh, Secretary of the Department of the President 11/11/1933. 
Contained in NAD D/T S221.
2 NAD S 6921 memo to each member of the Executive Council (cabinet).
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On top of this, whilst overall staff numbers had been largely unaffected by the changeover 
from the working of the British Post Office to the Irish Post Office, the telephone section had 
lost many of its key technical and engineering staff which, as J. J. Walsh, the Minister for 
Posts and Telegraphs concedcd in June 1924, limited the speed o f future development.3 On 
top of all this, the telephone service was losing substantial sums of money, returning a  deficit 
of over £46,000 during the first year of the Irish administration.
Thus, faced with an underdeveloped national network, a lack o f basic plant and technical 
staff,4 and civil warfare for the first two years of its existence, the Free State Government was 
unable to make any significant progress in developing the national telephone network. What 
development did occur between 1922 and June 1924, was of necessity focused on Dublin city, 
where exchange capacity was doubled between 1922 and 1924. However, since by 1922 
6,400 of the country’s 12,500 subscribers were already located in Dublin,5 the real need for 
development lay outside the capital. It was, however, in 1924 and 1925 before “the first real 
departure in telephone extension began..”6
The state of telephone development in 1922 left large areas of the country unconnected: only 
2 / 2% of the geographical area of the country could receive normal exchange service.7 J.J. 
Walsh noted o f 1922 that “with the exception of the cities and certain important towns, it 
could reasonably be said that we had no telephone system at all, that at most it was only a 
skeleton system,”8 singling out Connaught as an area where there were “practically no 
telephones whatever.”9
3 DD 7, p. 2983, 25/6/24.
4 In May, 1925 Walsh admitted tha t" Our technical staff is not able to satisfy demand, and I do not 
see any hope of expediting matters, for the reason that there are no more technical men available in 
the country... We have explored every avenue for further assistance, but pretty much in vain." DD 
11, p. 2075, 21/5/25.
5 DD 7, p. 2984, 25/6/24.
6 JJ Walsh, DD 15, p. 2341, 27/5/26
7 Telecom Eireann Information and Public Relations Division, (1987) Step-bv-Step to the Digital 
Exchange (Dublin: Telecom Eireann).
8 DD 7, p. 2982, 25/6/24.
9 Ibid.
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That situation may be judged by examining a 1926 map prepared for the office o f  the 
Engineer-in-Chicf, showing the extent o f  telephone development in Ireland in 1922.10 (See 
overleaf).
































Even a brief glance at the map reveals obvious gaps. There appear to have been only three or 
four major trunk lines: Dublin - Belfast (with a junction at Dundalk that reached westwards to 
Sligo), Dublin - Galway (via Athlone and Balhnasloe), Dublin - Wexford (with shorter 
extensions to Waterford), and Dublm - Cork. South of a line drawn from Dublin to Limerick, 
development was reasonably heavy: north o f that line (effectively Connaught and those Free 
State counties of Ulster) the dispersal of telephone lines was extremely sparse: Roscommon, 
Castlerea, Westport etc. have no external comiections. The entire county of Mayo was cut off 
whilst the only major lines north o f Sligo are connected not with Dublin but with Strabane and 
Londonderiy in the six counties.
The working assumption within the Post Office was that the underdevelopment of the system 
accounted for the loss telephone service.11 Given this, Walsh outlined the following skeleton 
development plan during the Telephone Capital Bill, debate in May 1924:
“We drew up various schemes covering not only the extension of those parts which 
were ready tapped but of development in those areas, like Connaught, which have 
practically no telephones whatever. The first step in this direction was the 
supplementing of the main arteries connecting the principal towns . . . the moment 
that these main lines are completed . . .  it is intended to cut into the sub-districts, the 
smaller towns and subsequently the villages, and finally the country districts, 
otherwise to push on with a universal scheme o f  telephony,”12 (Italics added)
Thus the general thrust of telephone policy in the first decade o f the state was to achieve 
geographically ubiquitous service. From 1924 to 1931 (although particularly between 1924 
and 1928), the Post Office actively pursued a programme of expanding the reach of the 
network by opening exchanges in rural areas. Capital expenditure of telephone development 
increased fourfold between 1923 and 1926 from £53,000 to (a still modest) £206,000. Given 
the limited level of capital expenditure (even after 1924), the growth in the number of 
exchanges was quite remarkable: the total rose from 192 in 1922 to 617 by 1928. In May 
1926, Walsh stated that “We have made the service practically universal. Every town and
11 Anonymous P&T document, undated (but c. 1922) in NAD 5049/22 Volume 1.
12 DD 7, pp. 2982-2983, 25/6/24.
139
village, I think I can truly say, will have an installation by the time the next report is presented 
here.”13 A month later, the opening of a telephone exchange in Ballyhaunis ended Mayo's 
ignominious distinction o f being the only county in Ireland unconnected to the trunk network 
and without a telephone exchange.14 By 1933 telephone facilities had been “provided at about 
556 previously unserved towns and villages.”15 A limited ubiquity was achieved in less than a 
decade. Furthermore, in an effort to stimulate usage and demand the Post Office reduced 
rental charges for subscribers comiected to pre-1922 exchanges and introduced a general 
reduction in local call charges (from 1 Vid to l%d).
The limits of universal geographical service were, however, made manifest by the fact that the 
geographical expansion had not been mirrored by an increase in subscriber numbers. Had the 
1922 figure for subscribers per exchange (65) remained constant through the expansion o f the 
trunk and exchange network through the 1920s, there would have been over 40,000 
subscribers on the network by 1928. In fact there were less than half this figure - 19,000. Of 
102 exchanges opened in 1926/7, 20 had between 4 and 51 subscribers, whilst the remaining 
82 had less than four subscribers each.16
Furthermore, the geographical coverage of the telephone remained relatively low since the 
expansion of the network of exchanges had been limited to “almost eveiy town of consequence 
m the Saorstat.”17 (Italics added.) With regard to rural areas, Post Office thinking assumed 
that “use o f the telephone in a rural district must to a large extent depend on the use which is 
being made of it in the town.”18 Outlying villages, according to Post Office wisdom, were 
unlikely to use the telephone “unless for the use of getting into communication with the
principal business people in the towns.”19 Yet the fact that the standard rental area only
extended to a one mile radius of the nearest exchange made the phone prohibitively expensive 
for any potential subscribers outside that area. The Post Office continued to pursue the belief
13 DD 15, p. 2210-2211, 26/5/26.
14 Telegraph and Telephone Journal Vol. 13, No. 139.
15 Anonymous survey of the operations of the Irish Post Office from 1922-1932. Prepared in 
response to request from Diarmuid O'hEigceartuigh, Secretary of the Department of the President 
11/11/1933. Contained in NAD D/T S221.
16 The Irish Times 9/7/1927.
17 M.R. Heffernan, DD 23, p. 1191, 10 May 1928.
18 M R. Heffernan, DD 23, p. 1274, 10/5/1928.
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that rural telephone development was possible “only through the party line system.”20 Yet 
having completely failed to win over Irish rural subscribers during the 1910s, the party line 
made no inroads in the 1920s either. The requirement that at least three subscribers to the mile 
were necessary to avail of the £4 per annum party line rental remained problematic given the 
low population density in rural areas. By May 1926, there were just 4 party lines serving 19 
subscribers in the whole country.21 Walsh conceded that “we have not been very successful in 
spreading this party line system throughout the country at this time.”22
The Department o f Post and Telegraphs appears to have been bewildered (and somewhat 
disgruntled) by the failure of provincial subscriber numbers to increase in the wake o f the 
general expansion of the phone network and cheaper rates, particularly as the service 
continued to register a loss throughout the 1920s. In May 1930 Michael Heffernan (then 
Parliamentary Secretary to Minister for Posts and Telegraphs (and indeed for Finance) Ernest 
Blythe) complained “that in the rural towns the demand for the installation of telephones 
shows little signs of expansion.”23
The Department interpreted the failure of subscriber numbers to increase significantly as a 
marketing failure. In May 1926, JJ Walsh, complained that “the telephone habit has not yet 
caught on here and the public have not fully wakened up to the value of the telephone 
. . . They do not seem to realise the commercial value of this service.”24 Thus from 1928, as
die Department came “to the end of our extension policy on a large scale,”25 its attention was
refocused on encouraging the formation of the “telephone habit.”26
With the benefit of hindsight it is possible that the drive between 1924 and 1928 to spread the 
geographical reach of the network, coupled with the poor internal organisation of the 
Telephone Section of the Department of Posts and Telegraphs may have actually hindered an
19 Ibid.
20 DD 11, p. 2332, 27 May 1925.
21 DD 15, p. 2210, 26th May, 1926.
22 DD 15, p. 2210, 26th May, 1926.
23 DD 34, p. 1843, 14 May 1930.
24 DD 15, p. 2210, 26th May, 1926.
25 Heffernan, DD 23, p. 1191, 10 May 1928..
26 Heffernan, DD, Vol 23, p. 1191, 10 May 1928..
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overall increase in subscribers numbers by focusing development away from areas where 
there was effective demand. Examining the cause o f the “Partial arrest of development” in 
August 1930, the head of the Contract Section (analogous to a Sales and Marketing Division) 
wrote that the work of the Contract section over the previous decade had been “severely 
hampered by the lack o f underground plant in many progressive and important districts and 
the lack of equipment at a number of the larger exchanges.”27 The effect of this was that “a 
large number o f people who applied for telephone facilities but whose requirements could not 
be met at the time, subsequently cancelled their applications and declined to sign agreements 
when the Department was later in a position to carry out the work.”28
The Contract Manager acknowledged that on his appointment in 1923, the Engineer-in-Chief 
had faced a shortage of underground plant and equipment but stated that:
“ ... had he consulted with the Contract Manager and the Traffic Superintendent, he 
would have been asked to proceed with the laying of underground plant and the 
provision of new equipment in areas where the demands for telephone facilities were 
such as to warrant priority over works which were o f less urgency . . . There can be 
no doubt that the policy was detrimental to the development of the Service during the 
past few years.”29
In short it is apparent that a combination of the political decision to focus development in new 
exchange areas and poor internal communication within the Telephone Section saw 
development occur where there was little demand. Meanwhile, those areas where there was 
effective demand (primarily Dublin where plant was congested throughout the 1920s), were 
not attended to sufficiently.
27 Selby to Deans in NAD H 1438/34 Vol 1.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid. Interestingly in 1924, Mulligan did concede that "there is a very limited field for canvassing 
work at the moment". See NAD 825/29 Vol 2, Mulligan to O'Hegarty, 17th September 1924. 
Furthermore, there was some recognition of this problem in the Dail. Sean Lemass complained in 
May 1930 that "When the work of this Department was being planned out it should have occurred to 
the responsible heads of the Department that the demand for extensions was likely to be much 
greater in a district like Rathmines and Rathgar than in any town in die country." See DD 34, p. 
1848, 14th May 1930.
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Nonetheless, by 1927 there was a move to improve the workings of the service in Dublin. The 
Irish Post Office had considered converting central Dublin to automatic working as early as 
September 1922,30 but the lack of both plant and sufficient technical personnel saw the plan 
put aside until September 1924, by which time Dublin's main manual exchange at Crown 
Alley was overloaded. Apparently convinced of the improvements in service quality (due to 
quicker connection times and 24 hour service) and cost savings that would accrue from 
automatic working, in September 1924 JJ Walsh announced a five year programme to bring 
full automatic working to Dublin city and suburbs within a five mile radius.31 The first 
exchange opened in 1927 and by 1936 some 90% of Dublin subscribers were connected to 
automatic systems. Although the initial capital cost o f the new exchanges was quite 
substantial (the first two exchanges at Ship Street and Merrion Street cumulatively cost over 
£53,000 pounds32), it was argued that over their lifetime the exchanges would by obviating 
the need to employ exchange staff by virtue of the increase in the number o f subscribers that 
could be connected to a single exchange). However the initial expense was such that following 
the opening of the first two Dublin exchanges in 1926 and 1927, further auto-exchanges 
would only by contemplated when the service was earning a profit. As a consequence of this it 
actually took fifteen years before the “five year programme” announced by Walsh in 1924 
was completed.33
The automation of the Dublin network created a substantial quality differential between the 
level of service available in Dublin and that available in the provinces where automation 
would not begin until 1949.34 Provincial subscribers on most manual exchanges.35 (despite 
frequently paying more for their service than their Dublin counterparts) lacked a 24 hour 
service and had only a skeleton service on a Sunday (typically 9 am to 10.30 am36). 
Furthermore the bulk of the equipment used in provincial districts after 1926 had been
30 Record of Official Papers Book No. 1, pp. 632-658. Cited in Thomas Wall(1994), Notes Towards 
a History of Telecommunications, (Unpublished manuscript), p. 114.
3 * The Irish Independent 1/9/1924.
32 Wall, op. cit., p. 118.
33 Ibid., p. 115.
34 When an automatic exchange was opened in Cork.
35 In 1929, only 82 exchanges of a total of 654 offered continuous service. All were located in cities 
or large towns. See DD 32, p. 1089, 13/11/1929 for full list.
36 Hefifernan, DD 32, p. 1089, 13/11/1929.
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recycled from that made spare by the automation of the Dublin system.37 In March 1931, 
Michael R. Heffeman, then Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, 
conceded that the quality of the service in rural areas was not equal to that o f the Dublin 
network, not only because of the fact o f different hours o f service but because “we have given 
the least modem plant to the rural areas, and we have made use of lines which were not as 
modern as we would like them to be.”38 The alternative, he argued, would be to have no 
service at all in such areas. Furthermore, he offered no hope that rural service would improve 
in the short term:
“As to future development policy, owing to the work already done there is not scope 
for any immediate large-scale extension, and therefore capital expenditure will be 
substantially less than in the past.”39
hi short having filled in the more glaring gaps in the national network, the Post Office decided 
that further expansion would only occur in response to effective demand.
5.2 General Development 1933 -1 9 3 9
On June 27 1933, Fianna Fail Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, Gerry Boland40 announced 
the first profits - of £66,947 - from combined services of the Irish Post Office.41 Given the 
financial state o f the countiy, which was increasingly affected by the global economic 
depression, initial reaction to the profits was cautious. Boland's response to the profit sought 
to discourage further demands for development, evincing a pessimistic tone with regard to the 
economics of telephone development in Ireland:
“Unlike England . . . there are very few big towns and we caimot hope to have the 
telephone used to the same extent all over the country as in other countries . . .  I do
37 Wall, op cit., p. 122.
38 DD 37, p. 2346, 27/3/1931.
39 DD 37, p. 2332,27/3/1931
40 Boland was not in fact die first Fianna Fail Posts and Telegraphs Minister: Senator Joseph 
Connolly had held the post up till March 3 1933, but little of relevance to this research occurred 
under Connolly. See DD 46, p.46, 3 March 1933.
41 DD 47, p. 1348, 27 June 1933.
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not think . . . that for some time, until the population increases and the country gets 
more prosperous and we have bigger centres of population that the telephone will be 
so extensively used as it is in other countries.”42
The onset of national recession remained the prevailing influence on telephone policy 
throughout the early 1930s. Speaking in 1935, Gerry Boland commented that:
“I do not know how we can be expected to go ahead with a big telephone development 
scheme when, not only in this country but in every countiy there is depression . . . 
This is not the time to ask the Government to subsidise . . .  a big telephone and postal 
development scheme.”43
The reluctance to spend was reflected in the levels o f telephone capital investment during the 
early 1930s which dropped from £206,000 in 1926 to £31,000 in 1934. The Department had 
always considered the levels of investment up to 1928 as abnormal, necessitated by the need 
to recover the ground lost during the political upheavals between 1914 and 1924. Thereafter 
“the Capital Expenditure required annually is not likely to be more than one-third of the 
average annual expenditure up to, say, March 1930.”44 In June 1933, Boland alluded to the 
fact that some engineering staff were being made redundant “due to the fact that the 
£1,000,000 advanced for telephone reconstruction had been spent.”45 Thus despite the 
Telephone Section's increasing profits from 1932 onwards (£41,613 in 1932 - 1933 and 
£44,009 in 1933 - 34) capital expenditure on development remained low. This was reflected in 
the pace o f exchange expansion, which after the rapid development o f the 1920s, slowed 
dramatically in the 1930s: less than 30 new exchanges opened between 1931 and 1935.
As a consequence, the growth in subscribers in the early 1930s was unimpressive, rising from 
21,50046 in 1931 to 23,20047 in 1935. Furthermore, growth was largely limited to Dublin
42 DD 47, p. 1367, 27 June 1933.
43 DD 56, p. 826, 10/5/1935.
44 Anonymous memo to each member of the Executive Council on the Telephone Capital Bill,
1927. NAD S 6921 Telephone Capital Bill 1927.




which by 1935 accounted for 11,200 of the 23,200 subscribers in Ireland.48 Boland noted in 
1935 that “Notwithstanding special canvassing in the provinces, the results have been 
disappointing.”49
Efforts at promoting the telephone had been hampered by the lack of development. Broadcast 
advertising was barred for fear of encouraging demand in those “areas in the country where 
saturation point has been reached.”50 The Department's marketing campaign was therefore 
limited to direct canvassing in specific (largely outside Dublin) areas o f the country,51 yet it 
was apparent that the major problem was not a lack of knowledge of the telephone system but 
the relatively high cost o f rural installation that made rural dwellers resistant to the effects of 
canvassing. As early as 1930, the Head of the Contract Section had argued in a letter to P.S. 
O’Hegarty, Secretary at the Department of Posts and Telegraphs that:
“There is very little prospect of obtaining any appreciable increase hi the number of 
subscribers where the £7.10.0 rate is in force and it does not pay, at present, to send 
an officer to carry out a canvas at such places.”52
One Dail deputy made the same argument more bluntly in May 1935
“You may fill all the newspapers and cover all the telegraph poles and dead walls in 
the country with advertisements but it will be no use unless you fix a charge for the 
telephone which the people can afford to pay.”53
48 At the same time only 472,935 of a total Irish population of 2,968,420 lived in the Dublin area. 
See Terence Brown (1981), Ireland: A Social and Cultural History. 1922-79. (London: Fontana), p. 
152.
49 DD 56, p. 744, 9 May 1935.
50 Ibid.
51 "There is a reason why we cannot broadcast advertisements, and it is diat in certain areas in the 
country saturation point has been reached. From the telephone point of view there are certain areas 
which may be described as congested at the moment, and the reason why we cannot invite new 
subscribers is because it will take some time before the new cables can be laid down in them." DD 
51, p. 1781, 12/4/1934.
52 Selby (Head of Contract Section) to O’Hegarty, 30/8/30. NAD H 1438/34 Vol. 1 “Telephone 
Organisation: Reports on Staffing and Operation 1930.”
53 DD 56, p. 817, 10/5/1935.
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A major shift in policy was just around the comer, however. Between 1933/34 and 1934/35, 
profits from the combined Post Office services increased by nearly 600% to £206,860 - the 
telephone branch alone returned a surplus o f £78,067 on expenditure o f £389,885. As a result 
of the increased profits in the telephone section, Boland finally conceded a reduction in 
charges, timed to come into effect from July 1 of that year:
“In view of the improving position for the past few years, and particularly of the 
profit for the year 1934-35, that is £78,067,1 came to the conclusion that the time has 
come when the demand of the public for a cheaper telephone service should be met”54
The major changes were as follows:
1. Subscribers connected to exchanges built after 1922 had their standard rental o f £7 
10s reduced to £6 10s for a business line and £5 for a residence line, (pre-1922 
exchange subscribers having received this benefit some ten years earlier).
2. The "free mileage" radius - i.e. the mileage covered by the standard rental - was 
extended from one to three miles.
3. Fees for local calls were reduced from 1 'Ad to Id.
4. General reduction o f all trunk calls charges, including the placement of a ceiling of 
2s 6d for any call made to places within the 26 counties and a 4s ceiling for all calls 
to Great Britain and Northern Ireland.55
The extension for the free mileage area was the most significant change, extending the 
geographical area covered under free mileage from just over three square miles per exchange 
to over 28 square miles.56 Having previously been under fire for neglecting rural districts
54 DD 61, p. 259, 25/3/1936.
55 Ibid.
56 The formula for calculating the area of a circle is nr2. Assuming diat the free mileage area 
extended as a circle beyond the exchange, the one mile free mileage areas would cover 3.14 square
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Boland characterised the extension of the free radius in telephone rentals as “a concession to 
the country districts”57 since those potential subscribers living in provincial areas would be 
the biggest beneficiaries of the extension. The high density of exchanges in the Dublin City 
area meant that most city inhabitants had already been located within the previous free 
mileage area.
The reduction in charges and the increase in subscribers that was expected to result from it 
prompted the introduction two months later of the 1936 Telephone Capital Bill which sought 
£500,000 to add to the £43,000 still unused from the 1931 Bill. By November 1936, the 
reductions were making a significant impact on the level of telephone take-up. Having made 
engineering staff redundant three years previously, the Department now sought an extra 60 
such staff to cope with demand.
“The reductions of telephone rates on 1-7-36 has caused a large increase in public 
applications for telephone service particularly a large proportion o f long subscribers' 
lines involving heavy construction work. The public demand is likely to be maintained 
and the long delay in providing service is like to give rise to serious public 
complaint.”58
The effects of the reductions and the subsequent upsurge in demand was not immediately 
reflected in the figures delivered in April 1937 by Boland's successor as Minister for Posts 
and Telegraphs, Oscar Traynor.59 Although the telephone section had continued to return a 
profit (£105,70 260) as did the combined services (£317,61261) the dearth of engineering staff 
coupled with delays in obtaining plant from foreign manufacturers led to “a certain amount of
miles (n (3.14) * 1 ( l2)). A three mile free mileage area would cover 28.26 square miles, (n (3.14) * 
9 (32)).
57 DD 61, p. 310, 25 March 1936.
58 M & T.B to the Engineering Branch Headquarters, 4/11/1936. NAD 11064/39 "Engineering 
Branch re: Temporary Telephone Labourers - seeking upgrade in rank. 1936 - 41." The same 
document contains a more attributable reference to the staff increase - from the Engineer-in-Chief, 
TJ Monaghan in a letter to the Department Secretary dated 31 October 1936.
59 Oscar Traynor became Minister for Posts and Telegraphs on November 11 1936. See DD 64.
60 DD 66, p. 1516, 22 April 1937.
61 Ibid.
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congestion on some of the longer distance circuits . . . (and) delay in providing services for 
new subscribers where any substantial pole route construction is involved/’62
This unprecedented level of investment was almost entirely fuelled by the post-tariff reduction 
take-up in charges. In spite o f the reduction, Traynor announced that the Telephone Branch in 
the first full year of the revised scale of charges had returned a surplus of £78,833 due to the 
“accelerated”63 growth of the telephone service: the number of local and trunk calls had gone 
up by 713,000 and 450,000 respectively whilst there were an additional 1,654 subscribers, 
20% up on the previous year’s increase. By June 30 1938, there were 26,400 subscribers and
40,500 telephones in use, representing increases of 3,000 and 3,800 respectively since June 
1936.
Congestion on trunk traffic in particular led the Department to invest heavily in new trunk 
carrier technology. Developed by Bell Telephone Laboratories as a means o f overcoming the 
difficulties in providing service economically in sparsely populated rural areas in the US, 
carrier systems appeared ideally suited to the similar problems faced by the provision of 
service hi rural areas of Ireland. Thus in 1931 the Department had inaugurated the first Irish 
three-channel carrier system between Belfast and Dublin (in co-operation with British Post 
Office) permitting three simultaneous conversations on a single bearer circuit and reducing the 
per call cost of service provision.64 No further investment was made in this technology until 
1936, however when the sudden increase in trunk traffic prompted a crash investment 
programme. By 1939, Dublin had been connected to the country’s other main population 
centres via an additional 18 carrier systems.65
Furthermore, such was the pace of development that the £500,000 voted by the 1936 
Telephone Capital Act was entirely depleted within two years,66 leading to the passing in July 
1938 of a further Telephone Capital Bill, providing £1,000,000 (the previous four acts had
62 DD 62, p. 1179, 27 May 1936.
63 DD 70, p,. 1144, 30 March 1938.
64 A.J. Litton (1961), “The Growth and Development of the Irish Telephone Sy stem", Journal oj 
the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society o f Ireland Vol. 20, Part 5, pp. 79-115, p. 86.
65 Ibid.
66 DD 70, p„ 1144, 30 March 1938
149
cumulatively amounted to only £1,750,000) to fund capital development over the next five 
years. Development continued apace until September 1939. By the end of that year there were 
over 27,000 subscribers and over 44,000 telephone stations.67 Furthermore, the telephone 
service continued to return a surplus: £61,28668 in 1937 - 38 and £65,75269 the following 
year.
Although the extension of the free mileage area meant that by 1938 the total normal service 
areas of all exchanges amounted to 60% of the area of the country, there remained the 
problem of serving the remaining sparsely populated areas. The density of subscribers outside 
urban areas was considered too low to justify the expense of an automatic exchange - of 
nearly 800 exchanges in late 1930s, over 600 had fewer than ten subscribers each:70 thus all 
rural subscribers were served by manual exchanges typically with limited service hours:
“The normal hours at exchanges with less than ten subscribers are from 8am to 8pm 
on weekdays and from 9am to 10.30am on Sundays. Where there are ten subscribers 
and upwards, the service is extended to 10pm on weekdays and additional attendance 
is given on Sunday evenings from 7pm to 9pm. Where continuous attendance is given 
at provincial exchanges, the traffic arising after 10 pm is, on the whole negligible.”71
Provision of longer service hours at such exchanges was considered too expensive. Oscar 
Traynor72 noted in March 1938 that: “Service outside day hours is extremely costly and . . . 
revenue from night and Sunday traffic at small exchanges would not nearly cover the cost of 
general extension of hours.”73 Recognising that the absence of 24 hour service constituted a 
serious disincentive to becoming a subscriber, however, in the mid 1930s the Department 
began to consider the adoption of new rural automatic technology to spread the service to 
“remote areas and the smaller villages.”74 In March 1938 Oscar Traynor announced the start
67 DD 75, p. 1441, 17 April 1940.
68 DD 74, p. 2464, 23 March 1939.
69 DD 75, p. 1437, 17 April 1940.
70 Wall, op. cit., p. 126.
71 P.J. Little, then Minister for P&T. DD 79, p. 1470, 17/4/1940.
72 Posts and Telegraphs Minister from 1937 to 1939.
73 DD 70, p. 1244, 31 March 1938.
74 DD62, pp. 1179 - 1180, 27 May 1936.
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of experiments with a semi-automatic system which automatically connected subscribers to 
distant 24 hour-a-day-exchanges. One year later he commented:
“Last year I mentioned that it was hoped to install experimentally a rural automatic 
telephone system in the exchange areas of Malahide, Donabate, Rush and Lusk. I am 
happy to say that the scheme, which was introduced about six months ago, is working 
satisfactorily and that it gives the prospect of affording a solution of the difficulties 
associated with the provision of continuous service at small exchanges. It is proposed 
to extend the experiment during the coming year.”75
The technological answer to the problem of extending service hours in rural areas was, 
however, suddenly undermined by political factors when the experiment was curtailed by the 
onset of war.
5.3 Conception of the Telephone
Although political and public opinion appeared to regard the institution of the Post Office as 
having a role to play in facilitating both the social and a commercial life o f the country, the 
vast bulk o f references referring to the function of the telephone in this period make it clear 
that it was primarily seen as a tool o f business and commerce. A 1924 letter to P. S.
O'Hcgarty, the Secretary of the Department of Post and Telegraphs, criticising the poor 
marketing of the telephone, is revealing in terms of the Department’s target market:
“There is no reason for believing that the average Irish commercial or professional 
man refuses to be convinced that the installation of a telephone is a reproductive 
investment and not a dead loss to him. Whatever is the cause of the want of 
development in provincial Ireland the Contract Staff, which is the propelling point of 
development, must take its share of blame.”76 (Italics added)
75 DD 74, p. 2468, 23 March 1939.
76 De Brit to O'Hegarty, 8th September 1924. NAD H 82529 Vol. 2,
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In the June 1923 Estimates debates JJ Walsh stressed that Post Office policy was based on 
giving “satisfaction” to “the commercial community.”77 Most calls for the expansion o f the 
service tended to be clientalist in nature, stressing the importance of the telephone for the 
commercial life of a particular town. Yet there is evidence that JJ Walsh had a wider vision of 
the role of the telephone in national development:
“ ...practically every town in the country has communicated with us to install an 
exchange. There is scarcely a Deputy here whose Constituents have not represented to 
him that the time has come for a more general utilisation of the telephone. There is 
nothing very strange in that. Our country is competing with up-to-date countries such 
as Sweden and Norway and England, and if people are placed in the position of dray- 
horses against race-horses, so to speak, they are going to get left behind.”78
This view seems to have been fairly pervasive. Professor Magennis, Dail Representative of 
the National University of Ireland implicitly argued for the subsidisation of the service on the 
grounds that it would improve the efficiency and cost effectiveness of the rest of the economy:
“The telephone service as an aid to commercial and industrial extension and 
development upon business lines ought to be regarded as a national service today . . . 
and the cost of it should not be a prime consideration in regard to the total turnover of 
postal business in a year.”79
Indeed Walsh made it explicit that such a line of reasoning had influenced his decision to 
introduce the tariff changes in 1925: “I though it well to recommend to the Minister for 
Finance a substantial reduction in telephone charges . . . because of the need for industrial 
stimulation.”80 In fact Walsh went so far as to suggest in the same debate that it would “be 
the policy of the Department to subsidise the (telephone) system from its own finances . . . 
because it is the great channel through which public business can be done.”81
77 DD 3, p. 2236,21/6/1923.
78 DD 3, p. 2234,21/6/1923.
79 DD 3, p. 2250,21/6/1923.
80 DD 15, p. 2062, 21/5/1925.
81 DD 15, p. 2403, 27/5/1925.
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This conception of the role of the telephone was also evident outside the Dad. Urging an 
improvement in the quality of the telephone service in a July 1927 editorial, The Irish Times 
stressed that “An efficient telephone service nowadays is essential to good business.”82 
Yet there were limitations on the extent to which the need to assist the general economic 
development of the state governed the extension of the network. Despite the official view that 
“in an agricultural country such as the Free State the urban residents are largely dependent for 
their livelihood from the produce of farming occupations,”83 the idea of extending a direct 
telephone to every farmer's house (there were 382,000 holdings in Ireland by 193 084) was 
“out o f the question [as] the expense would be too much.”85
Nonetheless, responding to calls from political groups such as the Fanners Party86 to extend 
the telephone for the benefit of farmers, the Post Office compromised where possible adopting 
a policy in the mid-1920s of extending telephone service to creameries: if  bringing the 
telephone to every farmer in the country was not immediately possible because of financial 
restraints, then at least the creameries, the foci of daily farming communities could be so 
connected. Even here however, the state was initially reluctant to sanction expenditure on the 
many creameries far removed from population centres, mitially experimenting with directional 
wireless systems as a cheap way of connecting the creameries.87 Hopelessly unreliable, these 
systems were abandoned by 1924, at which time JJ Walsh spoke of succumbing “to the 
pressure of the Fanners' Party” and of having provided “ ’phones to a big number of 
creameries.”88
82 The Irish Times 30/7/1927.
83 DD 23, p. 1200, 10/5/1928,
84 J.J. Lee (1989), Ireland 1912 - 1985: Politics and Society. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), p. 115.
85 D D ll,p . 2400, 27/5/1925.
86 "The development of the telephone service affects (the Farmers Party) interests ... agriculture is 
the great staple of the country and ... die telephone service could put community wide disruption 
(due to) unforeseen farm price changes out of possibility." William Magennis, Farmers Party TD, 
DD 3, p. 2250, 21/6/1923
87 Ibid.
88 DD 11, p. 2074, 21/5/1925.
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Thus whilst there was a prevailing understanding that the development of the telephone 
contributed at a macro-economic level to general economic development, this was not 
generally sufficient to encourage the Post Office (and the ever watchful Department of 
Finance) to extend the network where it did not pay.
The notion that the telephone might have a place in residences does not appear to have been 
widely embraced in the 1920s and 1930s. O f the 28,991 telephone sets (as opposed to lines) in 
service in 1929, 4,378 were classed as private residence lines. Given that private residences 
were less likely than business subscribers to have more than one telephone this figure is 
probably fairly close to the actual number of private subscribers. Thus private residences 
accounted for somewhere between 20% and 25% of the total number of subscriber lines in the 
country. If  this seems a reasonably high figure it should be remembered that this represented 
an infinitesimal level of penetration: by 1930 there were approximately 2.5 residential phones 
per 1,000 of population. The truth was that a private telephone remained beyond the financial 
reach of the bulk of the population, a fact acknowledged by Walsh in July 1923.
“I t  is recognised that high rentals are not conducive to the development o f  the 
Telephone Service and I am having the whole question of Telephone rates inquired 
into, with a view to ascertaining whether any reduction in the charges is warranted, 
and whether it would be practicable to afford extensions of the telephone system 
under more favourable terms.”89 (Italics added)
The average annual wage of, for example, a male permanent farm labourer throughout the 
1920s and 1930s was around £65.90 Even after the 1925 reductions and the introduction of 
the £5 residential rate (which, as Walsh acknowledged, with the added factor of call charges 
would actually cost around £8 per annum91), this would have placed the telephone beyond 
financial reach.
89 DD 4, p 569, 12th July 1923.
90 Central Statisdcs Office (1933), Statistical Abstract 1933. (Dublin: The Stationary Office).
91 DD 11, p. 2062,21/5/1925.
154
5.4 C onceptions o f the Telephone Service
Looking at Irish economic policy in the 1920s, J.J. Lee has concluded that “Fiscal 
responsibility, and low taxation, were supposed to impress English doubters of the Irish 
capacity for self-discipline.”92 Given this, a primary influence on the Department of Posts and 
Telegraphs was the Department of Finance. Leon O'Broin, a former secretary of P&T policy 
noted of the Department that:
“All these Ministers of mine were essentially juniors . . . there were none - even when 
they achieved some seniority - who were able to fight their comer in the Cabinet room 
or with the Minister for Finance who controlled the supply of money. The Post Office 
always suffered from a shortage of capital for telephone development, and with 
Ministers allowing themselves to be treated as small boys there was never any real 
hope of catching up on the demand. The officials did the best they could with their 
opposite numbers in Finance but there was a limit to what they could do once the 
priorities had been fixed. The Post Office was always down towards the bottom of the 
list. We obviously did not count for much politically.”93
The fact that a department that “prided itself on paying its way”94 was from 1927 to 1932 
controlled by a Minister (Ernest Blythe) who was also Minister for Finance and by a 
Parliamentary Secretary, Michael J. Heffeman, who were “committed to a policy of rigid 
economy in public expenditure,”95 meant that as the 1920s progressed, fiscal rectitude within 
the Department was if  anything likely to increase.
The Post Office service inherited by the Free State government was a loss-making 
proposition, returning a deficit of £1,412,00096 during the first year of the Irish 
administration. The fiscal outlook of the Cosgrave government, however, made ongoing
92 Lee, op cit., p. 108.
93 Leon O'Broin, (1985), Just Like Yesterday: An Autobiography, (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan), p. 
163.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid., p. 167.
96 DD 3, p. 2234, 21/6/1923.
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deficits of the scale recorded in 1922/23 intolerable.97 Thus in 1922 the Department of P&T 
established a Retrenchment Committee to review possible modifications o f the English Post 
Office system in its application to Ireland.98 The conclusions of the Retrenchment Committee 
were largely based on a Civil Service analysis of the Post Office operation which determined 
that it would be possible to break even “without any appreciable curtailment of essential 
services.”99 The Committee thus focused on “luxury services,”100 the Department line on 
which was that while such services might have made sense in the context of the UK “it will be 
agreed that something less would have suited this country.”101 The key question concerned 
which services came under the heading “essential” and which under “luxury.”
It was explicitly stated that certain services within the Post Office had a social value and had 
to be retained for their social value, even if this entailed a loss. Thus cross-subsidisation of 
rural Post Offices with profits from their urban counterparts would remain a feature o f the 
Irish Post Office.102 So whilst Heffeman noted in 1927 that five years earlier it had become 
“necessary to make reorganisations and readjustment so as to bring the service into line with 
the economic resources of the country,”103 he stressed that there were limits to the extent to 
which savings could be effected:
“There is no doubt that the Post Office could be placed on a paying basis - but at a 
c o s t . . . The value of the communication services of the Post Office must be judged 
by other considerations in addition to those of profit and loss on the immediate 
service.”104
97 "From a public point of view the most serious aspect (of the Post Office performance) is the heavy 
drain which this one Branch of the public service is making on the national finances." Expressed in 
a 1922 Civil Service analysis of the Telephone System. See NAD 5049/22 Vol 1, "Transfer of 
Services 1922".
98 DD 3, p. 2233,21/6/1923.
99 See NAD 5049/22 Vol 1, "Transfer of Services 1922".
100 DD 3, p. 2235, 21/6/1923.
101 J.J. Walsh in DD 3, p. 2234, 21/6/1923.
102 Walsh: " In the year 1923/24...We made a profit in the working of this service running into 
some hundreds of thousands of pounds through urban work, and we lost that profit and £700,000 in 
addition in...work in the country. Now, in contributing to these rural services, are we acting 
impartially? If we acted impartially we would spend in proportion to our returns in rural areas." DD 
11, p. 2366, 27/5/1925.
103 DD 3, p. 1197, 10/5/1927.
104 Ibid., p. 1200.
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Thus, the consistent deficits recorded by the “declining” 105 telegraph service since the 1880s 
continued to be tolerated because the telegraphs remained “essential to the comfort and 
welfare of certain members of the community.”106 Indeed in contrast to the postal and 
telephone services telegraph charges remained largely unchanged from the 1920s until the 
1950s.107 Similarly there was little question of curtailing the postal services although the 
working assumption was that the postal service would return to profit “in a comparatively 
brief period.”108
There was, however, less willingness to consider the telephone service in the same light.
Indeed its very underdevelopment made it possible to argue that tolerating telephone losses 
was Government subsidisation of a luxury service.109 Speaking in 1927, Sean Lemass argued 
that: “I would like to see the telephone service extended and facilities offered for its extension 
but 1 do not think that it should be maintained at the cost o f  the general taxpayer. ’n 10 
(Italics added)
Looked at as a single institution it was “generally accepted that the Post Office is amongst 
Govermnent Departments the nearest approach there is to a commercial institution and the one 
which should therefore be administered as far as possible on a self-supporting basis.”111 The 
question was where the profits would be found to subsidise the essential services if  they lost 
money. The telephone was to be the answer. Surveying the early experience of the Post Office
105 DD 23, p. 1188, 10th May 1928.
106 Michael Heffernan, Ibid.
107 DD 152, p. 226, 6/7/55.
108 Expressed in a 1922 Civil Service analysis of the Telephone System. See NAD 5049/22 Vol 1. 
"Transfer of Services 1922". The report also noticed with regard to the postal service that the main 
causes of the deficit were "increased wages, decreased revenue, and the widespread war which has 
been waged on the Post Office by Irregular Forces. Because of these reasons we may take it that the 
year under review is the high water-mark in abnormality."
109 This outlook appears to have pervaded all levels of the Department. In an August 1930 letter to 
the Secretary of the Department arguing against the introduction of commissions for Contract 
Officers, the Head of the Contract (Sales) Section expressed the view that it was “bad policy to push 
die idea of die telephone service too far, and so incur the chances of trouble in the collection of 
accounts, or even bad debts ultimately. A potential commission in the offing is likely to urge a 
Contract Officer to over zeal.” Selby (Head of Contract Section) to O’Hegarty, 30/8/30. NAD H 
1438/34 Vol. 1 “Telephone Organisation: Reports on Staffing and Operation 1930.”
110 DD 34, p. 1847, 14/5/1930.
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from the early 1930s onwards, former Secretary of the Department of Posts and Telegraphs, 
Leon O'Broin noted that:
“When I went to the Post Office, and for some years afterwards, the postal and 
telephone services taken together paid their way; that is to say, taking one year with 
another and offsetting the eggs that the golden telephone goose had started to lay 
against the expensive labour-intensive postal machine.”112
Thus whilst the first Minister for Posts and Telegraphs J.J. Walsh favoured reducing 
telephone rates, he stated that this could only happen if the financial position o f the Post 
Office as a whole was profitable. Even if the telephone service alone was profitable, telephone 
charge reductions or any expenditure on the telephone service that was not immediately 
remunerative could only occur if an excess of profits remained after cross-subsidising losses 
on the other Post Office services.
Given all o f  this, the loss on the operations o f the Telephone Service was considered 
politically unacceptable as was made explicit in its funding. A Civil Service document noted 
in 1922 that:
“The Telephone Service is built up from a consolidated fund, and the capital monies 
are advanced on the understanding that these monies will be reproductive and 
therefore not a cause o f  expense to the state.”113 (Italics added)
From its inception the Irish Post Office adopted the “custom of our predecessors”114 with 
regard to the telephone service setting charges according to the cost of capital expenditure and 
interest. Thus the Irish Post Office’s initial standard rental of £7 10s applied only to those 
subscribers located within a one mile radius of the nearest exchange. The annual rental
111 DD 23, p. 1197, 10th May, 1928.
112 O'Broin, op. cit., p. 162
113 Expressed in a 1922 Civil Service analysis of the Telephone System. See NAD 5049/22 Vol 1, 
"Transfer of Services 1922".
114 DD 15, p. 2400, 27/5/1925.
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increased by 25 shillings for every one-eighth of a mile beyond which radius the subscriber 
was located. Speaking in June 1933, Gerry Boland stated:
“When an individual is getting a special service at a distance, it is not considered right 
that the State should stand the expense... If a man lives three or four miles from a 
telephone exchange, I do not think it would be fair to ask the State to put up poles and 
wires for his convenience alone.”115
Furthermore even standard telephone rates only applied in what might be termed "standard 
areas", such as cities and larger towns, where the prior existence of plant and machinery 
enabled the setting of a standard rate: in 1922 this accounted for only 2.5% of the 
geographical area of the state. Outside these areas "standard" charges were non-existent.116 
J. J. Walsh noted in 1923 that:
“In the case of new Exchanges the rental for a subscriber’s line varies according to 
local circumstance and is based upon the cost of the extension of the trunk telephone 
system . . . there is no standard charge in such cases.”117
A 1930 list of approximately 100 selected exchanges,118 specifying those exchanges at which 
special rentals applied, makes it clear that such exchanges are small (with a typical maximum 
capacity of 40 subscribers) and located in remote (i.e. more costly to service) areas.
Furthermore the expansion of the telephone network beyond the cities and larger towns in the 
1920s was undertaken to bring the service into profitability, the loss being “in all probability 
due to our limited operations and we are advised that an extension of this service on well- 
defined lines, with up-to-date machinery will eventually wipe out the deficit.”119 However, the
115 DD 47, p. 1370, 27/6/33.
116 Thus for example, a question to Walsh from a Galway TD, John Lyons, in July 1923, suggested 
that the standard charge for a proposed new exchange at Moate was £15. DD 4, p. 569, 12/7/1923.
117 DD 4, p. 569, 12/7/1923.
118 Contained in NAD H 1438/34 Vol. 1 "Telephone Organisation. Reports on Staffing and 
Operation 1930."
119 Expressed in a 1922 Civil Service analysis of the Telephone System. See N.AD 5049/22 Voi 1, 
"Transfer of Services 1922".
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failure of the service to substantially increase subscriber numbers and the ongoing losses 
during and after the 1924 to 1928 expansion period induced caution with regard to any future 
expansion. The earlier view that underdevelopment was the cause o f the loss on the service 
was modified by a new outlook on the economics of telephone development:
“Ordinarily in an expanding business, proportionately to expansion, expenses on the 
unit basis have a tendency to decrease as expansion takes place. This rule does not 
apply to the telephone services. Overhead expenses do not, of course, increase in the 
same proportion as the number of telephones. The cost of apparatus tends to fall. The 
savings effected on these are offset to a large extent, if  not altogether, by the increased 
expense in cost of the plant necessary to provide ready means of communication 
between the increased number of users of the telephone. Exchange plant and staff 
increase out of proportion to the number of added subscribers.”120
hi short, cost-based pricing remained the standard Department of Posts and Telegraphs 
charging policy through the 1920s and early 1930s. Thus telephone policy, with regard to the 
development o f the service, represented continuity with British practice. There was no 
question of cross-subsidisation of rates. Extension of the service, particularly in rural areas, 
would only be carried out if it was felt that the establishment of a new exchange would be 
justified by the number o f potential subscribers and if that exchange was likely to pay its way. 
Indeed it is apparent that in 1924 the Department altered its own regulations to make the 
establishment of Telephone Call Offices specifically in rural areas conditional the expectation 
that “each Call Office is likely to be self-supporting.”121Failing that, a guarantee from a 
reputable local source was required.122 As Walsh put it:
“Telephonic extensions cost money. When we extend the Minister for Finance rightly 
insists that a certain amount of support shall be forthcoming. There is nothing 
unreasonable in that. He does not definitely assert that every telephone extension must 
pay its way, but he does insist that a certain reasonable guarantee should be
120 Heffernan, DD, Vol. 23, p. 1190, 10/5/1928.
121 Department of Posts and Telegraphs memo to the Cabinet Committee on Economic Planning, 5 
October 1943. NAD S 13086 A.
122 Such as a Justice of the Peace, Parish Priest etc.
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forthcoming in every district. In following that rule the Minister is simply adopting 
the one that prevailed under the English system.”123
The practical effect of such an approach however was to ensure that speed of development in 
rural areas, where almost by definition there existed a low population density, would remain 
extremely slow.
The same policy was pursued by Walsh's successors in the 1920s and 1930s. In refusing a 
request to extend the telephone service (i.e. build an exchange and establish a public call box) 
to two villages in the Longford-Westmeath area, Michael Heffernan (Parliamentary Secretary 
to Ernest Blythe, the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs), employed the same rationale that 
Walsh and various British Postmaster-Generals before him had done:
“I regret that the provisioning of the public telephone service . . . would not be 
warranted inasmuch as the revenue likely to be derived from calls would not be nearly 
sufficient to cover the expenditure which would be necessary and a considerable loss 
to public fund would consequently be involved.”124
Thus from 1922 to 1932 the Cumann na Gael administration actively pursued a policy of the 
utmost financial caution with regard to the Post Office which made heavy financial investment 
in telephony unthinkable. The first Fiaima Fail administration reaped the benefits o f this in 
1932 when, during his first estimates debate, Senator Joseph Connolly, the new Minister for 
Posts and Telegraphs, amiounced that the Telephone Section had made a profit of £6,000 
(although this ultimately proved to be significantly larger at £39, 2 8 9).125 Furthermore, 
throughout the Post Office service as a whole he expected to “have a clear balance sheet on 
the working of the Department for the year ended March 31st 1932. ”126
123 Walsh DD 15, p. 2248, 26/5/1926.
124 Heffernan's response to a request from the Longford-Westmeath T.D., P. Connolly to extend the 
public telephone service to the villages of Tarmonbarry and Clondra. DD 39, p.794, 24/6/1931.
125 Department of Posts and Telegraphs Commercial Accounts for the Year ended 31 March 1948.
126 DD 41, p. 439, 21/4/1932.
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As noted above, Fianna Fail reacted to the advent o f profits from the Post Office with extreme 
caution. At the Department of Posts and Telegraphs, the first Fianna Fail Minister, Senator 
Joseph Connolly, made it clear that general telephone policy would not be changed. There was 
to be no new expansionary wave of capital expenditure and pricing policy would remaine the
same:
“.. the method is to work out the costs of bringing the telephone to an area - the 
capital cost, the maintenance cost, and the cost of the engineering work, then take 
them in proportion to the number of subscribers and fix the cost on the basis of 
capital and maintenance cost over a certain number of years. I cannot see that any 
other method can be adopted. An isolated subscriber may want a line to his house and 
it may cost several hundred pounds to bring it. I f  he chooses to live in a certain area 
far removed, say on the top of a mountain, of course the telephone installation can 
only be made available for him at a certain cost.”127
However, the four years between 1932 and 1936 of sustained growth in the telephone section 
and overall Post Office profits, (which reached £317,812 in 1935/36128, a figure that would 
not be surpassed for a further 25 years), finally convinced the Department of Finance to 
sanction a change in rates. The tripling of the “free” mileage radius (the area within which the 
minimum standard rental applied) to three miles was undoubtedly sigmficant for rural 
development, bringing as it did 60% into free mileage areas. From the perspective o f how the 
service was conceived, the agreement to lower the standard £7 1 Os rental for those post-1922 
exchanges (primarily located in smaller towns) to the £6 1 Os and £5 rate for businesses and 
residences respectively was also important, implying some move towards cross-subsidisation. 
Nonetheless universally applicable rates were still out of the question: annual rentals were still 
increased by £ 10 per mile for every mile a new subscriber was situated beyond the new three 
mile radius from the exchange, whilst the practice of “specially assessing” the rentals on 
smaller, remote exchanges remained. Furthermore, the fact that two thirds129 of the £500,000 
voted by the 1936 Telephone Capital Bill were concentrated in city areas where there was
127 DD 41, p. 480, 22/4/1932.
128 Department of Posts and Telegraphs Commercial Accounts for the Year ended 31 March 1948,
129 SeeDD 62, p. 1616, 3/6/1936.
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existing “effective demand”130 meant that capital expenditure would remain focused in those 
areas where it would be immediately profitable. As for rural districts, effective demand was 
not yet there and could not be led by investment in advance of demand. Hope for expansion 
therefore lay not in a change o f heart on the part of the Post Office but, as Minister Gerry 
Boland put it in 1936, in the hands of rural people: “I hope that as a result of the reduction in 
charges, the country districts will become more telephone-minded and that the demand will be 
there in the future.”131
Before concluding this section it is worth noting that the Department outlook on the role of the 
Post Office and in particular the telephone section - namely that despite a social remit, it was 
a commercial operation which had to break even - did not go unquestioned in the 1920s and 
1930s. In fact there was active debate in the Dad as to the validity of the Department’s 
approach: Deputies pointed to the injustice of a system whereby in those districts in which the 
telephone main line had not previously lain (i.e. rural districts), those desirous of having a 
telephone must bear the entire cost not only of having the telephone installed but of conveying 
the mam to their houses:
“Is it not positively ridiculous to charge a man with the cost of laying a cable when 
the people who come to that district when it is built up will only have to bear a 
nominal charge?”132
There was also a far more fundamental questioning of the general conception of the Post 
Office role that appeared to inform the Department’s policy-making. Thus whilst County 
Dublin TD, B. Johnson described the Post Office as “essentially a community service,”133 
Deputy J I McGuires argued in May 1935 that:
“It must be remembered that a public government monopoly is not in the same 
position as a private monopoly. In the case of a private monopoly, such as transport,
130 DD 62, p. 1618, 3 June 1936.
131 Ibid.
132 DD 56, p. 815, 10/5/35.
133 DD3, p. 2244, 21/6/23.
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the criterion of charges should be what will give a proper wage to the workers and a 
proper income to the owners of the business. ...
In this public service it is obvious that another consideration will apply, first 
because in the public service the only source of revenue is the sale of the commodity 
which they deal in, but in the case of a public Government service there are hundreds 
of other sources from which losses can be met. It seems clear to me that in the case of 
an essential service like the Post Office the people who must o f necessity avail of it
should not have to bear the total expense of keeping it u p . ” ^ 4
Yet whilst this public service dimension was acknowledged by successive ministers they also 
continued to stress the standard position that the Post Office's freedom of action was limited 
by economic considerations:
“We must have some regards to the needs of the community and at the same time to 
the costs of the service - what the country can afford to spend on it. We claim that so 
far as it is possible for the Post Officc, within the means at its disposal, to meet the 
requirements o f the rural areas, we have done that. ...
But, as I have already indicated, we are bound by financial considerations 
which we cannot get over.”135
And critically it was the views of those in power that determined the actual development of the 
service.
134 DD 56, pp. 756-757, 9 May 1935.
135 DD 51, pp. 1782-1783, 12 April 1934
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5.5 Sum m ary: U niversal Service 1921 - 1939
Looked at from the perspective of the key universal service indicators, developments with 
regard to the Irish telephone system in the 1920s and 1930s were somewhat disappointing. 
Subscriber numbers increased from just under 12,000 in 1922 to 24,500 by 1939, equivalent 
to a rise from just 0.77 phones per 1,000 people in 1925 to a scarcely more impressive 1.55 
by 1940. In terms o f geographical diffusion there was an objective urban/rural imbalance in 
the development o f the Irish telephone service in this period. As a result of both the Post 
Office’s unwillingness to engage in any expenditure that was not immediately remunerative 
(i.e. in sparsely populated rural areas) together with a rental scale that hugely favoured those 
(implicitly urban) subscribers living within a one mile radius o f the nearest exchange. The free 
mileage radius in 1922 covered only 2.5% of the country, effectively only Ireland’s cities and 
larger towns. Yet 61% of the Irish population lived outside towns and villages in 1926.136 
Thus in 1922 Dublin subscribers accounted for 51%137 of all Irish subscribers, whilst in 
overall population terms Dublin accounted for less than 16% of the total.138 The telephone 
network expansion programme in the latter half of the 1920s actually saw the imbalance 
further advanced: by 1936 Dublin subscribers accounted for 64% 139 of all subscribers 
(although overall, numbers had doubled since 1922). The pattern of exchange development 
made it clear that the Department of Posts and Telegraphs itself saw the telephone as an urban 
implement:
“Unlike England... there are very few big towns and we cannot hope to have the 
telephone used to the same extent all over the country as in other countries.. I do not 
think..., that for some time, until the population increases and the country gets more 
prosperous and we have bigger centres of population that the telephone will be so 
extensively used as it is in other countries.”140
136 Terence Brown (1981), Ireland 1922 - 1979: A Social and Cultural History. (London: Fontana),
p. 18.
137 DD 7, p. 284, 25/6/24.
138 Brown, op cit., p. 152.
139 Anonymous: "Telephones. Crown Alley (and Exchequer Street) Trunk Exchanges. Comparative 
figures of Traffic and Staff - 1936 - 1942". NAD S 11992.
140 Gerry Boland DD 47, p. 1367,27/6/33.
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The Department’s reluctance to invest in the telephone service should also be understood in 
relation to the country’s overall economic situation and the policies which flowed from it. As 
noted in chapter three, the main fiscal objective o f the Cumann na nGael administration 
between 1922 and 1932 was to aid the farming community, then identified as the key to the 
economic health of the country, by minimising the tax burden and thus state expenditure. This 
was hardly conducive to encouraging heavy investment in capital intensive 
telecommunications infrastructure and equipment. The advent of Fiamia Fail in government 
might have offered a more fruitful environment for such investment given that party’s greater 
willingness to invest in the economy but such investment was focused on industrial 
development, which in this period at least did not identify development of telecommunications 
infrastructure as a prerequisite.
Department of Posts and Telegraphs reluctance to invest in the service absence of a 
guaranteed return was reflected from 1924 m its policy on the provision of public Telephone 
Call Boxes in rural areas, which required a strong expectation or actual guarantee that such 
provision would be financially self-supporting, As a consequence, call box provision, the 
single method wliich permitted non-subscribers access to the telephone, effectively ceased in 
rural areas in the mid-1930s when it became impossible to find any new locations that 
satisfied the financial requirement.141
Financial caution was also reflected in the policy of setting of a scale of distance-dependent 
rental charges rather than establishing a single national rental charge. This clearly favoured 
those living in urban areas although the extension of the free mileage radius in 1936 
substantially reduced the numbers coming under the higher end of the scale. Nonetheless the 
ongoing practice of charging different rentals clearly undermined the professed “universality” 
of the service.
The rural/urban imbalance was further exacerbated, however, by the fact that some 
subscribers outside Dublin received a quality o f service that was inferior to that available in
141 “A result of this condition of self-support as been, however, that the position has been reached 
for a number of years past that the opening of Call Offices in raral areas has, to all intents and 
purposes, come to a full stop because in practically all cases, the condition of self-support would not
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Dublin and which was frequently offered on less favourable tenns. The introduction of 
automatic exchanges to Dublin in 1926 gave Dublin subscribers a 24 hour service that offered 
immediate comiection (although some such subscribers had to wait till the end o f the 1930s 
for automatic service). Meanwhile all subscribers outside Dublin were reliant on manual 
exchanges with the result that connection time was slow.142 Furthermore, for those connected 
to exchanges with less than 30 subscribers (typically those serving towns with populations of 
less than 3,500 people), hours of service were limited.143 These varied throughout the 1920s 
and 1930s but, even by the close of the period, exchanges with ten subscribers or less received 
service from 8am to 8pm on weekdays and from 9am to 10.30am on Sundays. For slightly 
larger exchanges, service was extended to 10pm on weekdays and an additional two hours of 
service were provided on a Sunday.144 A combination of social and economic factors 
combmed to thwart any early consideration of extending automatic service beyond any Irish 
cities or very large towns (indeed in practice Dublin was the only site o f automatic exchanges 
until the close of the 1940s). Such was the initial capital expense of automatic exchanges that 
they could only be justified in areas with high population densities. This related not just to the 
cost of the exchanges themselves but also to the cost of cabling from the exchange to the 
subscriber. Such was the cost o f the copper and lead used for cabling in the 1920s and 1930s, 
that the Department of Posts and Telegraphs found it cheaper to build new satellite exchanges 
when extending the automatic service to the Dublin suburbs rather than cabling subscribers in 
those areas directly into the city centre auto-exchanges.145 The implications that the high cost 
of cable had on automatic service in sparsely populated rural areas (implying relatively long 
cable routes between individual subscribers and the nearest exchange), where the population 
continued to decline in the 1920s and 1930s, are obvious.
Nonetheless the application o f new technology in the provinces did begin to facilitate a 
reduction in the cost of service provision. Litton has noted that as trunk traffic grew in the
be met.” Department of Posts and Telegraphs memo to the Cabinet Committee on Economic 
Planning, 5 October 1943. NAD S 13086 A.
142 It appears to have been relatively common for subscribers to have to wait up to an hour to receive 
a comiection during busy periods.
143 Ibid.
144 Figures from P.J. Little, the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, DD 79, p. 1470, 17/4/40.
145 A.J. Litton (1961), “The Growth and Development of the Irish Telephone System", Journal o f 
the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society o f Ireland Vol. 20, Part 5, pp. 79-115, p. 85.
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1930s, it became clear that simply adding wire to existing pole routes would not offer a 
lasting solution to the increasing problem whilst the cost of the alternative - laying 
underground cables -was considered uneconomic relative to the “number of circuits then 
required or which could be envisaged during the next few years.” 146 Given the Department’s 
concern that the telephone service not constitute a drain on the exchequer, this might have 
proved a major stumbling block to further development in rural areas. However, although still 
costly, the installation and application of three carrier trunk systems proved a more economic 
means of adding capacity for distances of 60 miles or more, thus effectively trebling the 
capacity o f those trunk lines to which the system were applied.147 The Department introduced 
19 such three channel systems on the major national trunk routes between 193 1 and 1939 In 
consequence although total trunk circuit miles in Ireland increased by 9,800 miles during the 
1930s, only 2,800 of those miles represented actual physical cable, the other 7,000 resulting 
from the application of carrier systems. By 1940, use of such systems would had increased the 
carrying capacity o f the national trunk system by 40%, had the new technology not been 
invested in. (Similarly between 1937 and 1938 two co-axial cables carrying one 12-channel 
carrier system and two “ 1+3” carrier systems (audio and three carrier channels) were laid 
between Howth in Dublin and Abergeirch in Wales enormously expanding the volume of calls 
that could be handled simultaneously between the Free State and Britain. Previously there had 
been only four circuits in operation.148) Furthermore the experiments with rural semi­
automatic exchanges commenced by the Department in 1939 did promise a technological 
answer to the question o f how to offer continuous service to rural subscribers. Only the advent 
of the second world war prevented any wider application of such technology.
In terms of how the telephone was conceived the conclusions of section 5.3 above leave little 
doubt that it was primarily seen as a business implement, although it is important to qualify 
this by noting that although there was some acceptance of the telephone system’s 
infrastructural role for industry and commerce, this was not reflected in P&T investment 
decisions. Either way the notion that the telephone might be a tool for social interaction 
remained extremely rare: in any case, given the relatively low subscriber base in the 1920s
146 Ibid., p. 86.
147 Ibid.
148 Wall, op. cit. p. 158.
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and 1930s die potential for such usage would have been extremely limited. Although 
economic growth in the 1920s and 1930s was slow, incomes nonetheless increased two and 
half tunes faster than telephone charges between 1925 and 1946.149 Despite this, even by the 
end of the 1930s, telephone charges remained very expensive relative to average incomes, thus 
contributing to this perception of the telephone as a business instrument. In 1938 the average 
male industrial wage was 54 shillings 11 pence per week.150 Assuming that the average 
annual expenditure on a residential line was around £8 rental plus calls), the telephone would 
have accounted for nearly 6% of an individual’s gross income. Consequently residential 
phones which accounted for roughly 25% of all main lines in 1929 only gradually increased 
their share o f the total, reaching approximately 30% of all main lines by the close of the 
1930s.151 Thus only 8,000 Irish homes would have had a telephone by the close of this period, 
a household penetration rate of less than 1.4%.152
There were political ramifications with regard to how the telephone was seen. As a 
consequence of the perception that the telephone was either a business implement or a luxury 
in the home, the Department o f Posts and Telegraphs ruled out the possibility of any 
subsidisation of the telephone network development in this period. From the Department of 
Posts and Telegraphs’ perspective the telephone remained one of several communication 
options offered by the Post Office: there was thus no pressing need for its development. (The 
same was not true of less substitutable services in this period: electricity for example, reached 
the homes of about “50% of the total population”153 by 1943). Nonetheless there was an 
acknowledgement that the Post Office as a whole had an important role to play in the social 
life of the country. Asked in April 1934 whether the Post Office was a commercial institution 
or a social service, Gerry Boland responded that it was “partly both.”154 Thus losses from the 
telegraph service and from rural Post Offices were accepted because of the social function of 
these services. The perceived role of the “luxury” that was the telephone service in this period
149 Own calculadons based on figures provided in Appendices XXIVa and XXVIIIa.
150 CSO Statistical Abstract 146.
151 A.J. Litton (1961), “The Growth and Development of the Irish Telephone System", Journal of 
the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society o f Ireland Vol. 20, Part 5, pp. 79-115, p. 87.
152 Own calculations based on data in Appendices IV and XXXI.
153 F.S.L. Lyons (1973), Ireland Since the Famine. (London: Fontana), p. 617.






was to earn the profits that would subsidise the workings of the acknowledged socially 
essential services.
It should also be noted however that it was not impossible that the role of the telephone might 
nonetheless have been reconceptualised by the Department if Posts and Telegraphs as a 
service worthy of state investment. That such a reconceptualisation did not is in part down to 
the nature of Irish politics in this era and in particular relates it to the status of the Department 
of Posts and Telegraphs in cabinet. As noted in chapter three, the political hand-over from the 
British Administration to the Irish Free State in 1922 occurred remarkably smoothly, largely 
because the administrative framework remained almost entirely unchanged. As a consequence, 
however, there was a tendency, especially with regard to less overtly political issues, to simply 
follow pre-independence administrative practice. This was particularly significant for the Post 
Office which “amongst Government Departments, [was] the nearest approach there [was] to a 
commercial institution...”155 Consequently, the telegraphs and postal service remained the 
“social” services whilst the telephone remained the “commercial” service.
Active consideration of the role of the communications system in Ireland was in any case 
made less likely by the fact that the Post Office and Department of Posts and Telegraphs were 
rather low on the scale of cabinet importance, a fact emphasised by the fact that between 1927 
and 1932, the portfolio was occupied by Ernest Blythe, who was simultaneously the Minister 
for Finance, then as now the most senior cabinet position after the Taoiseach and Tanaiste. As 
a result, however, there appears to have been relatively little consideration given to what the 
future role of the telephone service might be. Thus, with the exception of those periods when 
the service was considered to be in extremis - such as the gaps evident in the national network 
in 1922 - there was little proactive thought given to the service. Thus the guiding principle 
with regard to the telephone service throughout the period under review in this chapter 
remained that principle inherited from the British Administration: that the development of the 
service should (implicitly)be driven by market demand.






6.1 G eneral D evelopm ent 1940 - 1944
The outbreak o f the Second World W ar should have been disastrous for telephone 
development since “the greater part of the plant and apparatus used for engineering purposes 
(was) made outside Eire...” ' Despite the lip service paid to self-sufficiency there was no 
question of the Post Office factory at St. John’s Road single-handedly providing for the 
technical needs of country.2 The timing of the outbreak of war was relatively providential, 
however, as extra materials had been laid in stock to cope with the increased demand that 
followed the 1936 rental and tariff changes. Nonetheless, as early as March 1940, Minister 
P.J. Little was forced to acknowledge that second-hand wire was being used in some areas.3 
Furthermore, the cost of stores, when it was possible to find any, (for example, the supply of 
pine poles crucial for telephone network development stopped abruptly in September 1940) 
rose sharply as the supply grew tighter:
“The closing up of continental sources of supply has naturally affected matters, but 
notwithstanding this, the position remains reasonably satisfactory, although heavy 
increases in costs have taken place.”4
In spite of this, Little announced in April 1940 that the Government was “particularly anxious 
that telephone development shall proceed as far as possible on normal lines.” Yet in practice 
the provision of service to new subscribers ceased for the first 12 months o f the war except 
where “urgent considerations of State or public service arise”5 (government departments, 
doctors, hospitals etc.), as the Department sought to establish an effective cross-country 
communication network for the Department of Defence:
1 DD 83, p. 1474, 4 June 1941.
2 Furthermore, the factory was badly damaged by fire in November 1942, losing its stocks, stores and 
"a large number of telephone switchboards in process of manufacture", and putting it out of action 
for at least eighteen months. See DD 91, p. 1706, 9 November 1943.




“Work on provision of emergency Defence circuits must be given priority over all 
normal works. An Priomh Innealtoir has explained diat it will be necessary to 
withdraw immediately every possible man of the Engineering staffs from ordinary 
construction, maintenance, installation, etc., works.”6
Once this was in place restrictions were lifted on new subscribers in the city areas of Dublin, 
Cork and Limerick. In rural areas, however, development effectively ceased from 1940 until 
the end of the war. In June 1941, Little explained to the Dad that the problem of replenishing 
supplies compelled him to pursue a policy of rigid economy in regard to engineering stores 
consumption:
“Accordingly until the position eases, new construction works which involve any 
substantial quantity o f  stores will, unless where essential services are concerned, be 
rigidly curtailed. Every effort will, however, be made to meet the demands from new 
subscribers as far as circumstances admit, but the difficulties in the way o f  providing 
long pole routes are considerable and, even when it is possible to erect such circuits, 
very long delays will be inevitable.”7 (Italics added)
As a civil service memo acknowledged in a letter to Little in October 1941., “long pole routes” 
meant rural subscribers. Furthermore, rural automatic telephony, regarded in the mid-thirties 
as a potential method of providing longer hours of service to rural communities at an 
affordable price also suffered. By June 1941, however, Little was forced to admit:
“The extension of the experimental semi-automatic system in rural districts which 
was contemplated, has had to be abandoned for the time being. As the apparatus has 
to be obtained from outside the country, mainly from the USA, it will not be possible 
to make further progress in the matter while the emergency lasts.”8
6 RJ Cremins to PJ Little, 13th June 1940, in NAD D/P&T M 1437/52 Vol 2. "Shortage of 
Engineering Stores 1942 - 1945."
7 DD 83, p. 1474, 4 June 1941.
8 DD 83, pp. 1472-1473, 4 June 1941.
173
Lack of supplies was a persistent problem throughout the war. As imports from the UK dried 
up, the Post Office looked to the USA despite the “seriously increased cost and ...considerable 
delays in delivery.”9 This failed to alleviate the problem however. An internal departmental 
report prepared in January 1942 by T.J. Monaghan, the Chief Engineer, outlined the scale o f 
the problem:
“Normally an appreciable amount of external and internal wire installation fittings are 
left in situ when thrown spare because their recovery would not be worth the cost as 
compared with the cost of new plant. In view of the present and prospective position 
with regard to renewal of stocks, however, it will be necessary to conserve new stores 
to the fullest possible extent and, therefore, to recover and recondition for use old 
plant which in normal times would be abandoned.”10
By the spring of 1943, however, the war was continuing without any sign of abatement. As a 
result, the British Post Office, which had hitherto been “most helpful”11 whenever the Irish 
Post Office faced real emergencies, were themselves only undertaking construction work 
directly concerned with their own war effort. There was thus no question of the British P.O. 
continuing to provide construction stores for the ordinary growth of normal public traffic in 
Ireland.
In consequence, Monaghan had recommended in February the introduction of new guidelines 
on development:
9 DD 83, p. 1476, 4 June 1941. Despite neutrality, the extent to which the course of the war effected 
Ireland is interesting: the decision to seek supplies from America was made possible by the fact that 
America had not yet entered the war (with the exception of the Lend-lease programme) and thus US 
shipping was relatively safe on the Atlantic route. By December 11 however, German declared war 
on the US and the U-Boat campaign in the Atlantic was stepped up, leading to a drying-up even of 
this source by 1943 (See DD 86, p. 391, 26 March 1942.)
10 Referred to in a letter to Little from within die Department (signature illegible), dated 9th 
February 1942. NAD M 1437/52 Vol 2.
11 Monaghan to O'Hegarty, 20 March 1943, NAD M 1437/57 Vol III.
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“the aim should be to restrict provision of new circuits generally to about one-third of 
normal demands. On this basis [MonaghanJ estimates that existing stores, for reserve 
and for current use, might last for about three years.”12
This duly occurred and Little informed the Dad at the November 1943 Estimates Debate that:
“As a result of the continued worsening supply position, it recently became necessary 
to extend this restrictive policy and to limit the provision o f additional subscribers’ 
lines generally.”13
Thus after April 1943, virtually all applications for private residence lines were refused 
(except in cases “showing really urgent and serious grounds for service”14). Indeed, such was 
the seriousness of the supplies situation by 1943 that even the army was refused new 
connections uidess “they are essential for Defence reasons i.e. for the safety of the Post 
concerned. The fact that a telephone would facilitate clerical work or routine administration 
does not constitute a case for its supply.”15
Irish telephone development did not stop entirely during the war however. The average annual 
net increases in the number of telephone installations in the three years preceding the war had 
been 1,294,16 a figure which dropped to 935 between 1939 and 1944. Yet, throughout the war 
“most applications for new business lines”17 were met, as were (eventually) all applications 
by government departments, public services and the emergency services. Restrictions on new 
applications remained until the end of the war but the fact that those mentioned above were 
acceded to suggests that, in urban areas at least, the situation never reached a critical stage. 
Certainly, as Monaghan mentioned in March of that year, mere maintenance the lines required 
a “practically negligible”18 quantity of stores.
12 O'Hcgarty (?) to Litde, 16 February 1943, NAD M 1437/57 Vol III.
13 DD 91. p. 1704, 9 November 1943. NAD M 1437/57 Vol III.
14 (Illegible signature - possibly O'Hegarty) to Litde 12 November, 1943. NAD M 1437/57 Vol III.
15 O'Hegarty to Secretaiy, Department of Defence, 11 February 1943. M1437/52 Vol 2 (General 
Instruction #9, dated 2 March 1942 is also included in this file.)
16 Anonymous Department of P&T Memo to Cabinet Committee in Economic Planning 16 October 




Furthermore, in spite of the curtailment o f the extension of the telephone network, the 
telephone service itself suddenly took off in the war period. Profits earned by the Telephone 
Branch rose from £61,286 in 1937/38 to £242,043 in 1942/43 despite the fact that the Post 
Office was unable to significantly expand the number of telephone subscribers. A clue as to 
the source of these profits lies in the decline from 1942 in the quality of the service for 
existing subscribers, particularly on the trunk lines, which lead directly to the November 1943 
decision “to impose a restriction of duration to six minutes on trunk calls during the busy 
traffic hours ,”19 In short, use of the existing telephone network increased to an enormous 
extent over the course of the war. The number of calls made per amium in Ireland had 
increased consistently from the beginnings o f the telephone service but the rate o f increase 
between 1939 and 1945 was unprecedented, particularly in light of the reduction in new 
installations. The six years up to 1938 had seen 36% and 57% increases in local and trunk 
call traffic, but between 1939 and 1945 the number of local calls increased from 32.5 million 
to over 49 million, a 50% increase, whilst the number o f trunk calls shot up from 3.6 million 
to 7.1 million, nearly a 100% increase. It is impossible to state definitively the source of the 
growth but military usage can be largely discounted since no actual “emergency” (as Ireland 
styled the wartime period) came to pass. The Department noted in 1944 however that:
“the telephone has been used to an abnormal extent by the commercial community 
and private persons owing to the general transport difficulties and problems o f trade 
arising out o f the emergency.”20
Little himself ascribed the growth to the relative unavailability of transportation suggesting in 
1943 and again in 1944 th a t :
“ ...every added limitation of ordinary public facilities - transport, fuel, supplies etc. - 
seems, by reason, no doubt, of the upset to normal activities, to react immediately 
upon the telephones.”21
19 DD 91, p. 1703, 9 November 1943.
20 Department of Posts and Telegraphs memo to Cabinet Committee on Economic Planning 16 
October 1944. NAD S 13086 A.
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Whatever the case, the role of the telephone changed irrevocably during the war heralding the 
general arrival of the “telephone habit” . Although the Department of P&T warned that the 
increase in telephone traffic was prompted by the Emergency and was therefore ephemeral, it 
nonetheless acknowledged that: “During the Emergency all classes of people have acquired the 
habit of using the telephone extensively and it may be taken that the service will be used more 
and more in the future.”22 Little echoed this in the Dail:
“There is no question that, as the years pass, the telephone will become more and 
more the medium of communication in this country. It will eventually supersede the 
telegraph and to some extent I believe it will supersede the post as well.”23
6.2 General Development 1945 - 1949
Irish post-war economic recovery was halting but a consumer boom fuelled by wartime 
savings significantly increased demand for the telephone: by May 1946, a waiting list of 4,000 
applicants had emerged. A year later it rose to over 7,000.24 Demand easily outpaced supply: 
the engineering stock needed to cope with even the existing traffic in the 1945 - 47 era was 
simply unavailable. Conceding this at the 1946 Estimates Debate Little estimated that even 
clearing up the backlog of the war years would take a further 12 to 18 months.25
21 See DD 91, p. 1703, 9 November 1943 andDD, p 1167, Vol 93, 19 April 1944. Little’s comment 
was probably based on Department of Posts and Telegraphs advice. A November 1944 departmental 
report ascribed the rise in Telephone profits to the 5% surcharge introduced in 1941 and the fact that 
"the telephone has been used to an abnormal extent by the commercial community and private 
persons owing to general transport difficulties and problems of trade arising out of the emergency". 
See Dept, of P&T to Cabinet Committee on Economic Planning, 16 November 1944 NAD S 13086 
A.
22 Dept, of P&T to Cabinet Committee on Economic Planning, 16 November 1944 NAD S 13086 A.
23 DD 93, p. 1356, 25 April 1944.
24 As an incidental point, by 1951, the population of Dublin had risen to over 575,000 (Brown, 
"Ireland" p 211): it is possible that part of the increased demand for the service was prompted by the 
fact that one fifth of the population now lived in the area where telephone installations were 
cheapest. Of the 4,000 outstanding installations in 1946, 2,500 were in the Dublin area. Certainly 
Deputy Alfie Byrne singled out the "new housing areas in the City of Dublin" in November 1946 as 
being "without an adequate telephone service" (or indeed an adequate bus service, proper lighting 
facilities etc.). SeeDD 103, p. 383, 6 November 1946.
25 DD 100, p. 2312, 1 May 1946.
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In spite of this, in May 1946 Little surprised the Dad by introducing an ambitious plan to 
triple subscriber numbers to 100,000 within a 15 year period and to equip every Post Office 
with a Telephone Call Office by 1951. The latter objective was explicitly intended to facilitate 
the provision of private subscriber circuits in rural areas since “when a subscriber is served a 
Call Office becomes an exchange.”26 Thus, whilst in the short term Department activities 
were “likely to concentrate mainly on rectification of existing shortcomings rather than on any 
large scale expansion,”27 he proposed to introduce a new Telephone Capital Bill to fund the 
scale of development envisaged.”28 Five months later therefore, during the second stage debate 
on the 1946 Telephone Capital Bill, Little announced the greatest commitment to telephone 
development yet made by any P&T Minister:
“The possibility of expanding the telephone service on a very large scale has been 
closely examined and I am satisfied that the time is opportune to prepare for such 
expansion. Plans are being completed and work is proceeding on a scheme having for 
its object the trebling of the present number of telephones in use. In order to attract 
new subscribers in the numbers contemplated it will be necessary to make the service 
as efficient, as attractive and as cheap as possible. At present the hours of service at 
many exchanges are from 8am to 8pm on weekdays and 9am to 10.30pm on 
Sundays...! am satisfied that the telephone service could not be extensively developed 
in rural areas and small towns unless continuous service were given.”29
Thus Little announced that automatic equipment would be installed in lieu of the equipment 
then in use at the great majority of exchanges, with a view to providing continuous service at 
all but the very smallest exchanges (those with less than about five subscribers). More than 
600 new automatic and semi-automatic exchanges along with 50 central manual exchanges 
were to be installed, in some cases prompting the need for new buildings. The hoped-for result 
of this development was the provision of a “no delay” trunk service. Thus Little also 
announced:
26 Department of Posts and Telegraphs to the Cabinet Committee on Economic Planning, 5 
November 1943. NAD S 13086A “Telephone, Development of.”
27 DD 100, p. 23125, 1 May 1946.
28 Ibid.
29 DD 103, pp. 203 - 204, 23 October 1946.
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“To cater for estimated growth of tmiik traffic, plans are being made to increase the 
trunk network six to eight-fold. The position has now been reached on some of our 
main routes that no additional circuits can be erected overhead, and underground 
trunk cables must be laid to provide the circuits required. Such cables are extremely 
costly and take a long time to manufacture and lay, but they enable all possible 
demands for the future to be adequately met. To give a satisfactory service on cross- 
Channel calls, a new submarine cable will be laid. It is also intended to erect 
telephone kiosks on a veiy generous scale in cities and towns.”30
The Telephone Capital Bill was to commit £6,000,000 towards the cost of this ambitious 
scheme, although this only represented the expenditure for die following four or five years, 
since the final cost was estimated at not less than £10,000,000.
Yet merely making a commitment to spend these sums did not automatically ensure that the 
promised development could occur. Although the extreme pressure placed on trunk network 
by the wartime traffic increases ensured that the Department of Posts and Telegraphs did 
invest in 60 new trunk carrier systems (which, by the 1940s, permitted up to 12 conversations 
to be carried simultaneously on the same circuit31), immediately they became available after 
the war, such national infrastructure investment did not continue uninterrupted. Confounding 
the Department of Posts and Telegraphs’ wartime caution, the end of the Emergency saw no 
diminution in the public demand for the telephone: traffic continued to expand at a rate which 
the Department admitted was too fast to keep up with in light of the ongoing stores shortage.
In April 1947 Little announced a further increase in the previous year’s telephone traffic: local 
calls were up by 4,000,000 and trunk calls by 460,000. Yet he was forced to admit somewhat 
ruefully:
“These increases would be more gratifying if means were available to cater more 
satisfactorily for the extra traffic which has been added year by year since pre-war
30 DD 103, pp. 203 - 204, 23 October 1946.
31 Wall, op. cit., p. 142. The first 12 channel trunk carrier system in Ireland actually came into 
operation between Dublin and Limerick (via Portlaoise) in 1941. Ibid.
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days. As I have explained on previous occasions, additional traffic without additional 
equipment to handle it, necessarily causes deterioration of the service.”32
By June 1 1947, there were 7 ,11633 applications outstanding for telephone installations, whilst 
the following year saw a record 7,00034 applications made for new installations. Whilst some 
inroads were made into the arrears in the Dublin area, the situation in rural areas, where the 
lack of spare cable made all but the shortest extensions impossible, grew steadily worse in the 
latter half of the 1940s.35 Thus in 1948, the new Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, James 
Everett, a Labour Party TD, representing Wicklow, was immediately presented with one of 
two choices: development of the national infrastructure or concentration on the connection of 
individual subscribers. Confronted with a growing crisis in applications in arrears,36 Everett 
followed the latter path.37
“In view of the great need to give telephones to the people who were on the waiting 
list at 31st December last it has been decided to suspend the provision o f call boxes 
for the current year in favour of the clearance of waiting applications for 
telephones.”38
As a consequence, however, all work on the Rural Call Box programme, provincial automatic 
exchange building and additional trunk lines was either slowed or suspended indefinitely until 
the Department had overcome the obstacles posed by a “shortage of engineering staff.
32 DD 105, p. 637, 16 April 1947.
33 DD 107, p. 10, 24 June 1947
34 DD 114, p. 1751, 29/3/49. See also Ibid., p. 2375, 6/4/49: Everett: "New applications were ... 
received during 1948 at a rate almost double die highest rate ever previously received."
35 The 2,500 Dublin arrears of May 1946 had been reduced to 1,700 by November of the same year, 
whilst the 1,500 outstanding rural extensions had risen to 2,300 in the same period. See DD 103, p. 
403, 6 November 1946.
36 By May 1948, there were over 6,300 awaiting connection, in a countiy with fewer than 80,000 
subscribers. By February 1949 there were still more than 5,800 applications outstanding despite the 
connecdon of a further 7,000 applicants in the calendar year 1948 (DD 117, p. 357, 7/7/49). This 
represented a massive increase in the number of annual installations. Up to 1948, the best figure 
achieved in a single year was 2,600.
37 DD 112, p. 803, 20/7/48.
38 DD 112, p. 804, 20/7/48. At the date referred to there would have been over 7,000 applications 
outstanding (See DD, 112, p. 803, 20/7/48). This is a slightly earlier reference to the suspension of 
the call office programme in May of 1948 " Owing to arrears of other construction work -
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difficulties in making headway in budding protects and increased public demand for 
telephones.”39
6.3 General Development 1950 - 1954
Throughout 1949, the main engineering effort of the Department was concentrated on 
installing telephones: some 6,500 were installed in the year up to May 1950. With the 
applications that had accumulated between 1939 and 1947 almost entirely cleared, Everett 
announced in March 1950 that “work on the Department's scheme to install a telephone in 
every post office has now been resumed,”40 and that 91 rural call boxes had been installed in 
1948 before the suspension o f the programme.41 It was expected to take “several years”42 to 
service the remaining 800 rural Post Offices.”43
At the same time work on the programme to automate provincial exchanges had recommenced 
using a combination of fully automatic exchanges and Unit Automatic Exchanges (UAX). In 
1949 Cork City had become the first location outside Dublin to receive a fully automatic 
exchange44 but over the course of the 1950s, large automatic exchanges were opened in 
Dundalk, Athlone, Waterford, Drogheda, Limerick, Mullingar, Sligo, Naas and Galway (in 
that order).45 At the same time UAXs which were essentially updated versions of the semi­
automatic exchanges the Department had experimented with before the war, were installed in 
smaller towns from 1950 onwards.46 UAXs were not in fact fully automatic exchanges but 
rather they offered a conduit through which subscribers in smaller towns wore connected to
particularly the clearance of waiting applications for telephone service - it has been necessary to 
suspend work on the call office programme for the present..." (DD, 110, p. 83, 25//5/48)
39 NAD S 13086c.
40 DD 119, p. 1895, 15/3/50.
41 All figures from DD 133, p. 183, 3/7/52.
42 Ibid.
43 DD 121, p. 516, 24/5/50.
44 Litton, op. cit. , p. 88.
45 Wall, op. cit. p. 127.
46 Wall lists the following towns as receiving UAX service between 1948 and 1960: Malahide, 
Castleisland, Carrickmacross, Swords, Mitchelstown, Castlecomer, Trim, MuineBheag, Tullow, 
Maynooth, Buttevant, Celbridge, Blarney, Lusk, Roscommon, Ardee, Atliery, Ballincolig, 
Balbriggan, Crosshaven, Portmarnock, Whitegate, Midleton andKinsale. Wall, op. cit. pp. 126-127 
Litton notes, however that a total of 55 such exchanges had been opened by 1959. Litton, op. cit., p. 
90.
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distant full auto-exchanges. As such UAXs offered substantial cost savings to the Department 
of Posts and Telegraphs in its efforts to provide automatic service to rural customers: since 
they were substantially cheaper than their fully automatic counterparts, the Department was 
able to offer automatic service in areas where a full auto-exchange would not have been 
economic due to an insufficiently high population density.47
The fmal major element of the 1946 development plan, related to the expansion o f the trunk 
network. Again the Department opted for new technology with a view to both attempting to 
match trunk capacity to demand but also to reduce the per channel cost of investment. Thus 
whereas in the 1940s, the most advanced trunk carrier system had permitted up to 12 
conversations per circuit, from 1949 onwards, the Department increasingly invested in co­
axial cable which, if fully installed, was capable of providing up to 600 channels (and thus 60 
simultaneous conversations) on a single circuit. As had been the case with the introduction of 
trunk carrier systems in the 1930s, co-axial cables were laid on routes stretching from Dublin. 
By 1956 three such cables (respectively designated as the “Southern”, “Northern and 
“Western” cables) connected Dublin to Cork, Portlaoise, Limerick, Waterford, Dundalk, 
Naas, Drogheda, Sligo, Mullingar, Longford, Claremorris and Athlone. At the same time, by 
the mid-1950s, further improvements in co-axial technology meant that the last of the three 
cables (“The Western Cable”)had an increased the carrying capacity of 960 channels. (Co­
axial cable also sped up the process of setting up and dealing down of trunk calls, in turn 
speeding up the freeing of circuits once a call was connected and reducing ineffective trunk 
occupation time. In consequence this allowed more calls to be made and ultimately “paved the 
way for full Subscriber Trunk Dialling” in the late 1950s.)48
Although the engineering developments immediately above were thus in train by June 1951 
when Fianna Fail were returned to power, with Erskine Childers taking the Posts and 
Telegraphs portfolio. Childers implicitly criticised the short-termism of his predecessors 1949 
decision to focus on new installations, arguing that this had allowed the trunk service to fall 
into disrepair.49 He continued:
47 Wall, op. cit. pp. 126-127.
48 Wall, op. cit., pp. 142-143.
49 Childers: "... during the past three years the emphasis has been upon an increase in the number of 
exchange lines and stations or individual telephone points as compared with the number of trunk
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“The previous Government took the view that subscribers’ lines should be joined at 
the expense of more fundamental planning and trunk circud development.
The day must come when we either secure more electrical engineers or, 
remembering our duties to those who succeed us, slow down the joining of 
subscribers' lines and speed up the planning of exchanges, new circuits, trunks and so 
forth.”50 (Italics added).
The practical result of this had been a further focus on providing service in urban areas. O f
6,500 lines installed in 1950, 4,815, were connected to exchanges in “Dublin and the other 
main centres of population” but only 1,985 to exchanges in smaller towns and villages. As a 
result by December 1950, 36,069 of the 52,506 subscribers exchange lines were in Dublin 
and other large centres o f population whdst the rest of the country accounted for only 
16,437.51
He reminded the Dad that the plan outlined by P.J. Little in 1946 had contemplated:
“ ...new main auto-manual exchanges at trunk centres, rural automatic exchanges and 
rural semi-automatic exchanges would be provided on a very extensive scale in the 
ensuing five years and that trunk cables to the north-west, to the north and to the 
south-east would have been laid as well as the main southern cable.”52
Thus, in contrast to his predecessor, Childers recommitted the Department to the completion 
of the 1946 plan. He introduced his first Telephone Capital Act in July 1950, earmarking 
£5,000,000 of the £8,000,000 sought to trunk circuit development and the building of new 
exchanges (or the extension of old ones). Whilst not discounting the need to continue 
connecting subscribers, the five year programme for the 1951 Act was intended to “meet in
lines. As a result there are still arrears in the work of providing sufficient trunk lines , minor trunk 
lines and circuits in order to deal with the increased number of telephone calls." DD 126, p. 296, 
20/6/51.
50 DD 126, pp. 946-7, 4/7/51.
51 DD 126, p. 244, 20/6/51.
52 DD 126, pp. 938-9,4/7/51.
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full the public demand for telephones and for raising the standard o f trunk service to a 
satisfactory level.”53
Childers also inherited a depressing set of financial figures from the coalition administration 
of 1948 - 1951. In July 1949 Everett had announced the figures for 1947/48: a decline in the 
telephone section surplus to £161, 897, while the ailing Telegraph service registered a loss of 
just over a quarter of a million pounds, contributing to an overall deficit of £112,236. 
Continuing losses from the service as a whole on 1950 prompted Everett to set in motion a 
departmental examination of Post Office charges with a view to reducing the deficit but this 
was only completed after Childers was appointed as Minister.54 During his first Estimates 
Debate in June 1951, Childers stated that the financial position of the Department was “not 
satisfactory”55: the deficit for the year 1949 - 50 was £167,251, the combined surplus of 
£115,576 from postal and telephone services easily wiped out by the massive loss on 
telegraphs. A month later, he warned that early figures for 1951/52 were projecting a loss of 
about £40,000 on the working of the telephone service, the first since 1931, and mentioned the 
possibility of “progressively greater sums in the succeeding years if existing charges were to 
remain undisturbed.”56 Consequently, a blanket increase of 25% was applied to the rentals 
and tariffs set in 1936, increasing annual business and residential rentals to £8 2s 6d and £6 
5s respectively.
Despite the charge increase, the telephone service lost £68,000 in 1951/52 and a further 
£33,500 in 1952/53, forcing Childers to introduce a second charge increase in 1953 increasing 
business and residence rentals to £10 and £7 10s respectively. This increase (combined with 
the developments outlined immediately below) saw the service comfortably return to 
profitability the following year. At the same time, however, Childers actively sought to 
minimise the effects of the increases in rural areas. He ended the practice of specially 
assessing the rentals at very small exchanges, introducing standard rentals at all exchanges
53 Ibid.
54 Childers was to prove an innovadve force in the department, and as his biographer points out, was 
not prepared to act merely as a rubber stamp to the decisions of the Department Secretary (appointed 
in 1946) Leon O'Broin. His appointment to P&T was his first ministry and made him the youngest 
member of the cabinet. See John N. Young (1985), Erskine Childers. President of Ireland, a 
Biography. (Gerrard’s Cross: Smytlie).
55 DD 126, p. 238, 20/51.
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(although reducing the free mileage radius within which standard rentals applied from 3 to 2 
miles outside of Dublin, Cork and Limerick). Furthermore, in order to offset the higher 
charges for long lines, the rural party line service was re-introduced at lower rates.57
Notwithstanding the financial crisis, Chdders had announced in February 1952, that the pace 
of the rural call box programme would be accelerated, in order to complete it by the end of 
1954.58 Since 244 new call boxes had been installed in rural post offices in 1950 and 1951,59 
achieving this objective would have involved a doubling of the previous pace. Childers 
acknowledged that it would be “a considerable undertaking for most of the post offices in 
question are in remote areas and the erection of hundreds of miles o f new poles and wire will 
be mvolved.” 60 Nonetheless, he stressed that that work warranted:
“a certain measure of priority over ordinary rural telephone lines for individuals, not 
only because it will bring the benefits of the telephone earlier to remote rural 
communities but also because it will help rural telephone development by extending 
the telephone network into areas not previously served, and so facilitate at a later 
stage the work of providing service for prospective applicants in those areas/’61
Despite the efforts expended on the rural call box programme, Childers was also able to refer 
to the “great progress”62 in new installations in the early 1950s. By the close of 1953. the 
waiting list which had peaked at over 7,000 by mid-1947 had been reduced to 3,250 due 
mainly to the setting of successive records for amiual installations in 1952 and 1953 of 
7,23463 and 7,60 164 lines. (A slight drop in the number of annual applications, prompted by 
the charge increases also helped.) Rural development remained the focus of attention at the 
expense o f catching up with outstanding applications. Childers announced in April 1953 that
56 DD 126, p. 944, 4/7/51.
57 NAD S 15045 A.
58 DD 129, p. 593, 14/2/52.
59 All figures from DD 133, p. 183, 3/7/52.
60 DD 133, pp. 183-4, 3/7/52.
61 DD 133, pp. 183-4, 3/7/52.
62 NAD S 13086 D, Childers to De Valera, 29/1/53.
63 DD 138, p. 955,30/4/53.
64 DD 144, p. 697, 18/2/53.
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he would not “clear off the list of waiting applicants untd the trunk circuits have been still 
further improved, until all call offices in post offices have been installed.”65
By June 1954, only 25 of the original 900 post offices included under the Rural Call Box 
scheme remained to be connected. Furthermore, all provincial towns with a population greater 
than 1,000 people had kiosks installed, a tacit recognition that the level of use in rural areas 
had increased, since kiosks were installed only if  the Post Office was confident of their paying 
for themselves.66 With the call-box programme thus virtually completed, the Department 
shifted its attention to “providing telephone services for those people who have long lines in 
the country and have been waiting a long time in the interests o f providing telephones for all 
post offices.”67
6.4 General Development 1955-59
Childers’ interparty government successor, Michael Keyes, was given something of a head 
slarl on taking office: the postal and telephone charge increases inherited from the previous 
administration68 had reduced the postal deficit to £142,000 and returned the telephone section 
to profitability: £177,000. Furthermore, as Table 6.1 below indicates, whilst there remained 
an overall deficit on the combined services of the Post Office (of £312,000 in 1953/54), this 
was converted to an overall profit during the latter half of the 1950s, due largely to the 
telephone section, the profits of which averaged over £300,000 per annum between 1955 and 
1960.
; Table 6.1 Post Office Profit and Loss 1955- 1960
! Year I Postal Service Telegraphs Telephone Total
1 1954/55 1 (£98,606) (£377,897) £228.102 (£248,404)
j 1955/56 ! (£264,617) (£238,299) £134.437 (£368.479)
65 DD 138, p. 1185, 6/5/53.
66 DD 146, p. 347, 16/6/54. It is important to distinguish between kiosks and call boxes. The former 
were installed externally, on the streets inside weatherproof (and theoretically soundproof) boxes. 
Call boxes were usually installed in a post office or general store on a wall and offered little privacy, 
although "silence cabinets" were occasionally installed around them. The obvious problem with the 
latter is that their use relied on the building they were installed in being open. Kiosks however were 
available 24 hours a day, assuming that the local exchange remained open.
67 Ibid., pp. 354-5.
68 Note: telegraph charges had not yet been introduced pending the report of a special committee 
examining the position of the telegraph service (DD 146, p. 350, 16/6/54)
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1957/58 £104,999 (£177,556) £366,377 £293,820
1958/59 £4.672 (£140,144) £413,048 £277,576
1959/6069 £129,771 (£136,867) £396,179 £389.083
Keyes also inherited an increase in the number of applications for service which rose from 
5,300 in 1953/54 to 8,300 in 1955/56. Furthermore an increasing proportion of the new 
applications came from provincial residential applicants. Childers had noted this phenomenon 
as early as mid-195370 but it persisted throughout the 1950s: provincial residence line 
applications in 1958 were twice the 1953 figure.71 The growth in this specific sector was 
prompted by a combination o f the Rural Call Box programme (which as noted above was 
intended to facilitate the provision of private subscriber lines) and by the fact that the pattern 
of call charge increases since 1939 had favoured the provincial residential users. Keyes noted 
in 1956 that while Dublin residential rates increased by 50% since 1939, those residential 
subscribers “outside the Dublin automatic area”72 had experienced only a 27% increase in the 
same period due to their receipt from 1956 of a local call allowance worth £1 3 s 4d per 
annum (in recognition of the fact that the local rate area enjoyed by Dublin subscribers was 
larger than the standard local area - a five mile radius - diat applied elsewhere73).
Keyes conceded in July 1956 that the increase in provincial applications would require a 
“substantial increase in the level of capital expenditure on the service.”74 1 9 5 5 and 1956 
were, however, crisis years for the economy, forcing the Department of Finance to seek 
spending cuts from all departments. As a consequence, when Keyes came to introduce the 
1956 Telephone Capital Act, he sought only £6,000,000, £2,000,000 less than the previous 
act despite the fact that demand was running ahead of supply. Keyes argued that it was 
unreasonable to expect:
“telephone development and particularly the extensive installation of private
telephones which now constitutes a very large part of the increased demand to be
69 From Post Office Commercial Accounts year ending 31 st March 1971, p 22.
70 DD 141, p. 1039, 30/7/53.
71 DD 167, p. 379, 17/4/58.
72 DD 158, p 22, 126/56.
73 DD 158, p. 22, 126/56.
74 DD 159, p. 22, 3/7/56.
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regarded as of such overriding importance that the needs of the service should be met 
in full at the expense of the other capital services...”75
However, he also conceded that the £6,000,000 would be insufficient to meet completely “the 
anticipated needs of the service over the next few years.”76 Once again the financial 
limitations had a disproportionate effect on provincial development. Whilst, in Dublin, strain 
on the capacity of the underground system simply promised delays for applicants, in rural 
areas “the capital cost of long rural lines per subscriber is disproportionately high” meant that 
“it may be necessary to restrict the amount of work of this kind which is undertaken.”77 In 
July 1956, Sean Ormonde, Keyes’ successor announced the suspension of the programme to 
extend continuous service into rural areas via small automatic exchanges.78 Furthermore the 
long term objective of achieving a universal “no-delay” trunk service became an even longer 
term objective.
The general economic climate improved in 1958 however, with the end of the international 
recession and the introduction of the Department of Finance’s first Programme for Economic 
Development. Furthermore, the fact that the telephone section had made unprecedented profits 
during a period when capital spending had been severely curtailed together with the fact that 
the objectives of the 1946 development plan had largely been achieved prompted the 
Department to consider future development. In doing so, as is outlined below, it is apparent 
that the Department deliberately set out to address the question of developing demand for 
service in rural areas.
Before developing a new development programme, however, the Department had applied to 
the UN Technical Assistance Programme for assistance.79 The Programme provided Gerrit J. 
Kamerbeek, a telephone planning expert with the Dutch Post Office, who prepared two 
reports. One offered a general assessment of the problems faced by the Irish Telephone 
Service and the second was on the possibility of introducing national subscriber trunk dialling 
,which would permit subscribers to make trunk calls without recourse to an operator. The two
75 DD 159, p. 24, 3/7/56.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 DD 165, p. 300, 13/2/58.
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reports were subsumed into a Department memo entitled “Telephone Development” detailing 
the Department’s future development plans. This was submitted to the cabinet in June 1959.80 
The report noted that “the bulk of telephone development” since 1922 had been concentrated 
“in Dublin and the provincial cities and larger towns.”81 Even in the post-war era, 34,000 of 
the 58,950 phones installed nationally since 1946 had been provided in Dublin. Furthermore, 
the report noted that whilst the plan for national development drawn up in 1946 had 
anticipated that 20,000 of the total projected increase in installations (100,000 new lines) 
would be accounted for by farmers, “by 1959 with the achievement o f the 100,000 figure in 
sight, only 3,000 farmers had telephones.”82
Nevertheless it concluded that “scope for development in rural areas exists (as) evidenced by 
the fact that some 20,000 farmers with relatively large holdings of reasonably good land have 
not got telephones.”83 Consequently the memo concluded that:
“more attractive rental terms should be made available to rural applicants and also 
that rural subscribers should be enabled to make a greater proportion of their calls at 
the local call charge.”84
The expansion o f the local call area (or “Group Charging”) was, according to Kamerbeek's 
second report, a prerequisite of any plan to introduce STD working which also required the 
conversion of all exchanges to automatic working. In 1959, however, there were 959 
telephone exchanges in the country, each with its own scale o f charges. If  left unchanged, it 
would have been necessary to provide separate equipment for each exchange. Since this would 
have been prohibitively expensive, Group Charging was introduced, creating 127 Group 
Charging areas “having one point for each group as the measuring point for all trunk calls 
made from all exchanges in the group.”85
79 Ibid.





85 NAD S 15045 A. From Oifig Aire Poist agus Telegrafa "Memorandum for the Government - 
Telephone Development". 17th June 1959.
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In consequence, the report went on to suggest three far-reaching changes in the structure of 
telephone charges which the Department estimated would cost it £125,000 per annum at the 
then current subscriber levels.86 Given the scale of the profits earned by the telephone section 
over the previous five years, however, the cabinet accepted the report’s recommendations with 
demur, allowing then Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, Michael Hilliard, to announce the 
changes in July 1959.
Firstly, the area covered by local calls was to be greatly extended. Hilliard noted that “some 
5,000,000 calls a year now charged at 6d or lOd or more will in future cost 2d.” 87 This 
would have a substantial impact in rural areas, where Department of Posts and Telegraphs’ 
unwillingness to fund heavy capital investment had in part been influenced by the fact that 
compared to their Dublin counterparts, rural subscribers had made relatively few calls.88 
This, it was acknowledged, was “due in large measure to the few numbers which could be 
called for the local call fee, the majority of calls involving a trunk charge.”89 Thus a vicious 
circle was created: few people living in rural areas wished to become subscribers because of 
the small number of existing subscribers they could call at the local fee. The introduction of 
group charging together with the fact that in most cases calls to adjoining zone were also 
charged at the local rate greatly increased the number of callers a subscriber in a rural area 
could contact for the cost of a local call.
Furthermore the scale of taink charges was to be simplified90 and the maximum charge 
reduced, whilst an increase in night rates for certain cross chamiel calls was introduced to 
achieve a better balance between night and day traffic.”91 This was also aimed at improving 
the position o f the rural subscriber, who, it was acknowledged, would continue to make 
proportionately more trunk calls than his or her Dublin counterpart.
86 DD 176, p. 1329, 15/7/59.
87 DD 176, p. 1325, 15/7/59.
88 Litton, op. cit., p. 89.
89 Litton, op. cit., p. 89.
90 Something which Fine Gael T.D. James Dillon had been calling for over the previous two 
decades, arguing that there should be fixed charges for calls within county boundaries, provincial 
boundaries and national boundaries.
91 DD 176, p. 1325, 15/7/59.
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Secondly, the report recommended that the previous practice of charging farmers for 
telephones at the business rental rate was to be terminated and the residence rate applied 
instead, reducing the cost by £2 10s a year.
Finally, the report had acknowledged that the rural party line service had been unsuccessful 
and that it was “unlikely that it will ever prove an acceptable service to Irish people.”92 The 
party line service was therefore abandoned and “as a further incentive...to rural development” 
the 3 miles radius for standard rentals was applied to all exchanges.
6.5 Conception of the Telephone
The wartime need to prioritise certain categories of applicants for service established a 
practice that persisted through the 1940s and 1950s, one which gave a clear picture o f how 
the Department conceived of the telephone. Whilst in wartime only “Government 
Departments, Doctors, Hospitals etc.”93 were explicitly prioritised, the fact that “most 
applications for new business lines”94 also received service at a time when the provision of 
service to residences simply ceased, suggests that in fact, business applicants were considered 
to fall under the priority heading. Six years later, the list was longer yet more specific:
“Doctors, chemists, veterinary surgeons, dentists, hospitals, nursing homes, 
journalists, midwives, clcrgymcn, public utility companies, radiographers, hatcheries 
registered with the Dept, of Agriculture, and firm s giving a considerable amount o f  
employment, or giving employment to more than seven hands all the year round .”95
This was reflected by the increasingly “common-sense” perception that the telephone was a 
tool of industry and commerce. A comment made by P.J. Little, a former Minister for Posts 
and Telegraphs during the 1949 Vote on Account, is illustrative of this:
92 NAD S 15045 A, 17/6/59.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 DD 126, p. 1015, 5/7/51.
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“Obviously the postal system and the telephones and telegraphs are the nerve centres, 
the whole nervous system, o f  commerce and they are vital to the development o f  
industry and commerce. Indeed, there is nothing so important for us as to give them 
every possible facility and take every opportunity of decentralising industrial effort 
and enterprise throughout the country. For that reason all expenditure no matter what 
may be the deficit is to the good, because it will bring about a real return to the 
nation.”96
The same outlook was expressed by another former Minister, when Erskine Childers 
complained at the decision to cut back capital expenditure in the 1956 Telephone Capital Act:
“The Minister for Finance in all too dulcet terms has been pleading for more 
efficiency in industry and more efficiency in distribution (to improve the balance of 
payments through increased production for export). He has been pleading for greater 
output.
.. .whatever rental is paid and in spite of the cost, for a huge modern 
community the telephone becomes an essential o f  increased production and o f  more 
economic distribution,”97
That the telephone was a prerequisite (or even useful) for the workings of agriculture was a 
somewhat less widely held belief, especially at die start of the period under review. Fanners 
were not, for example, included on Departmental priority lists during the 1940s or 1950s 
despite the explicit assertion by some TDs that they should be.98 Yet the beginnings of the 
shift were evident in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In 1948, P.J. Little suggested that the 
1946 Telephone Capital Bill would allow “the fanning community” to make contacts with 
their markets.”99 In February 1952, Childers had commented that judging by the general 
income level, the farming community had been very conservative about installing telephones: 
“By now about 100,000 farmers should have them,”100 whereas in fact, as Childers was
96 DD 117, p. 363, 7/7/49.
97 DD 159, pp. 28-9, 3/7/56.
98 M O'Reilly: "since we must have more tillage and machinery breaks down, an efficient telephone 
system is absolutely necessary.” DD 126, p. 1005, 5/7/51.
99 DD 112, p. 809, 20/7/48
100 Irish Independent 18/2/52.
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“distressed” to find, only 5,710 provincial telephone lines were not for business purposes.101 
Five months later, at the July 1952 Estimates Debate, he announced that he was:
“completely dissatisfied with the long-established tradition unchanged since 1921, 
whereby it has been made as difficult as possible for farmers to have telephones. 
Every obstacle in the way of deposit charges, rental charges to be paid in advance, is 
put in their way.
We have about one tenth of the telephones installed with farmers o f any given 
acreage compared with any agricultural exporting country in Europe. Compared with 
cigarettes, wireless, motor cars, rural electrification, the telephone is virtually 
unknown in rural districts.”102
Yet rather than frame a policy specifically targeting the fanning community for development, 
Childers and his successors favoured the pursuit of policies for promoting the general 
diffusion o f the telephone in rural areas, on the assumption that the farming community would 
benefit indircctly. Yet in an era when rural farmers faced choice between spending money on 
electrification or the telephone, the expense o f the latter meant that the fonner was likely to 
win out. Only with the 1959 decision to apply the residence rate to farmers, was agriculture 
effectively singled out for development.
The sudden increase in telephone usage during the war years demanded some 
reconceptualisation of the role of the telephone, since as the Department acknowledged in 
1944, the increase in usage could not be attributed to increased governmental and commercial 
traffic alone. The persistent increase in telephone traffic after the war appeared to confinu 
that the “telephone habit” had been established amongst the population as a whole. That by 
the end o f the period under review, one TD could reasonably suggest that the Department 
encourage the use of the phone as a social instrument, for something as trivial as chat103
101 Irish Independent 18/2/52.
102 DD 133, 3/7/52. Nor could this be regarded as a sudden conversion on Childers part. Eight 
mondis earlier on 27/11/51, the Irish Press reported that, at the opening of a new automatic 
exchange in Dublin, "The Minister said he was not satisfied with the development of the telephone 
service in mral areas. There were far fewer telephones than in countries of corresponding national 
income and general prosperity level." (NAD GIS 1/57, 12/11/51)
103 James Hilliard: “I ... believe it would be a very good thing to permit that type of personal 
communication, particularly when the trunk lines are there widi nothing to do. 1 suggest to the
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suggests a significant psychological adjustment of the previously puritan perception of the 
phone on the part of both the state and users.104
This was reflected in the growth of residential subscribers between 1940 and 1959. Whilst the 
overall number of subscribers increased from 27,000 to 103,000 between 1940 and 1959, in 
the 1950s in particular “the bulk of the increased demand was for private telephones.”105 
Thus the number o f residential accounts increased from 8,000 to approximately 47,000 in the 
same period (or from 31.8% to 46.7% of all subscribers).
Nonetheless, there remained a substantial dichotomy between how the telephone was 
perceived in this regard in urban and rural areas. It is notable that when in April 1944, the 
Cabinet Committee on Economic Planning asked the Department of Posts and Telegraphs to 
consider how the installation of private telephone might be extended after the war, the provisio 
“in the cities and larger towns”106 was included. (Italics added.)
As a result, by the mid-1950s, the residential telephone, although not yet approaching the 
status of a consumption norm, was in urban areas increasingly considered essential to 
negotiate the travails of daily life. Michael Keyes noted in 1956 that:
“Moreover, the great increase in residential building schemes, often at fairly 
considerable distances from main shopping centres and places of employment, has 
stimulated demand for private telephones.
This demand is welcome in so far as it indicates more telephone 
consciousness amongst our people...” 107
Minister that he should induce people to use die telephone for social conversation by offering a 
peculiarly attracdve rate after 9 PM.” DD 183, p. 1335, 12/7/60.
104 The following May, Deputy McGilligan claimed to perceive evidence of this adjustment taking 
place: "The fact that so many new subscriber lines were installed ... is an indication of the popularity 
of the telephone service and the public recognition of the value of that service not only for trade and 
commercial purposes but for its social advantages as well." (DD 189, p. 557, 17/5/61)
105 Michael Keyes, then Minister for Posts and Telegraphs: “DD 159, p. 23, 3/7/56.
106 Extract from Minutes of Meeting of 17th of April 1944. Included in NAD S 13086 A.
107 DD 159, p. 23, 3/7/56.
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In rural areas, however, even after the rapid wartime increases in usage, a Department of 
Posts and Telegraphs’ memo noted that “Experience in regard to Call Offices in rural areas 
shows that, in fact, small rural communities have no need fo r  telephone services in 
connection with their ordinary daily affairs and that the use o f the telephone is almost 
exclusively for emergency purposes - for calls for a Priest, Doctor, Nurse etc. Such calls are 
infrequent and produce no economic revenue.”108 (Italics added.) Nor did rural TDs attempt 
to argue in the 1940s that the establishment of call boxes or kiosks in rural villages would be 
justified by the financial return. Rather, such requests characterised the role of the telephone 
as an emergency instrument to summon medical or spiritual aid to remote communities. 109
This conception gradually altered during the 1950s, however, particularly as the pace of rural 
emigration increased. In February 1952, at the switching on of electric power in Killashee,
Co. Longford, Erskine Childers commented that the mass exodus from the land over the 
previous 25 years would not be stemmed “until among other changes, the amenities of 
electricity, running water and the telephone were enormously extended.”110 Other Deputies 
made similar arguments:
“Everybody in Ireland realises that we must do as much as we can to make conditions 
in rural Ireland as tolerable as possible in order to provide an incentive to our people 
to stay at home. Believe it or not the installation of telephones in post offices in rural 
areas could be a great help in that respect.”111
Furthermore, the introduction of standard rentals to all exchanges in 1953 and the completion 
of the Rural Call Box Programme two years later, saw demand for residential phones in 
provincial areas gradually increase. With regard to the Public Call Box Programme in 
particular, it is reasonable to speculate that as the telephone penetrated the more remote areas, 
it became a physical reality in the everyday lives of those living in rural areas, insinuating 
itself into the daily routine, and thus at least raising the possibility of acquiring a private
108 Ibid.
109 For example M. O’Cinneide, TD: "The installation of telephones in small sub-offices . . . is veiy 
necessary to provide such facilities for people who may require the services of a doctor or veterinary 
surgeon." DD 112, p. 1194, 10/3/49.
110 Irish Press 23/2/52.
111 Deputy McQuillan in DD 117, p. 385, 7/7/49.
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subscription. In any case, in 1958 Kevm Boland announced that, whilst residential demand in 
the Dublin area was up 70% on the 1953 figure, it had increased by “more than 100% outside 
the Dublin area.”112
Nonetheless the 1959 Departmental memo, “Telephone Development”, noted that whilst in 
Dublin, residential lines had exceeded the number o f business lines by 1958, the opposite was 
true in the provinces.113 Thus whilst “In Dublin particularly and also in Cork the residence 
telephone has come to be accepted as a desirable social amenity... in the rest of the country the 
telephone is still regarded as a business necessity and a social luxury.”114
Thus the memo concluded that “it is desirable therefore that plans for future development 
should aim at stimulating development in small towns, villages and rural areas.”115
6.6 Conception of the Telephone Service
Throughout the period under review the dominant view of the Post Office els a whole was that 
although it had a social remit to fulfil, to let the cost of doing so fall upon the taxpayer (via 
the central exchequer) was unfair. Defending the charge increases introduced in 1953, Fianna 
Fail TD, Robert Briscoe asked:
“I wonder how many people who have not got telephones in their homes, who rarely 
use the telegraph form and who rarely receive or send a letter, like having to 
subsidise, even by indirect taxation, the facilities accorded to the people who have got 
telephones in their houses for convenience...”116
112 DD 167, pp. 378-9, 17/4/58.
113 “The number of business lines was and still is considerably in excess of the number of residence 




116 DD 138, p. 1250, 6/5/53.
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Furthermore, adopting classic liberal economic theory, successive Ministers argued that to 
vote for the Post Office funds to make up any deficit on a regular basis would lead to an 
inefficient administration:
“As long as the service pays for itself ..there will be every inducement... to insist on 
innovations, to insist on high output, to insist on efficiency, to prevent the gradual 
seepage of unnecessary staff into the service.”117 (Childers)
Thus it remained a commercial institution necessarily earning profits to subsidise its social 
remit. In October 1943, for example, whilst the Department acknowledged that the 
supernormal profits of the Telephone Service over the previous four years (especially after the 
introduction of a “temporary Emergency increase” of 5% on all charges), appeared “to 
present a prima facie  case for reduction of charges,”118 it was unwilling to do so in light of 
the risk that the revenue increase was temporary, dependent on Emergency conditions.
“The Department’s policy will continue to be to provide an efficient service, earning a 
sufficient margin of profit to ensure against loss... Any substantial reduction of rental 
is not favoured because, in the case of private telephone (as distinct from business 
lines), user [sic.] is small and it is on the rental that the Department must rely for the 
recovery of the cost of installation. The... average annual sum needed to provide for 
interest and depreciation in respect of each station is £4.9.0. The rental for residence 
lines of £5 per annum (apart from the temporary 5% surcharge) which provides only 
a small margin of profit. This margin may very easily disappear with the increased 
cost of engineering stores. Reduction of rental would tend to induce people to get 
telephones who cannot afford them and would have little use for them. Such 
telephones would, in effect, be subsidised by the other users of the service.119
117 DD 138, p. 1298, 6/5/53.
118 Department of P&T (Uncredited) memorandum to Cabinet Committee on Economic Planning, 5 
October 1943, NAD S 13086A.
119 Ibid.
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Nonetheless, increased usage and thus profitability o f the service prompted the powerful 
Cabinet Committee on Economic Planning120 in January 1943 to ask the Department o f Posts 
and Telegraphs to prepare detailed “proposals for the extension o f telephone facilities and the 
development o f their use in cities and urban and rural areas.” 121 The recommendations o f the 
report would be accepted almost in their entirety and would ultimately form the basis o f  the 
large-scale development plan introduced to the Dail by P.J. Little in 1946. Thus the 
significance o f the thinking underlying the entire document cannot be overly stressed:
“Under existing Departmental regulations, Telephone Call Offices in rural areas can 
be opened only on the condition that each Call Office is likely to be self-supporting. 
These regulations were made in 1924 when there was a  loss on the Service. A result 
o f  this condition o f  self-support has been, however, that the position has been reached 
for a number o f years past that the opening o f Call Offices in rural areas has, to all 
intents and purposes, come to a full stop, because in practically all cases, the 
condition o f self-support would not be m et... Considered, however from the point of 
view o f  national interest in relation to development o f rural areas and the desirability 
o f providing normal public services in such areas, it is clear that a wide extension o f 
telephone services in rural areas is called for. The Department o f  Posts and 
Telegraphs considers therefore, that the time has come for a change o f policy and it is 
thought that the self-support condition should  be abandoned  and that when the 
supply position is satisfactory and development can again be undertaken, Call Offices 
should  be opened on the same basis as rural posts  are provided, i. e. losses on 
particular services to be covered by the revenues o f  the Telephone Service as a 
w hole ,” 122 (Italics added.)
Thus, whilst Departmental policy had hitherto entirely ruled out the subsidisation o f any 
aspect o f the Telephone Service, the post-war expansion plan, developed by the Department 
over 1943 and 1944, placed at least one element o f the telephone service in a new light: as a
120 This was in fact just three people, albeit die three most influential members of the cabinet. 
Taoiseach Eamonn De Valera, Minister for Finance, Sean MacEntee and Minister for Industry and 
Commerce (and later Taoiseach), Sean Lemass.




service wherein some socially oriented non-remunerative expenditure was possible.123 For the 
first time, profits from the Telephone Section would be used not ju s t to cross-subsidise other 
services but internal aspects o f its own workings. Thus Childers could note by 1952, that the 
loss sustained on the workings o f “most rural telephone call offices” had to continue since 
they were “a public  service ”124 (Italics added.)
The completion o f the rural call box programme saw nearly 2,000 towns and villages receive 
service: there was on average one public call box every three or four miles by 1955. 
Ultimately as the programme progressed, the public telephone increasingly usurped the social 
role that was previously the preserve o f rural telegraphs and post offices. This was made 
explicit in a Dad committee report on the fmancial position o f the telegraph service presented 
in July 1955. Aside from suggesting organisational changes to effect economies, the report 
recommended an increase in telegraph rates, some o f which, as Keyes pointed out, had 
remained unchanged since the 1920s.125 The decision to introduce an increase in rates 
signalled the diminution o f the telegraph’s status as a socially essential service.
The social role o f the telephone service was however strictly limited to the operations o f the 
Call Box programme. Thus, for example, Childers stressed in 1951 that provision o f public 
kiosks (which had the advantage over call boxes o f being accessible outside Post Office 
openmg hours) would not be subsidised:
“The charges for telephoning, to a 99 per cent degree, are paid for in exact proportion 
to the wealth o f those using the telephone... It is in the interests o f the community at 
large, therefore, that kiosks be kept as self-supporting as possible, and that the social 
purpose o f  the telephone should be served by facilities a t Garda Siochana stations 
and the opening o f  call offices in sub-post offices regardless o f  the receipts likely to 
flo w  in relation to the expend iture”126 (Italics added)
123 The Department estimated that capital cost of the Rural Call Box Programme would £315,000
over a period of five years., on top of winch die new call boxes would require an annual charge
against telephone revenue of £31,500. NAD S 13086 A.
124 DD 133, p. 177, 3/7/52.
125 DD 152, p. 226, 6/7/55.
126 DD 126, p. 1022 -3, 5/7/51.
199
Taken as a whole, as Childers reminded the Dad in July 1951, that “ the telephone service 
must pay for itself.” 127
Nonetheless, there is evidence that the Department altered its income structure in the late 
1940s with a view to encouraging an increase in subscriptions. Until the 1940s the 
Department set its rental charges so as to recoup the average amiual charges for interest and 
depreciation on telephone plant: thus in 1943, the annual interest and depreciation costs of 
£4 9s were covered by the residential rental o f £5. However with the post-war expansion into 
more sparsely populated rural areas, capital investment rose from £57 per telephone in 1938- 
39 to £100 in 1951/52, leading to a depreciation in interest charges o f about £10 per line.128 
Yet both standard business and rentals in 1952 were, at £8 6s 6d and £6 5s respectively, 
substantially less than £10. The gap was filled by the extra revenue from the increases in call 
traffic which began in the w ar and continued thereafter. Thus whilst the number o f 
subscribers increased 330% between 1940 and 1959, the volume o f  call traffic (taking local 
and trunk traffic together) increased by 420%. Childers acknowledged in M arch 1953 that 
rentals had been kept as low:
“as is economically feasible in order to encourage the largest possible number of 
persons to become telephone subscribers and bearing in mind that prospective 
subscribers are influenced largely by the rental figure.” 129
6.7 Summary: Universal Service 1940 - 1959
The key statistics o f development between 1940 and 1959 depict the quantum leap made by 
the service in the post-war era. Subscriber numbers increased from 27,000 in 1940 to 103,000 
in 1959: fully two thirds o f this growth occurred during the 1950s. This translated mto a 
figure o f  approximately 5 telephones per 100 people in 1959.130 Looking to the geographical 
diffusion o f the telephone, the absence o f  specific data detailing the spread o f  subscribers by 
the close o f  the period makes it difficult to offer a detailed picture. However by 1961, the
127 DD 126, p. 1022, 5/7/51.
128 DD 133, pp. 192-1, 3/7/52
129 NAD S 15045 A 5/3/53
130 DD 175, p. 361, 30/6/59.
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Dublin automatic area continued to account for 57% o f all telephones.131 Thus whdst there 
were 9.25 exchange lines per 100 people in Dublin, this figure dropped to only 1 and 1.4 lines 
per 100 respectively in the midland counties o f Leitrim and Roscom m on.132 This nonetheless 
represented an advance for rural telephony, however, since the increasing concentration of 
telephones in the Dublin area witnessed in the 1920s and 1930s had ceased: overall the rate o f 
increase in rural and urban areas during the 1940s and 1950s was roughly the same. At a 
more tangible level, the work earned out to effect the Rural Call Box Programme meant that 
mam trunk lme network development in Ireland reached perhaps 95%  o f  its historical peak by 
1955: The basis o f  the modem Irish telephone network had been virtually completed by the 
mid-1950s and there were 980 exchanges by 1955. Although the figure would continue to 
increase, peaking in 1966 (at 1,131), it thereafter settled at around 1,080 exchanges. As a 
result, the expansion o f the network after 1960 was no longer dependent on striking out and 
reaching new areas but on building smaller arteries from the main network
hi the post-war era, it was clear that the telephone was no longer exclusively seen as an urban 
tool. The 1946 development plan was explicitly targeted at rural development Furthermore, 
the end o f the practice o f specially assessing exchanges in 1953 and the simultaneous 
introduction o f standard rentals at all exchanges (albeit with a reduced free mileage area until 
1959, outside Dublin, Limerick and Cork), began to iron out the disparities in the costs faced 
by subscribers in urban and rural areas. It also increased the degree o f rate averaging. The 
introduction o f  group charging in 1959, by increasing the range o f  the local call area, would 
ultimately be a critical factor in developing the rural service since proportionately, it was far 
more useful outside Dublin than inside, given the high population concentration within the 
pre-Group charging Dublin automatic area. For all that, however, the fact diat those 
subscribers living outside the free mileage area still faced additional rental charges meant that 
the charging structure continued to favour urban development.
There was also a move to even out the differences in service quality in urban and rural areas 
via the commitment in the 1946 Development plan to introduce continuous service at all but 
the very smallest exchanges. From 1940 to 1948, the percentage o f subscribers receiving
131 A.J. Litton (1961), The Growth and Development of the Irish Telephone System, Journal o f the 
Statistical and Social Inquiry Society o f  Ireland, Vol. 20,Part 5, pp. 79-115, p. 93.
132 Ibid., p. 106.
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automatic service had remained at 60% ,133 reflecting the fact that autom atic service was only 
offered in the Dublin area (which as noted above accounted for approximately 60% o f all 
subscribers throughout this period). After the commencement o f  rural automation in 1948 
(with brief stoppages in 1949 and 1957), however, the percentage o f subscribers receiving 
automatic service increased consistently, reaching 76.5%  by 1959.134 Furthermore the 
extension o f service hours at manual exchanges meant that as early as July 1955, 97% o f all 
subscribers had continuous service.135
The most important changes from a  universal service perspective, however, were the shifts in 
the conception o f the telephone and thus o f that the telephone service. The assumption at the 
heart o f the Rural Call Box Programme, that the telephone service should at least partially 
serve a social function and that that function would, if  necessary, be subsidised, represented a 
major change from the policy which had prevailed in the 1920s and 1930s. Although profits 
from the telephone continued to even out the losses from the telegraphs and postal service, the 
fact that the telephone service could also internally cross-subsidise itself represented a first 
step towards the pursuit o f  universal service goals.
To understand what prompted and sustained the dramatic expansion o f the service in the 
period under review requires an examination o f the convergence o f political, economic and 
social factors during the period under review. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
political factors, both at a  national and international level, were critical in kickstarting the 
post-war expansion. In particular the influence o f the w ar itself cannot be underestimated 
especially with regard to the key 1944 decision o f the Cabinet Committee on Economic 
Planning to approve a massive postw ar development o f the service. Indeed one might 
reasonably question whether, in the absence o f the war, such an programme would have been 
proposed at all, for as already noted, the war played a key role in altering the perception o f the 
telephone within many sectors o f Irish society. At a military and political level for example, 
the threat o f  a sudden invasion by any o f the warring powers (a threat taken quite seriously as
133 Ibid., p. 105.
134 Ibid., p. 105.
135 DD 151, p. 22, 12/6/55
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Lee’s discussion o f Irish wartime foreign policy makes clear136) made it essential to create not 
simply a communications system that covered the whole country but also one that permitted 
rapid information exchange. The resulting crash-programme to connect military and 
governmental buildings to the telephone network saw these groups' usage o f  the telephone 
system increase to a  previously unseen extent (and in the process extended the telephone 
system to some areas which had previously been unserved137). In effect the onset o f  the war, 
by creating the need for a  rapid national communications system, fostered an appreciation o f 
the utility o f the telephone system at governmental level that had not previously existed.
Yet this increased appreciation o f the telephone’s utility was not limited to the institutions of 
the state. As noted in section 6.1, the limitations on physical movement resulting from fuel 
shortages and a curtailed public transport service appear to have alerted both businesses and 
individual citizens to the potential utility o f  the telephone, a  fact reflected in the extent to 
which local and trunk call traffic increased during the w ar years. A.J. Litton, then Deputy 
Chief Engineer at the Department o f Posts and Telegraphs has noted:
“On account o f the great transport difficulties in [sic], or sometimes lack o f transport, 
during these years the telephone service came into its own and much greater use was 
made o f it, more especially in the rural areas. M any came to rely on it, and the 
making o f trunk calls became common place amongst people who in the past had 
never dreamt o f using a telephone.” 138
hi short, the w ar was critical in creating a  hitherto unknown widespread social need for the 
telephone.
The extra revenue resulting from the increased wartime traffic fed back into government 
policy-making. Although previous Irish governments had identified the role o f the telephone 
section as that o f cross-subsidising the other two services when necessary, Table 6.2
136 J.J. Lee (1989), Ireland 1912-1985: Politics and Society, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), pp. 242-253.
137 Litton notes that the Ballina to Bclmullet trunk lines, erected to establish a connection with a 
lookout post in Belmullet, connected the latter to the national network for the first time. Litton, op. 
cit. p. 86.
138 Ibid., p. 87.
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immediately below indicates that the w ar years saw the telephone service earn substantial 
profits for the Post Office as a whole even after the internal cross-subsidies between services 
were accounted for.
= Table 6.2: Post Office Profits and Losses 1938 - 1946
i Year Posts Telegraphs Telephones Total
! 1938/39 £115,431 (£129,737) £65,627 £51,321139
I 1939/40 £48,595 (£141,562) £80,519 (£12.449)
1 1940/41 (£115,257) (£130.203) £90,390 (£155,070)
; 1941/42 £91.465 (£115.573) £180,165 £157.057
1942/43 £52,803 (£103.917) £242,043 £190.929
i 1943/44 £114,621 (£73,685) £247,703 £288,639
\ 1944/45 (£20. 101) (£122.663) £267,289 £124,525
(£! 16,001) £298.004 £214.515
The long-established policy with regard to the Post Office was that it should be self-sufficient, 
not that it should consistently earn substantial profits: thus there was scope for adjusting 
existing telephone policy on financial grounds. At the same time it is apparent that the 
government interpreted the enormous wartime increase in telephone traffic as evidence that the 
public perception o f the telephone had been altered by the war: from conceiving o f it as a 
purely business instrument towards some recognition o f its potential social role. This is 
apparently confirmed by the emphasis placed on the increasing the number o f private lines by 
the Cabinet Committee on Economic Planning (see section 6.5 above). As a result then, two 
intersecting factors - an increased awareness o f  the social potential o f the telephone system 
resulting from w ar conditions and the profits resulting from increased usage o f the system - 
coincided to convince the Cabinet Committee to recommend the abandonment o f  the previous 
blanket policy that each individual element o f the telephone service be self-supporting, and to 
permit some subsidisation o f rural call boxes.
There was, however, a tldrd factor in shaping the Cabinet Committee's thinking: new 
infrastructural technology. Although the Committee was prepared to countenance some losses 
in extending the service there nonetheless remained limits to their largesse. However, 
developments in semi-automatic exchange technology, in trunk carrier systems and the advent 
o f co-axial cable, by reducing both per subscriber automation cost and the cost o f  extending
139 1932/33 - 1938/39 from Department of Posts and Telegraphs Commercial Accounts for Year 
ended 31 March 1948, Government Publications.
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the trunk service made investing in the extension and automation o f  the telephone system in 
rural areas financially viable even given the Departm ent’s still cautious attitude with regard to 
the service. Thus, although not in itself a determining factor, the im pact o f technology on 
reducing the cost o f  long line extensions particularly, was, alongside the political and social 
factors referred to above, a necessary condition for the Committee to even consider the 
possibility o f  some subsidisation o f the system.
The profitability or otherwise o f both the telephone section and the Post Office as a whole 
would remain a key influence on telephone development policy. Hence the Governm ent’s 
willingness to adopt the Kamerbeek recommendations (see section 6.4 above) and thus lose an 
estimated £125,000 per annum in revenue, was almost certainly coloured by the record profits 
earned by the telephone section in the last few years o f  the 1950s:
Tahle 6.3 Post Office Profits and Losses 1955-1% 1
Year Posts Telegraphs Telephones Total
1955/56 (£264,617) (£238,299) £134.437 (£368,479)
1957/58 £104.999 (£177,556) £366.377 £293.820
1958/59 £4.672 (£140,144) £413.048 £277.576
1959/60140 £129,771 (£136,867) £396,179 £389,083
1960/61141 £91,291 (£149,525) £426,822 £368,588
Yet social factors would also continue to shape the telephone system ’s development during the 
period under review in tins chapter. Thus whilst the Cabinet Committee could make a 
unilateral decision to develop the national telephone call box system, it could not o f itself 
guarantee that there would be sufficient demand for the service to fulfil its second objective, 
that o f trebling the existing number o f subscribers by the close o f the 1950s. To understand 
what prompted growth in demand for the telephone in the post-war era, 142 one must consider 
socio-economic factors. Firstly the experience o f the w ar appears to have permanently 
established what the Department termed the “telephone habit.” Having established its utility 
under wartime conditions, there was no apparent diminution in both the urban and rural 
public’s appreciation o f the telephone’s usefulness in the post-war era. Thus during the brief 
post-war consumer boom, the telephone was amongst the sought after goods, a fact reflected
140 From Post Office Commercial Accounts year ending 31st March 1971, p. 22.
141 Ibid.
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in the emergence o f the first substantial waiting list for service in the late 1940s despite record 
annual new subscriber connection levels during the same period. Demand was sustained into 
the 1950s by economic factors: namely the improving affordabdity o f the telephone relative to 
income over this period, Thus, although the 1950s themselves were, for the most part, not a 
period o f economic growth and did not see substantial increases in real incomes, in 1956, 
Minister Michael Keyes could argue that: “The small increases in rentals and call rates as 
compared with the much greater increases in money incomes have undoubtedly put telephones 
within the reach o f  people who could not afford them pre-w ar.” 143 W hilst the average annual 
wage for a  man working in industry and services rose from £142 pounds in 1938 to £484 in 
1960, an increase o f 330% ,144 the price o f standard residential telephone rental rose from £5 
to £7 10s over the same period, an increase o f just 50%.
A second key social factor, sustaining demand for the telephone was the beginning o f  the 
process o f  the suburbanisation o f Irish society in the 1950s. particularly in the Dublin area. 
Although the clearing o f Dublin’s inner city slums had begun in the 1930s with the 
development o f new housing estates in areas such as Crumlin and Drimnagh,145 with the 
advent o f funding from the European Recovery Fund, the process gatheed pace in the late 
1940s and 1950s.146 Many o f these “new settlements” situated as they were at a distance from 
the urban cores were without “any o f the essential social am enities... ” 147 Consequently 
conditions not unlike those prevailing during the war - lack o f convenient access to basic 
amenities - characterised daily life on the new estates. As a result, ju st as wartime conditions 
had prompted an increase traffic, so life in the new estates apparently caused residential 
telephone penetration rates had prompted an increase substantially during the period under 
review in this chapter (but particularly in the 1950s) as residential lines increased from 
accounting for ju st 31 .8% 148 o f all main exchange lines in 1940 to 48.6%  in I9 6 0 ,149 By the
142 Litton again has noted of the increasedin subscriber numbers in the 15 years after the war that: 
“nor was any sales effort required.” Litton, op. cit., p. 87.
143 DD 159, p. 23, 3/7/56.
144 Central Statistics Office (1968), Stadstical Abstracts 1968. (Dublin: The Stationery Office).
145 Terence Brown (1981), Ireland: A Social and Cultural History 1922-79. (London: Fontana), p. 
207.
146 Ibid., p. 223.
147 Ibid., p. 207.
148 NAD S 13086 A.
149 Litton, op. cit.
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close o f the 1950s, nearly 47,000 Irish households had acquired the telephone, a  household 
penetration rate o f  over 7% .150 Thus the combination o f  the relative affordability o f the phone 
and changing housing patterns meant that by 1962, Dublin W est T.D., Noel Lemass could 
declare him self pleased that so many o f his own constituents in Crumlin and W alkinstown, 
“the working class people, the skilled men, the artisans and so on, can now afford to have a 
telephone in their private homes and need not regard a telephone, as was the case before the 
war as a luxury for the better class o f person.” 151
Economic factors do not appear to have played a  key part in the Cabinet Committee’s 1944 
decision. There are no explicit references to the importance o f the plan for the national 
economy hi either the memos flowing between the Committee and the Department o f Posts 
and Telegraphs during the period in which the post-war plan was developed or indeed in the 
M inister’s Paddy Little’s introduction o f the plan to the Dail in 1946. Having said that, the 
fact that Sean Lemass, one o f the architects o f  the opening up o f  the Irish economy at the 
close o f the 1950s, had sat on the Committee meant that such considerations cannot have been 
entirely absent. Yet despite the fact that by the close o f the 1940s there were an increasing 
number o f  references both inside and outside the Dail to the telephone’s crucial infrastructural 
role, the stagnation o f the economy during the 1940s and for the bulk o f the 1950s make it 
difficult to identify any major economic factors that might have influenced Department o f 
Posts and Telegraphs policy. It might be argued that the ongoing commitment to the 1946 
development plan (with its focus on rural development) during the 1950s was activated by the 
need to respond to the tide o f emigration from rural areas by establishing part o f  the 
infrastructure upon which new industries in these areas could be built. Yet in practice, it 
would appear that the country’s bleak economic performance during the 1950s if  anything 
augmented the perceived social importance o f the telephone in rural areas, as the telephone 
became increasingly identified as a means o f improving living conditions in such areas.
In sum then, during the period under review in this chapter, social changes engendered by the 
effects o f a global political and military conflict generated a substantial increase in the usage 
o f the telephone system. This in turn prompted a political volte-face in 1944 that accepted
150 Own calculations based on data in Appendices IV and XXXI.
151 DD, 194, p 1109, 3/4/62
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both that the telephone system was o f some social value and that consequently, specific 
elements o f  it could be subsidised. The decision also related to the improving financial 
position o f the telephone section and Post Office (itself the result o f  increased usage) and the 
potential o f new telecommunications technologies to reduce the cost o f service provision, 
especially in rural areas. Thereafter a combination o f  factors: the increasing affordability o f 
the telephone relative to wage rates; the established utility o f the telephone for all sectors o f 
society (another result o f  the wartime era) and ongoing social change (e.g. suburbanisation) 
ensured a consistent level o f  demand. The critical decision o f 1959 to adopt the proposals put 
forward in the Kamerbeek plan should then be understood in the light o f  the social demand for 
the telephone demonstrated during the 1950s. The fact that such demand could be catered for 
profitably was also a  crucial factor in the state’s decision to encourage rural development. As 
was the case with the adoption o f the post-war development plan a  decade and a half earlier, it 
is very much open to question as to whether such a  decision would have been made in the 






7.1 G eneral D evelopm ent 1960 - 1964
The measures suggested by the Kamerbeeck Report quickly paid o ff rich dividends. In the 
12 months up to June 1960, there were 13,200 applications, a 57%  increase on the 
average number between 1957 and 1959.1 This was in large part due to increased 
provincial demand: the 1960 figure for applications from outside Dublin exceeded the 
average for the previous three years by 83%.2 Michael Hilliard noted that:
“Provincial applications increased by over 1,500 and this is largely attributed to 
the concessions introduced last A ugust... Since these measures were introduced 
primarily to stimulate rural telephone development, the increase in demand is 
gratifying .”3
The number o f new installations also increased to 11,600. Yet, whilst this bettered the 
previous annual connection record by 1,000, it was insufficient to meet the increased 
demand and the waiting list began to increase. In an effort to catch up, H illiard introduced 
a  new Telephone Capital Bill in July 1960 to be spent as follows:
Table 7.1: 1960 Telephone Capital Bill - Projected Expenditure
Category of Expenditure Amount
Subscribers’ installations and local 
underground schemes
£6.42m
Exchanges, new and extended £2.24m
Trunk and junction circuits £ 2 .13m
Buildings £0.53m
Thus whilst the Act did seek improve the trunk network and to speed up the conversion o f 
rural exchanges to automatic working, the local loop and increasing the rate o f subscriber 
installations was the focus o f spending:
1 DD 183, p. 1328, 12/7/60.
2 Ibid.
3 DD 181, p. 1415, 17/5/60.
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“The programme proposed provides for the installation o f  65,000 additional 
subscribers’ lines and 80,000 extra telephones the net effect o f  which will be to 
increase the number o f existing telephones by one-third.”4
Active pursuit o f the goals o f the 1960 Capital Act was shortlived however. Although a 
record 15,300 new phones were installed in 1960, this was outstripped by the 16,500 
applications for service received the same year. Still trying to keep pace, Hilliard sought 
an extra £2 .5m from the M inster for Finance for telephone development in 1961/2, but 
acknowledged that:
“Even that increased provision will not be nearly sufficient to meet our 
requirements in full but the amount o f capital available is not, o f  course, 
unlimited, and we would need a very great increase indeed in our allocation to 
cater fully for the demand we have been experiencing recently.”5
In retrospect it appears that in framing the 1960 Capital Act, the Department incorrectly 
assumed that the density o f  the national network by the close o f  the 1950s was such that 
the anticipated post-Kamerbeek plan increase in rural applications would not engender any 
substantial increase in capital costs. Furthermore, although the Department clearly 
expected that the 1960s would see increased demand, it doesn’t  appear to have anticipated 
the rate o f  growth that actually occurred.
Since the network was unable to cope with the unexpected increase in traffic levels 
consequent on the increase in demand, the Department shifted its focus from increasing 
subscriber installations to devoting a higher proportion o f available capital to trunk and 
exchange development, without which, as Hilliard noted “the addition o f substantial 
numbers o f new subscribers to the system would eventually result in congestion and 
delays to the detriment o f subscribers generally.”6
As a result, connection figures for 1961 dropped to 14,500. Consequently, waiting lists 
began to grow again: reaching 9,360 by the end o f January 1962.7 Furthermore, as 
Hilliard noted in M ay 1961, the need to develop the trunk network meant that there would
4 DD 183, p. 1329, 12/7/60.
5 DD 189, p. 540, 17/5/61.
6 DD 189, p. 540, 17/5/61.
211
be a delay in connecting those rural applicants whose connection required the 
establishment o f long cable routes.8
Notwithstanding this, the focus remained on trunk and exchange development, increasing 
demands on capital: Hilliard secured a capital provision o f £3.5 million for 1962/62 (£1 
million up on the previous year’s figure which had in itself been exceptional), exhausting 
the £10 million provided for by the 1960 Telephone Capital Act two years ahead o f 
schedule. Even with this expenditure, 1963 was considered a crisis year for the telephone 
branch, the quality o f  service deteriorating dramatically in the summer months. An OECD 
report on “Science and Irish Economic Development” published that year noted that the 
telephone service was “undergoing severe stress in relation to economic expansion and it is 
barely meeting demand.”9
In the midst o f  the crisis, Hilliard identified its origins in five basic factors:
1) Lack o f network development: “I was not too long in office. . . when I came to realise 
that we could not in any circumstances attempt to continue the installation o f  new 
telephones at that rate until we arrived at a time when we had caught up on, to some 
extent at least, the backlog o f essential engineering w ork .” 10
2) Increased demand: “There has been a huge increase in recent years in the rate of 
demand for new telephones and in the traffic requirements o f  existing subscribers. . . the 
number o f exchange lines has doubled in the last ten years and quadrupled since the end o f 
the w ar.” 11
3) Lack o f capital: “If  (capital) is unduly restricted, the amount available is necessarily 
devoted to short-term needs and adequate provision o f spare capacity necessary to meet 
even normal growth is im practicable.” 12
7 DD 193, p. 689, 22/2/62.
8 DD 189, p. 589, 17/5/61.
9 Research and Technology Survey Team Report 1963. Volume 1 Science and Irish Economic 
Development.




4) Lack o f qualified staff: “S taff experienced in telephone work are not freely available; 
consequently it is necessary to spend a comparatively long time on the training o f new 
recruits before they become really effective.” 13
5) Lack o f supplies: “W e cannot get delivery from the m anufacturing firms for a year, two 
years and, in some cases, even three years. You cannot order this equipment in quantity, 
because it has to be specially designed to fit in with the exchanges.” 14
O f these, Hilliard argued that “the severe shortage o f capital during the 1950s when the 
telephone service was afforded a low priority” 15 had combined with the post-Kamerbeek 
increase in demand, to become the “principal causes” o f the chaos o f  the summer months:
“Development planning was therefore necessarily restricted to short-term 
measures, sufficient to keep the service going rather than to cater adequately for 
growth and maintain necessary reserves o f plant. The consequent depression o f 
spare capacity o f lines and equipment coincided with the steep rise in public 
demand which I have outlined .” 16
In December 1963, Hilliard moved to address the origins o f the problem identified above, 
introducing a new Telephone Capital Bill authorising expenditures o f  £30 million, a sum 
almost equal to the combined Telephone Capital Acts between 1922 and I9 6 0 .17 The 
ambitious works programme planned for the capital from the Act was intended to place 
the service once and for all on a secure basis from which to manage future development. It 
included:
. . the connection o f 115,000 new subscribers' lines, the conversion o f some 
hundreds o f  manually operated exchanges to automatic working, the opening o f an 
auxiliary trunk exchange in Dublin, the erection o f 600 street kiosks, and the 
expansion o f  trunk circuiting in order to overtake arrears, to establish a no-delay 
service and to cater for expansion .” 18
13 Ibid.
14 DD 202, p. 1389, 14/5/63.
15 DD 206, p, 659, 5/12/63.
16 DD 206, p. 659, 5/12/63.
17 If one ignores the effects of inflation.
18 Ibid., p. 662.
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At the same time, in a move that was interpreted as an attempt to reduce demand, the 
Department introduced a connection fee o f £10 for new exchange lines.19 Meanwhile, the 
Department focus was on network development. 1964 saw 1,150 new trunk circuits 
(40,000 miles o f cable) established, augmented by radio links between larger towns. 
Furthermore, a t the April 1964 Vote on Account, which included an additional £312,000 
to pay for an extra 650 technical and telephonist staff, 20 Hilliard announced plans to 
double the number o f technician trainees (“the main avenue o f recruitment for the skilled 
s ta f f ’) within twelve months. W hilst such developments took place, however, the number 
o f subscriber installations dropped and even urban areas faced waiting periods o f five 
months. Furthermore, in February 1964, Hilliard re-emphasised that in order to conserve 
capital monies to fund trunk development, it was necessary to deny service to:
“the person who lives over a  certain distance from an exchange a telephone for a 
long period o f  time. . . It has been my policy to defer these long-line cases in order 
to conserve the capital available to m e.”21
Effectively, then, connections in the more sparsely populated rural areas were ruled out. 
Even some priority cases faced delays in some areas “because o f local equipment 
shortages.”22 Fhlliard, however, continued to insist that waiting lists would be eradicated 
within the lifespan o f the program m e.23
7.2 General Development 1965 - 1969
At the March 1965 estimate, then M inister for Posts and Telegraphs, Joseph Brennan 
complained that “the number o f applicants each year seems to increase and this rate of
progress makes the problem more and more difficult to catch up with 24 Only 13,726 new 
subscribers had been connected in the previous year, against an increase o f 15,300 in
19 DD 209, p. 706, 29/4/64.
20 DD 209, p. 364, 23/4/64.
21 DD 207, p. 1765, 27/2/64.
22 DD 208, p. 1498, 14/4/64.
23 Nearly a decade later, viewing the 1963 Act from the perspective of a waiting list that had 
grown to over 30,000, Fine Gael TD Richard Burke would argue that the decision taken at the 
time of the 1963 Telephone Capital Act to concentrating on improving the existing service at the 
expense of delaying connections to existing users was the source of the difficulties facing the 
telephone service in 1972. (See DD 263, p. 1266, 9/11/72.)
24 DD 217, p. 2022, 21/7/65.
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applications, the bulk o f which was accounted for by private subscribers,25 a fact which, 
according to Brennan, exacerbated the Department’s difficulties:
“Particularly in relation to the service in rural areas, as far as I can see, the 
difficulty is this: once new telephones are installed in private houses, all the 
friends and neighbours o f  those new subscribers want one too. When a  telephone 
is installed in a rural area in a private house, nearly invariably there are five or six 
new applicants from the same area.” 26
In spite o f this, Hilliard expressed the hope the Department would begin to concentrate on 
catching up with subscriber installation work “within a few m onths.”27 In point o f  fact, 
the waiting list did drop from its M arch 1965 figure o f 14,260 to 13,200 in October 1966 
Paradoxically, this coincided with a decrease in new installations. The paradox was 
explained by a substantial drop in new applications to 12,500 in 1965/66 owing to the 
introduction from September 1965 o f a requirement that new applicants pay a  sum 
covering the initial term o f the rental agreement on applying for a  telephone, i.e. in 
advance o f  actual service. 28 The express object o f the advance rental charge was to 
dampen a level o f  demand which, in the absence o f sufficient capital, the Department was 
unable to m eet.29 Furthermore, since the initial minimum term o f rental agreements was 
longer for those subscribers located at a distance from the nearest exchange, the policy 
disproportionately affected those subscribers for whom service provision would entail the 
erection o f substantial plant on the part o f the Post Office.30
In the short term, the advance rentals requirement had the desired effect o f reducing new 
applications, allowing the Department to begin clearing pre-1966 long-line applicants (all
25 DD 217, p. 2022, 21/7/65.
26 DD 217, p. 2022, 21/7/65.
27 DD 214, p. 1627, 10/3/65.
28 Although in fact the new regulation had come into effect on August 10th. A printing strike 
had meant that a public announcement in the national newspapers was impossible until the 13th 
September.
29 A submission to the Dargan Report in 1978 from Mr O Droma, the Deputy Secretary of the 
Department of P&T confirmed that the practice of insisting on payment by all new subscribers of 
rental covering a year at least in advance was "designed to contain the enormous latent demand 
within manageable limits." Department of Posts and Telegraphs/Dargan, Michael J. (1979), 
Report of Posts and Telegraphs Review Group: 1978-1979 presented to the Minister for Posts 
and Telegraphs, May 1979. (Dublin: Stationery Office), p. 17.
30 Although in those cases where the cost of providing the service was abnormally high, the 
initial rental period could be as long as 7 years.
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but 100 o f which were connected by M ay 1967).3IAnnual installations rose to a record 
15,528 in 1966/67 and again the following year to 19,393 whilst the waiting list fell to 
7,585 by M arch 31st 1968, down nearly 3,000 on the figure for the same period the 
previous year.
Childers had yet more ambitious plans however:
“The target for the current financial year (1968-1969) is 22,000 connections;
17,000 were provided in the nine months April- December so that we are well on 
the way to reaching it.”32
Despite this activity, the objectives o f the 1963 Act had clearly not been achieved within 
its lifetime: 72,000 new main lines were installed between 1963 and 1969, some distance 
short o f  the 115,000 envisaged in 1963. Furthermore, there remained widespread 
complaints about the quality o f  service offered to those who’d succeeded in becoming 
subscribers. In May 1967, Childers promised a major review o f the entire organisation of 
the telephone service, seeking “to ascertain what may be required as a result o f  the 
explosive expansion in the last seven years .”33 The results o f the review were not made 
public but they informed the 1968 Telephone Capital Bill. The 1 1th Telephone Capital 
Bill since the foundation o f the state sought £50 million to develop the telephone network 
over the following five years. Introducing the Act, Childers stressed the need for long term 
capital expenditure:
“As has often been said before but is still perhaps not fully appreciated, major 
telephone development plans take five years to mature in working equipment. 
Sometimes where new sites and buildings are needed the time interval is even 
longer. It is clearly impossible to develop a service adequately unless there is a 
firm assurance that capital monies to meet forward commitments will be 
available. 'Stop-go' conditions o f  which there has been some unfortunate 
experience on occasions in the past are an impossible handicap to development. I 
am fully confident that they will not be permitted to recur and that the sum o f £50
31 DD 228, p. 981, 16/5/67.
32 DD 238, p. 1856, 27/2/69.
33 DD 228, p. 981, 16/5/67.
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million which I am asking for in this Bill will be made available year by year as 
required .”34
The specific objectives o f  the 1968 Act were remarkably similar to those o f  the 1963 act. 
Again the programme aimed to connect 115,000 new subscribers lines and again it sought 
to place the entire telephone service on a secure footing from which to plan for future 
development.35
Such was Childers’ confidence in a steady flow o f capital that he embarked the 
Department on a follow up to the Rural Call Box Programme o f the previous decade. 
W hilst the initial programme had brought a public telephone to virtually eveiy small town 
in Ireland, the fact that such telephones were located in Post Offices made 24 hour access 
impossible. Given the acknowledged role o f the call boxes in rural areas as emergency 
devices this situation was considered unsatisfactory. In practice, in those towns with a 
G arda Barracks, 24 hour emergency access was available via the G arda phone but 5 8 
such barracks closed between 1960 and 1969.36 Thus as Paddy Cooney, Fine Gael TD for 
Longford-W estmeath argued “the availability o f a kiosk  is much more important in rural 
Ireland than in a densely-populated area like Dublin.”37 (Italics added ) Throughout the 
latter half o f  the 1960s, the Department had been erecting telephone kiosks at the rate of 
approximately 100 each year (of which on average 50 were erected in rural areas). In mid- 
1969, however, there was a  change in policy with specific regard to rural kiosks:
“Previously kiosks were only provided where they would pay their way. It was 
decided to allow a modest subsidy in the case o f  kiosks in rural areas and to 
accelerate the extension o f  kiosk facilities to these areas. It was also decided that 
this extension could best be achieved by replacing by kiosks these call offices in 
rural sub-post offices which are used fairly extensively. 38 (Italics added)
Thus, the Department was committed to another five year expansion programme to 
establish kiosks in all towns where annual income from the existing public call box
34 DD 238, p. 1862, 27/2/69.
35 Ibid.
36 DD 248, p. 603, 29/7/70.
37 DD 252, p. 526, 9/3/71.
38 Patrick Lalor, DD 245, p. 916, 19/3/70.
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exceeded £100. It was envisaged that the annual provision o f kiosks would increase from 
100 to about 200 o f  which 150 would be located in rural areas.
7.3 General Development 1970 - 1974
From the outset, the 1970s saw the telephone service in a more or less constant state o f 
crisis. Despite Childers’ optimism that the Telephone Capital Bill o f 1968 would solve the 
problems o f the Post Office for the foreseeable future, the waiting list began to increase 
again as demand recovered from its brief decline in 1965/66. A 21%  increase in 
applications between 1967/68 and 1968/69 meant that notwithstanding the 22,300 lines 
connected during 1968/69, the waiting list reached 11,000 by the close o f 1969. 
Furthermore, Childers’ confidence that the days o f “stop-go” capital provision were a 
thing o f the past when introducing the 1968 Act, was not borne out by subsequent events. 
In 1970, facing a deteriorating economy, Finance M inister George Colley sought 
expenditure cuts from his cabinet, specifically requesting a cut o f  £800,000 from Posts 
and Telegraphs. Childers’ successor, Gerry Collins argued against the cuts pointing out 
that the remaining sum would be :
“altogether insufficient to provide a minimum balance between construction staff 
and the engineering stores they would use. The only way in which we could keep 
within the allocation therefore would be to lay o ff large numbers o f staff. . . .It 
will involve severe restrictions in the provision o f subscribers lines. The most 
serious effect will be a reduction in the amount o f underground cabling we can 
undertake in towns and cities. It will mean that hi many areas we will provide 
telephone only on a priority basis and even this will not be possible in some 
areas.”39
The Finance M inister prevailed however, prompting Collins to concede in M arch 1971 
that it was impossible to keep up with demand:
“Planning has been on the basis o f  rapid growth in demand, but with the resources 
available and procurable, it simply was not possible to meet the demands in full. I 
may mention that the rate o f demand for telephones increased by 90 per cent
39 Quoted by Conor Cruise O'Brien in DD 266, 20/6/73, pp. 876-878
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between 1960 and 1965. It is very difficult to expand a  telecommunications 
system sufficiently quickly to cater fully for growth at this ra te .”40
Furthermore, the capital cuts coincided with a further growth in demand. Consequently, 
the waiting list rapidly expanded, rising to just over 20,000 by the close o f  1971. The 
kiosk programme also suffered: although the numbers provided in rural areas did increase 
from 65 in 1969-70 to 73 from M arch to December 1970, this was still far short o f  the 
150 promised two years earlier.
The capital cuts prompted widespread criticism inside and outside the D aif The most 
trenchant censure came from Fine Gael TD, Garret FitzGerald:
“To anybody involved with economics it is quite absurd that the Government have 
here a commercial enterprise for whose services there is a  quite extraordinary 
demand, a demand that is economic in that people are prepared to pay the cost 
and more besides to yield a profit and yet, in this area which if  it were under the 
control o f anybody other than the state there would be enormous expansion and 
the demand would be met by the supply, in this area almost the only one where the 
State is running something commercial and potentially profitable which is tightly 
restricted and controlled, the criteria by which capital is rationed to it are the same 
as are applied to the rationing o f capital for social purposes from which little or 
no economic return can be expected. This is ludicrous.”41
FitzGerald suggested that the service be re-organised as a semi-state body to rectify the 
situation. Responding, however, Collins pointed out that since the Public Capital 
Programme, which included expenditure by semi-state bodies, was also controlled by the 
Minister for Finance, it was “unlikely that semi-State status in itself would be o f much 
help in securing a bigger capital allocation in a period o f scarcity .”42 Collins thus 
concluded that:
40 DD 252, p. 1080,23/3/71.
41 DD 257, p. 343, 25/11/71.
42 DD 252, p. 1087, 23/3/71
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“W e must face the unpleasant fact that sufficient capital cannot be made available 
for telephone development if  this service, which is so im portant to the whole 
community, is to be as efficient as subscribers and users expect it to b e .”43
Nonetheless, demands such as FitzGerald’s would increase in number as the 1970s 
progressed and the telephone service worsened. In the interim, however, Collins effectively 
stated that what funds were available would be used to maintain the service in its then 
current state rather than expanding and developing it. In effect, the telephone service 
would become a  holding operation.
The issue o f capital was partially addressed in 1972 but the £13 .73 million capital 
provision for 1972/3 remained well short o f the kind o f funding that was required. The 
waiting list increased by 50% between January and December 1972 to ju st over 30,000 
applicants. At the same time, the Post Office as a whole began to lose more money than at 
any other time hi its history. A profit o f half a million pounds in 1969/70 became a loss of 
over £1.7 million in 1970/71. The telephone section remained profitable but only just, 
returning a  surplus o f £162,000 in 1970/71. At the outset o f a marathon debate on the 
1972 Estimates, Collins acknowledged that “what has been done in not enough” but 
repeated that lack o f  capital forced the Department to take a short-teim ist approach:
“M y Department have had the experience o f repeatedly being pulled up short in 
their construction programme because o f lack o f funds and having to devote 
engineering resources to make-shift and uneconomic expedients which multiply 
difficulties for the future . . . The rapid acceleration o f demand in Ireland did not 
take us by surprise but the Department simply had not the resources to deal with 
it adequately.”44
Following the 1973 General Election, the successful Fine Gael/Labour coalition brought 
Conor Cruise O'Brien to the Department o f P&T. Almost his first task at the outset o f  the 
May 1973 estimates debate was to announce a further deterioration in the D epartm ent’s 
figures: in addition to the by now inevitable waiting list increase (hitting 32,000 in May 
1973) was the news that after twenty years o f  profitable operation, the telephone service
43 DD 252, p. 1087-88, 23/3/71.
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would record a loss o f ju st under £1 million pounds in 1971/72.45 Cruise O'Brien laid out 
the state o f  the service as he saw it thus:
“ Our immediate problems . . .  are the difficulties affecting the telephone service 
at home and the mounting demand for connection to a system which is in many 
areas overloaded. Lack o f sufficient capacity in the Dublin exchanges is a major 
cause o f the difficulties generally. Because so much o f provincially originated call 
traffic is for Dublin or is switched at Dublin, trouble there affects the whole 
service in provincial centres also .”46
W ith regard to the waiting list Cruise O ’Brien noted that only by doubling the annual 
connection rate was there any prospect o f  even reducing it. Since such figures were 
impossible in the short term (and would in any case have crippled the network), he decided 
to focus on developing the network itself:
“Extra equipment must first be installed in existing exchanges, new exchanges 
m ust be provided in certain areas, extra circuits must be provided on trunk routes. 
The numbers o f  skilled staff have to be increased. Installation work is in progress 
in numerous exchanges; extra trunk lines are on the way and relief will begin to be 
apparent in a  number of areas later this year. Orders for new plant and equipment 
now amount to over £25 million.”47
W hat is so remarkable about Cruise O'Brien's statement is the striking similarity it bears 
to that o f Michael Hilliard a decade earlier. In ten years, the problems with the telephone 
service outlined by Hilliard - lack o f network development, increased demand, lack of 
capital and the lack o f qualified s ta ff - had changed only in so far as they’d worsened. 
Facing a similar malaise to his predecessor at the Department, Cruise O'Brien prescribed 
a similar medicine: spend capital on the development o f the network in order to facilitate 
later growth at the expense o f the current waiting list. Thus on December 4th 1973, Conor 
Cruise O'Brien introduced the Telephone Capital Act 1973. announcing his D epartm ent's 
intention to spend £175 million (a sum exceeding total previous capital expenditure on the
44 DD 263, p. 1256, 9/11/72. Collins candour was noted by Richard Burke : "I detect for the
first time in listening to many Estimates speeches a note of restrained exasperation running
through the document." DD 263, p. 1261, 9/11/72
45 DD 265, p. 862, 10/5/73.
46 DD 265, p. 860-1, 10/5/73.
221
telephone service since the foundation o f the state over the five years to follow). The major 
objectives o f  the Department during the lifetime o f the Capital Act would be as follows:
1) “Overall priority is being given to raising the quality o f  service o f  existing 
subscribers to a satisfactory standard by clearing local congestion and providing 
larger capacity links between the principal exchanges.”
2) “The second general objective is, o f course, to reduce and eventually eliminate 
the waiting list for new telephones. . . Provision is being made for a  net increase 
o f 190,000 subscribers’ lines from 270,000 to 460,000. This would represent an 
increase over the period o f 70 per cent or an annual increase o f 11.3 per cent as 
compared with 6.9 per cent over the past five years. It would give an increase of 
250,000 telephones and a density o f 19 telephones per 100 population in 1978.
It is planned to at least treble the present connection rate over the period o f the 
program me.”48
In an attempt to make up lost ground, the Act also envisaged the erection o f 750 kiosks up 
to 1978. Cruise O ’Brien admitted that the Department might be approaching the point 
where “virtually all call offices which are used to a fair extent will have been replaced by 
kiosks.”49 Hence, a year later, at the outset o f the 1974 kiosk programme, the criteria were 
altered: the requirement that call boxes earn at least £100 per annum was reduced 
substantially to £42, a move which Cruise O'Brien stressed had been influenced by 
considerations o f  the social role o f the telephone in rural areas.
Possibly the single most important figure - public perception wise - with regard to the 
service remained the spiralling waiting list. Speaking at the July 1974 Estimates debate 
Cruise O'Brien stated that, in spite o f the fact that the 30,000 new lines had been 
connected over the last year, the waiting list had risen throughout to 41,000, an increase o f
9,000 in a 12 month period. Noting a simultaneous increase in telephone traffic he stated 
that they indicated the scope for a “soaring rate o f growth if all the necessary facilities 
were there to meet public demand quickly and fully. W e must therefore treat
47 DD 266, p. 879, 20/6/73.
48 DD 269, p. 872,4/12/73.
49 DD 269, p. 877, 4/12/73.
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telecommunications as a rapidly expanding sector o f the economy and plan 
accordingly.”50
In the short term however, Cruise O'Brien repeated that the Departm ent would focus on 
the improvement o f the quality o f service offered to existing subscribers even at the cost of 
restricting new subscriber numbers: “It takes about tw o-and-a-half years before the full 
effects either o f  the cuts or expansions o f capital provision are felt.” 51 There could be no 
“quick fix” for the waiting list.
7.4 General Development 1975 - 1979
Given Cruise O ’Brien’s estimate o f a 30 month lead time before the effect o f increases in 
capital expenditure were felt, it would have been m id-1976 before any improvements were 
noticed from the 1973 Capital Act. In the meantime the service remained in a state o f 
crisis. Cumulative losses o f over £25 million were recorded from the operation o f the 
telephone service in 1975 and 1976 whilst the average gap between applying for and 
receiving service reached 12 months. The absolute size o f  the waiting list also continued to 
increase although a 1975 increase o f nearly 6,000 in annual connection (to 36,400 new 
installations) saw the waiting list’s rate o f increase slow (reaching 43,000 by M arch 
1976).52
In January 1977, introducing that year’s budget, M inister for Finance, Ritchie Ryan 
announced that postal charges would have to be further increased by 13% in order to 
compensate for the projected deficit on those services. At the same time he announced 
average increases o f 25% in the charges for the telegraphs and telephone services. In 
making the announcement he provided a lengthy and detailed description o f the state o f the 
services.
“The Post Office services which should be self-financing, are running at a 
substantial loss on their commercial accounts. The telephone service lost £8.5 
million in 1976 and now is losing almost half-a-m illion pounds a week. The loss
50 DD 273, p. 293, 3/5/74.
51 DD 283, p. 1374, 10/7/75.
52 DD 290, p. 1104, 12/5/76.
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in prospect on the postal services is £3.7 million this year. These losses have to be 
made good by taxpayers through general taxation ...
The major factor in the increased costs has been pay increases. In 
addition, in the case o f the telephone service, a  significant but necessary growth in 
the number o f  staff employed reflected the very substantial development o f  that 
service.
The second important factor has been the increasingly heavy capital cost 
o f  telephone development; the cost o f  interest and depreciation has increased from 
£7.6 million in 1971 to £26.4 million in 1977, an increase o f 247%  and now 
represents 38%  o f expenditure on the telephone service. The country is now 
obliged to pay the cost o f  culpable underinvestment in the Sixties and early 
Seventies, when the potential for growth in traffic to service the investment was 
considerably greater and when capital costs were much lower.
Notwithstanding the enormous capital cost of improving the telephone 
service at present, the truth is that any further delay would not merely be an 
inconvenience but an intolerable handicap to business and industry .” 53
(Italics added)
In the longer term, the charge increase had little effect on demand: the Department 
received 44,000 applications in 1977 (up 8,000 on the figure for 1976) rising to 58,000 in 
1978.
In June 1977 Fianna Fail swept to a spectacular victory over the incumbent coalition with 
a manifesto54 that included a promise to subsidise telephone charges for Old Age 
Pensioners living alone.55 Fianna Fail also committed themselves to improving 
Departmental S taff relations, to achieving a position where the demand for telephone and 
telex services could be met and critically to “examine the desirability o f  giving autonomy 
to telecommunications.”56
53 "Postal Charges to go up by 13% and phone, telegram and telex services by 25%." The Irish 
Times 27/1/77.
54 A manifesto which would in the depression years of the 1980s earn party’s then leader the 
sobriquet Jack "Give-away" Lynch.
55 Fianna Fail Election Manifesto 1977, p. 23.
56 Ibid., p. 38.
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W ithin four months Padraig Faulkner,57 Cruise O'Brien's successor, introduced the 1977 
Telephone Capital Act. By 1977, the £175 million pounds o f the 1973 Act had effectively 
been reduced by inflation to an estimated £126 million. The new act doubled the 
investment o f the previous one, committing up to £350 million for telephone development 
over the following five years.58 The main objectives o f  the 1977 Act as described by 
Faulkner were to:
(1) Increase connection rate from 45,000 to 85,000 per annum.
(2) Raise to 96% the percentage o f automatic telephones.
(3) Improve quality o f  existing service.
(4) Ensure the P& T ’s ability to continue its progress after 1982 by acquiring sites 
and building/equipment contracts in advance.
The task o f achieving those objectives was rendered problematic by the escalation in 
January 1978 o f an Irish Post Office Engineering Union dispute within the 
telecommunications section o f Faulkner's department. Although the dispute returned to 
arbitration before the Dail recess o f  summer 1978, the resulting widespread stoppage had 
decimated the already vulnerable service. Subscribers connected to manual exchanges 
were particularly badly hit by the stoppages: dependent (unlike those connected to 
automatic exchanges) on the presence o f operating staff, they effectively lost all service 
during industrial action. The waiting list raced from 40,600 in M arch 1977 (two months 
before the dispute) to 53,000 in M ay 1978 due both to the industrial action but also 
another unexpected increase in the number o f applications. Estimates o f the cost o f the 
dispute varied but the public perceived that industry and tourism had suffered enormous 
losses as a  direct consequence o f the strike.59
Increasingly, Faulkner was pressured to examine the feasibility o f establishing his 
Department's telecommunications section as a separate body (the possibility o f which had 
been raised in the 1977 pre-election manifesto). In October 1978, he announced the 
establishment o f  a review body under Dr. Michael Dargan, primarily to examine the
57 One of the three Fianna Fail Deputies representing Louth.
58 It will be interesting when papers are released from the short-lived Department of Economic 
Planning and Development (overseen by Martin O'Donoghue) to see to what extent (if any) it 
influenced the content and direction of the 1977 Telephone Act (and indeed general 
telecommunications policy).
59 See for example Fine Gael TD for Limerick East, Tom O'Donnell complaining about the 
effect of the dispute on the Aer Lingus telephone system. DD 306, p. 1926, 25/5/78.
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feasibility o f giving autonomy to the telecommunications services, but with a “completely 
open”60 remit to consider any other aspects o f  the service.
The Dargan Report was delivered in July 1979 (a week after the conclusion o f  a second 
Post Office strike). The report’s influence on the subsequent history o f the Irish telephone 
service cannot be underestimated: it offered the first independent and comprehensive 
assessment o f the difficulties faced by the service and allowed it to suggest effective 
remedies. The executive summary commenced with the words:
“The state o f  the telecommunications service constitutes a  crisis and a heavy dose 
o f realism is now needed. Policies and attitudes need to be changed fundamentally 
and quickly. W e have striven to bring out our report quickly so that no time may 
be lost.”61
The medium-term prognosis provided by the Dargan Report was gloomy, predicting a 
waiting list o f  100,000 by 1981. It identified as the core problem o f  the 
telecommunications service its administration by a Government Department, which it 
argued was structurally unable to cope with the running o f a modern telecommunications 
service:
“The cause o f the shortcomings and inefficiencies is primarily structural. The 
telecommunications service is a business. It has a rapidly changing technology 
and an increasing need for a marketing orientation. In those circumstances the 
governmental and civil service structure, which has to accommodate to many 
restrictions, is unsuitable for management o f telecommunications.”62
As a  direct result, the report noted that increases hi telephone capital expenditure from 
1968 to 1978 were, taking into account the effects o f inflation and the demands placed on 
the service, surprisingly small. Thus, havhig explored a range o f organisational 
alternatives it opted for a state-sponsored company:
60 DD 308, p. 1458, 1/1//78.
61 Dargan Report, p. 1.
62 Ibid.
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“W e recommend that the telecommunications service be taken out o f  the civil 
service and be entrusted to a  state-sponsored body in the form o f a  statutory 
company to be run on commercial lines. The new company should have a board 
with a strong business experience content, the chairman and members thereof to 
be appointed by the Government. The management o f the company should be 
headed by a chief executive who would be chosen for his business outlook, 
experience, attributes and attainment. The new body will need considerable 
flexibility and special powers.”
The government accepted the report with scarcely a reservation and by the close o f 
October 1979 had appointed an interim boards, headed by Michael Smurfit, CEO of 
Ireland’s largest private company, the Smurfit Group. Furthermore, accepting that 
increased demand had again rendered the development programme envisaged by the 
previous Telephone Capital Act obsolete, the government announced a new programme of 
investment based on the recommendations o f  the Dargan report. These were:
“(i) over the next 2 to 3 years acquire over 200 sites and provide about 560 
buildings and building extensions throughout the country for the necessary plant 
and support facilities; about 50 large buildings for equipment at switching centres 
are critical; they would be required at latest within 2 years.
(ii) within about 4 years more than double the number o f  trank circuits and the 
capacity o f trunk switching exchanges, increase subscriber exchange terminations 
from over 0.5 million to  about 1 million, replace about 50,000 life-expired 
terminations in Strowager type exchanges, and extend the subscriber cabling 
network to cater for the extra subscribers. . .
(iii) nearly double the number o f  subscribers' lines from 390,000 in 1978 to
750,000 at end o f 1983.
(iv) convert the system fully to automatic working .”63
63 From the Dargan Report, Paragraph 6.3, p. 27
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Faulkner announced the intention to invest £650 million in the service between 1979 and 
1984 with a  view to doubling the size o f the existing network (as the Dargan Report 
suggested):
“It is clear from all I have said here that the Government are unreservedly 
resolved to have the quality o f the telecommunication service raised to a high level 
as quickly as possible. O ur present problems have arisen over a long period. 
Never before has there been such Government determination to have them settled 
once and for all and within a relatively short tim e.”64
7.5 Conception of the Telephone
The shift in the overall direction o f the Irish economy in the 1960s saw the role o f the 
telephone as an infrastructural prerequisite for the workings o f industry and commerce 
stressed as never before. Indeed, as is discussed in section 7.6 below, the telephone service 
was virtually co-opted into becoming an arm o f the Industrial Development Agency. As 
such, throughout the period under review, it was assumed not merely that the telephone 
was essential for industrial development but that industrial development was the driver of 
increased demand for service. Speaking in 1964 Michael Hilliard noted that Ireland was 
competing with other countries for telephone equipment to keep up with demand:
“Demand here has exceeded all expectations. That demand has been created by 
increased productivity, the buoyancy o f the economy and by an increase in 
business and m anufacturing activity within the state over the past five years.”65
This perception if  anything increased during the latter half o f the 1960s as the state geared 
up for EEC entry: “Communications are vital to industry and the country, especially now 
that links with the continent are getting closer and closer.”66 Thus, when the large-scale 
strike o f 1978 decimated the service, its impact was understood not in terms o f the 
disappearance o f a socially useful service but a key tool for industry: The Irish Times o f 
11 February 1978 noted that:
64 DD 316, p. 208, 17/10/79.
65 DD 207, p. 1762, 27/2/64.
66 M. E. Dockrell, T.D. DD 228, p. 95, 16/5/67.
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“Overseas investment is grinding to a halt because o f a telecommunications 
blackout to the outside world. The operations o f  Irish semi-state bodies, science 
and industry based in the United Kingdom are also being seriously disrupted. T h e  
damage to our attempts to attract industry is im m easurable,’ a  spokesman for the 
Industrial Development Authority said in Birmingham on 10 February, ‘The 
image the blackout is giving Ireland is very grave .’ ”67
This was reflected in the Departm ent’s ongoing setting o f priority categoric:s. Although the 
“overriding consideration” in determining the allowance o f priority to applicants for 
service was “the public interest or the existence o f strong hum anitarian or compassionate 
grounds,”68 the list also included in November 1964:
“private or public businesses or professions where substantial and urgent use of 
the telephone is essential to the conduct o f  business or to the maintenance of 
employment. Examples are: Government and local authorities, public utilities, 
transport organisations, building contractors (who afford considerable 
employment), hotels, co-operative societies, taxi services, journalists and 
solicitors... ”69
Theoretically, only those companies employing seven o f  more individuals were considered 
priorities,70 but hi M ay 1974 Cruise O’Brien noted that companies with less than seven 
employees were accorded priority status “where circumstances warrant(ed) it”:
“Priority is also extended to specialised businesses, irrespective o f employment 
content, for which a  telephone is clearly essential, for example a full-time 
auctioneer, a registered hotel or guest house.”71
Similarly, the composition o f the newly established Post Office U sers’ Council in 1974 
made no bones about the fact that the views o f the large users would predominate. 
Outlining the structure and functions o f the Council in May 1974, Conor Cruise O ’Brien 
stated that:
67 Irish Times, 11/2/78.
68 DD 212, p. 507, 10/11/64.
69 DD 212, p. 507, 10/11/64.
70 DD 274, p. 1924, 24/7/74.
71 Ibid.
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“The council, whose functions will be advisory, will comprise a  chairman and 17 
other members. The chairman and three members o f the council will be chosen by 
the Minister. Seven o f the remaining members will be appointed by the M inister 
on the nomination o f bodies representative o f workers, employers, including 
fanners, consumers, local authorities and the Gaeltacht. The other seven members 
will be appointed by the M inister on the nomination o f large users. All members, 
however will service in a personal and not in a representative capacity .”72
The inclusion o f consumers (presumably private/residential users in the case of 
telephones) amongst the more disparate group seems largely cosmetic, since their voice 
alone could not have carried much weight.
The extension o f the residence rental rate to farmers in 1959 saw  the distinction between 
agricultural and residential users diminish. Despite the fact that fanning still represented 
about a third o f  all economic activity by the 1970s, fanning was perceived as a small 
telecommunications user, which was reflected in the fact that that was only one farm er’s 
representative on the Post Office Users Council.73
In 1961, residential lines had accounted for 54,000 (47%) o f the total 115,000.74 By the 
close o f the period, however, residential lines constituted a majority o f all lines, accounting 
for 57% (245,100 lines) o f  the to tal.75 Although the increase was in part due to the post 
Kamerbeek increase in provincial residential applications, the increasingly urban nature o f 
Irish society in this period was also a factor. W hilst in the 1920s two thirds; o f the 
population lived in rural areas, by 1966 49 .2% o f the population lived in towns with 
populations o f 1500 or more. Five years later this figure had risen to 52.25% .76 The 
Greater Dublin Area alone accounted for almost one third o f the population by the close o f 
the 1970s.
72 DD 273, p. 305, 3/5/74.
73 DD 273, p. 303, 30/5/74.
74 DD 303, p. 336, 1/2/78.
75 ITU (1990), Yearbook of Telecommunications Statistics, (Geneva: ITU).
76 Brown, Terence (1985), Ireland: A Social and Cultural History, 1922 to the Present. (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press), p. 258.
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As a rapid process o f urbanisation occurred in the 1960s, there was a marked increase in 
internal migration .77 New housing estates began to sprout up around the country, 
particularly in Dublin and the dormer towns o f the surrounding counties. Deputies argued 
that people moving into new housing estates needed the telephone to “keep in touch with 
their friends or relatives”78 out o f  whose social circle they had moved. Thus the telephone 
increasingly became a consumption norm, crucial to living in w hat was an increasingly 
geographically mobile society. Fine Gael TD Thomas J. Fitzpatrick pointed out in 1965 
that:
“communication by telephone has ceased to be a luxury. . . if a person were 
deprived o f the telephone in this year and age, it would take him perhaps hours to 
do something that he should be able to deal with in a m atter o f m inutes.”79
From the point o f  view o f the Post Office the new housing schemes were attractive places 
to install phones since the high density o f housing greatly reduced the per line capital 
costs. From October 1966, the Department endeavoured to ensure that “in all new 
schemes ducts are laid in the course o f erection o f the scheme which enables them to put 
the wires in eventually, thus facilitating the installation o f telephones.”80 However, the 
growth o f residential telephony in urban areas brought substantial teething problems, as 
the growth o f  new suburban housing estates saw exchanges built for villages suddenly 
dealing with town populations o f 20,000 .81 Thus whilst the national average waiting 
period o f connection had reached 13 months by June 1978, the figure was nearly twice 
that in many Dublin housing estates.82
Despite their numerical dominance by the close o f the period, private subscribers remained 
second class citizens relative to business users, accounting for a disproportionate size o f 
the waiting list.83 When the Post Office Users Council was established in 1974 there was 
only one direct representative o f the residential users, who for the purposes o f the Council
77 Ibid.
78 Ciaran Murphy, Fianna Fail TD for Wicklow. DD 300, p. 333, 12/10/77.
79 DD 217, p. 1988, 21/7/65.
80 Joseph Brennan, the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs. DD 224, p. 307. 27/10/66.
81 Tallaght, a new town in west County Dublin was a case in point. By May 1973 the area 
accounted for 3% of the entire waiting list, forcing the Department to entirely replace the 
existing exchange.
82 John Kelly, Fine Gael TD for Dublin County South. DD 307, p. 589, 7/6/78.
83 Joseph Brennan. DD 217, p. 2022, 21/7/65.
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were characterised as “consumers”.84 Thus, the view's o f  the majority o f  users were likely 
to be swamped by those o f  the large users bloc.85
That the telephone was becoming a “consumption norm'’ was in part reflected by the 
introduction o f  free telephone rental for OAPs in the wake o f the 1977 election. Whilst the 
stipulation that the benefit be limited to elderly people living alone suggested that the 
scheme sought to provide access to assistance in the case o f an emergency, it also 
facilitated any communication with the outside world. Given that, the immediate 
effectiveness o f the scheme was disappointing. 3.90086 existing subscribers automatically 
qualified for the scheme as soon as it was introduced but by November 1978 only 600 o f  
the 4,500 new applications made under the scheme were “installed or in the course o f  
installation.”87
84 DD 272. p. 303, 30/5/74.
85 This is of coursc speculative. Only an examination of the ininules of the Council could allow 
any definitive assessment to be made.
86 DD 309. p. 74.2/11/78.
87 Ibid.
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7.6 C onception o f the T elephone Service
As noted above such was the stress on the importance o f the telephone for industry from 
1960 onwards that it became possible to regard the Post Office alongside the IDA as an 
agent o f industrial development. In M ay 1964 Hilliard stated that:
“I recognise that this is nation building, that an efficient and effective telephone 
service is necessary for the expanding economy we enjoy. I recognise the future o f 
this country depends on increased productivity and exports, increased work in 
factory and field, and that it is absolutely necessary to have an efficient and 
effective telephone service to serve those needs.”88
The telephone service was considered particularly critical to the IDA drive in the 1960s 
and 1970s to establish industry outside urban areas. The consistent tardiness in developmg 
the rural service relative to that in urban areas was considered a major obstacle to this 
goal. Deputies argued that expenditure by way o f  grants to encourage industry to establish 
in under-developed areas was useless without a reliable telecommunications service: “All 
the good work o f the IDA is lost for the want o f a proper telephone service.” 89 hi 
particular, the relatively low level o f automation in the Republic o f Ireland (especially 
compared to Northern Ireland where the figure was 100%) placed Ireland at a significant 
disadvantage hi terms o f its ability to attract industiy:
“An industrialist likes to set up in a country' where he can dial a number and get it 
quickly instead o f losing time waiting while one exchange gets in touch with 
another and so on. . . When an industrialist has established a business and 
somebody comes to him asking if  it is a  good place to site an industry, if  he has 
experienced a good telephone service, it is the sort o f thing that will make him 
advise an associate to come there to establish a factory .”90
Finally, the Industrial Development Authority, in a submission to the Dargan Review 
Group in 1978 argues that “telecommunications deficiencies represent an ever increasing
88 DD 209, p. 1542, 14/5/64.
89 Mrs Hogan O'Higgins. DD 251, p. 2140, 25/2/71.
90 DD 252, p. 856, 11/3/71.
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negative factor in IDA campaigns to attract overseas industry .”91 The submission asserted 
that foreign industrialists perceived an immense gap between the standards they were 
accustomed to in their home countries and the norm in Ireland:
“It is now the most serious deficiency in our industrial infrastructure, and is 
hurting the IDA effort daily .”92
A second submission from the Department o f Economic Planning addressed the suggestion 
that since relative to GNP, telephone penetration in Ireland was roughly equivalent to 
international norms, there was scant need to increase levels o f  penetration. The 
Department argued that such a conclusion would be misleading:
“Our telecommunications needs had to be related to such exceptional factors as 
our unfavourable geographic location, the high degree o f dependence on foreign 
trade and the need to attract substantial and sustained foreign investment to 
promote economic development and to create jobs. Consequently, Irish 
telecommunications services must be exceptionally good; they must at least match 
the standards o f our main trading partners and o f those countries whose 
industrialists were likely to invest in Ireland .”93
Thus it was consistently argued throughout the 1960s, but particularly in the 1970s, that 
telephone development should be planned in conjunction with the IDA. W hilst this was 
never officially adopted as policy, anecdotal evidence nonetheless suggests that the 
Department went out o f  its way to accommodate IDA requests.94
There remained significantly less willingness to accede to more socially oriented requests 
Throughout the period under review, Ministers continued to parrot the line that:
91 Dargan, p.a. 6.12, p. 31.
92 Dargan, p.a. 6.12, p. 31.
93 Dargan, p.a. 5.4, p. 25.
94 For example: in November 1972, Clare-South Galway TD, Brigid Hogan-O'Higgins, cited an 
example of an American company which had been attracted to the West by the IDA but for 
which the [DA was unable to provide a telephone. Mrs Hogan-O'Higgins claimed that after she 
made representation to Minister Geny Collins a telephone was duly installed. DD 263, 15/11/72, 
p. 1759.
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“It has been the settled policy o f all Ministers for Posts and Telegraphs that the 
Post Office should pay its way on a commercial basis. A departure from this 
policy is certainly not warranted now. . . ”95
Given the Dargan R eport’s 1978 assessment that capital expenditure in the 1960s and 
1970s had been small relative to demand (see above), Department policy on the need to 
break even meant that there was no question o f  running a deficit to fund more costly 
elements o f  the service. These were usually the first to be cutback in periods o f extreme 
capital shortages. In practice, this meant that, throughout the period under review, the 
connection o f long-line (i.e. remote) applicants was extremely slow. Hilliard noted in 1965 
the need to:
“by-pass the long-line cases in order to keep up the rate o f installation. I have 
great sympathy with these long-line cases, some o f whom are four and a half 
miles from an exchange. But the cost o f  installation in such cases would involve a 
capital expenditure o f between £500 and £ 1200. I had to make a decision to 
conserve as far as possible the capital made available to me to provide new 
telephones and I decided to make the service available to the greater num ber.”96
Indeed, one area in particular, the remote Black Valley in Keriy, stood out durmg the 
period under review as an area where the Department simply refused to provide service on 
the grounds o f the expenditure involved. Conor Cruise O'Brien noted in June 1974:
“This problem has been extensively considered on a number o f  times by the 
Department but there does not, unfortunately, appear to be any way o f  providing 
a  service that would not be prohibitively costly... I f  the costs o f the order required 
to give service to the relatively small number o f households were incurred in this 
case, it would be difficult to resist demands for the provision o f  kiosks in other 
remote areas, regardless o f the cost involved.”97
95 Michael Hilliard, DD 209, p. 376, 23/4/64. However see also: Erskine Childers, DD 228, p. 
983, 16/5/67; Gerry Collins, DD 249, p. 1401, 12/11/70; and Conor Cruise O’Brien, DD 286, p. 
830, 3/12/75.
96 DD 214, p. 1694, 10/3/65.
97 DD 273, p. 1148, 13/6/74.
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W ith regard to the rural kiosk programme commenced in 1969, the D epartm ent’s decision 
to such pursue an explicitly socially oriented programme represented a policy shift in this 
period since in four years previously, then M inister for Posts and Telegraphs Joseph 
Brennan had refused to countenance such a programme on cost grounds:
“Then we have demands for kiosks in rather remote areas in rural Ireland. The 
case is always made that if  somebody is looking for a priest or a doctor in the 
middle o f  the night, they have no way o f contacting them. Finally, a  telephone is 
installed in some o f these and it is found that the revenue during the year is very 
small. One must set certain economic standards which would justify the erection 
o f these kiosks... One cannot be entirely influenced by the social amenity 
aspect.”98
Yet even when the programme was undertaken, the Department sought to reduce the level 
o f subsidy to minimum, determining priorities for the establishment o f kiosks according to 
level o f revenue earned. Thus Conor Cruise O ’Brien noted in 1973 that:
“In rural areas kiosks are only provided in replacement o f public-call offices in 
sub-post offices which are used to a fair extent.”99
At the same time, when it became clear that all areas fitting the criteria (which in practice 
limited the establishment o f kiosks to those areas where call or revenue was in excess of 
£10 per annum) would have been connected by the close o f the 1973 kiosk programme, 
the Department was willing to alter the criteria when planning the 1974 programme, 
reducing the revenue requirement to £42. Given that the average annual cost o f  providing 
and maintaining a kiosk in provincial areas was estimated at £170 in 1975100 the level o f  
subsidy per kiosk was around £130.101
98 DD 224, p. 2175, 27/10/66.
99 DD 267, p. 2109, 26/7/73.
100 £170 seems to have been the cost of maintenance and of paying off of interest on the initial 
capital expenditure on a kiosk. Certainly Peter Barry, answering a question for Cruise O'Brien in 
June 1975 indicated that the capital cost of erecting a kiosk was £800 pretty much regardless of 
whether it was in an urban or rural locale. See DD 280, p. 1862, 5/6/75.
101 This could be better stated as kiosks were subsidised up to the value of £130. Cruise 
O'Brien's actual quote was "Call offices in which the receipts are £42 pounds or over qualify for 
inclusion in the 1974 kiosk programme...Since the annual cost of providing and maintaining a 
kiosk is calculated at £170, it is clear that the element of subsidy in that programme is quite 
heavy." (DD 273, p. 697, 6/6/74.)
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There remained a limit to the Departm ent’s generosity however: by October 1977 all but 
350 o f the 2,000 rural call boxes that had existed in 1969 had been replaced with outdoor 
kiosks with 24 hour service. O f the remainder, however, Padraig Faulkner, then M inister 
for Posts and Telegraphs said:
“W ith few exceptions, the stage has now been reached where kiosks provided in 
replacement o f the remaining call offices would be unlikely ever to pay their way 
even with a  very substantial subsidy .” 102
As a consequence Faulkner stated that the Department would not establish any new kiosks 
at the locations o f remain call boxes thus denying those areas a 24-hour public telephone 
service. Any further provision, he argued, was only likely to occur where the erection o f 
the kiosks was guaranteed by the local authority .103 Thus there was no ideological 
commitment (nor indeed any legal requirement on the Department) to provide public 
telephone facilities in all areas o f the country.
There was, however, a significant rethink on the question o f socially-oriented expenditures 
during the 1970s. Introducing a  charge increase in 1975, Conor Cruise O'Brien pointed 
out that failure to do so would mean:
“deliberately passing on to the taxpayer a large part o f  the cost o f  the services o f 
which he or she may, in fact, make very little use. In its extreme form it would 
make taxpayers who have no telephone and who seldom use them pay a 
disproportionate share o f the cost o f  running an expensive service from which 
others benefit substantially .” 104
Yet the consistent losses o f the telephone service during the 1970s meant that de fa c to , the 
taxpayer was subsidising such losses. Already facing such losses by November 1972 
Gerry Collins queried the wisdom o f  continuing to “lump in totally uneconomic services
102 DD 300, p. 293, 12/10/77.
103 DD 300, p. 481, 13/10/77. For example public telephone facilities were only provided on the 
23 most populated islands off the coast by March 1979. The other 61 inhabited islands were 
denied such facilities on the grounds that it was not "warranted, having regard to the small 
population to be served in each case and the heavy costs involved." T.J. Fitzpatrick in DD 312, 
pp. 699-700, 6/3/79.
104 DD 286, p. 830, 3/12/75.
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provided for social reasons with normal commercial services.” 105 He pointed out that, for 
social reasons, the Post Office provided services (citing in particular the telegraph) that 
any ordinary business organisation “would long since have dispensed o f.” 106 Thus while 
reassuring the Dail that he was not considering the suspension o f  such services he stated 
that:
“I m ust consider, and am doing so, whether services needed more for social than
economic reasons should be financed by the taxpayer rather than carried by the
Department at the expense o f economic services.” 107
The implications o f this statement, although negligible in terms o f any immediate policy 
decision, were nonetheless interesting in terms o f overall policy. Collins’ statement 
indicates a querying o f the wisdom o f the cross-subsidisation between the Post Office 
services that was standard practice. Instead he was advocating the introduction o f direct 
and transparent subsidy, undisguised by internal Post Office transfers. This implied both a 
more commercial conception o f the Post Office as an institution, yet a t the same time 
acknowledged the social importance o f  the services it offered. As such it represents one of 
the first attempts at re-analysing the function and role in society o f the Post Office and the 
services it provided .108
The im pact o f this line o f thinking would eventually be felt some five years later with the 
introduction o f free telephone rental for pensioners living alone. Eight years earlier, in 
December 1969, Labour TD, Barry Desmond had requested o f then Fianna Fail M inister 
for Posts and Telegraphs, Patrick Lalor, that he introduce free installation and rental for 
elderly people living alone, couching his argument in terms o f the social importance o f the 
telephone for the isolated.109
A t the time Patrick Lalor had argued that the Telephone service was not in a position to 
subsidise such a socially oriented programme:
105 DD 263, p. 1257, 9/11/72.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid., p. 1258.
108 Collins continued to bring up. the need to reassess how uneconomic services were to be paid 
for in opposition. See DD 265, p. 1905, 24/5/73.
109 DD 243, p. 1949, 18/12/69.
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“Telephone service tariffs are at standard rates o f general application to which no 
exception is made. . . the 1966 census suggested that there were some number 
short o f  23.000 persons in the country o f 70 years and over living alone. The 
House will appreciate the huge cost that would be involved in providing a 
telephone service for that number o f persons individually.”110
Yet it was a Fianna Fail government that introduced free rental. The critical difference 
between 1969 and 1977 however was the source o f  funding. Rather than funding the 
policy through internal Post Office cross-subsidies, free telephone rental was financed by 
the Department o f  Social Welfare. In short, what had changed was not the conception o f  
the role o f  the Post Office, which retained the obligation to be financially self-sufficient, 
but o f the role o f  the telephone itself.
110 Ibid.
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7.7 Sum m ary: U niversal Service 1960-1979
Despite the chaos o f  the 1960s and 1970s, the period did see a fourfold increase in 
subscriber numbers, from 115,000 in I960111 to 436,000 by 1980,112 equivalent to a rise 
o f 5.6 telephones per 100 people in I960113 to  17.2 per 100 by 1979.114 Again in the 
absence o f reliable data it is difficult to state with confidence how the network diffused 
geographically in the 1960s. It can be stated, however, that by 1972, provincial lines 
accounted for 82,597 (44%) o f all lines. However, the cuts in capital spending 
notwithstanding, the 1970s saw the level o f  telephone penetration outside the Dublin area 
increase by over 140,000 phones, compared to 100,000 within the Dublin area: i.e. 
provincial installations accounted for 60% o f  all new comiections in the second decade o f 
the period under review .115 By 1979 telephone connections were geographically diffused 
as follows:
Table 7.2 Number of Telephone Connections in each Engineering District (30/9/79)
Engineering District Connection








(Source: DD 317, p. 1162, 6/12/79)
Thus, by the close o f  the 1970s, the numbers o f  provincial exchange lines had risen 
substantially to account for 52% o f all exchange lines. Given that the Dublin area 
accounted for only a third o f the total population at this time, there remained an imbalance
111 A.J. Litton (1961) “The Growth and Development of the Irish Telephone System", Journal 
o f  the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society o f  Ireland, Vol., 20, Part 5, pp. 79-115.
112 Central Statistics Office (1980), Statistical Abstracts 1980. (Dublin: The Stationery Office).
113 Litton, op. cit., p. 105.
114 ITU (1990), Yearbook of Public Telecommunications Statistics. (Genera: ITU).
115 DD 317, p. 1161-62, 6/12/79.
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between development inside and outside Dublin, but the spread o f subscribers in the 1970s 
began to approximate more closely overall population patterns.
As had been the case in previous decades, the development o f telephony in rural areas 
during the period under review in this chapter owed something to new infrastructural 
technology’s im pact upon costs. As the number o f provincial subscribers increased, so did 
the volume o f trunk traffic. However, by the start o f the 1960s the potential for adding 
capacity by way o f applying three or 12 channel carrier systems had been exhausted. 
Previously the laying o f co-axial cable had offered a relatively cheap means o f solving the 
problem but the rising costs both o f cable and, in particular, o f trenching (i.e. digging 
cable routes) in the early 1960s threatened to place veiy strict limits on new long line 
development using this method. However, from 1961 onwards, the Department 
increasingly used microwave transmitters as a means o f augmenting trunk routes. Using 
no cable and thus requiring no trenching, microwave transmitters capable o f cariying up 
to 240 channels connected to Dublin Galway, Arklow Belfast and Cork by 1966 116 The 
system was also successfully used in those areas where the terrain rendered the work of 
erecting pole routes or trenching particularly arduous, most notably in the Sligo- 
Bundoran-Donegal route which opened in 1961.117
Given the above, it hardly needs to be stated then that the telephone was no longer 
considered as a  primarily urban instrument. Nonetheless, there remained geographic 
inequities in the charging structure, most notably the practice o f adding an additional sum 
to the rental for those subscribers located more than three miles from the nearest 
exchange.118 Such subscribers were further hampered by the introduction in 1965 o f a 
“progressive scale” o f advance rental charges. These required that those applicants for 
service situated three or more miles from the nearest exchange to pay five years rent in 
advance on application. Meanwhile, those within the free mileage area were required to 
pay ju st one year’s rental in advance.
116 Litton, op. cit., p. 89.
117 Evening Herald, 21/11/1961.
118 In a personal interview with Telecom Eireann’s Pricing Division, it was suggested that this 
practice was abandoned for a single distance independent rental "at some point in the 1970s.’’ 
Against this, however, the 1982 Post Office Guide records that additional annual rental charges 
would be levied for those applicants located 5 kilometres (3 miles) from the nearest exchange. 
Telecom Pricing Division, personal interview notes.
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Several Deputies singled this as iniquitous arguing that such charges:
“should be borne by way o f an overall charge on the country as a whole. In other 
words, those who live in isolated districts should be encouraged to stay where they 
are and they should be given the necessaiy facilities from the state. After all, let 
the rest o f  the country pay for it. Let it be an overall national charge, so that, in so 
far as possible, there is an equitable overall charge for telephones and an equitable 
charge all round.” 119
Nonetheless, the differential charges were retained beyond the end o f the 1970s.
Accurate quality o f service indicators are not available for the bulk o f the period covered 
by this chapter, although a succession o f  reports from institutions representing business 
users in the late 1960s and 1970s suggests that in general the system was unable to cope 
with the level o f  traffic throughout this period. The Confederation o f Irish Industry, an 
employers’ representative body, published two reports in the 1970s singling out the 
telephone service as “one o f the obstructions to a more efficient business situation in this 
country .” 120 Similarly, as noted above, the IDA pointed to the failings o f  the telephone 
service as a  hindrance to its own activities. In 1978 the Dargan Review Group offered 
some more objective figures on service quality: in brief the report noted that nationwide 
61.1%  o f  local calls and 37.7%  o f STD calls were successful on the first attempt. These 
compared poorly with the ideal 97% and 95% first time success rates sought by the 
report.121
Furthermore, there remained substantial geographical disparities in the quality o f service. 
While the automation o f rural exchanges continued throughout the period under review, it 
remained the case that by 1979, more than 50 years after the opening o f the first 
automatic exchange in Dublin, there remained several hundred manual exchanges in rural 
areas, accounting for 10% o f subscribers.122 A letter to The Irish Times from a Donegal 
subscriber in December 1975 asked:
119 Sir Anthony Esmonde. DD 228, p. 11)2, 17/5/67.
120 Justin Keating quoting from the report DD 252, p. 889, 11/3/71.
121 The Dargan Report, p. 14.
122 Figure quoted by T. J. Fitzpatrick answering for Padraig Faulkner in response to question 
from William O'Brien, Fine Gael TD for Limerick West (See DD 313. p. 2037, 2/5/79).
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“Is it impossible for the telephone system in this part o f Ulster to be brought, if  
not up to date, a t least to the same stage o f development as Dublin enjoyed in the 
early 1930s? Until this takes place it would, I submit, only be fair to introduce 
differential rates o f charges. Subscribers not on the autom atic dialling system 
might be charged, say, half as much as those enjoying the benefits o f that 
system .” 123
Indeed, the fact that the 1970s saw the first significant industrial unrest in the history o f 
the service meant that the period o f the strikes (1977 to 1978) saw the differential between 
manual and automatic service widen.
The quadrupling o f exchange line numbers, the basic indicator o f telephone development 
during this period, must agam be understood in terms o f the enoimous changes occurring 
in Irish society and the economy during the period under review in this chapter. Economic 
growth both in the 1960s and in the 1970s (albeit driven by massive state borrowing in the 
second decade) generated substantial social change. Four per cent annual economic 
growth during the 1960s contributed to a simultaneous rise o f  “about 50% in material 
living standards.” 124 This encouraged a reduction in the rate o f emigration in the early 
1960s and net immigration in the 1970s reversing the pattern o f population decline which 
had persisted since the 1840s: the Irish population grew from 2,818,341 in 1961 to 
3,443,405 by 1981. In short the period saw not ju st an increased population but also an 
increase in per capita purchasing power. As a result social historians o f  the period have 
noted that “consumerist values made swift advances. . . as in no other period o f modern 
history .” 125 Given this, telephone ownership became, as Chubb has suggested,126 one of 
the visible indices o f prosperity alongside television set and car ownership. In short, the 
increasing wealth o f the country saw the telephone acquire the status o f a consumer 
durable, a product which an individual family might reasonably expect to acquire as 
opposed to a  luxury item.
This status was in large part a result not ju st o f increased income but also the ongoing 
decrease in the cost o f the residential rentals relative to average wages. The average male
123 "On the 'Phone", a letter to The Irish Times from W.G.G. Kelletl, dated 9/12./75.
124 Lee, op. cit., p. 360.
125 Terence Brown (1981^' Ireland: A Social and Cultural History 1922-1979. (London. 
Fontana), p. 260.
126 Basil Chubb (1992), The Government and Politics of Ireland, (London: Longman), p. 24
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industrial wage increased from £534 in 1960 to £1,067 by 1969, an increase o f  almost 
exactly 100% .127 A t the same time residential rental charges increased from £7 10s to £12 
10s, an increase o f  only 66%. The gap between wage and rental rate increases widened 
throughout the 1970s as a  series o f  national wage agreements saw incomes soar ahead of 
inflation: thus whilst residential rentals nearly tripled between 1970 and 1980, the average 
industrial wage (i.e. including men and wom en’s wages) rose from £1,005 in 1970 to 
£5,020 by 1980, a  500% increase.128 In consequence the period under review saw for the 
first time a  substantial proportion o f the population perceive the utility o f the telephone to 
be greater than its cost.
This is evident from the dramatic increase in residential demand for the telephone: from 
constituting 48.6%  o f all lines in I96 0 ,129 residential lines came to account for 57% o f all 
lines by 1979, equivalent to a household penetration rate o f 28% .130 That is, o f the
313,000 new lines connected in this period, residential lines accounted for 188,000, or 
60%. Furthermore, this figure does not include those applicants waiting for service by the 
end o f the 1970s: by the late summer o f 1980 there were 95,000 names on the waiting list, 
roughly 70% o f which were residential applicants. Had the Department been able to 
accommodate effective demand there would have been a further 65,000 residential 
connections by 1980.
Ironically it was as a consequence o f  the hugely increased demand that the Department of 
Posts and Telegraphs continued to pursue the geographically discriminatory policy o f 
charging advance rentals (thus undermining any commitment to universal service goals) 
throughout the period under review. Unable to satisfy with the increased demand, the 
advance rental was (as the Department admitted to the Dargan committee) ' designed to 
contain the enormous latent demand within manageable limits,” 131 focusing particularly 
on discouraging the costly and time-consuming connection o f rural applicants situated at a 
distance from the exchange.
127 Note: these figures are the decimal equivalents of the average annual wages in these years. 
CSO (1978), Statistical Abstract 1977. pp. 144-145.
128 CSO (1986), Statistical Abstract 1982-1985, pp. 155-157.
129 Litton, op. cit. p. 105.
130 Own calculations based on Appendices V and XXXI.
131 The Dargan Report, p. 17, para. 4.6.
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The developments in the economy during this period, however, had a second longer term 
impact on the development o f the service, which would prove particularly significant for 
the future o f  Irish universal service policy. The end o f protectionism, saw the state 
actively encourage export-oriented companies and inward investment in the form of 
foreign-owned companies establishing bases in Ireland. As noted in chapter three, the 
Industrial Development Authority was highly successful in both enterprises, especially in 
the aftermath o f Irish entry to the EEC in 1973 (since it provided companies based outside 
Europe with access to the European market), attracting export oriented overseas firms.
(As a consequence, by the late 1970s Ireland had, amongst OECD countries, the second 
highest dependence on exports and the highest on foreign direct investment relative to 
G D P.132) Yet the changing orientation o f the economy and the presence o f  overseas 
companies highlighted weaknesses in Irish infrastructure relative to the standards such 
companies were accustomed in their mother countries. A short-term result was that IDA 
and Department o f Posts and Telegraphs co-operation increased dramatically, to the 
extent that the latter organisation was at times virtually an ami o f the former, particularly 
with regard to the extension o f the automatic service.
In the longer term, however, the state accepted the analysis (put forward by the Dargan 
Report amongst others) that future economic development would rely on the prior 
existence o f a highly developed telecommunications system. As this research has 
previously argued, the telephone had been seen as a business instrument in Ireland since 
the inception o f the service in the 1870s, a perception which had gradually expanded to 
encompass the notion that the telephone system as a whole was an element o f the nation’s 
economic infrastructure from the 1920s and 1930s onwards. However, hitherto this had 
not been reflected in state investment in the telephone service which had justified what 
pro-active non-remunerative investment it had made on social grounds - most notably with 
the rural call box programme in the 1940s and 1950s and the rural kiosk programme in 
the early 1970s. Thus at the close o f the period under review a National Economic and 
Social Council report would criticise what it characterised as an ad hoc approach to 
infrastructure and “a tendency to avoid any precise planning o f infrastructural 
requirements in terms of. . . economic priorities.” 133
132 Ibid., p. 38.
133 Christopher D. Foster/NESC (1981), The Importance of Infrastructure to Industrial 
Development in Ireland: Road. Telecommunications ami Water Supply. (Dublin: Stationery 
Office), p. 79.
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It further argued that:
“W e suspect that in the event resources have been spread too thinly, so that the 
country has been able neither to solve the problems or urban congestion. . . nor to 
develop the smaller town and rural areas that can readily absorb new industry .” 134
The state’s decision to accept the Dargan R eport’s recommendation o f a vast development 
o f the national service, however, was to a  large extent based on precisely the logic that 
assumed that an advanced telecommunications infrastructure was a prerequisite for 
economic growth. Henceforth investment in telecommunications would be perceived as an 
investment in the nation’s economic future, and industrial development policy would 
increasingly come to dominate Irish telecommunications policy decisions. Although the 
full implications o f this for universal service did not become evident by the close of the 
1970s, the tone o f the NESC report was ominous in this regard:
“It is tempting to conclude that first-class telecommunications throughout Ireland 
is unequivocally desirable... (but) there must be priorities and it is not obvious 
that there is a commercial case for a first-class service in all areas o f the country, 
including the remotest ones. . . The likely outcome at present will be some 
compromise between lower standards and uneven coverage. . . There is therefore a 
strong case for concentrating the provision o f infrastructure for those with 
intensive requirements - roads, telecommunications and water - in limited areas, 
many o f  them probably urban. . . on resource grounds there is undoubtedly a 
strong case for concentrations at points within each county where the marginal 
development costs are least.” 135
Yet ironically the increasing industrial development orientation o f telephone service 
prompted the Department to question its social role and thus saw the beginnings o f a  more 
coherent understanding o f the question o f universal service (although the actual term itself 
remained alien to any Irish discussion). This is reflected in the ongoing discussion on the 
funding o f loss-making services, from Gerry Collins' querying o f the rationale for funding 
social services in 1972 (section 7.6 above), to that o f the Dargan report. Collins’ question 
coincided with the rural kiosk programme, an initiative which the Department explicitly
134 Ibid., p. 79.
135 Ibid., p. 81.
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stated had been undertaken for social reasons and would require subsidisation. Thus, what 
Collins asked was why an institution that was explicitly required to run its finances along 
commercial lines was expected to fund such a loss-making initiative. In short, he drew 
attention to the inherent contradiction, present since the beginning o f the state, between the 
Post Office’s social remit and its commercial one.
This was particularly significant for the telephone service which was becoming 
increasingly important for national economic development as a result o f  the changing 
orientation o f the economy. It simultaneously had an increasing social role responding 
both to social change but also to the fact that the development o f the telephone system 
itself made it possible to consider it a consumption norm, an object necessary to existing 
in a modem society. The increasing presence o f the telephone system hi national life, made 
it difficult to disguise the Departm ent’s schizophrenia with regard to whether the service 
was a commercial or a social one: the fudge that funded the rural kiosk programme would 
become more difficult to justify in the future. In consequence, the 1970s saw the state 
begin a  parallel pursuit o f  two different conceptions o f universal service, divided between 
those loss-making services offered for commercial reasons and those offered for social 
reasons.
The first strand o f the emerging universal service policy in the 1970s was that represented 
by the increasing extent o f  rate averaging. Although not a de ju re  reality at this point, 
such was the development o f the exchange system by the end o f  the 1970s that 99% o f the 
population would have lived within a free mileage area. As a result, it’s extremely likely 
that some cross-subsidisation o f high cost from low cost subscribers was occurring, hi 
effect this was perceived o f as a commercially sensible policy: rate averaging was a useful 
means o f  attracting customers in provincial areas without (in theory) incurring overall 
losses on the operation o f the system. The Dargan report, for example, made an explicit 
distinction between those services that “a public utility with general service obligations” 
was partially required to provide at ‘ prices below cost” 136 (i.e. rate averaging) and those 
services that the state required the service provider to provide on social grounds (free 
telephone rental for pensioners). The former services were considered normal common 
carriage obligations for a public utility: establishing the same price for rural customers for 
(from the customers perspective) the same service as their urban counterparts.
136 Ibid., para. 14.14, p. 89.
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Thus the report noted that:
“It is recognised that the privilege o f monopoly imposes obligations to take 'the 
rough with the smooth' in terms o f the degree o f profitability o f particular 
services.” 137
The working assumption remained, however, that such cross-subsidisation would not 
entail losses overall. In reality, then, in the case o f the Ireland during the 1970s the pursuit 
by the Post Office o f  a commercially-oriented policy meant that commercial 
considerations still played a part in shaping day-to-day interpretations o f  the extent to 
which universal service objectives would be fulfilled. Hence the need to reduce the 
telephone services losses during the 1970s required the retention o f  differential rental and 
advance rental rates for those living three miles beyond the nearest exchange. 
(Furthermore, as noted in section 7.6, it also led to the refusal o f the Post Office to 
connect subscribers living in very remote areas such as the Black Valley in Kerry.)
The Dargan report would also argue, however, that those services which were explicitly 
socially oriented should not be considered part o f the service obligations of the semi-state 
body that would replace the Telephone Section. Furthermore, argued the report, should the 
Government require that body to operate such services, “ it should be compensated 
specifically for so doing.” 138 The Department o f Social W elfare decision to subsidise free 
telephone rental for Old Age Pensioners from 1977 effectively embodied this 
recommendation, by placing the burden o f financing the scheme in the hands o f the 
Department o f Social W elfare. Unlike the Post Office this was funded from the central 
exchequer and by definition was not expected to be self-sustaining. This then constituted 
the second strand o f  Irish universal service policy by the close o f  the 1970s. The logic 
advanced for the scheme at the time o f its introduction was that it would facilitate the 
access o f  elderly people living alone to what was termed “a lifeline” .139 However, 
arguably the telephone had always been a lifeline. To understand the reason for the policy 
decision at this juncture one must consider factors beyond the telephone’s intrinsic 
functionality. At its most basic, the initial decision was, as part o f the most generous 
election manifesto in the history o f the state, a  piece o f naked electioneering. Nonetheless,
137 Ibid., para. 14.9, p 87.
138 Ibid., para. 14.9, p. 87.
139 Sean Moore, Fianna Fail T.D., DD 300, p. 38, 12/10/77.
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the decision to actually fulfil the electoral promise was shaped by a combination o f the 
factors already referred to above. Firstly the relatively few existing subscribers who would 
qualify for the scheme meant that the initial cost was likely to be minimal. Furthermore, 
the fact that the scheme did not pay for new connections meant that in an era o f advance 
rentals, the scheme was unlikely to generate an uncontrollable deluge o f applications. 
Finally, the perception pervading the Fianna Fail manifesto o f 1977 - that the levels o f 
growth and prosperity experienced during the previous 15 years were guaranteed for the 
foreseeable future - was apparently shared by the rest o f the population. Given this, and 
since the telephone was apparently well on the way to becoming a consumer durable, it 
seemed only reasonable that pensioners’ access to the technology should be aided in the 
same way that access to the television already was, via the free television licence.
In the longer term the free telephone rental scheme represented a  sea change in the 
perceived role o f the telephone. The social changes noted in the 1950s - ongoing 
urbanisation and the associated process o f suburbanisation - continued apace during the 
1960s and 1970s. The majority o f the Irish population lived in urban areas by 1971 and 
the bulk o f those new entrants lived in suburban estates. Such internal migration had 
social consequences, however, breaking up older communities in both rural and urban 
areas. A 1968 study o f those living in a new Dublin Corporation Housing estate noted not 
only complaints about the lack o f transport facilities and the distance from the nearest 
shops but also that the majority o f the newly arrived families had had less contact with 
their parents and extended families since moving.140 Thus, although there was no explicit 
statement justifying the introduction o f the free rental scheme, it can hardly have escaped 
the notice o f  those framing the scheme that, although the telephone would serve a critical 
emergency for old age pensioners living alone, this category also had much to gain in 
terms o f maintaining familial and friendship links, hi short, the telephone’s growing role 
as the “nervous system o f  society” was implicitly acknowledged by the 1977 decision, to 
fund the scheme not from within the Post Office’s own resources but directly from the 
Department o f Social Welfare.
In short, by the close o f the 1970s “universal service” had a dual meaning and practice: 
one commercially oriented, the other socially. This fact was reflected in how the two
140 Conor K. Ward (1968), “Living in a New Community: A Summary of Results of a Social 
Survey”, in The Journal o f  the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society o f  Ireland, Vol. XXII, Pail 
I, pp. 30-55.
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practices were funded, one by the service provider, the other by the state (via the 







The conclusions and recommendations o f the Dargan Report constituted the basis o f  Irish 
telecommunications policy at least until the mid-1980s, when control o f  the national 
telecommunications service was vested in a state-sponsored body, Telecom Eireann. 
Thereafter, successive governments took a back seat in telecommunications policy, leaving not 
ju st the day-to-day administration but general policy questions to the State-Sponsored Body. 
Actual governmental decision-making was generally limited to approving/disapproving price 
increases, although increasingly, (especially in the early 1990s) pricing became the 
predominant issue in telecommunications policy. The apparent willingness o f  Government to 
abdicate responsibility for telecommunications policy was if  anything encouraged by the 
emergence o f a coherent and increasingly comprehensive European Community 
telecommunications policy after the 1985 European Court o f Justice decision that 
telecommunications services were subject to general competition law. Thus increasingly, 
national policy was shaped by supra-national policy.
8.2 General Development 1980 - 1983
After the collapse o f the 1970s, the dawn o f the 1980s saw the telephone service’s key service 
indicators reach what would prove to be an all time low. The 100,000 applicants for service 
faced a waiting period o f 18 months. Meanwhile 10% o f existing subscribers were still 
connected to manual exchanges (although in recognition o f the relatively poor service they 
received such subscribers were exempted from charge increases introduced in July 1 1980).
Although by the start o f the 1980s measures were afoot that would finally eradicate the 
waiting list, in the interim the Department continued to attempt to suppress demand by 
increasing charges. The cost o f  connection trebled1 from 1980 to 1982 whilst the cost o f  the 
advance rental nearly doubled in the same period .2 As a result o f this, by 1982 an applicant
1 From £60 to £180. See "Post, phone charges up 20%" The Irish Times, 16/3/82..
2 By the end of 1979, residential customers were paying a rental of £58.12 per annum. This had 
increased to £101.28 by March 1982. See: Frank MacDonald, "20% increase in phone and post
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located more than three miles from the exchange faced the serious disincentive o f a bill o f in 
the region o f £980 to secure connection.3 This had the desired effect: in 1981, 20%  o f  those 
applicants offered service refused it when the initial payment became due.4
Given this state o f  affairs, the objective o f government policy with regard to 
telecommunications during the first half o f the 1980s was “to provide an efficient modern 
telecommunications service at the lowest possible cost, consistent with the need to achieve a 
reasonable return on capital employed.”5 The means was the detailed development blueprint 
offered by the Dargan Report which was put into effect between 1979 and 1984 by the £650 
million Accelerated Development Programme (ADP). The enormous scale o f the investment 
(equivalent to 2%  o f G NP6) during a period marked by substantial cuts in public expenditure 
indicated the perceived urgency o f the programme.7
Since there were very few areas left in the country where (technically at least) service 
provision was not already possible, geographical expansion o f the network was not a major 
issue for the A D P .8 The major aim was rather the overhaul and upgrading o f the existing 
network (including the digitisation o f all exchanges to allow a more diversified range of 
speech and data services) with a view to “removing once and for all the danger o f further 
congestion in our tim e.”9 As a result it would take several years before the effects o f  the ADP 
were appreciated. Albert Reynolds, then M inister for Posts and Telegraphs, noted in May 
1980 that:
charges announced", Irish Times, 6 July 1979 and "Post, phone charges up 20%" The Irish Times,
16 March 1982, respectively .
3 By March 1982 annual residential rental had risen to £101.28. "Post, phone charges up 20%" The 
Irish Times, 16/3/82.
4 DD 336, p. 1457, 23/6/82.
5 Government of Ireland, "The Way Forward: National Economic Plan 1983-1987", (Dublin: The 
Stationeiy Office, 1982), p. 91.
6 DD 328, p 3062, 14/5/81.
7 L.M. Cullen (1987), An Economic History of Ireland since 1660 (2nd Ed), (London: B.T. 
Batsford), p. 188.
8 Although areas such as the Black Valley in County Kerry, the subject of repeated Dail questions in 
the 1970s, remained cut off from the network by the surrounding topography until the late 1980s 
when radio telephony was introduced to the area. See Telecom Eireann, Report and Accounts for the 
year ended 29th March 1990, p. 22.
9 Albert Reynolds (specifically referring to the redesign of national trunk exchange infrastructure) 
DD 321, p 1233, 30/5/80.
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“The whole infrastructure o f the service, in terms o f  accommodation for both 
equipment and staff, telephone exchanges, trunk circuits, local cabling and the 
necessary skilled staff must first be built u p .” 10
Nonetheless progress on the ADP was swift from the outset: before the end o f 1980 work was 
either in progress or set to begin on 300 buildings or extensions, an improvement o f almost 
300% on the performance o f the previous three years. 11 Furthermore the programme 
remained largely on target throughout its duration. By June 1983 the following advances had 
been made:
The waiting list had been reduced from the 1980 high o f 90,000 to 60,000.
Roughly half o f those telephone subscribers with manual service at the beginning o f the 
ADP, had been connected to automatic exchanges, although this still m eant that 5 per cent 
o f all subscribers would have only manual service.12
All Irish exchange areas received an STD service to Northern Ireland by the close o f 1982 
and to all o f  Britain by m id-1983.13
The failure rate on trunk calls (at 40 per cent in 1980) was halved to 20 per cent and was 
expected to reach the final target o f  4 per cent by 1984. The failure rate on the local 
automatic service on the other hand reached its target figure o f 2 per cent by 1983, a year 
ahead o f schedule.14
As the focus o f national congestion, the Dublin area remained problematic throughout the 
ADP: whilst every other engineering district had achieved at least 80% o f their connection 
target by November 1981, Dublin had reached only 56%.
10DD321, p 1238 30/5/80. .
11 Albert Reynolds, DD 321, p 1231, 30/5/80.
12 DD 344, p. 1984,6/7/84.
13 DD 344, p 1984, 6/7/83.
14 Jim Mitchell, Minister for Posts and Telegraphs. DD 344, p. 1985. 6/7/83.
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Table 8.1: Targeted and Actual connection rate 1981









W aterford 6,500 5,337
(Source: DD 331, p 1425, 9/12/81)
The main problem was the difficulty in acquiring space for buildings for house exchanges and 
staff. Thus by 1983, Dublin, where the “progress made so far has been much less spectacular 
than in most districts,” 15 remained “the main area o f  concern with regard the progress o f  the 
program me.” 16 It was M arch 1984 before the exchanges necessary to deal with the capital's 
telecommunications congestion started to come on stream .17
8.2.1 1983 Postal and Telecommunication Services Bill
The Dargan Report had not simply recommended that the ADP but also that the telephone and 
postal services be placed in the hands o f a statutory company. After the initial issuing o f a 
Green Paper on Posts and Telecommunications in M ay 15 1980, the collapse o f  three 
governments in an 18-month period conspired to delay first the introduction and eventually the 
final vote on the bill. Thus it was July 1983 before the bill was finally passed under a Fine 
Gael/Labour coalition.
15 DD 344, p. 1984, 6/7/83.
16 DD 344, p. 1984, 6/7/83.
17 Jim Mitchell. DD 349, p. 770, 29/3/1984.
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The enormous scale o f  the debate renders any attem pt to cover it in its entirety impossible.18 
Both m ajor parties (Fianna Fail and Fine Gael) agreed that the broad administrative change 
embodied in the bill - that the operation o f the postal and telecommunications services be 
placed in the hands o f state-sponsored bodies - was the most effective method o f  improving 
the quality o f the service.19 There was thus little chance that the minority Fianna Fail 
government would be defeated on the issue. The most interesting discussions, however, 
occurred during the bill's protracted committee stage, the following year, when a  new Fine 
Gael/Labour coalition was in power. That over 150 amendments to the act were tabled 
reflects the level o f disagreement and debate on the implications o f the change in status for the 
telephone service, its staff and its subscribers. Broadly speaking, the main debates and their 
conclusions were as follows:
(i) Functions o f Bord Telecom Eireann - see Section 8.7 below
(ii) Position o f staff: since the transfer o f the postal and telecommunications services to the 
semi-state sector would effectively remove 30,000 employees from the Civil Service, much o f 
the debate was taken up with deputies expressing their concern that the job security and 
pension rights that accrued to the P& T employees as Civil Servants would be lost. However, 
as eventually passed, the Act stated that the position o f An Post and Bord Telecom Eireann 
workers would be precisely that which had prevailed in the Department o f Posts and 
Telegraphs.
(iii) Privatization: a major concern, largely expressed by the left-of-centre parties, was that the 
Bill was a  cover for a planned privatization o f the company,20 since the act technically 
permitted the M inister for Finance to authorise the “issuance” (sale) o f the shares o f both An 
Post and Telecom Eireann (the new postal and telecommunications bodies). Such concerns 
were mollified, however, by deletion o f the words “unless the Minister, with the consent o f the
18 Quite apart from the sheer length of time il took for the Bill to progress through the House there 
were some 150 amendments made to the bill. DD 344, p 1953, 6/7/83.
19 See for example DD 344, pp. 1516-1517, 15/6/83
20 For example: "It is my contention that this is the first stage in the hiving off of profitable sections 
of the public sector and dismantling all non-viable areas assessed purely on an economic basis rather 
than on their social content." J. Ryan, DD 336, p. 1211, 22/6/82.
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M inister for Finance, has authorised such issue”21 after the following sentence in Section 21 
o f the act:
“N o issue o f  share capital shall be made other than those referred to in sections 18,
19, 29 and 3 1.”22
As a consequence even a  partial privatization o f the new company would require the Dail to 
approve a change m legislation.
(iv) Public accountability o f the company: since, as a semi-state body, Telecom Eircann 
would no longer be under the day-to-day control o f  the M inister for Posts and Telegraphs, 
concern was expressed that the new body would not be publicly accountable. As a response, 
the Act created two new Councils for those availing o f the services o f An Post and Bord 
Telecom Eireann. Both were given wide-ranging ambits but since their major role was to offer 
advice on service proposals referred to them by the Minister, neither had any independent 
power to wield. Thus their effectiveness was dependent on the willingness o f  a given Minister 
for Posts and Telegraphs to seek, accept and act upon their counsel. Unlike a regulator the 
Users Councils had no proactive powers.
(v) Question o f Bord Telecom Eireann's debt burden: by the close o f 1982, £985 million o f the 
telephone service’s total assets o f £1.480 million effectively represented loans. Technically, 
placing the full value o f the telephones services assets into the hands o f Telecom Eireann, 
would have given the company what was considered a reasonable debt-equity ratio o f 2 :1. 
However, in anticipation o f a continuing need for heavy capital investment combined with the 
expectation that it would take some time for the company to enter into profitability (estimates 
varied from 3 to 5 years), the Act transferred to Telecom Eireann all the debt-free assets but 
only half (£355 million) o f the debt-assets, effectively giving it a debt-equity ratio o f 1:1.35.
21 DD 344, p. 1948, 6/7/83.
22 Postal and Telecommunications Seivices Act, 1983, Section 21. The other sections referred to 
provided for the issuance of shares to the Minister for Finance and Minister for Posts and 
Telegraphs.
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This remained, however, a very substantial debt burden which would prove to be a 
determining influence on the company during its first decade o f  operations.
8.3 General Development 1984-1989
Following the transfer o f the telephone service to Telecom Eireann on January 1st 1984, the 
ADP continued apace largely achieving its m ajor targets by the end o f  the year. The total 
number o f  subscribers had risen from 436,000 in 197 923 to 664,00024 by April 1985, a  50% 
increase. Furthermore, by April 1985, 96.8%25 o f the subscribers were connected to 
automatic exchanges, up from approximately 90% in 1980.26
By M arch 1985, the waiting list which five years earlier had peaked at just under 100,000 
with an average period o f 18 months between application and connection had dropped to 
40,000,27 whilst telephone service was “freely available over most o f the country'” with the 
exceptions o f  parts o f Dublin and Sligo. Despite these improvements, the company faced a 
financial deficit o f £82 million after the first 15 months o f operation .28 This was compounded 
by an increase m company debt to finance the £220 million spent on capital development in 
the 15 months up to April 1985.29 As the company's total debt neared £1 billion, its finances 
became increasingly vulnerable to interest rates changes and movements in currency exchange 
markets (since much o f the borrowing had been sourced from overseas). Just under a  quarter 
o f the company's current expenditure (£136 million30) went on servicing debt in its first 15 
months o f  operation.
Faced with this financial position, the company sought to increase revenue and reduce costs 
by expanding the customer base “as quickly as possible so as to increase the utilisation o f our
23 CSO Statistical Abstracts 1980, p. 332.
24 Telecom Eireann 1st Report & Accounts for the period ended 4th April 1985. P. 14.
25 Telecom Eireann 1st Report & Accounts for the period ended 4th April 1985.
26 "Some 10 per cent of subscribers...are served by nearly 500 manual exchanges." Albert Reynolds, 
DD 321, p. 1239, 30/5/80.
27 Telecom Eireann Annual Report and Accounts for the year ended 4th April 1985.
28 Telecom Eireann Annual Report and Accounts for the period ended 4th April 1985, p. 7.
29 Telecom Eireann Annual Report and Accounts for the period ended 4th April 1985, p. 9.
30 Telecom Eireann Annual Report and Accounts for the period ended 4th April 1985, p .13.
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existing assets and generate extra revenue” whilst reducing staffing costs. The company thus 
set itself the following targets in its first five year plan:
- six per cent growth per annum in telephone lines
- a  household penetration rate o f 60 per cent by 1988/89
- break-even on profit/loss account by 1987/88
- to be self-financing (i.e. not borrowing) 75 per cent o f capital expenditure by
1988/89.
Telecom's progress was remarkable. Only in 1985/86 was the growth in telephone lines less 
than 6%, increasing the number o f main subscriber lines from 667,267 in 1984 to 856,000 by 
1989. The effective disappearance o f the waiting list was complemented by a marked increase 
in the average connection period which fell to six to eight weeks. Household penetration, at 
48%  in M arch 1985 reached 60% on schedule. Furthermore, the Black Valley in Kerry, 
previously considered unreachable by the Department o f Posts and Telegraphs finally received 
a public kiosk in 1984 (although it was a  further six years before Telecom provided the multi­
access subscriber radio systems that would permit residents o f the valley to receive service in 
their homes31). However, against this, for a period in the late 1980s, there remained categories 
o f applicant from whom Telecom Eireami refused to even consider an application. Deputies 
complained (to no avail) in June 1988 that Telecom was providing no new services “to houses 
more than 0.5 kilometres from an existing telegraph pole.”32
The company recorded its first profit o f £17 million in 1987/88. Furthermore, not merely was 
the company entirely self-financing by 1989 but it reduced its debt by some £40 million the 
same year. Less fanfare greeted a more dubious (yet crucial from the point o f  view o f the 
company’s finances) achievement - the reduction o f staff numbers from 17,260 in March 
1985 to 14,270 by M arch 1989.
The same period saw the company introduce a series o f new services, largely aimed at the 
business user: EfRPAC, a Public Packet-Switched D ata Network (1985); Eircell, Telecom’s
31 Telecom Eireann Annual Report and Accounts for the period ended 4th April 1985, p. 24.
32 DD 382, p. 1934, 28/6/88.
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m obile services provider (1985), E irpage, a  paging service in co-operation  with M otorola 
(1988). Furtherm ore, the application o f  radio telephony technology w ould finally see a  long­
standing problem  - the connection o f  the B lack Valley area  in K erry  - perm anently  solved.33
Overall then, Telecom  E ireann succeeded in transform ing the im age o f  the national 
telecom m unications service in scarcely h a lf  a decade. An Irish Times editorial in June 1989 
found it “hard  to  disagree w ith”34 chairm an M ichael Sm urfit's 1989 assessm ent o f  the 
com pany's previous five years, tha t it had “come through in fa r  better shape and with m uch 
better p rospects than  m any w ould have considered possible when we started  o u t.”35
8.4  G eneral D evelopm ent 1990 - 1993
The years 1990 to  1993 represented not m erely a consolidation o f  the success o f  the previous 
h a lf  decade bu t a  substantial advance. Between 1990 and 1993, new subscriber lines 
increased by an  average o f  11%  p er annum  from  916,000 in M arch  1990 to 1.17 m illion in 
M arch 1994. By 1993 tw o-thirds o f  all subscribers w ere residential, w hilst the level o f  
household penetration increased from  64 telephones per 100 hom es in 1990 to 75 per 100 by 
M arch 1994. The w aiting list, already dow n to 6,000 by M arch  1990 effectively vanished 
during 1992. M eanw hile a t com pany level, the prim ary policy goal o f  deb t reduction w as 
facilitated by successive profits o f  around £90 million betw een 1990 and 1993.
The key developm ents then in the early 1990s did not occur w ith respect to the national 
in frastructure  but in the political econom ic environm ent in w hich T elecom  E ireann operated: 
specifically the  increasing influence o f  European telecom m unications legislation and the 
related issues o f  the introduction o f  com petition and the privatization  o f  Telecom  Eireann.
Ireland’s m creasingly neo-liberal political econom ic environm ent com bined w ith T elecom ’s 
im proving financial fortunes through the 1980s and early  1990s ensured that the possible 
privatization  o f  the com pany becam e an issue for public debate. C om pany chairm an, M ichael 
Sm urfit, w as also a  vocal advocate o f  such a  move, opining in June 1988 tha t “ it w as a
33 Telecom Eireann, Report and Acconnls for the year ended 29th March 1990, p. 22.
34 "Telecom's Success." Editorial. Irish Times. 13 June 1989.
35 Telecom Eireann Report & Accounts for the year ended 30th March 1989, p 8
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question not o f  i f  bu t o f  when the G overnm ent decided to p riva tise .”36 Successive 
governm ents between 1988 and 1991 were, however, careful to  distance them selves from 
Sm urfit’s rem arks, stressing th a t Sm urfit's view  w as purely  a  private  one w hich did not 
“ reflect the  G overnm ent's v iew .”37
In 1988 Telecom  E ireann com m issioned a private report on its ow n privatization , w ithout 
consulting then M inister fo r C om m unications, R ay B urke who rem ained unaw are o f  it until 
June 1991 w hen Telecom  presented it to B urke’s successor, Seam us B rennan. A pparently  
open to  the idea, the D epartm ent requested tha t any follow -up report should address the key 
issues ignored by the first one: the regulatory environm ent in the  w ake o f  a privatization, and 
the effect o f  international com petition on privatization. M om entum  tow ards privatization 
appeared  to  gather fu rther pace follow ing Telecom ’s com m issioning o f  a  fu rther report in 
A ugust 1991, w hich M inister Brennan conceded m ight lead to  legislation.38
A t tins point how ever an unrelated issue - a controversial purchase  o f  land by Telecom  
E ireann - caused B rennan to  order the suspension o f  w ork on the new report. Denying any 
w rongdoing on his part, M ichael Sm urfit nonetheless resigned, rem oving one o f  the key 
figures pushing for privatization. Sm urfit's im m ediate successor, B rendan Hynes w as equally 
favourably  disposed tow ards privatization, however. B ut H ynes w as not to last long in the 
job: in July 1992, the new M inister fo r C om m unications, M aire G eoghegan-Q uinn requested 
his resignation, citing a break-dow n in co-operation betw een the chairm an and the board  o f  
the com pany. In  the absence o f  a  definitive account, it w as publicly  speculated  that the break­
down occurred as a result o f  H ynes' determ ination to  see the com pany privatised. Hynes 
publicly  com plained th a t the com pany w as in general unprepared  fo r the advent o f  
com petition which, although the actual E uropean Council o f  Telecom m unications M in is te rs’ 
announcem ent o f  full com petition in the critical voice telephony m arket w as still a year aw ay, 
w as assum ed to  be inevitable a t this point.
The th rea t o f  com petition had em erged as a  result o f  tw o factors. Telecom  C hairm an M ichael 
Sm urfit noted in the com pany’s second annual report in 1986 tha t “ C om petition on
36 "Local call time charges inevitable", Irish Times, 29 June 1988.
37 Ray Burke, DD 401, p. 456, 5/7/90.
38 Quoted by Brennan himself in DD 412, p. 28, 5/11/91.
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international public telecom m unications routes w as already a  rea lity”39 when Telecom  
E ireann com m enced operations in 1984. Four years later, how ever, Sm urfit pointed to  the 
inevitability o f  the liberalization o f  the Irish m arket as a result o f  “new teclinologies, 
international trends and  European Community requirem ents ,”40 (Italics added) Limited 
com petition in the provision o f  some term inal equipm ent had been a  fac t o f  the Irish m arket 
since the 1983 Postal and Telecom m unication Act. T o  that extent then, Irish 
telecom m unications policy w as ahead o f  the gam e w hen the EU 's critical G reen P aper on 
Telecom m unications Policy appeared in M ay 1987, stressing the virtues o f  “ liberalizing” 
European telecom m unications m arkets. A lthough the 1987 G reen P aper on 
Telecom m unications had m ade it clear that the EU  w ould begin to  press fo r m ore com petition 
within national telecom m unications m arkets, tw o 1990 directives w ere particu larly  effective in 
realizing the G reen P ap e r’s m arket-driven philosophy: the Services D irective41 and the O pen 
N etw ork Provision (O N P) Fram ew ork D irective.42 The O N P directive targeted  three 
perceived blocks to  com petition:
“the potential existence o f  barriers to  system s in teroperability  across national 
boundaries; second the privileged position o f  telecom m unications adm inistrations 
(TA s), preventing 'fa ir trade' rules from  applying in a  stra teg ic  m arket segm ent; third, 
the resulting unacceptable variations in ta r if f  policies fo r telecom m unications services 
and  consequent lim itations in consum er choice.”43
The Services D irective w ent even further in the direction o f  liberalization, requiring the 
abolition o f  all P T T  m onopoly rights bar the provision o f  voice telephony services and 
netw ork infrastructure. A s one com m entator pointed out as early  as 1991 :
39 Telecom Eireann (1986), Report and Accounts for [lie year ended 3ld April ¡986. p 10
40 Telecom Eireann (1988), Report and Accounts for the year ended 31st March 1988. p. 10
41 Commission Directive of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecommunications 
services, 90/388/EEC.
42 Council Directive of 28 June 1990 on the establishment of the internal market for 
telecommunication services through the implementation of open network provision, 90/387/EEC.
43 Delcourt, Bernard, "EC Decisions and Directives on information technology and 
telecommunications." Telecommunications Policy, Feb. 1991, p. 16.
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“there is clearly an irreversible trend tow ards the break-up o f  m onopolies and the 
progressive liberalization o f  the telecom m unications services m arket. The question 
today is not w hether but when changes will take p lace .”44
Com petition w as in any case increasingly the norm on international routes. In Telecom  
E ireann’s 1990 A nnual R eport, M ichael Sm urfit noted th a t a com bination o f  m arket forces, 
continuing technological advances and “political developm ents favouring com petitive 
m arkets”45 prom ised a  com plete transform ation  o f  the com pany’s operating environm ent.
“The new environm ent will be characterised by developing com petition, continuous 
change and w ider consum er choice, resulting in g reater challenges and increased 
uncertain ty  fo r service providers.”46
A year later the 1991 Telecom  E ireann annual report noted “clear evidence during the year o f  
the acceleration o f  com petitive p ressu res.”47 Pointing out tha t the im pact o f  com petition had  
thus fa r  been m ost pronounced in the international service, chairm an M ichael Sm urfit w arned 
that it w ould be “ increasingly felt also in the dom estic service.”48 Em ployer and industry 
lobby groups had com plained since the 1980s that, despite the reductions introduced by 
Telecom , Irish international rates rem ained “significantly  higher than in o ther EC 
countries.”49 In January  1992, the Confederation o f  Irish Industry  dem anded tha t Telecom  
Eireann redress w hat the CII characterised  as the “cross-subsidization  from  international 
callers to those m aking dom estic calls.”50 Furtherm ore the developm ent o f  sophisticated  call 
back technologies m eant th a t de facto , Irish com panies were already bypassing the Telecom  
E ireann netw ork international calls by 1992.51 By 1992 international com petition threatened a 
“severe financial c runch”,52 as Telecom 's share o f  international traffic  w hich had  stood a t
44 Delcourt, Bernard, "EC Decisions and Directives on information technology and 
telecommunications." Telecommunications Policy, Feb. 1991, p. 19.
45 Telecom Eireann Annual Report for the Year Ended 29 March 1990. p. 8.
46 Telecom Eireann Annual Report for the Year Ended 29 March 1990, p. 8.
47 Telecom Eireann Annual Report for the Year Ended 4th April 1991. p. 4.
48 Telecom Eireann Annual Report for the Year Ended 4th April 1991, p. 8.
49 John McGee, “Shifting Charges”, Business and Finance 10/12/92.
50 “Telecom Cuts its Rates” , Business and Finance 9/1/92.
51 Gail Seekamp, “California computer makes for cheap calls”, Sunday Business Post 26/7/92.
52 "Telecom faces Financial Crunch" Business and Finance Magazine, p. 1, 30/7/92.
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39%  in 1988 dropped to  37%  by m id 1992. P lanning s ta ff  estim ates quoted (leaked) to the 
national p ress53 predicted  a  continuing decline in m arket share over the following three to  four 
years down to 30% . T h a t Telecom  w as vulnerable to  any com petition in this m arket is clear 
from  the fac t th a t by 1992 its top 100 custom ers accounted fo r 23%  o f  its international 
revenues. A s one com m entator pointed out: “foreign com petitors could thus challenge 
Telecom  for a  large proportion  o f  its international business by targeting  a relatively small 
num ber o f  firm s.”54
N o r w as com petition lim ited to  foreign com panies. In D ecem ber 1992, the D epartm ent o f  
Com m unications licensed an Irish based consortium  E S A T  Telecom  to lease lines from  
Telecom  E ireann w ith a  view  to com peting in the long distance business calls m arket.55 
Follow ing pro tracted  negotiations on the cost o f  leasing lines from  Telecom , E S A T  finally 
secured its first custom er in O ctober 1993.56
T he final nail w as driven into the coffin o f  T elecom 's exclusive privilege o f  the Irish voice 
telephony m arket in M ay 1993 when the EC Council o f  Telecom m unications M inisters 
approved plans to  liberalize the key voice telephony m arket by 1998. Im m ediately the Irish 
Com m unications M inister, B rian  Cow an, m ade an (ultim ately successful) request fo r a 
derogation o f  up to five years to allow  Telecom  E ireann tim e to “ im prove the national 
netw orks before the full rigours o f  com petition are faced .”57
The increasing com petitive pressures w ere cited as the reason fo r the increase in the pace o f  
price “ rebalancing” from  1991. T hroughout the 1980s, Telecom  had progressively reduced the 
cost o f  international calls as part o f  a  program m e o f  “rebalancing”, yet this had occurred 
w ithout a  concom itant increase in local call charges (except as p a rt o f  tw o general rounds o f  
price increases in 1985 and  1986). Ray B urke noted in 1988:
53 "Telecom faces Financial Crunch" Business and Finance Magazine, p. 1, 30/7/92.
54 "Telecom faces Financial Crunch" Business and Finance Magazine, p. 1, 30/7/92.
55 Douglas Dalby "Business Communicator" Irish Times, 26 Mar 1993.
56 ACT Kindle, a software company. "O'Brien targets the home phone market" Irish Times 22 Oct 
1993
57 Joe Carroll, "Telecom revolution is on the line and cannot be kept on hold" Irish Times 15 May 
1993.
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“Telecom  Eireann, in the current corporate plan, are engaged on a  program m e o f 
rebalancing the charge structure which they inherited in 1984 w ith a  view  to reducing 
international changes and so im proving their com petitiveness on key rou tes.”58
Since “ rebalancing” apparently  referred only to  the reduction o f  international call charges, the 
term  w as not considered problem atic. H ow ever as Telecom  E ireann entered the 1990s, the 
practical application o f  “ rebalancing” changed to m ean increasing the cost o f  local calls w hilst 
reducing the cost o f  international ones, w ith a  view  to satisfy ing the call in the ON P 
Fram ew ork D irective to relate call charges to costs. The first significant alteration  in charging 
patterns em erged in 1991 w hen Telecom  put forw ard a  package o f  changes proposing the 
reduction o f  trunk  call charges, cellular phone charges, and  the expansion o f  provincial local 
call areas. (The last proposal w as prom pted by T elecom ’s observation  that the group charge 
areas established under the K am erbeek R eport “did not reflect developm ents w hich had taken 
place in technology in the interim  or the consequent cost reductions” : the net result o f  the 
expansion w as to  enorm ously increase the local call access a rea  in the m ore sparsely 
populated w estern counties.59 ) A t the sam e tim e local call tim ing was introduced: w hereas 
previously 12 pence paid  fo r a  phone call o f  (in theory) infinite length, this w as reduced to  15 
m inutes after 1991.60 The m ove attracted  relatively little adverse com m ent largely because the 
initial unit length - 15 m inutes - w as considered am ple to com plete the vast m ajority  o f  calls.
Such w as not case, how ever, w ith the announcem ent in M ay 1993 o f  the m ost substantial 
changes in charging policy since the early 1980s. The new  charges prom pted w hat w as 
unquestionably the grea test level o f  public com plaint faced by Telecom  E iieann  in ten years o f  
service, despite the fac t th a t it w as estim ated th a t the price package introduced w ould actually  
cost the com pany £15 m illion.61 A lthough a  package o f  m easures w as introduced, including 
the expansion o f  local calling areas and the reduction o f  international and trunk  call tariffs, it 
w as the reduction o f  the local call unit length to  3 m inutes (20%  o f  its duration hitherto) that 
w as the focus o f  com plaint. The perception w as that, as a  result, dom estic users in particu lar 
w ould face a  500%  increase in their phone bill. In point o f  fact, official estim ates o f  the actual
58 DD 379, p. 2534, 28/4/88.
59 Geraldine Kennedy “Telecom plans sent to Burke last August’', Irish Times 23/2/91.
60 Seamus Brennan, M inister for Communications: DD 406. p. 1522, 20/3/91.
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effect on different user categories varied betw een a  1% to 4%  increase on residential bills and 
a  7%  to 8%  reduction on those faced by business users.62 N onetheless the fac t tha t the new 
charging structures clearly  favoured business users over dom estic custom ers prom pted the 
accusation th a t the  la tter group were subsidising the form er.
T hroughout the debate on the increases the governm ent consistently  argued tha t the changes in 
the ta r if f  struc tu re  had been m ade unavoidable as a result o f  the increased com petition faced 
by Telecom  E ireann on its international routes and by the EU drive tow ards m ore cost- 
oriented tariffs. F ianna Fail TD , Noel T reacy  argued tha t it w as im possible to:
“expect Telecom  Eireann to  com pete i f  it m ust subsidize dom estic local calls w ith 
profits from  international calls w hile its com petitors do not offer such a  service and 
have no such obligation.”63
To w hich M inister for Social W elfare, Joan B urton added: “EC policies and directives in the 
a rea o f  telecom m unications all point to the need to have charges based on objective c rite ria .”64 
U ltim ately the governm ent’s line o f  argum ent concluded that i f  the changes w ere not 
introduced, th a t Telecom  E ireann w ould reach a point where:
“there w ould be insufficient revenue from  international calls to subsidize local calls, 
w hich w ould then have to  increase. This w ould not be in the interests o f  the consum er, 
Telecom  E ireann or the nation. Q uite sim ply w e have to  act before this o ccu rs.” 65
Thus it w as suggested th a t international calls w ould continue to subsidize local calls bu t that 
the extent o f  cross-subsidy would be reduced. H ow ever, neither the M inister fo r 
C om m unications nor Telecom  E ireann itse lf offered any concrete figures to  suggest w hat the 
scale o f  cross-subsidy w ould be thereafter.
61 Damien Kiberd “Telecom makes £15 million gift to consumer” The Sunday Business Post 
22/8/93.
62 Telecom Eireann (1993), Annual Reports and Accounts for year ended l 51 April 1993. p. 10. See 
also Brian Cowan, M inister for Communications. DD 430, p. 1570, 12/5/93.
63 DD 430, p. 253, 19/5/93.
64 DD 430, p. 224, 19/5/93
65 DD 430, p. 1571, 12/5/93.
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Such w as the scale o f  the public response, how ever, tha t it becam e politically  im possible for 
the governm ent to  ignore. Thus in Septem ber 1993, the governm ent announced the 
establishm ent o f  the Telephone U sers’ A dvisory C ouncil, the prim ary  function o f  w hich would 
be to m onitor the operation and im pact o f  the new tariff. It lacked, how ever, any sta tu tory  or 
legislative pow ers: in effect its im pact w ould depend on the w illingness o f  individual M inisters 
for Com m unication to  accept its recom m endations. In addition to  the estab lishm ent o f  
A dvisory G roup, the  D epartm ent o f  Social W elfare announced tha t those subscribers in 
receipt o f  free telephone rental w ould henceforth also receive 20 free call units (60 m inutes o f  
peak tim e local calls) every tw o m onths.66 Finally  Telecom  E ireann them selves established a 
£500,000 fund to  establish lim ited freephone facilities fo r eight charity  organisations including 
the Sam aritans, Childline and the R ape C risis Centre. 67Since the basic  changes to  the 
charging structures rem ained intact, however, the concessions w ere considered “ irrelevant”68 
by consum er groups. N onetheless the new  ta r if f  structure  w ould rem ain in place.
8.5 C onception o f  the Telephone
The shift observed in  the 1960s and 1970s from  the view  tha t the telephone w as sim ply a  tool 
o f  com m erce tow ards a perception that it w as an essential in frastructure  requirem ent for 
national econom ic developm ent i f  anything increased in the 1980s and 1990s. The 
internationalisation o f  the Irish  econom y, brought abou t in part by the ongoing ID A  pursu it o f  
em ploym ent creation through the wooing o f  foreign firm s to Ireland, created an ever m ore 
open econom y. This had rendered :
“any deficiencies in physical and social infrastructure... m ore evident, because 
in frastructure  is now  readily com pared...w ith w hat is available in o ther countries.”69
T hat national econom ic success depended on an  efficient telecom m unications service was 
sim ply no t up for debate in the 1980s. M ark  Killilea, M inister o f  S tate fo r Posts and




Telegraphs, com m ented in 1981 that “an efficient and developed telecom m unications service 
is an  essential ad junct to  the industrial developm ent.”70 Successive governm ent policy 
docum ents on national developm ent in the 1980s and 1990s devoted extensive space to  the 
sam e assertion. In  July 1981, a  N ational Econom ic and Social C ouncil (N E SC ) report 
noted:71
“Ireland 's general need fo r developm ent o f  good telecom m unications in line with 
developm ent o f  the econom y is reinforced by its high dependence on exports and on 
direct foreign investm ent (relative to  G N P )...B oth  place a  prem ium  on the efficient 
and rapidly hauling (sic) o f  inform ation not only w ithin Ireland bu t also between 
Ireland and the rest o f  the w orld .”72
Sim ilarly the  W hite P aper on Investm ent and N ational D evelopm ent 1979 - 1983 stressed that 
in an open and  relatively isolated economy such as Ireland's “ it is essential d ia t the 
telecom m unications service a t least m atches tha t available to  our com petito rs.”73 Furtherm ore 
the collapse o f  the dom estic m anufacturing base in the 1970s and  1980s as com petition from  
other E E C  nations increased saw  in frastructu re  singled out as critical to  im proving the 
com petitiveness o f  Irish industry vis-à-vis the rest o f  the EEC. T hus the N ational Planning 
Board 's A pril 1984 docum ent “Proposals fo r Plan 1984-1987” stressed the need to  bring 
telecom m unications prices down to the level prevailing in the rest o f  the EEC  “w ithin a  period 
o f  not m ore than  four years. ”74
B y the end o f  the 1980s, the tu rnaround in the telephone service effected by Telecom  Eireann 
had sufficiently eased problem s w ith the quality  o f  the service tha t in M ay 1988, R ay Burke 
noted th a t the standard  o f  service “has been im proved to such a  degree that it is now  a  m ajor 
contributory  fac to r to  presen t day successes in w ooing foreign firm s to  our shores.”75
69 The Importance of Infrastructure to Industrial Development in Ireland NESC No. 59, July 1981,
p. 1.
70 DD 328, p 3061, 14/5/81.
71 The Importance of Infrastructure to Industrial Development in Ireland NESC No. 59, July 1981.
72 Ibid., p. 38.
73 White Paper on Investment and National Development 1979 - 1983 - Laid by the Government 
before each House of the Oireachtas, January 1980. pp. 5 0 -5 1 .
74 Ibid., p. 118.
75 DD 380, p. 2385, 24/5/88.
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N onetheless national developm ent plans continued to stress the im portance o f  
telecom m unications to  overcom m g w hat it w as argued w ere m ajor cost disadvantages faced 
by Irish industry due to  its peripheral and island location. The “N ational D evelopm ent Plan 
1989 -  1993” , draw n up to request E uropean S tructural Funding noted th a t notw ithstanding 
the £1.46 billion invested in the m odernisation and developm ent o f  the telecom m unications 
service since 1980 that:
“ .. .com pared  w ith m ost M em ber States o f  the C om m unity, the level o f  
telecom m unications developm ent rem ains lo w .. The cost o f  developing the 
telecom m unications service is very high in Ireland due to  the low  population density 
and, in particu lar, to  the low  urbanisation  ratio, which reduces econom ies o f  scale. 
T he high developm ent costs are reflected in relatively high prices to custom ers, which 
reduce national com petitiveness and slow  the rate o f  telecom m unications grow th. A 
national priority , therefore, m ust be to  reduce the cost o f  telecom m unications services, 
while enhancing their range and quality .”76
The perceived im portance o f  telecom m unications to  industry w as i f  anything increased by the 
ID A  decision in the  early 1990s to prom ote Ireland as an international base fo r teleservices 
operations, an  industry w hich it argued exhibited strong em ploym ent grow th potential 77 Thus 
w hilst T elecom  E ireann justified  the 1993 price changes on the grounds o f  the need to “give 
Irish  business a  com petitive edge in international m arkets and to m ake Ireland a  m ore 
attractive location for overseas com panies” , it also referred to the need to  “ increase 
telem arketing activity  - the sale o f  goods and services by telephone.”78 The sam e rationale for 
1993 charge increase w as advanced by M inister B rian Cow an during the Dail debate on the 
1993 changes:
76 National Development Plan 1989 - 1993. Submitted to the European Commission on 22 March 
1989. P. 22.
77 "Eveiywhere, world-wide significant employment growth is foreseen in sen'ice industries. These 
industries depend for their life blood on the availability of the communications facilities of the 
highest quality. In many instances the quality and cost of communications facilities is the key factor 
in the decision-making process affecting the location of industrial activity. In this dynamic and cut­
throat environment top class Irish communications facilities are essential if  the Government are to 
achieve their job creation targets." Ray Burke, DD 381, pp. 502-503, 27/5/88.
78 Telecom Eireann (1993), Annual Report and Accounts for year ended 1 April 1993. p. 10.
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“T he im portance o f  com petitive international telephone charges to  job creation  and 
retention cannot be overstressed ... M o re than 2,000 back office jo b s  have been 
created  in Ire lan d ... I understand th a t the ID A  estim ates that there is the potential for 
the creation o f  1,000 to  2 ,000 jo b s per annum  in this a rea  i f  the conditions are  right in 
the nature o f  telecom m unications services and prices.”79
U ltim ately then the s ta rt o f  the 1990s saw  telecom m unications not only rem ain a  prerequisite 
for national econom ic grow th, but actually  constitu te a  substantial p a rt o f  th a t grow th.
Y et while national and supranational bodies stressed the role o f  telecom m unications in 
econom ic developm ent, in the D ail itse lf there w as a  grow ing body o f  opinion throughout the 
period under review  tha t the telephone’s social function was an equally  im portan t function. 
Fine Gael TD , John Kelly characterised  it as a  consum ption norm  essential for m odern day 
living:
“ ...one is as dependent in the late 20th  century on posts and telegraphs as one is on 
every public service...It is no use telling som ebody not to use the postal service or 
telephone. People m ust use them. Only herm its or m em bers o f  enclosed orders...are  in 
the situation o f  not being dependent on these services.”80
This conception w as reflected in the Postal and Telecom m unications Services Bill 1982, 
Section 14 o f  w hich defined the objectives o f  Telecom  E ireann as m eeting "the industrial, 
com m ercial, and social needs o f  the country fo r efficient telecom m unications services, and, to 
satisfy  all reasonable dem ands th roughou t the country .”81 (Italics added) In the Dail debates 
tha t follow ed the introduction o f  the Bill, som e Deputies sought a m ore specific definition o f 
the com pany's social function arguing tha t A rticle 14 did not lay sufficient em phasis “on the 
social needs o f  the com m unity. “ 82 D espite this the w'ording rem ained unchanged.
79 DD 430, p.p. 2062-2063, 18/5/93.
80 John Kelly, DD 336, p. 1133, 22/6/82.
81 Green Paper on die Reorganisation of Postal and Telecommunications Services, p. 9.
82 DD 334, p. 1692, 19/5/82.
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Beyond th is the perceived social function o f  the  telephone w as em phasised by rapid 
developm ents in the D epartm ent o f  Social W elfare’s free rental program m e. In M ay 1980 
A lbert Reynolds announced tha t Pensioners qualifying for the F ree Telephone Rental Schem e 
w ould be placed in the priority  category for telephone connections.83 Furtherm ore over the 
course the 1980s and 1990s the num bers availing o f  the schem e increased dram atically  from  
9,752 in 1979 to  114,179 (or m ore than 10% o f  all subscribers) by the end o f  1993.84 Tins 
w ould cost the D epartm ent o f  Social W elfare nearly £16 m illion per annum  by 1993.85
The focus on the free rental schem e as fulfilling the social objective o f  the telephone service, 
how ever, m eant tha t the telephone’s social role w as officially understood  as lim ited to 
allow ing pensioners “ living alone to have a telephone in order to  be able to  sum m on help in an 
em ergency.”86 R equests to expand the qualification criteria  w ere rejected on grounds o f  the 
already “very considerable” com m itm ent o f  E xchequer funds to the scheme. T hus the notion 
that the telephone m ight have any fu rther social (and subsidisable) role to  p lay  (in the sense o f  
m aintaining the very existence o f  society through facilitating com m unications betw een its 
m em bers), w as m uch ra rer and, a t an official level, sim ply not acknow ledged for the bulk o f  
the period under review.
H ow ever, having becom e a de fa c to  household consum ption norm  as a  result o f  the increases 
in residential penetration  during the 1980s, the introduction o f  the 1993 round o f  rate 
“ rebalancing” prom pted a w ave o f  criticism  based on the im pact tha t the  changes w ould have 
on the telephone’s social function. The effective increase in local call costs (as a  result o f  the 
reduction hi the duration o f  the local call unit) w as characterised  as an a ttack  on the needs o f  
“the m ost vulnerable m em bers o f  society ... the sick, lonely and isolated .87 Furtherm ore, much 
o f  the criticism  unconsciously expressed the extent to  w hich the telephone had becom e as 
essential tool in a m odem  society. C om plaining about the peak tim e local charges, W orkers 
Party  T D  Eam onn G ilm ore argued that:
83 Albert Reynolds, DD 320, p. 1886, 15/5/80.
84 Department of Social Welfare (1993), Statistical Information on Welfare Services 1993. p. 66
85 Ibid., p. 75.
86 DD 413, p, 1068,26/11/91.
87 Des Rushe “Government’s scant regard for the most vulnerable” , The Irish Independent, 18/8/93.
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“A s I pointed out yesterday, the pensioner w anting to  con tac t the departm ent o f  Social 
W elfare, a  paren t w anting to  telephone the school, a  fam ily  w anting to talk  to their 
doctor cannot leave these calls till after 6 o ’clock in the  evening or until the weekend 
nor can the length o f  call alw ays be determ ine by the caller. H ow  m any o f  us have 
m ade calls to  firm s or, indeed to G overnm ent departm ents, to be left holding on for 
interm inable periods and then passed from  section to section before the query can be 
dealt w ith?88
Furtherm ore, in a  tac it acknow ledgm ent o f  the telephone’s critical role in negotiating 
citizenship rights, M inister fo r Social W elfare, Joan Burton, noting th a t her D epartm ent w as 
already am ongst Telecom  E ireann’s five biggest custom ers (w ith a  bill o f  £2.7 million in 
1993) stated  tha t she w ould be negotiating with Telecom  for g rea te r use o f  freephone or fixed 
charge calls fo r those contacting the departm ent.89 As noted above (section 8.4) B urton’s 
departm ent also introduced a  20 unit free call allow ance in the  w ake o f  the charges. A lthough 
a t a  glance this appeared to  add little to the extant free rental allow ance, it was critical in 
term s o f  the implied conception o f  the telephone. W hereas previously  the free rental allow ance 
had  been justified  sim ply because it allow ed “elderly and disabled  people sum m on help in 
em ergencies,”90 the introduction o f  free call units suggested th a t the telephone had a further 
function o f  m aintaining societal links. H ence B urton stated  o f  the rental and call allow ance 
th a t their purpose w as twofold:
“first, to  allow  elderly and disabled people sum m on help in em ergencies and, second, 
enable them remain active in the community and keep in touch with relatives and  
fr ien d s .”91 (Italics added)
8.6 C onceptions o f the T elephone Service 1980 - 1983
As noted above the increased em phasis on the im portance o f  telecom m unications for national 
econom ic developm ent in the 1980s m eant that at one level, the P ost O ffice and subsequently
88 DD 430, p. 1568, 12/5/93.
89 DD 430, pp. 225-226, 19/5/93.
90 Joan Burton. DD 430, p. 225, 19/5/93.
91 Ibid.
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Telecom  E ireann w ere perceived as the in frastructure providers fo r industry and com m erce. 
T hus w hilst an Industrial Policy R eview  G roup (“The C ulliton R eport”) recom m ended in 
1992 an  im m ediate reduction in the cost o f  overseas telephone calls as a  prerequisite for 
reducing industrial costs,92 one o f  the subm issions to the group on the “ Im pact o f  
Com m unications on Industry and Industrial D evelopm ent” w ent so fa r  as to m ake the 
(ultim ately rejected) suggestion th a t responsibility for telecom m unications policy form ation be 
transferred  from  the D epartm ent o f  Com m unications to  the D epartm ent o f  Industry .93
W ith  regard  to  the com m ercial orientation o f  the service, little changed in the period under 
review. R esponding to  com plaints from  deputies about charge increases introduced in 1980, 
A lbert Reynolds argued th a t to  provide services below  cost, w ould  create an artificial dem and 
th a t w ould divert capital and labour w hich m ight be spent elsew here m ore productively .94 
T hus Reynolds and his successors continued to refer back the standard  D epartm ental policy 
since the foundation o f  the State: th a t the Post O ffice services be self-supporting, placing 110 
burden on the taxpayer.95
N o r w as th is approach  altered w ith regard to  Telecom  Eireann. In considering the basic 
objectives and duties o f  Telecom  Eireann, sections 14 and 15 w ere critical. Section 14 laid out 
the follow ing as the principal objects o f  the telecom m unications com pany:
“ (a) to provide a  national telecom m unications service w ithin the S tate and between 
the S tate and places outside the State.
(b) to  m eet the industrial, com m ercial, social and household needs o f  the S tate for 
com prehensive and efficient telecom m unications services, and, so fa r as the com pany
92 Industrial Policy Review Group (1992), A Time for Change: Industrial Policy in the '90s. 
(Dublin: The Stationery Office), pp. 46-47.
93 Dr. Jim Mountjoy on behalf of Euristix Ltd. (1992), The Impact of Communications on Industry 
and Industrial Development - A study undertaken for The Industrial Policy Review Group. (Dublin: 
The Stationery Office), p. m8.
94 DD 321, p 812, 27/5/80.
95 O f course to a large extent the distinction between taxpayers and users of the service is somewhat 
illusory. Given the fact that taxation in some form (direct or indirect) was unavoidable, all users of 
the service were also taxpayers. The language of the government often seems to suggest diat 
taxpayers and users of the service were two separate and distinct groups.
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considers reasonably p racticab le, to satisfy all reasonable dem ands th roughou t the 
State, and
(c) to  provide such consultancy, advisory, train ing and con trac t services inside and 
outside the S tate as the com pany thinks fit.”96
M eanwhile Section 15 on the general duties o f  the com pany, sta ted  that:
“ It shall be the general duty o f  the telecom m unications com pany to  conduct the 
com pany's affairs so as to  ensure that-
(a) charges for services are kept a t the m inim um  rates consistent w ith m eeting 
approved financial targets, and
(b) revenues o f  the com pany are not less than sufficient to-
(i) m eet all charges properly chargeable to  revenue account 
(including depreciation o f  assets and p roper allocation to general 
reserve) taking one year w ith another.
(ii) generate a  reasonable proportion o f  capital needs, and
(iii) rem unerate capital industrial, com m ercial, social and household 
needs and repay borrow ings.”97
The inclusion o f  the phrase “consistent w ith m eeting approved financial ta rg e ts” in section 15, 
established as the com pany's firs t p riority  in setting charges the need to  break even, thus 
retaining the principle previously adhered to by the P ost Office.
96 Postal and Telecommunications Services Act, 1983, Section 14.
97 Postal and Telecommunications Services Act, 1983, Section 15, paragraph 1
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Looking a t the obligations laid upon Telecom  E ireann in Sections 14 and 15, the m ost notable 
aspect is the am biguity contained w ithin paragraphs (a) and (b) o f  Section 14. A lthough the 
com bination o f  paragraph  (a) and (b) appeared to require the new  com pany to  provide a 
“com prehensive and efficient telecom m unications services” th roughou t the state, the 
requirem ent w as qualified by the inclusion o f  the term  “ reasonable dem and” . Furtherm ore the 
A ct expressly placed the pow er to  decide w hat constituted “ reasonab le” into the hands o f  the 
com pany. In  addition, P aragraph  (2) o f  Section 15 w hich m ade reference to the previous 
section stated  that:
“N othing in section 14 o f  this section shall be construed as im posing on the com pany, 
either directly or indirectly, any form o f  duty or liability enforceable by proceedings 
before any court to  w hich it w ould not otherw ise be sub jec t.”98
Furtherm ore, Section 88 o f  the A ct specifically rendered the com pany “ im m une from  all 
liability” in the event tha t it failed or delayed in “providing, operating  or m aintaining a  
telecom m unications service.”99 Legally, therefore, not merely did the A ct place no concrete 
obligations on the com pany bu t it explicitly protected the com pany from  the consequences o f  
failing to provide service.
The im plications o f  this did not go unnoticed during the Dail D ebates. S tressing the need to 
service “the w hole com m unity” 100 and for “unity o f  service th roughout the  country”, 101 
L abour T D  Dick Spring stressed the need to  guarantee a geographically  universal service:
“ People living in rem ote parts o f  the country are entitled to the sam e kind o f  service 
as those living in u rban  a reas .” 102
T hus the parties o f  the  left (L abour and the W orkers Party) argued for an alternative wording 
fo r Section 14
98 Postal and Telecommunications Services Act, 1983, Section 15.
99 Postal and Telecommunications Services Act, 1983, Article 88, para 1 (a).
100 DD 336, p. 1198, 22/6/82.
101 DD 336, p. 1198, 22/6/82.
102 DD 336, p. 1198, 22/6/82.
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“a  com prehensive and efficient postal service o f  the h ighest atta inable  standard  to  
satisfy as fa r as possib le the industrial com m ercial and social needs o f  the S tate” 103
H ow ever in the face o f  F ianna Fail/F ine Gael agreem ent on the Section, such changes w ere 
rejected.
Technically, how ever, Telecom  E ireann had far from  carte blanche  to ac t as it liked. Section 
90 required the com pany to  seek M inisterial approval fo r any charge  increases,104 w hilst the 
Postal and Telecom m unications Users Councils established under the A ct w ere given the 
function o f  “considering charges”, 105 a function outside the rem it o f  the Post O ffice Users 
Council th a t had  preceded them. FurtheiTnore, w hilst the underlying aim  o f  the entire A ct was 
to place Telecom  E ireann a t arm s length from  Civil Service control, Section 110 did give the 
M inister fo r C om m unications extensive pow ers over the com pany, requiring it to:
“ (a) com ply w ith policy decisions o f  a  general kind m ade by the G overnm ent 
concerning the developm ent o f  the postal or telecom m unications services o f  w hich he 
m ay advise the com pany from  time to tim e,...” 106
The A ct's treatm ent o f  the question o f  the com pany's m onopoly sta tu s also raised the question 
o f  the com pany’s social obligations. Section 87 justified  the new  telecom m unications body's 
m onopoly status (or “exclusive privilege”) in part “because a  viable national 
telecom m unications service involves subsidization o f  som e loss-m aking services by profit- 
making services.” 107 As noted in chapter 7, the D argan R eport had suggested that, should 
Telecom  E ireann be required to  operate loss-m aking services (im plicitly fo r social reasons) in 
the course o f  m eeting its s ta tu tory  obligations, “ it should be com pensated specifically for
103 DD 343, p. 1679, 15/6/83.
104 "The company shall not increase any charge under a scheme under this section without the 
concurrence of the Minister." Postal and Telecommunications Services Act, 1983, Section 90, 
paragraph 2.
105 Michael Wilson, DD 334, p. 1580, 19/5/82.
106 Postal and Telecommunications Services Act, 1983, Article 110. para 1 (a).
107 Postal and Telecommunications Services Act, 1983, Article 81. Paragraph 2 (c).
276
doing so .” 108 H ad  such a  recom m endation been adopted it w ould have required tha t the social 
elem ent o f  Telecom  E ireann’s service obligations be identified, costed  and thereafter th a t it be 
funded by a  system  o f  transparen t subsidies from  the central exchequer. T hus the specifics o f  
w hat the social obligation com prised would necessarily  have been m ade explicit.
H ow ever the G reen P aper preceding the 1983 Post and Telecom m unications A ct rejected the 
D argan R eport’s proposal. I t stated th a t w hilst the G overnm ent acknow ledged that the new 
body would be required to provide loss-m aking socially oriented serv ice ,109 it could not:
“accept the im plication...that a  state-sponsored body, particu larly  one entrusted  w ith 
a  public m onopoly should be entitled as o f  right to  com pensation for loss-m aking 
services w hether or not these are provided on the instructions o f  the M inister.” 1 U)
In short the A ct ruled ou t the creation o f  any universal service fund. Section 51 o f  the A ct 
stated th a t w here the M inister for Posts and T elegraphs considered that a specific loss-m aking 
service should be provided bu t w here the com pany disagreed, tha t the com pany could 
“increase its charges to  com pensate for the losses incurred .” 111 In short it w as acknow ledged 
tha t socially oriented loss-m aking services w ould be funded by internal cross-subsidy rather 
than  from  external sources.
B y rejecting the D argan  R ep o rt’s transparen t subsidy suggestion the G reen P aper w ould make 
it difficult thereafter to  define either the m axim um  or m inim um  extent o f  Telecom  E ireann 's  
social obligation. Y et given the fact th a t the extent o f  m inisterial and public oversight over the 
telephone service w ould be lessened by the A ct there w as a  g reater need than  ever before for 
some such definition. The only guidelines Telecom  E ireann w ould be able to  look to  w ere the 
charging structures inherited from  the Post O ffice w hich effectively established rate averaging 
as the m inim um  extent o f  its social obligation. A t the other end o f  the scale, the consistently
108 Quoted in p. 10 of the Green Paper on the Reorganisation of Postal and Telecommunications 
Services, May 1980.
109 The Green Paper cited as examples of loss-makers "new services which may initially incur 
losses, residence telephones rented by under-privileged groups for emergency use, public call offices 
in some post offices and so on.” Ibid., p. 11.
110 Ibid.
111 Postal and Telecommunications Services Act, 1983, Article 51, Para 1.
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expressed view  o f  Telecom  E ireann’s predecessor between 1980 and 1982. th a t the 
subsidization o f  free telephone rental w hilst “a  very desirable social objective... w as not the 
duty o f  the telephone system , “ ’ 12 allowed Telecom  E ireann to infer the m axim um  extent o f  
their obligation. There were, however, no specific guidelines as to  w here exactly on this 
m inim alist-m axim alist continuum  Telecom  E ireann’s social obligation lay.
8.6.1 C onceptions o f the Telephone Service 1984 -  1993
Telecom  E ireann’s first annual report contained a  statem ent o f  how  the com pany understood 
its own role:
“Telecom  E ireann exists to  provide a  service to the com m unity. It d ischarges its 
social responsibility  m ainly through the corporate purpose laid dow n fo r it by law, 
w hich is in the provision o f  com prehensive and efficient telecom m unications service 
a t the low est prices consistent w ith meeting reasonable financial ob ligations.” 113
In practical term s, however, such a  statem ent w as alm ost m eaningless since it com m itted the 
com pany to  only the m ost general objectives. The absence o f  better defined social objectives 
m ight not, how ever, have been an im portant issue after Telecom  Eireann took over the running 
o f  the telephone service had M inisters for C om m unications used their pow ers o f  coercion and 
oversight vis-à-vis Telecom  after 1984. As one T D  pointed ou t in 1988 the 1983 A ct 
perm itted the G overnm ent quite extensive au thority  over the com pany:
“The existing procedures in regard to  public accountability  are  laid dow n as follows 
they ensure tha t the following role o f  the G overnm ent in relation to both bodies 
provides for these safeguards - G overnm ent appointm ent o f  the boards. G overnm ent 
approval o f  corporate plans, G overnm ent approval o f  capital expenditure.
G overnm ent approval o f  prices, adherence to G overnm ent policy on pay and 
G overnm ent control o f  licensing. I f  one takes these key areas as an exam ple o f  the
112 Jim Mitchell. DD 343, p. 1788, 15/6/83. For a similar response, see also Mark Killilea to Frank 
Cluskey (DD 322, p. 261, 11/6/80) and Paddy Harte to Mervyn Taylor ( DD 331, p. 1443, 9/12/81.)
113 Telecom Eireann (1985), 1st Report & Accounts for the period ended 4lh April 1985.. p 11.
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degree o f  public accountability  fo r a  com pany like B ord Telecom  Eireann, it is clearly 
the case th a t a  bond exists between dem ocratic control and com m ercial p u rpose .” 114
In practice, how ever, the years between 1984 and 1993 w itnessed the s ta te ’s alm ost total 
w ithdraw al from  the telecom m unications policy-m aking arena. It w ould ap p ear th a t the 
D argan  analysis th a t state control had been largely responsible for the chaos o f  the 1970s 
created a  political atm osphere which left successive M inisters fo r C om m unications reluctant 
to intervene in the running o f  the com pany. Furtherm ore, the com pany’s substan tia l inherited 
debt burden, w hich increased for m ost o f  the 1980s, appears to  have m ade M inisters reluctant 
to  im pose any obligations on the com pany th a t w ould w orsen its already p recarious financial 
position. It becam e clear tha t despite the com pany’s nom inal status as a  public body 
com m itted to  the public service objectives, th a t Telecom  E ireann would be perm itted (indeed, 
in light o f  the need to  reduce the debt burden, encouraged) to pursue a  m ore com m ercially- 
oriented developm ent path. Such an orientation was fu rther encouraged by the changing 
m arket environm ent in w hich Telecom  E ireann found itse lf  operating as the 1980s: the 
privatization o f  B ritish Telecom  in 1984, together w ith EU -led m oves tow ards liberalization 
o f  E uropean  telecom m unications m arkets created  a m arket environm ent quite d ifferent from 
tha t w hich had prevailed during the Post O ffice’s tenure o f  the telephone service.
Y et arguably  from  its inception, Telecom  E ireann has enjoyed the kind o f  liberty denied to 
m ost com m ercial finns. From  1984 the com pany w as exem pted from  the purview  o f  the 
N ational Prices C om m ission (and therefore from  public price controls) on the grounds that the 
anticipated need fo r heavy capital investm ent in the telephone service m eant that the:
“ criteria  norm ally used by the N ational Prices C om m ission for determ ining w hether 
o r not to  recom m end an increase in prices would not necessarily be com patible with 
the special requirem ents applicable in the case o f  the tw o new com panies.” 115
Sim ilarly, in O ctober 1987, then M inister fo r C om m unications, Ray B urke, disbanded the 
Telecom m unications Users Council as part o f  the G overnm ent's " on-going review o f  public
114 Tomas MacGiolla. DD 381, pp. 813-814, 31/5/88.
115 DD 334, p. 1583, 19/5/82.
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expenditure.” 116 The decision w as largely justified  on the grounds that in April 1985, the 
am bit o f  the O m budsm an's office had been extended to  cover com plaints abou t the 
telecom m unications service, thus apparently  duplicating the w ork o f  the tw o users councils.117 
H owever, in addition to  the fact that there w as plenty o f  evidence that the office o f  the 
O m budsm an w as unable to  cope with its existing w ork load ,118 the O m budsm an lacked the 
Users Council's “ right to  consider any  m atter other than  m atters o f  internal m anagem ent 
relating to the services provided by B T E ” .119 A lthough the C ouncil's pow er to proactively 
m onitor Telecom  Eireann 's operations w as limited, the B oard had nevertheless had som e 
effect. In January  1986, it prevailed upon M inister Jim M itchell to  reduce a  proposed 5 .6%  
charge increase to  4 .4% . Indeed even Telecom  E ireann acknow ledged tha t its w atchdog role 
had “proved invaluable both from  the view point o f  the C om pany and o f  its custom ers .” 120 In 
effect then, its closure rem oved the only channel independent o f  both the com pany and the 
G overnm ent through w hich custom ers w ere able to m ake their feelings about the com pany and 
its level o f  service heard.
As a  result, the jo b  o f  m onitoring Telecom  E ireann 's perform ance becam e the exclusive 
province o f  the D epartm ent o f  Com m unications itself. A t the time. M inister Ray Burke 
assured the D ail th a t he had  stressed to both com panies the need fo r “an increased aw areness 
o f  the quality o f  service being provided to their custom ers and to  be particu larly  v igilant and 
responsive to  com plain ts”,121 yet he w as unw illing to  offer any specific standards by which 
the com pany w ould be judged  beyond the following: “ I will be keeping a  close eye on the 
m atter bu t the only bench m ark I would have is that they w ould satisfy the legitim ate dem ands 
o f  their custom ers.” 122
116 DD 374, p. 430, 15/10/87.
117 From diis date onwards the scope of die Ombudsman's office had been expanded to include 
consumers complaints relating to Telecom Eireann and An Post. Annual Report of the 
Telecommunications Services Users' Council 1985-86, p. 7.
118 Particularly since, as part of the same Government expenditure review it had had its staffing 
levels reduced. See DD 374, p. 432. 15/10/87.
119 Annual Report of the Telecommunications Services Users' Council 1985-86. p. 7.
120 Telecom Eireann (1985), 1st Report and Accounts for the period ended 4th April 1985.
121 Ray Burke, DD 370, p. 430, 15/10/87.
122 Ray Burke, DD 374, p. 431, 15/10/87.
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In practice, how ever, R ay B urke consistently refused to  do even this. Faced w ith requests to 
order Telecom  E ireann to  drop its refusal to connect applicants located m ore than  500 m etres 
from  the nearest telephone line, B urke noted that:
“T here  are  no funds available to  me from  which I could provide subsid ization  to 
enable people w hose houses are not convenient to existing telephone lines to  obtain a 
new  telephone service and there are  no special arrangem ents w hich I could m ake in 
th is regard.
The priority  given to  connections is a  m atter o f  day-to-day adm inistration o f  
B ord Telecom  E ireann in w hich it w ould  not be appropria te  for m e 'to  intervene ” 123
Y et i f  extending the netw ork by 500 m etres w as im plicitly considered an “ illegitim ate” 
custom er dem and, then the practical application  o f  Telecom  E ireann’s own m ission statem ent 
(above) to  provide a com prehensive service w as clearly very limited. Furtherm ore B u rk e’s 
a ttem pt to  avoid intervening in the running o f  Telecom  by describing the com pany’s 
connection priorities as a  question o f  “day-to-day adm inistration” suggested a  m inim alist 
in terpretation o f  m inisterial rights w ith regard to  the com pany under the 1983 Act. The 
question w as raised tha t i f  intervention in this area  w as not appropriate , w here could it be?
De fa c to  it appeared  tha t the limits o f  the com pany’s social obligation w ere encom passed 
w ithin its rate structure. In N ovem ber 1987 R ay B urke offered w hat rem ains the m ost detailed 
description o f  the w orking o f  universal service in Ireland:
“T a r if f  principles for telecom m unications have developed historically  ou t o f  a 
com plex trad e -o ff between com m ercial considerations and im iversal service goals 
ra ther than  hi response to articulated  scientific, social and accounting bases...
So fa r as cross-subsidization  is concerned, the legislation setting up B oard 
Telecom  E ireann acknowledges, in g ran ting  its exclusive privilege fo r providing 
telecom m unications m essages w ithin the State, that a  viable national 
telecom m unications system  involves subsidization o f  som e loss-m aking services by
123 DD 382, pp. 1934 -1935, 28/6/88.
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profit-m aking services. It is clear, therefore, th a t any uniform  structu re  o f  
telecom m unications charges m ust involve com plex system s o f  cross-subsid ization ...
In general term s, under the present structure  the more frequen t users 
subsidize the lower users, business customers subsidize the residential customers, 
areas with high telephone density subsidize the low density areas, call charges 
subsidize rental and connection charges, short local calls subsidize long local calls 
and international charges subsidize national charges. T h a t is roughly the w ay the 
system  w orks.” 124 (Italics added)
A lthough there  w as clearly a  social elem ent w ithin this, it did not extend to  the provision o f  a 
geographically  universal service. In effect Telecom  Eireann interpreted its social obligations in 
term s o f  the com m on carriage principle: equal treatm ent o f  custom ers given a pre-existing  
infrastructure.
Some attem pt w as made in the late 1980s to  arrest Telecom  E irean n ’s grow ing  freedom  o f 
action. R ichard  B ru ton’s Postal and Telecom m unications Service A m endm ent Bill hi 1988 
sought the publication o f  m ore data  on Telecom  E ireann 's  perform ance and its fu ture 
objectives w hilst seeking to  im pose m ore extensive regulation upon the com pany than  that 
im plicit in  M inisterial overseeing. Introducing his bill, B ruton rem inded the Dail that:
“These com panies w ere no t set up to m ake a  profit or to com pete. They have been 
to ld  tha t p rofit is not their objective. They have been to ld  tha t they are to  be 
m onopolies, tha t they are to  have exclusive privilege in the  area. They do not have a 
com m ercial bottom  lin e ...T h ey  do not have to  m axim ise profits like private 
com panies. They are there to provide us with a  quality o f  service and a  low price. The 
D ail has a  clear function to oversee those bodies.” 125
The response from  the governm ent side o f  the Dail m ade clear, how ever, the extent to  which 
Telecom ’s com m ercial orientation w as taken fo r granted:
124 Ray Burke, DD 375, pp. 1332-1333, 19/11/87.
125 DD 381, p. 1147, 1/6/88.
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“I f  this G overnm ent or any G overnm ent politician or political party  w ere to introduce 
a  sim ilar Bdl im posing such a  public disclosure clause on the private  sector, they 
w ould tell them  w here to  go. It is unthinkable and an unheard  o f  concept in the world 
o f  business. L et us not forget fo r one m om ent th a t Telecom  E ireann and An P ost are 
as m uch p art o f  the com m ercial m ilieu as any private com pany .” 126
The defeat o f  the Bill appeared to  signal to  Telecom  E ireann th a t its p rim ary  function w as the 
p u rsu it o f  com m ercial rather than social goals. In the absence o f  m inisterial intervention, the 
com pany effectively began to set its ow n priorities and to that extent becam e the de facto 
m aker o f  Irish  telecom m unications policy, albeit w ithin the pro-com petition fram ew ork o f  
European Union telecom m unications legislation. (The fact th a t in 1988 the com pany decided 
to explore the possibility  o f  its own privatization  w ithout even inform ing the M inister a t the 
tim e th a t this w as being considered is indicative o f  this freedom  o f  action .) This occurred in 
spite o f  the fac t tha t this ran  contrary  to  the role assigned to  sem i-state bodies in Irish political 
theory, w hich considers them  executors ra ther than the m akers o f  po licy .127
And given its com m ercial outlook, Telecom  E ireann has, particu larly  since the beginning o f  
the 1990s, largely pursued  the objectives tha t a  private firm  w ould. D espite the fac t tha t as a 
public body Telecom  E ireann is not in theory driven by the p rofit m otive, the substan tia l debt 
burden (w hich peaked at over £1 billion in 1989128), has forced Telecom  E ireann to m axim ise 
profits to  fund interests and the reduction o f  the prm ciple. A rguably  this has occurred a t a 
cost to  its public service obligations. In the w ake o f  the introduction o f  local call tim ing, an 
Irish T im es editorial com m ented that:
“The com pany ought to recognise th a t it is not exclusively in the business o f  profit 
m axim isation. It has an obligation to  provide a  service a t the low est reasonable c o s t...
T he ex tra  cost to  Telecom  Eireann o f  long telephone conversations is 
m inim al. Furtherm ore the introduction o f  m etering w ould  be quite inequitable in that
126 Thomas ("G.V.") Wright, DD 381, p. 803, 31/5/88.
127 See T.J Barrington (1980), The Irish Administrative System, (Dublin: Institute of Public 
Administration).
128 Telecom Eireann (1990), Report and Accounts for the year ended 2911' March 1990 p. 6.
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it w ould  h u rt the people on fixed incomes hardest. It w ould  also  render more 
expensive one o f  the few  com forts tha t attend the elderly living a lo n e ...
Telecom  E ireann m ust no t abuse its m onopoly and it m ust recognise its social 
obligation not to  im pact hardest on the people w ho can least afford  it.” 129
N onetheless defending the 1993 changes in Telecom  E ireann ta r if f  structu re , M inister for 
C om m unications, Brian Cow an argued:
“ I f  the H ouse does not w ish to w ithdraw  the com m ercial m andate given to Telecom  
E ireann it should allow  it to  operate in a m anner w hich enables it to com pete on 
som ething approaching an equal footing w ith its com petitors in Europe and the 
U S A .” 130
8.7 Sum m ary: U niversal Service 1980 -1993
Looked a t from  any objective standards, the years 1980 to  1993 w itnessed a rem arkable 
transform ation  in the fortunes o f  the Irish telephone service. T he num ber o f  exchange lines 
rose from  48 3 ,0 0 0 131 in 1980 to 1.113 m illion by M arch 1993.132 This w as equivalent to 30 
telephone exchange lines per 100 head o f  population. Furtherm ore although there rem ained 
substantial regional disparities in the penetration o f  the telephone - 27 .6  household telephones 
per head o f  population  in the “01” (D ublin) area as opposed to  only 22 per hundred in the 
“07 /09” (the W est and  N orth-W est) - by the close o f  1993, the “0 1 ” D ublin  area  accounted 
for only 38%  o f  all subscriber lines, approxim ately  in keeping w ith the overall d istribution o f  
the Irish population.
W ith the closure o f  the last m anual exchange in 1987, the last m ajor regional d isparity  in 
service quality  disappeared, although arguably  a  new disparity  appeared in the distinction 
between those subscribers connected to  digital exchanges (and thus able to  access Telecom 
E ireann’s range o f  V alue-A dded Services) and those connected to analogue exchanges. The
129 “The Trouble with Monopolies”, Irish Times, 23/2/91.
130 DD 430, p. 2066, 18/5/93.
131 Central Statistics Office (1980), Statistical Abstracts, (Dublin: The Stationery Office), p. 332.
132 Telecom Eireann (1993), Report and Accounts for the year ended Is' April 1993 p. 6.
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pattern  o f  exchange digitisation follow ed tha t o f  autom ation, com m encing in urban areas in 
1980 and  spreading gradually  to  less densely populated areas: by 1993 67%  o f  all subscribers 
w ere connected to  digital exchanges.133 In term s o f  first tim e call connection rates, the 
objectives set ou t in the D argan  R eport - 97%  for local calls and  95%  fo r trunk  calls - were 
achieved on target, by the close o f  1984 and w ere m et o r surpassed  fo r the duration  o f  the 
period under review. As o f  M arch 1993 the national figures fo r local and trunk call failure 
w ere 1% and 2%  respectively .134
In term s o f  residential penetration the period under review also saw  im pressive gains: ju s t 
under 50%  o f  Irish households w ere connected when Telecom  E ireann cam e into being in 
1984. Less than  a  decade later, the figure had risen to 75% , contribu ting  to the recognition hi 
the Dail during the 1993 ta r if f  s tructure  debates tha t it w as increasingly d ifficult to function in 
a  m odem  society w ithout access to  the telephone.
The ex traord inary  grow th w as prom pted by a num ber o f  factors. The technical basis for the 
grow th lay in the com pletion o f  the A ccelerated D evelopm ent P rogram m e betw een 1979 and 
1984. A s noted hi C hapter Seven, the program m e itse lf w as not ju s t  a  result o f  the D argan 
R ep o rt’s recom m endation tha t it be undertaken bu t o f  the acceptance on the p art o f  the state 
th a t fu tu re  econom ic grow th w ould require an up-to-date telecom m unications infrastructure, 
one capable  o f  coping w ith any conceivable level o f  dem and fo r service and o f  offering the 
kind o f  value-added services that, in p articu lar, US firm s locating in Ireland w ould take  for 
granted. C onsequently the D epartm ent had invested heavily both in new digital exchange 
technology and in the in frastructure  necessary  to support the creation o f  a  nationally 
integrated digital network. N ew  m icrow ave radio links and 30 channel Pidse Code M odulation 
system s w ere brought into service to  ac t as transm ission system s for the new digital 
netw ork .135
In addition to  allow ing the subscriber to  use new telecom m unications services, the digitization 
o f  the netw ork also offered cost advantages to the Post Office. F au lt testing, service provision
133 Telecom Eireann Information and Public Relations Division (1987), Step-by-Step to the Digital 
Exchange. (Dublin: Telecom Eireann).
134 Telecom Eireann (1993), Report and Accounts for the period ended 4th April 1985. p. 1.
135 Wall op. cit., pp. 129-130.
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and  cessation adjustm ents to  the charging structures could all be m ade w ithout electrical 
m odifications and could, assum ing the p rio r existence o f  in frastructu re  be carried  out rem otely 
reducing the telephone serv ice’s personnel requirem ents. Further reductions in personnel needs 
resulted from  the lower m aintenance associated  w ith the digital exchange: in con trast to  its 
step-by-step and crossbar predecessors, the digital sw itches had no m oving parts and 
consequently w ere fa r less vulnerable to w ear and tear. In consequence Telecom  E irealm 's 
firs t annual report w ould praise its predecessors foresight in deciding to  convert the entire 
netw ork to  digital w orking w hich the report noted w ere “m ost cost-effective and 
re liab le ... providm g the potential fo r m ore diversified services and  fo r the integration o f  speech 
and data services.” 136
(Fibre optic technology w ould prove a  m assive boon to the developm ent o f the international 
and trunk system  from  the late 1980s onw ards. Using glass fibre ra ther than co-axial cable 
perm itted a huge increase in inform ation carrying cap ac ity 137 contributing  in tu rn  to a  rapid 
decline in the cost o f  international and trunk  calls. In 1988 Telecom  E ireann com m enced w ork 
on building a  spur to  P T A T , the firs t transatlan tic  fibre optic link and from  1989 onw ards 
w ould increasingly augm ent the existing trunk netw ork w ith fibre optic links, leading 
tosuccessive decreases in international and trunk rates.)
Once the D epartm ent had invested heavily in this m aterial how ever, it w as incum bent on 
Telecom  E ireann w hich inherited responsibility  for paying o f f  the debt created  by the A D P, to 
m axim ise the revenue potential o f  the newly developed system . H ence financial factors 
prom pted Telecom  to actively seek to increase subscriber num bers: the charging structure 
w hich in the 1960s and 1970s had  been designed to  dam pen dem and to artificially  low levels 
w as radically  overhauled: the dem and fo r advance rentals w as abandoned and m ore attractive 
term s w ere introduced fo r paying connection fees. H ow ever fo r the first tim e in the history o f  
the telephone service, the period under review  saw  no dram atic im provem ents in the cost o f  
basic telephone rental relative to w ages. The social partnership  agreem ents from  1987 
onw ards stressed the need fo r pay restrain t as part o f  a program m e o f  m easures designed to
136 Telecom Eireann (1985), 1st Report and Accounts for the year ended 4th April 1985. p. 23.
137 Illustrative of this is the distinction between the carrying capacity of die TAT 7 a transatlantic 
telephone cable laid in 1983 and that of the first transatlantic fibre optic cable, the PTAT laid five
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life the econom y ou t o f  recession. Thus w hilst the four years from  1980 to 1984 saw  a  65%  
increase in the  average industrial w ages,138 the period from  1987 to  1993 saw  only a  26%  
increase.139 Thus w hilst the average industrial w age in 1980 w as £5021 , this had risen to 
£12,975. by the start o f  1993, a  total increase o f  158% .140 D uring the sam e period telephone 
rentals increased from  £58 .12  to £132 .80 , an increase o f  129%.
In short the m assive increase in residential dem and for the telephone cannot be ascribed to the 
relatively m inor im provem ent in its affordability. R ather one m ust conclude th a t the telephone 
had, in p a rt as a  resu lt o f  its own success, reached a  critical m ass point w hereby subsequent 
developm ent becam e self-generating. In effect, having gone through  the stages o f  being a 
luxury  item in the hom e and then o f  being a  consum er durable, an  item w hich the average 
fam ily could reasonably  asp ire to , the telephone finally arrived  a t the status o f  a consum ption 
norm , an object critical to  facilitating  day-to-day existence in the  m odern world. As noted, this 
status w as a  consequence o f  the extent o f  the telephone’s developm ent: as residential 
penetration approached 50%  in the m id-1980s, dom estic access to  a  telephone was 
increasingly taken  fo r gran ted  and Irish  society began to  adap t accordingly Indicative o f  this 
w as the introduction in D ecem ber 1984 by Telecom  E ireann o f  the freephone service.
A m ongst the first custom ers w ere the C arro ll’s Irish Open G o lf  T ournam ent and significantly 
the governm ent itse lf w hich established a  freephone num ber in January  1985 to offer 
inform ation on the annual B udget which w as read before the D ail during that m onth. In short 
the potential o f  the telephone to  facilitating access to  both consum er and citizenship 
inform ation becom e increasingly recognized. As such services w ere developed, it w ould 
becom e increasingly difficult to  operate w ithout a  telephone in Ireland o f  the 1980s and 
1990s.
D espite the increasing im portance o f  the phone in the period under review, underlined by the 
sta te ’s tac it identification o f  its potential as a  means o f  dissem inating citizenship inform ation, 
the practical policy definition o f  universal service in the period under review rem ained alm ost 
totally  unchanged. The Postal and Telecom m unications Services A ct 1983 offered the first
years later in 1988. Whereas the TAT 7 could carry 4,200 circuits, the PTAT carried nearly 40,000. 
Arthur C. Clarke (1992), How the World was One. (London: Victor Golancz), p 255.
138 CSO (1985), Statistical Abstract 1982-1985. p. 155.
139 CSO (1993), Statistical Abstract 1993. p. 147.
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opportunity  to  redefine the objectives and functions o f  the telephone service in Ireland since 
the 1869 T elegraph A ct, w hich had sim ply assigned to  the Postm aster General “exclusive 
privilege o f  transm itting  telegram s w ithin the United K ingdom  o f  G reat B ritain  and 
Ire land .” 141 H ow ever the A ct w as ultim ately notable m ore for w hat it om itted than fo r w hat it 
included. A rguably, the ac t w as a  m issed opportunity  to  develop and express a  philosophy 
underlying the role o f  com m unications in Irish society, a philosophy beyond the bare 
objectives laid ou t in Section 14 o f  the Act. Speaking during the debate on the Bill in 1982, 
L abour TD , Justin  K eating argued tha t the absence o f  such a philosophy had been critical in 
the poor perform ance o f  the D epartm ent o f  Posts and Telegraphs:
“ ...the public service fo r years has had no goal or target. No m em ber o f  the 
D epartm ent o f  Posts and Telegraphs, no m em ber active in the postal and 
telecom m unications services, has any idea w hatever o f  w here they are going, w hat is 
their w ork and w hat is expected o f  them . They operate w ithin no fram ew ork, no goal, 
no target, no objective o f  any k ind ...142
Furtherm ore, as argued above in section 8.6, the rejection in the 1980 G reen P aper (on w hich 
the 1983 Postal A nd Telecom m unication Bill w as based) o f  the D argan R ep o rt’s p roposal that 
Telecom  E ireann be specifically com pensated fo r the providing those loss-m aking socially 
oriented services its public service rem it required w as also a rejection o f  the opportunity  to 
define w hat those socially oriented services were. As a  N ational Planning B oard (N PB ) report 
on sem i-state bodies w ould argue in 1984, the practice  w hereby sem i-states invisibly funded 
their social obligations by internal cross-subsidy effectively left the decision as to w hich social 
services to fund in the hands o f  the sem i-state body itself. Y et the board concluded, in keeping 
w ith the understanding o f  the sp lit between the role o f  the policy-m aker and policy executor 
inherent in Irish political theory, “th a t the decision on w hether a  public enterprise should 
provide a  social service, or include a  social elem ent in any service, should be m ade by the
140 CSO (1985), Statistical Abstract 1982-1985. p. 155.
141 Section 4, Telegraph Act 1869 ("An Act to alter and amend "The Telegraph Act" 1868.). A 
telegram was defined as "any message or communications transmitted or intended for transmission 
by a telegraph. A telegraph in turn was defined as "any apparatus for transmitting messages or other 
communications by means of electric signals." Section 3, Ibid. These definitions saw the telephone 
fall under the Postmaster-General's exclusive privilege in an 1880 court decision.
142 DD 336, pp. 1248, 23/6/82.
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Governm ent, and no t by the public enterprise.” 143 T hus the report argued th a t the social 
elem ent in the service provided by any state-sponsored body should be identified and costed. 
T hereafter, exchequer paym ents w ould be m ade “by w ay o f  con trac t paym ents d irectly  related 
to  the m inim um  cost to  the public enterprise o f  m eeting precisely defined social needs.",] 44 
(Italics added).
H ow ever, the B o ard ’s approach  assum ed tha t social obligations once identified could be 
costed as discrete items. Related to this, R ichard B ruton 's 1988 Postal and 
T elecom m unications A m endm ent Bill (which appears to have been largely based on the N PB  
R eport) required tha t each section o f  the telephone service provide separate accounts so as to 
facilitate an exam ination o f  w hich parts o f  the service w ere profitable and w hich w ere not 
w ith a  view  to  replacing the internal cross-subsidy system  w ith a  system  o f  exchequer 
transfers to  fund universal serv ice .145 Y et in response to this dem and, M inister o f  S tate for 
Com m unications, M ichael K itt argued that such calculations w ere effectively im possible:
“ ...the in tegrated  nature  o f  the telecom m unications netw ork m akes a  conventional type 
o f  capital appra isa l difficult and inappropria te  in m any cases, as the costs and 
benefits o f  specific items o f  expenditure cannot readily be identified in isolation from  
the netw ork as a  whole. . .The telecom m unications netw ork is a  single struc tu re  and 
while certain  costs m ay be directly a ttribu ted  to  individual exchanges or to su b ­
netw orks w ithin the network, the bulk o f  the com pany's capital expenditure relates to 
the provision o f  the  m ain countryw ide telecom m unications system  and the costs 
incurred fo r the various elements are fo r the com m on benefit o f  all users o f  the 
netw ork .” 146
143 National Planning Board (April 1984), Proposals for Planning 1984-1987. (Dublin: NPB),
p. 121.
144 Ibid., p. 121.
145 Richard Bruton, DD 380, p. 2380, 24/5/88.
146 Michael Kitt, DD 381, pp. 791-792, 31/5/88.
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This w as apparen tly  confirm ed by R ay B urke’s com m ent a year earlier that:
“T a riff  principles for telecom m unications have developed historically  ou t o f  a 
com plex trad e -o ff between com m ercial considerations and universal service goals 
ra ther than  in response to articulated  scientific, social and accounting bases.. ." 147
h i consequence, then, B urke could only explain that any “uniform  structu re  o f  
telecom m unications charges m ust involve com plex system s o f  cross-subsid ization ,” 148 and 
offer the follow ing description o f  how  tha t cross-subsid ization  worked:
“the m ore frequent users subsidize the low er users, business custom ers subsidize the 
residential custom ers, areas w ith high telephone density subsidize the low density 
areas, call charges subsidize rental and connection charges, short local calls subsidize 
long local calls and international charges subsidize national charges.” 149
These cross-subsid ies effectively em bodied the extent o f  Telecom  E irean n ’s com m itm ent to  a 
universal service objective, w hich could therefore be sum m ed up as “uniform  pricing” 150 or 
rate averaging. (Indeed during the debate on R ichard  B ruton's A m endm ent bill, M ichael K itt 
explicitly identified the provision o f  “services to isolated parts o f  the country w ithout any 
ex tra  charge” 151 as p a rt o f  Telecom  E ireann’s “social ro le.” 152) G iven this the reduction o f  
international charges w hilst effectively increasing local call charges (by reducing the duration 
o f  the local call unit) in 1991 and again in 1993 effectively underm ined the universal service 
objective described in 1987. H ow ever in the absence o f  any figures from  Telecom  E ireann it 
rem ains im possible to  m ake any assessm ent o f  the specific effect o f  the rate rebalancing on the 
cross-subsidies referred to  by B urke in 1987. Indeed it is even im possible to  confirm  or refute 
the assertion m ade during the Dail debate on the 1993 ta r if f  changes that rebalancing 
effectively m eant th a t residential users w ere subsidizing business custom ers
147 Ray Burke, DD 375, pp. 1332-1333, 19/11/87.
148 Ibid.
149 Ray Burke, DD 375, pp. 1332-1333, 19/11/87
150 Michael Kitt, DD 381, pp. 793-794, 31/5/88.
151 DD 381, p. 796,31/5/8.
152 Ibid.
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In effect then, by  1993, the extent o f  the universal service obligation placed upon the Irish 
telephone service provider itse lf w as no different from  that w hich had prevailed a t the close o f  
the 1970s: com m on carriage. To understand why this w as the case, one considered the 
political econom ic environm ent in w hich state and service provider operated in the 1980s. 
There is little doub t tha t the experience o f  both the m ajo r political parties w ith regard to the 
telephone service during the term s o f  office in the 1970s had not been happy ones. Conor 
Cruise O ’B rien’s biographer has noted o f  his term  as M inister fo r Posts and Telegraphs tha t 
his tim e in the D ail w as spent responding to  a barrage o f  orchestrated  com plaints forcing him 
to explain:
“why his departm ent w as not responding to  the urgent need for the erection o f  
telephone kiosks a t B urncourt, C ahir, County T ipperary ; why the phone service in 
B racknagh w as u n sa tisfac to ry ... even to C harlie H au g h ey 's  dem and tha t C onor 
arrange to  have a  public telephone kiosk provided on the pier a t H ow th in the vicinity 
o f  the yach t club for the use o f  fisherm en.” 153
Thus on the one hand, the telephone w as increasingly recognised to have a  vital national 
in frastructure  role as increased, significantly strengthening the position o f  the D epartm ent 
within Cabinet. O n the o ther M inisters and governm ents took the b run t o f  the blam e fo r the 
decline in the service during the 1970s (as indeed the concept o f  the “corporation  sole” 
(referred to  in chap ter three) required th a t they should be). T hus when the D argan report 
recom m ended th a t the service be taken out o f  the direct control o f  the D epartm ent o f  Posts and 
Telegraphs, the F ianna Fail governm ent w hich had been in pow er during the w orst period for 
the service - betw een 1978-79 - leapt a t the opportunity  to free itse lf o f  the politically 
troublesom e departm ent.
Furtherm ore, as noted in section 8.6.1, the precarious financial position both o f  the com pany 
itse lf given its debt position during the 1980 's and the fact that it was operating  in the context 
o f  a  decade-long depression, left the governm ent unw illing to interfere with the running o f  the 
com pany in any w ay th a t m ight fu rther jeopard ise  its prospects. In effect Telecom  Eireann
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was effectively left to  establish its own priorities and as section 8.6.1 suggests these included 
protecting the com pany’s own future, limiting it w illingness to engage upon the 
unreproductive spending associated w ith universal service objectives.
It w ould be incorrect, how ever to suggest tha t Telecom  E ireann’s actions w ere totally 
divorced from  the w ishes o f  the state: indeed given the perceived im portance o f  
telecom m unications in frastructure to  the rest o f  the econom y, such a situation w ould have 
been bizarre. N onetheless the sta te ’s influence on the developm ent o f  the telephone service 
changed from  direct control to  an agenda setting function This w as largely effected v ia  the re- 
em ergence o f  national p lan  during the 1980s: the persistence o f  the 1980s recession saw  a 
succession o f  three year developm ent plans draw n up by successive governm ents, each 
prom ising a  w ay ou t o f  econom ic decline. As noted in section 8.5 each report stressed the 
central role o f  telecom m unications fo r econom ic grow th. H ow ever, there w ere few  equivalent 
reports on the condition o f  Irish  society: indeed it w as im plicit w ithin the national plans that 
the problem s o f  Irish  society w ere related to the econom y and tha t “fix ing” the latter w ould 
result in all-round im provem ents in the form er. In short w hat external influences there  w ere on 
Telecom  E ireann  during the period under review  stressed the com pany’s key role in the Irish 
economy, not w ithin Irish society. In consequence Telecom  E ireann w ould purse a  m inim alist 
version o f  universal service.
H owever, w hile the question o f  the extent to w hich the uniform  pricing/cross-subsid ization 
w as socially oriented rem ained unansw ered, the developm ent o f  the free telephone rental 
scheme during the 1980s and 1990s m ade it clear tha t in one area  a t least the provision o f  the 
telephone w as recognised as an objective o f  social policy. The ongoing increases in household 
penetration augm ented the social utility  o f  the telephone. T hus notw ithstanding the fac t tha t 
the free rental schem e did not cover connection costs, the period under review  saw  an increase 
o f  over 100,000 people availing o f  the scheme.
153 Donald Harman Akenson (1994), Conor. A Biography of Conor Cruise O ’Brien: Volume I. 
Narrative, (Montreal and Kingston: M cGill-Queen’s University Press), p. 396.
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! Table 8.2 Number availing of Free Telephone Rental Scheme 1979 - 1993
i Date :  Free Telephone Rental Allowance
: end 79 j 9.572
: end 80 j 12.112
: end 81 ;  16.500
i end 82 j 22,700
i  end June 84 j 29,600
: end 85 !  40,747
:  end 86 j 49,967
j end 87 |  51.781
i  end 88 j  65,284
end 89 {  73,091
i end 90 1  78.515
end 91 j  94.804
j end 92 !  105.443
i end 93 1 114.179
Furtherm ore, it is possible to  argue tha t by the end o f  the period under review, the scope o f  the 
philosophy underlying such social spending w as becom ing increasingly expansive: w hilst at 
the outset o f  the period it w as both im plicit in the qualification crite ria  and explicit in the 
statem ents o f  G overnm ent M inisters th a t the schem e w as effectively a  safety m easure for 
elderly people living alone, the introduction o f  the free call units in the w ake o f  the 1993 
tariffs restructuring  implied a  m uch g reater role - one o f  societal cohesion - than 
hitherto.(Indeed it could be argued th a t the D epartm ent recognized th a t the telephone already 
played such a  role and  tha t the allow ance w as sim ply an  acknow ledgm ent th a t tha t particu la r 
function w ould  be underm ined by the increase in call charges). Joan B u rto n ’s description o f  
the allow ance’ purpose in M ay 1993 confirm ed this:
“ first, to  allow  elderly and disabled people sum m on help in em ergencies and, second, 
enable them to remain active in the com munity and keep in touch with relatives and  
friends. ”154
C ritically, how ever, the thinking behind the second function w as not necessarily  lim ited to the 
elderly: it m ight also apply to virtually  any section o f  the com m unity. A rguably  therefore by 
adverting to  th is role o f  the telephone fo r one section o f  the com m unity and by im plicitly 
approving it in the decision to use D epartm ent o f  Social W elfare funding to  pay  for it. Burton
154 Ibid.
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laid the philosophical foundations for a far wider conception o f  universal service, one that 
might ultimately apply to a greater portion o f  the population than pensioners living alone.
T hat such a philosophy was not given application in the development o f  a widely applicable 
socially-oriented universal service policy, however, indicates the extent to which the state 
assumed that the apparently self-generating increases in residential penetration recorded in the 
1980s and 1990s would continue unchecked o f  their own accord, hi effect outside the confines 
o f  the free telephone rental schem e, the state implicitly left the achievement o f  universal 
service objectives in the hands o f  the market. Given the ongoing increase in penetration there 
was apparently no need to consider the possibility that such a policy might see anything less 





This chap ter sets out to  bring together the variety  o f  technological, social, econom ic, and 
political influences identified in chapters one to three and to explore their bearing on the 
developm ent o f  both the telephone service in Ireland and o f  Irish universal service policy. 
It is broken dow n into three sections. Section 9.2 offers a  b rie f sum m ary o f'the  diffusion 
o f  the  netw ork betw een 1880 and 1993 in num erical and geographical term s, w ith a  view 
to offering a  context for the rest o f  the chapter. S im ilarly, Section 9.3 sum m arises the 
parallel developm ent o f  universal service policy over the sam e period. Finally  in section 
9.4, this research  exam ines how  technological, social, econom ic and political/policy 
factors have shaped the m odem  Irish telephone service and universal service policy. Since 
the u ltim ate objective o f  this research is to consider universal service policy, the last o f  
these factors is given particu lar prom inence.
9.2 D iffusion o f PO T S in Ireland 1880 - 1993
Telephone exchange service in Ireland began alm ost sim ultaneously in D ublin and B elfast 
in 1880. It w as not until the raising o f  the sta tu tory  limit on the private com pan ies’ radius 
o f  operations in 1884, however, tha t any fu rther geographical expansion occurred. Then, 
in fact, it w as the P ost Office tha t firs t extended the service outside D ublin, establishing 
exchanges in G alw ay, Cork and W aterford  during the 1880s. These operations a ttracted  
few  subscribers, however. Only when the Telephone C om pany o f  Ireland (T C I) opened 
exchanges in these cities did the telephone service begin to expand beyond D ublin in any 
significant way.
D uring the 1890s the developm ent by the Post Office o f  the trunk netw ork began to 
gradually  expand the geographical reach o f  the telephone network, but the service 
nonetheless rem ained limited to  urban  areas. T hus by the close o f  the 1890s service w as 
limited to  larger tow ns situated  on the trunk routes running from  D ublin to  Belfast, 
W aterford , C ork and Lim erick. N onetheless, it is apparen t th a t the 1900s and 1910s saw  
the service gradually  diffuse further, to  the extent tha t by 1922 all but three o f  the 26 
counties o f  the Irish  Free S tate were connected to the national trunk  system.
N onetheless, the Irish Post O ffice inherited a  telephone system  that w as unprofitable and, 
relative to  the rest o f  the U nited Kingdom , underdeveloped. There w ere ju s t  under 12,000
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subscribers in Ireland by 1922, equivalent to  less than 7 phones per 1000 people. 
Furtherm ore, the to tal norm al service a rea  o f  the 192 exchanges in operation accounted 
fo r only 2.5 per cent o f  the area  o f  the state. W ithin a  year o f  the end o f  the Civil W ar 
hostilities in 1923, however, the Post O ffice com m enced a  program m e to expand  the 
network. T hus although the num ber o f  exchanges only quadrupled  between 1920 and 
1940, the  area  o f  the countiy  included in the telephone serv ice 's  ‘to tal norm al service 
a re a ’ increased from  2 / 2%  to over 60%  in the sam e period. S ubscriber num bers failed to 
m atch the ra te  o f  this expansion however: the 1918 figure o f  12,500 had barely doubled to 
25,817 by 1938. Furtherm ore, the setting o f  distance dependent rentals ensured that 
developm ent w as concentrated in urbanreas: by 1936 D ublin accounted for 64%  o f  all 
subscribers.
The in troduction o f  autom atic exchanges to  D ublin in 1926 gave subscribers there a  24 
hour service th a t offered im m ediate connection. M eanwhile, those subscribers living 
outside D ublin  w ere until 1949 reliant on m anual exchanges w ith slow er connection times. 
Furtherm ore, during the 1920s and 1930s, hours o f  service at the sm aller rural exchanges 
(serving 30 subscribers or less) w ere limited. A lthough the D epartm ent o f  Posts and 
Telegraphs w ould, during the late 1930s, m ake some attem pt to  extend au tom atic  working 
beyond D ublin  by experim enting w ith sem i-autom atic exchanges, the experim ent w as 
shelved in the firs t year o f  the war.
W orld  W ar II w as to  prove a  critical w atershed for the service, however. D efence 
requirem ents saw  the netw ork expanded along the coastline to  connect arm y posts 
positioned around the country. Furtherm ore, the limits placed on transpo rta tion  by fuel 
shortages prom pted a  huge grow th in the use o f  the existing telephone netw ork. Call 
traffic  on trunk  lines, for exam ple, increased by 100% during the w ar w hilst local calls 
increased by 50% . This grow th encouraged the powerfiil w artim e C abinet Com m ittee on 
Econom ic P lanning to  approve a p lan  to  trip le  the subscriber base in the 15 years after the 
close o f  the w ar, and to expand the rural call box netw ork, bringing a  telephone to  eveiy 
sub-post office in the country before 1950,
A  side effect o f  the R ural Call Box Program m e w as to lay the basic  foundation  o f  the 
provincial trunk  netw ork upon w hich subsequent developm ent w ould occur. The 1953 
decision to  introduce standard  rentals across the countiy  (albeit w ith only a 2 mile free-
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m ileage radius outside D ublin, L im erick and Cork) reflected the extent to w hich the 
netw ork had  perm eated the country.
It is apparen t th a t the spread o f  the  netw ork via the R ural Call B ox P rogram m e prom pted 
the beginnings o f  a  significant increase in dem and for the telephone outside D ublin. The 
Program m e had explicitly intended tha t call boxes be converted into exchanges, once 
subscribers situated  near the call box  sought their own exchange line. Provincial 
applications were fu rther encouraged by the com m encem ent o f  exchange autom ation 
outside D ublin  in 1948. A s a  result the increasing concentration o f  exchange lines in the 
D ublin a rea  w itnessed in the 1920s and 1930s ceased during the 1950s as the rate o f  
increase in urban  and rural areas began to  even out. Thus, by 1961, D ublin  subscribers 
accounted for 7%  less (57% ) o f  the to tal num ber o f  lines than they had a  qu arte r o f  a 
century earlier.
As the 1950s drew  to a close, and w ith the 1946 D evelopm ent P lan  near or on target w ith 
m ost o f  its objectives, the D epartm ent called in an expert from  the D utch 
Telecom m unications Service under the U N  Technical A ssistance Program m e to assist in 
fu ture developm ent planning. The resulting plan greatly expanded local call charging areas 
and placed farm ers in the  residential subscriber category' rather than in the business 
category in w hich they had  been since the 1880s. The 1960s. how ever, saw the 
consequences o f  earlier failures to m ake sufficient capital investm ents in the service 
(notably the attenuated sum  voted in the 1956 Telephone C apital A ct) com e to  light. As 
the post rogram m e fo r Econom ic D evelopm ent Irish econom y grew  a t a  previously 
unknow n rate, the dem and fo r telephones also grew  at an unprecedented pace. The under­
funded service w as unable to  cope w ith this increased dem and, how ever. T he 1960s thus 
saw  the beginning o f  a  w aiting  list that w ould continually expand until the 1980s.
A lthough investm ent in the service gradually  crept up during the 1960s. this did not occur 
a t anything like the rate necessary  to  keep up w ith applications fo r service, prom pting the 
D epartm ent o f  Posts and Telegraphs to actively dam pen dem and by m eans o f  introducing 
a  connection fee and an advance rental charge.
The increased dem and persisted  into the 1970s contributing to the grow ing crisis. This 
cam e to  a dram atic clim ax betw een 1977 and 1978 w ith a series o f  lengthy P ost O ffice 
strikes in the late 1970s w hich crippled the service and saw  w aiting lists approach  six 
figures. N otw ithstanding the chaos, how ever, the 1960s and 1970s saw  the num ber o f
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subscriber lines quadruple and w itnessed a  substantial increase in dem and from  provincial 
applicants, w ho accounted for 60%  o f  all lines connected between 1972 and 1978. 
N ationw ide, there w ere ju s t  under h a lf  a  million exchange lines by 1980.
A s a  result o f  the crisis o f  the 1970s, however, the G overnm ent o f  the day established the 
Post O ffice Services R eview  G roup to analyse the root o f  the telephone serv ice’s 
problem s. The resulting D argan  R eport concluded th a t the operation  o f  the 
telecom m unications service as a  branch o f  G overnm ent had  constitu ted  a block to  its 
effective and  efficient operation and recom m ended tha t it be re-established as a  state- 
sponsored body. It fu rther recom m ended the adoption o f  a  m ajor program m e to develop 
the telephone service to  a  point w here it could begin to actively m arket its services as 
opposed to its previous policy o f  actively discouraging connections.
Both recom m endations w ere im m ediately accepted. The period from  1979 to 1984 saw  the 
com pletion both  o f  a  £650 m illion A ccelerated D evelopm ent P rogram m e and o f  the 
process o f  passing the telephone service from  Civil Service hands into those o f  a  new 
sem i-state body, Telecom  Eireann.
Faced w ith a  still substantial w aiting list and a  heavy debt burden, Telecom  E ireann 
initially concentrated  on increasing subscriber line connections. 1984 to 1989 saw  the 
com pany effect a  total transform ation  o f  the service, effectively w iping out the w aiting 
list, earning (from  1987) consistent profits and, by the end o f  the 1990s, beginning to 
reduce the principle am ount o f  the debt burden. The num ber o f  exchange lines rose from  
483 ,000 ' in 1980 to  1.113 m illion by M arch 1993, Furtherm ore, although there rem ained 
regional d isparities in the  penetration o f  the telephone by the close o f  1993. the “ 01” 
D ublin area  accounted fo r only 38%  o f  all subscriber lines, approxim ately  in keeping w ith 
the overall d istribution o f  the Irish  population.
9.3 U niversal Service 1880 - 1993
H avm g looked a t the basic  diffusion o f  the telephone netw ork from  1880 to  1993, it is 
now possible to consider how  the concept o f  U SO  and explicit o r im plicit policies related 
to  universal service developed in p ara lle l.
1 Central Stadstics Office (1980), Statistical Abstracts, (Dublin: The Stationery Office), p. 332.
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Looking a t the period from  1880 until 1946, there w as a  consistent refusal on the p art o f  
the British and Irish Post O ffices to consider any subsidisation o f  telephone network.
From  the perspective o f  both the B ritish Post O ffice and the D epartm ent o f  Posts and 
Telegraphs the telephone w as only one com m unication option am ongst several offered by 
the Post Office. There w as thus no pressing need to  encourage its developm ent. Thus the 
touchstone o f  telephone policy w as th a t the service should be financially  self-sustaining. 
The practice  o f  setting distance-dependent rentals (particu larly  a t the specially  assessed 
exchanges) ensured th a t the fees charged fo r service w ere cost-oriented. T hus, w hilst a 
differential betw een business and residential rentals w as in troduced in 1925, there is no 
evidence th a t this constituted cross-subsid isation  from  business users to residential 
subscribers. In effect, then, universal service was sim ply not an issue with regard to  the 
telephone service. N onetheless, the telephone did play a role in ensuring th a t the universal 
service obligation faced by the Post O ffice w as achieved. The telephone service in this 
period w as to  earn  the profits th a t w ould subsidise the acceptable losses from  the 
telegraph service and from  rural Post O ffices, w hich were explicitly  identified as 
perform ing a social function.
The firs t step tow ards universal service goals with regard to the telephone service emerged 
with the R ural Call Box Program m e. A t the heart o f  the program m e w as the assum ption 
th a t the telephone service should, a t least partially , serve a social function. Furtherm ore 
losses incurred on the program m e could be cross-subsidised from  the earnings o f  m ore 
profitable areas o f  the service. Thus, w hilst profits from  the telephone w ould continue to 
even out the losses from  the telegraphs and postal service, the fact th a t the service could 
also internally  cross-subsidise itse lf m arked an abou t-tu rn  w ith regard to  the telephone. 
The com m encem ent o f  a  follow -up rural kiosk program m e in 1969 w as sim ilarly a 
recognition o f  the social role o f  the telephone service (although the program m e w as 
som ew hat less am bitious than  its predecessor - it did not, fo r exam ple, p lace a  kiosk in 
every tow n th a t had a P ost O ffice call box).
The other key elem ent o f  universal service in this period w as the gradual move tow ards 
rate-averaging. The decision in 1953 to end the practice o f  specially assessing rentals a t 
very sm all exchanges w as the first step tow ards uniform  pricing. From  1953 onw ards, 
standard  rentals w ere established nationally (although it rem ained the case that the full 
extent o f  the free mileage radius w as limited to subscribers in D ublin, Cork and Limerick). 
Furtherm ore, it is apparen t that the D epartm ent gradually  relaxed its p rincip le that rental
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charges should cover the cost o f  in terest and m aintenance o f  individual su b sc rib e rs’ lines 
during the late 1940s and 1950s. In e ffe c t then, rental charges w ere kept artificially  low 
by cross-subsid isation  from  call charges thereafter, as a m eans o f  encouraging the take-up 
o f  the telephone. H aving said this, however, the advances tow ards nationally  uniform  rates 
made in the 1950s w ere som ew hat underm ined by the introduction in 1965 o f  the advance 
rental requirem ent, the scale o f  w hich varied according to a given ap p lican t’s distance 
from  the exchange.
The 1970s saw  the beginnings o f  a  dual (and a  m ore explicit) policy approach to universal 
service, the tw o aspects o f  w hich w ere differentiated by the source o f  funding. The first 
aspect w as the introduction during the 1970s o f  nationally standardised  rentals (or rate 
averaging), i.e. one rental regardless o f  location. Thus, by the late 1980s, universal service 
in p a rt consisted o f  a  com plex system  o f  cross-subsidisation on the p a rt o f  the service 
provider. As R ay Burke, then M inister fo r C om m unications, outlined in 1987:
“The m ore frequent users subsidise the lower users, business custom ers subsidise 
the residential custom ers, areas w ith high telephone density subsid ise the low  
density areas, call charges subsidise rental and connection charges., short local 
calls subsidise long local calls and international charges subsid ise national 
charges.”
T he second aspect o f  universal service developed w ith the decision o f  the D epartm ent o f  
Social W elfare to  subsidise free telephone rental fo r Old Age Pensioners from  1977. The 
extension o f  the  schem e during the 1980s and 1990s to the extent th a t 10% o f  all 
subscribers qualified fo r it m ade it clear that in one area  at least the provision o f  the 
telephone w as recognised as an objective o f  social policy. Furtherm ore, w hilst the schem e 
w as initially considered a  safety m easure fo r elderly people living alone, the introduction 
o f  the free call units in the w ake o f  the 1993 tariffs restructuring  implied a  som ew hat 
different role: i.e. tha t the telephone had a  function in m aintaining social netw orks and was 
an integral p art o f  the social infrastructure. C ritically , such a  rationale could be used to 
argue fo r the connection to the telephone netw ork o f  any section o f  the com m unity, on the 
grounds tha t otherw ise they w ould no longer be p a rt o f  the larger com m unity A lthough, 
as o f  1993 there w as no indication th a t such a  rationale w ould actually  lead to  any
2 Ray Burke, DD 375, pp. 1332-1333. 19/11/87.
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practical expansion o f  the universal service objective in Ireland, the philosophical 
foundations fo r such a  m ove had  nonetheless been laid
9.4 Influences
H aving looked a t the developm ent both o f the service itse lf and o f  the universal service 
policies w hich inform ed its developm ent, the following sections exam ine in detail the 
respective influences o f  technological, social, econom ic and political factors in shaping 
both the diffusion o f  the system  and the developm ent o f  universal service policy.
9.4.1 Technology
As the follow ing sections argue, technological innovations do no t appear to have had a 
pro-active influence on Irish  telecom m unications policy, w here social and political factors 
w ere proportionately  m uch g reater influences. T hat is, in the Irish context, new  technology 
has rarely  ( if  ever) been a  determ ining influence on any substan tia l developm ent o f  the 
system. N onetheless a  review o f  the application  o f  new technology over the period covered 
by this research does suggest th a t w ithout the use o f  such technologies policy decisions to 
develop the netw ork could not have been fulfilled to  the extent they were. Thus w hilst 
teclinology w as unable to  surm ount the  problem s posed fo r the early  developm ent o f  the 
netw ork (1880 -  1921) - i.e. the cost o f  the telephone relative to  average income and the 
country’s low population density - it can nonetheless be argued tha t the introduction o f  the 
first exchange in D ublin  in 1880 did reduce the cost o f  telephony, by substantially  
reducing the cost o f  interconnecting subscribers. Indeed as argued in chap ter four, the 
introduction o f  the exchange m eant th a t m arginal costs o f  adding new  subscribers fell, 
ensuring th a t it w as in the interests o f  the service provider to encourage new subscriptions 
once a  given exchange had been opened.
H ow ever, as a result o f  the slow  pace o f  netw ork grow th (itse lf due to the factors 
identified in the sections th a t follow ), other technical innovations associated  w ith declining 
telecom m unications costs sim ply w ere not introduced to Ireland until the establishm ent o f  
the Free State. The introduction to  the UK o f  exchange autom ation in 1912, for exam ple, 
was necessitated by the p ressures placed on operators by increasing subscriber num bers. 
The absence o f  such stresses on the Irish  system  m eant tha t there w as no need for 
autom atic exchanges until the 1920s.
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Once autom atic exchanges w ere introduced to D ublin (in response to  the grow ing num ber 
o f  subscribers there), however, a  com bination o f  social and econom ic factors m ade it 
im possible to  consider an early extension o f  the autom atic service beyond any Irish cities 
or very large tow ns. The high initial capital expense o f  au tom atic  exchanges lim ited their 
application econom ically to areas w ith high population densities, a  fact w hich related not 
ju s t  to  the cost o f  the exchanges them selves bu t also to the cost o f  cabling from  the 
exchange to  the subscriber. The high cost o f  cable needed to  connect subscribers to 
autom atic exchanges m ade the introduction o f  the service to  sparsely  populated  rural areas 
im possible in the short term . N onetheless, the absence o f  such a  service on a  nationw ide 
scale w ould rem ain a  problem  from  the u se rs’ perspective, not ju s t  because o f  the ex tra  
service hours the au tom atic exchange perm itted relative to  m anual exchanges. As Fielding 
and H artley  point out, the ability to  dial num bers directly, by em pow ering the subscriber, 
encourages use o f  the telephone, ultim ately rendering it m ore useful:
“H ow ever it can be argued t h a t . . .  the introduction o f  direct dialling, replacing 
the need to go through an  operator, created  a  user-transparen t medium  w hich 
people see as enabling them  to establish sim ple, direct and private contact 
betw een them selves and another individual. Before this, the presence o f  an 
operator represented, and indeed created, a  m edium  w hich w as com plex, indirect 
and essentially  pub lic .”3
G iven the above and the rejection o f  the rural party  line on the grounds that it w as not 
sufficiently private, autom ation w as thus identified in Ireland as critical to  overcom ing the 
perception o f  the telephone as an “essentially public” com m unications system.
Nonetheless, the 1930s did see new technology contribute to the developm ent o f  the 
provincial service. As trunk  traffic  grew  beyond the capacity  o f  the existing system  in the 
1930s, the installation and  application o f  three carrier trunk system s proved a  m ore 
econom ic m eans o f  adding capacity  for distances o f  60 miles o r m ore, effectively trebling 
the capacity  o f  those trunk  lines to w hich the system s w ere app lied .4
3 Fielding and Hartley (1987), "The Telephone: A Neglected Medium" in Asher Casheden and 
M artin Jordan (eds.) Studies in Communication (London: Basil Blackwell), p. 115.
4 A.J. Litton (1961), The Growth and Development of the Irish Telephone System, in The 
Journal o f  the Statistical acl Social Inquiry Society o f  Ireland. Vol. 20, Part 5, pp. 79-115, p. 
110.
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As T able 9,1 below  suggests, the D epartm ent’s introduction o f  19 system s on the m ajor 
national trunk  routes, betw een 1931 and 1939, increased the carry ing  capacity  o f  the 
national trunk  system  by 40%  above its m axim um  capability  p rio r to investm ent in the 
new technology.
Table 9.1: Number of Miles of Trunk Telephone lines 1931 - 1951.







1932 14.8 0.3 15.1
1933 14.9 0.3 15.2
1934 15.1 0.5 15.6
1935 15.2 0.8 16.0
1936 15.4 1.3 16.7
1937 15.5 3.8 19.3
1938 15.8 4.7 20.5
1939 16.5 5.7 22.2
1940 16.8 7.0 23.8
1941 17.4 8.0 25.4
1942 17.9 8.6 26.5
1943 18.1 9.4 27.0
1944 18.7 11.9 28.1
1945 19.1 12.8 31.0
1946 20.0 19.2 32.8
1947 20.5 20.2 39.7
1948 21.0 20.6 41.2
1949 21.6 20.6 42.2
1950 22.3 22.2 42.9
Technology w as also a  key fac to r in shaping the C abinet C om m ittee’s post-w ar 
developm ent plan. D evelopm ents in sem i-autom atic exchange technology, trunk carrier 
system s and co-axial cable, reduced both per subscriber autom ation cost and the cost o f  
extending the trunk  service. T hus, new technology m ade investing in the extension and 
autom ation o f  the telephone system  in rural areas financially viable, even given the 
D epartm ent’s still cautious a ttitude w ith regard  to the service. A s table 9.2 overleaf 
illustrates, the com bination o f  installing autom atic exchanges in the  larger provincial 
tow ns and sem i-autom atic exchanges in the sm aller ones, m eant tha t by 1959, 76%  o f  
subscribers w ere receiving autom atic service.5
5 Ibid.
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1940 25,896 59% auto
1941 26,359 61% auto



















Ironically, the post-w ar plan, w hich had been m ade possib le by technology., w ould in turn 
dem and the application  o f  new er technology still. As the num ber o f  provincial subscribers 
increased, so did the volum e o f  trunk traffic. H ow ever, by the s ta rt o f  the 1960s the 
potential fo r adding capacity  by w ay o f  applying three or 12 channel carrier system s had 
been exhausted, w hilst the rising cost bodi o f  cable and o f  digging cable routes threatened 
to place very stric t lim its on new long-line developm ent. H ow ever, from  1961 onw ards, 
the D epartm ent w as able to  use m icrow ave transm itters, w hich used no cable and thus 
required no trenching, as a  m eans o f  augm enting trunk routes. Indeed w ireless additions to 
the national in frastructure  w ould often prove the only econom ic m eans o f  bringing the 
service to the m ost rem ote areas. The obvious exam ple noted in this research is tha t o f  the 
B lack V alley in K erry  w hich w as finally connected to  the national netw ork via a 
radiotelephony system  in the late 1980s.
N ew  technology w as finally critical in achieving the aim s set out in the D argan  Report. 
Consequently the D epartm ent had invested heavily both in new digital exchange 
technology and in the in frastructure  (new m icrow ave radio links, 30 channel Pulse Code 
M odulation system s and ultim ately fibre optic cable) necessary  to support the creation o f
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a  nationally  integrated digital netw ork.6 In addition to allow ing the subscriber to  use new 
telecom m unications services, the digitalisation o f  the netw ork also  offered cost advantages 
to  the P ost Office. Fault-testing, service provision and cessation  adjustm ents to  the 
charging structures could all be m ade w ithout electrical m odifications and could, 
assum ing the p rio r existence o f  in frastructure be carried  out rem otely, reduce the 
telephone serv ice’s personnel requirem ents. Further reductions in personnel needs resulted 
from  the low er m aintenance associated w ith the digital exchange: in con trast to  its step-by- 
step and crossbar predecessors, the digital sw itches had  no m oving parts and consequently 
w ere fa r less vulnerable to  w ear and tear. Consequently, m ore reliable than its 
predecessors, digital technology w as critical in achieving the quality  o f  service indicators 
dem anded by the D argan R eport. In 1978, before digitalisation, only 61 .1%  o f  local calls 
and 37.7%  o f  STD  calls w ere successfiil on the first attem pt. Six years later and five 
years after the digitisation program m e began, the figures had im proved to  97%  for local 
calls and 95%  fo r trunk  calls. As o f  M arch 1993 the national figures for local and trunk  
call failure w ere 1% and  2%  respectively.7
In sum, the advances in technology over the period covered by this research played a  vital 
role in facilitating  the diffusion o f tiie  network. Furtherm ore, the application o f  such 
technology, although frequently expanding the capacity  o f  the netw ork both in term s o f  
subscriber num bers and o f  traffic , was often m ore expensive in the short term  than that 
which preceded it. The cost savings offered by new technology related to falling  per 
subscriber’ or ‘per ca ll’ costs. To derive the full benefits o f  these savings, the service 
provider often needed to  increase subscriber num bers or the level o f  call traffic . Thus 
initial capital investm ent in new teclinology w as frequently followed by drives to  develop 
the network, to  ju stify  the initial expense (m ost notably in the afterm ath  o f  the 1979 - 
1984 A ccelerated D evelopm ent Program m e). In short, once the initial policy decision to 
sanction investm ent had been m ade, the cost o f  the new teclinology actually  encouraged 
the service provider to  increase subscriber num bers, contributing to the overall 
developm ent o f  the network.
6 Wall, op. cit., pp. 129-130.
1 Telecom Eirearm (1993), Report and Accounts for the year ended Is' April 1993. p. 6.
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9.4.2 Social Influences
This research  has consistently  argued tha t social and socio-spatial factors have been a 
critical force in shaping both the developm ent o f  the telephone system , and in influencing 
universal service policy, not least because, as o f  the late 1990s, residential subscribers 
account for m ore than  tw o-thirds o f  all subscribers. This research has specifically 
identified three social factors as particularly  im portant to  the developm ent o f  the telephone 
system  over the period under review:
- population  density per square kilom etre
- rising incom es and standards o f  living relative to  the cost o f  the telephone
- w hat m ight generally be described as the forces o f  m odernity.
In considering the firs t period covered by this research, the fact that private: operators 
sought to  earn  the grea test possible profits in the shortest possible tim e (due to  the 
political factors d iscussed in chapter four), m ade the social factors o f  Irish incom e levels 
and population d istribution, critical determ inants o f  in the early developm ent o f  the 
telephone. G iven their uncertainty about their own future, die T C I and subsequently  the 
N T C  adopted a  business strategy w hich can be sum m arised thus: setting rental charges to 
the m axim um  level th a t the m arket w ould b ear and focusing developm ent on those areas 
th a t could be served a t the low est possible cost per custom er. This strategy would have 
serious im plications for the developm ent o f  the telephone in the Irish context.
As the tab le  9.1 below  indicates, rental charges in Ireland betw een 1880 and 1922 
fluctuated  enorm ously. H ow ever, given the estim ates o f  average Dublin fam ily incomes 
during the 1910s (22/6 per w eek8), even the low est figure in the chart p laced the telephone 
beyond the m eans o f  the great bulk o f  the Irish population. T hus only com m ercial o r state 
subscribers could afford  it, an analysis borne out by the fact tha t a t late as 1936, 
residential subscribers accounted fo r only 28%  o f  all Irish exchange lines.
8 F.S.L. Lyons (1973), Ireland Since the Famine. (London: Fontana), p. 69.
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Table 9.3: Rental charm s ncr annum 1880 - 1995.
Year Rental
1880 £20 per annum
1886 TCI offered telephones to domestic subscribers at £10 rental
1887 £15 exchange tariff in Belfast (NTC)
1890 £12 - £15 (NTC rates)
1891 £10 for first line, £8 10s for subsequent lines within a 1 mile radius of the nearest 
exchange. For each additional half-mile, the annual rental was increased by £2 10s. 
(NTC rates)
1897 y2 mile radial distance £8 , 3A  mile £9. one mile £10
1899 £12 10s NTC Annual rental (unlimited local calls)
1900 £3 7s NTC rental (Id per local call)
1900 Vi mile radial distance £7 10 and £1 5s for each additional 'A mile (PO Office)
1902 £3 within Vi mile radial distance (plus message rate introduced - Id for each local call, 
the subscriber guaranteeing to spend at least 30s per annum in respect of such calls. 
(Post Office) Therefore total cost at least £4 10s.
1907 Minimum message rate up to £5 (included 500 free local calls). Unlimited rate totally 
withdrawn.
1907 £4 up to 2m radial distance
5/1907 PO & NTC agree £5 minimum annual rental (covering 500 local calls)
1914 £4 surcharge placed on all new applications
4/1921 Flat and measured rates abolished - all subscribers come under the measured rate , 
paying VAA per local call and an annual rent of £8 10s (London), £8 (Birmingham, 
Glasgow, Liverpool and Manchester) and £7 l()s (Provinces - inc. Dublin)
1922 £7 10s up to Ini radial distance. 25/- per one-eighth mile (furlong) over (or £10 per mile).
The second policy, low cost service provision, required a  certain population  density to 
ju stify  the initial capital expense o f  building an  exchange. Y et Ireland had a  low and 
falling population  density in the second h a lf  o f  the 19th century. T he failure o f  the British 
industrial revolution to spread  to  Ireland and the seism ic effects o f  the fam ine m eant that 
the Irish population  rem ained predom inantly ru ral throughout the 19th century relative to 
the UK. B y 1911, 70%  o f  the population w as classified  as living in rural a reas .9 Even 
w ithin this overall decline, diere w ere substan tia l regional disparities in population 
density. T he w estern  seaboard  in particu lar lost people both to  em igration and to internal 
m igration tow ards the east o f  the country.
Table 9.4: Irish Po uilation Density !>v Province 1881 -1956
Province 1881 1891 1901 1911 1926 1936 1946 1956
LEINSTER 64.7 60.3 58.4 58.7 58.2 61.8 64.8 67.8
MUNSTER 55.1 48.5 44.5 44.8 40.1 39 37.9 36.3
ULSTER 78.2 72.7 71.1 70.9 37.2 34.7 32.7 29.2
CONNAUGHT 46.4 40.6 36.5 34.5 31.2 29.7 27.8 25.2
IRELAND 61.7 56.1 53.3 52.2 35.4 35.4 35.2 34.5
9 Ibid., p. 46
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Ire land’s political and econom ic orientation with respect to the United K ingdom  ensured 
th a t the adm inistrative and com m ercial centre w ere located on the east coast - that is to  
say D ublin and Belfast. Furtherm ore, post-fam ine internal m igration from  the country to 
the cities m eant th a t notw ithstanding the overall population decline, the counties o f  D ublin 
and A ntrim  (o f  w hich B elfast is the county tow n), saw  their population density increase 
a fter the fam ine, reaching 487 and 149 people per square kilom etre respectively. 
C onsequently, it w as initially only the tw o cities o f  D ublin and B elfast w hich offered both 
the m ost econom ically viable locales fo r service provision, and w hich w ere likely to  house 
those firm s or civic institutions m ost likely to  find a  use for the new  service during its 
initial developm ent stages.
T hus D ublin  and Belfast w ould be the hubs o f  national developm ent. D evelopm ent outside 
these areas largely depended on the centre. Flence the first trunk line in Ireland connected 
both cities, consequently leading to  the establishm ent o f  new exchanges along the route o f  
the trunk. T hus, notw ithstanding the fac t th a t there w as substantial dem and fo r telephone 
service outside the D ublin-B elfast axis, this dem and w as only m et when either the 
T C I/N T C  or Post O ffice adjudged the cost o f  service provision to  be sufficiently  low to 
ju stify  expansion. In short, N T C /P ost O ffice policies actively m ilitated against 
developm ent in areas o f  low population density, under which heading m ost o f  Ireland 
could be classed in the late 19th and early 20th century. Thus the com bination o f  
N T C /P o st O ffice polices and Irish population d istribution netw ork would a) necessarily  
spread geographically  from  east to w est and b) ensure that the spread  o f  the netw ork 
would occur slowly, given the fact th a t population density outside Dublin and B elfast 
w ould continue to  decline until the 1960s
Even when the P ost Office actively attem pted to extend the netw ork into the m ore rural 
areas o f  Ireland in the 1910s the sam e social factors hindered the a ttem pt The m ain policy 
m easure fo r so-doing, the rural party  line, faced not merely the social barriers o f  a 
reluctance o f  potential Irish subscribers to accep t a  non-private com m unications system  
but also the fac t tha t even the party  line required a population density tha t sim ply did not 
obtain in m ost o f  Ireland.
In any case, there is little to  suggest that the telephone fulfilled any supervening social 
needs in Irish  society in the late 19th century and early 20th century. Those areas on the
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w estern seaboard  hit hardest by em igration and thus w ith the m ost obvious 
com m unications needs w ere also the areas least likely to  receive service. Furtherm ore, the 
dual function served by the m ails - o f  conveying not ju s t  news bu t also  m oney v ia  postal 
orders - w as beyond the capacity  o f  the telephone.
Furtherm ore, the S tate in the late nineteenth century understood social com m unication as 
referring to  the content o f  a  given com m unication medium  rather than  the form  o f  that 
medium. Thus the telegraph could be considered a m eans o f  social com m unication to the 
extent th a t it perm itted the transm ission o f  m essages o f  a  non-business nature. The 
inherently social nature o f  telephonic com m unications w as not overly stressed in the initial 
phase o f  m arketing the telephone (indeed there is evidence th a t telephone com panies w ere 
often a t pains to  discourage such use which w as considered a  frivolous use o f  a business 
instrum ent). T hus a t G overnm ent level the telephone w as not seen as significantly  distinct 
from  the telegraphs bu t ra ther as an augm ented data  transm itting  and receiving device. 
G iven this, the telephone apparently  offered no substantial social utility over the existing 
telegraphs system s and the state saw  no social grounds on w hich to subsid ise the service.
The absence o f  any pressing social need fo r a  telephone service persisted  into the 1920s 
and 1930s, particu larly  as the relatively low num ber o f  subscribers lim ited the potential 
for social interaction over the telephone. In any case, despite the  fact that incomes 
increased tw o and h a lf  tim es faster than  telephone charges betw een 1925 and 1946,10 
telephone charges rem ained very expensive relative to  average incom es, contributing to the 
perception o f  the telephone as a business instrum ent. By 1938, assum ing tha t the average 
annual expenditure on a  residential line w as around £8 per annum  (rental plus calls), the 
telephone w ould have accounted fo r nearly 6%  o f  the gross average male industrial wage. 
C onsequently residential phones w hich accounted for roughly 25%  o f  all m ain lines in 
1929 only gradually  increased their share o f  the total, reaching approxim ately  30%  o f  all 
m ain lines by the  close o f  the 1930s." T hus only 8,000 Irish hom es w ould  have had a  
telephone by the close o f  this period, a  household penetration rate o f  less than 1 .4% .12
The critical factor in creating an im portant new  cluster o f  social and econom ic needs (and 
thus dem and for the telephone) occurred during wartim e. L im itations on physical
10 Own calculations based on figures provided in Appendices XXIVa and XXVI 11a.
11 CSO Statistical Abstract 1946.
12 Own calculations based on data in Appendices IV and XXXI.
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m ovem ent resulting from  fuel shortages and a curtailed public tran sp o rt service forced 
both businesses and individual citizcns to  explore the potential o f  the telephone, a  fact 
reflected in the extent to w hich local and trunk  call traffic  increased during the w ar years. 
H aving successfully  established its utility  am ongst non-business users under w artim e 
conditions, telephony becam e an increasingly im portant elem ent in the changing social and 
consum ption norm s o f  both the urban  and rural publics in the post-w ar era. The telephone 
becam e a  m uch sought after item during the b rie f post-w ar consum er boom. T hereafter, in 
the 1950s, residential dem and w as sustained by the increased affordability  o f  the telephone 
relative to  income over this period. Thus, although the 1950s represented a  period o f  slow 
econom ic grow th com pared to odier industrial econom ies, nonetheless it w as noted in 
1956 that:
“T he sm all increases in rentals and call rates as com pared w ith the m uch greater 
increases in money incomes have undoubtedly pu t telephones w ithin the reach o f  
people w ho could not afford  them  pre-w ar.” 13
W hilst the average annual w age fo r a  m an w orking in industry and services rose from  
£142 pounds in 1938 to  £484 in 1960 - an increase o f  3 3 0 % 14 - the price o f  standard  
residential telephone rental rose from  £5 to  £7 10s over the sam e period - an  increase o f  
ju s t 50% .
A  second key social factor sustaining dem and for the telephone w as the ongoing 
urbanisation  o f  Irish society. This w as com plicated in the post-w ar era  by the beginning o f  
the process o f  the suburbanisation  o f  Irish cities, particularly  o f  D ublin. M any o f  these 
new settlem ents w ere w ithout “any o f  the essential social am enities... ” 15 C onsequently ju st 
as w artim e conditions had prom pted an increase in traffic , so the relative difficulty o f  life 
in the new estates prom pted residential telephone penetration rates to increase 
substantially  during the 1940s and in particu la r during the 1950s. R esidential lines would 
increase from  accounting for ju s t 3 1 .8% 16 o f  all main exchange lines in 1940 to 48 .6%  in
13 DD 159, p. 23, 3/7/56.
H CSO Statistical Abstract 1968.
15 Brown, op. cit., p. 207.
16 NAD S 13086 A.
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I9 6 0 .17 By the close o f  the 1950s, nearly  47,000 Irish households had acquired the 
telephone, a  household penetration rate  o f  over 7%  18
Econom ic grow th, both in the 1960s and in the 1970s, w ould generate substan tia l social 
change in the fabric o f  Irish  society. F our per cent annual econom ic grow th during the 
1960s contributed to a  sim ultaneous rise o f  “about 50%  in m aterial living standards.” 19 
This encouraged a  reduction in the rate o f  em igration in the early  1960s and net 
im m igration in the  1970s, creating a bigger, w ealthier population. In this context 
“consum erist values m ade sw ift advances”20 and telephone ow nership becam e one o f  the 
visible indices not ju s t  o f  individual p rosperity  bu t also o f  one’s inclusion in the changes 
o f  m odernity. In short, the telephone acquired the status o f  an essential consum er good, a 
p roduct w hich an individual fam ily m ight reasonably expect to acquire, as opposed to  a 
luxury  item.
This sta tus w as augm ented by the ongoing decrease in the cost o f  the residential rentals 
relative to  average wages. The average m ale industrial w age increased from  £534 in 1960 
to £1 ,067  by 1969, an increase o f  a lm ost exactly 100% .21 A t the sam e tim e residential 
rental charges increased from  £7 10s to £12 10s, an increase o f  only 66% . M eanw hile in 
the 1970s, the average industrial w age rose from  £1,005 in 1970 to  £5 ,020  by 1980, a  
500%  increase.22 Indeed it is apparen t tha t the changing relative cost o f  the telephone, in 
this period in particu lar, created  a  situation  w hereby for the firs t tim e a  substantial 
proportion o f  the population perceived the utility o f  the telephone to  be g rea ter than its 
cost (as tab le  9.5 overleaf illustrates). The period w itnessed a  dram atic  increase in 
residential dem and for the telephone. F rom  constituting 48 .6%  o f  all lines in I9 6 0 .23 
residential lines cam e to  account fo r 57%  by 1979, a  household penetration ra te  o f  28% .24 
Furtherm ore, had the D epartm ent been able to  accom m odate effective dem and (i.e. those 
residential applicants on the w aiting list) there w ould have been a fu rther 65,000 
residential connections by 1980.
17 Litton, op. cit.
18 Own calculations based on data in Appendices IV and XXXI
19 Lee, op. cit., p. 360.
20 Terence Brown (1981), Ireland: A Social and Cultural Histoiy 1922-1979. (London: Fontana),
p. 260.
21 Note: these figures are the decimal equivalents of the average annual wages in these years. 
CSO (1978), Statistical Abstract 1977, pp. 144-145.
22 CSO (1986), Statisdcal Abstract 1982-1985, pp. 155-157.
23 Litton, op. cit. p. 105.
24 Own calculations based oil Appendices V and XXXI.
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Tabic 9.5: Annual »hone rental as a nerccntaue of averasic weekly waees
1938 -1 9 8 0 )
Year Annual Rental W eekly Wage Annual Rental as % 
of weekly wage
£ s/p S. D.
1938 5 54 11 110%
1945 5 5 70 8 92%
1950 5 5 107 11 60%
1955 7 10 146 5 64%
1960 710 10 186 4 50%
1965 12 267 2 53%
1980 2 2 2 51%
The social changes noted in the 1950s - ongoing urbanisation  and the associated  process 
o f  suburbanisation  - continued apace during the 1960s and 1970s. The m ajority  o f  the 
Irish  population lived in urban  areas by 1971 and the bulk o f  those new  u rban  dwellers 
lived in suburban  estates. Such internal m igration had social consequences, how ever, 
b reaking up older com m unities in both rural and urban  areas. T his w as a  critical fac to r in 
shaping the social environm ent w hich w itnessed the introduction o f  the free telephone 
rental schem e in 1977. A lthough the free rental scheme w as explicitly  ju stified  on the 
grounds tha t the telephone served a  critical em ergency function for old age pensioners 
living alone, recipients o f  free rental also had m uch to  gain in term s o f  m aintaining 
fam ilial and friendship links. In  short the 1977 decision im plicitly acknow ledged the 
telephone’s grow ing role as the “nervous system  o f  society,” a conclusion supported  by 
the fac t th a t the scheme w as directly funded by the D epartm ent o f  Social W elfare.
As residential penetration passed the 50%  m ark in the m id-1980s, the te lephone’s role as 
society’s “nervous system ” increased creating a  virtuous circle. The m ore pervasive the 
telephone becam e in Irish society, the m ore essential it w as to have access to  the 
telephone, leading in tu rn  to  increased dem and.
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The fac t th a t the S tate w as am ongst the firs t custom ers for Telecom  E ireann 's  new 
freephone service, when it w as introduced in 1985, is indicative o f  the extent to w hich 
even governm ent tacitly  recognised the telephone’s social im portance. A s the 1980s 
progressed, dom estic access to  the telephone w as increasingly taken  for granted, and 
access to  it w as considered vital to  operate in m odem  society - no t least by beneficiaries o f  
the free telephone rental schem e who, being pensioners, w ere no t am ongst the richest 
sectors o f  society. D espite this and  the fac t th a t the schem e did not cover connection costs, 
the num ber o f  people availing o f  the schem e increased by 100,000 people between 1979 
and 1993
Table 9.7 Number availiim of Free Telephone Rental Scheme 1979 - 1993
















D espite the increasing im portance o f  the telephone in society during the 1980s and 1990s, 
this did not lead to  any substan tia l developm ents in governm ent policies aim ed at 
encouraging its take-up. N onetheless, the charge increases o f  1993 forced both the S tate 
and the service provider to  concede the increasing extent o f  the telephone's vital social 
role. Telecom  E ireann’s decision to create a  fund from  w hich to  finance freephone lines 
operated by charities, stressed the extent to w hich charities such as the R ape C risis Centre 
and Childline could not operate w ithout the telephone system . Furtherm ore, the scope o f  
the philosophy underlying the D epartm ent o f  Social W elfa re ’s free telephone rental 
scheme becam e increasingly wide. W hilst a t the outset o f  the period, it w as both im plicit 
in the qualification criteria, and explicit in the statem ents o f  G overnm ent M inisters tha t 
the schem e w as effectively a safety  m easure for elderly people living alone, the 
introduction o f  the free call units in the w ake o f  the 1993 tariffs restructuring  implied a 
m uch g reater role than  hitherto  stated - i.e. one o f  societal cohesion, indeed it could be 
argued tha t the D epartm ent recognised tha t the telephone already played such a role, and 
that the allow ance was sim ply an  acknow ledgem ent tha t tha t particu la r function w ould be 
underm ined by the an increase in call charges. Joan B urton’s descrip tion  o f  the 
allow ance’s purpose in M ay 1993 confirm ed this:
“ first, to  allow  elderly and disabled people sum m on help in em ergencies and, 
second, enable them  to rem ain active in the com m unity and keep in touch w ith 
relatives and friends.”25
9.4.3 E conom ic Factors
As noted in section 6.4.2, the shape o f  the Irish  econom y indirectly influenced the initial 
diffusion o f  the telephone. G iven tha t the m arketing and the pricing o f  the telephone 
identified it as a  business tool, the initial developm ent o f  the telephone service was focused 
on Ire land’s com m ercial centres - B elfast and Dublin. H ow ever, w hilst the telephone’s 
utility as a  tool for individual businesses w as taken fo r granted  from  the outset, the idea 
th a t it m ight have a  w ider role to  play in the econom y w as not. In particu la r the state saw  
no relationship betw een the developm ent o f  a  national telephone in frastructure and 
national econom ic growth. T hus early requests from  organisations representing industry 
and com m erce to  extend the trunk  telephone netw ork w ere rarely acceded to. Furtherm ore, 
the adherence to a  laissez-faire  political econom ic orthodoxy by both British
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adm inistrations and the first Irish adm inistration, m eant th a t the state w as unw illing to 
invest in an in frastructure  tha t w ould largely benefit private capital. In any case the main 
fiscal objective o f  the C um ann na nGaedhael adm inistration betw een 1922 and 1932 was 
to aid  the fann ing  com m unity, by m inim ising the ta x  burden and  thus state expenditure. 
This w as not a  political econom ic environm ent conducive to encouraging heavy investm ent 
in capital intensive telecom m unications in frastructure and equipm ent. In short, the absence 
o f  any perceived link betw een the econom y and the telecom m unications netw ork during 
the early  p a rt o f  the period under review  in this research m eant that the econom y w as 
unlikely to  p lay  a  determ ining role in the initial developm ent o f  the telephone netw ork.
Although fa r m ore com m itted to  actively shaping the national econom y, the first F ianna 
Fail adm inistration o f  1932 to  1948, like its predecessor, did not identify the 
telecom m unications in frastructu re  as a m eans to do so. Thus despite th a t p a rty 's  active 
prom otion o f  industrial developm ent during the 1930s, the telephone system  w as largely 
left to  its own devices, its diffusion dictated by the presence or absence o f  effective 
demand. Even the decision th a t would ultim ately lead to the creation o f  a tru ly  national 
trunk  system , the C abinet C om m ittee 's 1944 post-w ar developm ent program m e, w as 
apparently  not prom pted by national econom ic considerations. There are  no explicit 
references to  the im portance o f  the plan for the national econom y in either the memos 
flowing betw een the C om m ittee and the D epartm ent o f  Posts and Telegraphs during the 
period in w hich the post-w ar plan w as developed despite the fac t tha t Sean L em ass, later 
one o f  the architects o f  the opening up o f  the Irish economy a t the close o f  the 1950s. was 
a  m em ber o f  the Com m ittee
In fact, it w ould take developm ents in the econom y itse lf to force re-evaluation o f  the link 
between telecom m unication and econom ic grow th. The opening up o f  the Irish economy 
from  1958 saw  the sta te  actively encourage the developm ent o f  dom estic export-oriented 
com panies and direct inw ard investm ent. The re-orientation o f  the economy tow ards 
exports together w ith the  presence o f  m ultinational com panies in Ireland m ade the 
im portance o f  the telecom m unications in frastructure  to  econom ic developm ent suddenly 
and spectacularly  clear. A 1978 a  D epartm ent o f  Econom ic P lanning subm ission to  the 
D argan R eport w ould argue that:
25 DD 430, p. 25, 19/5/93.
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“O ur telecom m unications needs had to  be related to  such exceptional factors as 
our unfavourable geographic location, the high degree o f  dependence on foreign 
trade and the need to  a ttrac t substantial and sustained foreign investm ent to 
prom ote econom ic developm ent and to  create jo b s .”26
H ow ever ,the re-orientation o f  the econom y also highlighted the inherent w eaknesses not 
ju s t o f  the existing telephone infrastructure  but also o f  a developm ent policy w hich had 
previously been dem and-led. The apparen t inability o f  the service to cope w ith unexpected 
increases in dem and (as w as the case during the 1960s and 1970s) em phasised the need to 
develop the service in anticipation  o f  demand. The analysis th a t such long-term  planning 
w as beyond the ability o f  the state, ultim ately lead to the D argan  R eport's  
recom m endation th a t the service be placed in the hands o f  a  sem i-state body. In effect 
then, econom ic change and  industrial developm ent concerns in particu la r indirectly 
prom pted the total re-organisation o f  the telephone service.
It also led successive governm ents to  accept as an article o f  faith  th a t econom ic 
developm ent depended on the p rio r existence o f  a  highly developed telecom m unications 
system , especially in the late 1980s and 1990s when G overnm ent econom ic developm ental 
rhetoric increasingly stressed the im portance o f  inform ation and service industries for 
fu ture Irish em ploym ent. (Furtherm ore as teleservice industries developed in the late 
1980s and 1990s, the telephone w ould increasingly constitute an industry in its own right.) 
The succession o f  three year developm ent plans draw n up by Irish  governm ents in the 
1980s and 1990s each stressed the central role o f  telecom m unications for econom ic 
growth. In consequence, industrial developm ent policy and thus the needs o f  industry 
w ould increasingly come to dom inate Irish telecom m unications developm ent and policy 
decisions. (A  fact em phasised by the fact that a  subm ission to the C ulliton R eport on Irish 
Industrial Policy in the 1990s, could seriously suggest sim ply handing responsibility  for 
telecom m unications policy over to  the D epartm ent o f  Industry and Com m erce.) Thus 
although som e o f  the new services introduced by the D epartm ent o f  Posts and Telegraphs 
and Telecom  E ireann in the 1980s and 1990s w ould eventually benefit residential 
custom ers, the m ajority  o f  such services were directed at the business m arket. It is 
difficult to  avoid the conclusion tha t the introduction o f  a digital network, the Eircell 
mobile phone service, the D A SSN E T  data  service, the E IR PA G E  paging service etc., 
w ere not prim arily  driven by the needs o f  com m ercial users.
26 Dargan Report, para 5.4, p. 25,
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The full im plications for universal service o f  the new em phasis on intim ate links betw een 
econom ic perform ance and  econom ic grow th w ere not evident by the close o f  the 1970s. 
Econom ic grow th did not have exclusively negative consequences for universal service 
policy. The perception inform ing F ianna F a il 's  1977 m anifesto th a t the country would 
continue to  experience grow th and prosperity  w as arguably  critical in the creating the 
environm ent w here the sta te  could consider the free telephone rental scheme. N onetheless 
in the longer term  the influence o f  the telecom m unications/econom ic developm ent 
orthodoxy w ould have serious im plications for developm ent o f  PO T S and IJSO. The tone 
o f  one N E SC  report on the im portance o f  in frastructure  fo r industrial developm ent w as 
ominous in this regard:
“ It is tem pting to  conclude that first-class telecom m unications th roughout Ireland 
is unequivocally desirable., (but) there m ust be priorities and it is not obvious that 
there is a  com m ercial case for a first-class service in all areas o f  the country, 
including the rem otest ones . . . The likely outcom e a t presen t will be some 
com prom ise betw een lower standards and uneven coverage . . . There is therefore 
a  strong case fo r concentrating the provision o f  in frastructure  for those with 
intensive requirem ents - roads, telecom m unications and w ater - in lim ited areas, 
m any o f  them  probably  urban  . ” 27
As a  result o f  the experience o f  the 1970s, there is little question tha t post-D argan , the 
outlook o f  the telephone service provider changed quite dram atically . A lthough Telecom  
E ireann w as established as a  sem i-state com pany with a  public service remit, the m ove to 
sem i-state status w as ju stified  on the grounds th a t it w ould lead to  a  m ore com m ercial 
outlook on the p a rt o f  the service provider (and by im plication a  better service). 
Furtherm ore, the fact th a t the telecom m unications opera to r had becom e a  critical fac to r in 
national econom ic developm ent m ade the state less w illing to  interfere w ith or in any way 
jeopard ise  the prospects o f  the com pany. As suggested in chapter eight, however, this 
effectively left Telecom  Eireann to  establish its own priorities. Faced with a  substantial 
debt burden and, in the 1980s, a  depressed overall econom ic context, the com pany thus 
had no incentive to  expand the com m itm ent to the universal service objective it inherited
27 Christopher D. Foster/NESC (1981), The Importance of Infrastructure to Industrial 
Development in Ireland: Rositi. Telecommunications and Water Suppls, (Dublin: Stationery 
Office), p. 79.
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from  the state: com m on carriage. Even as the com pany’s econom ic position began to 
im prove in the 1990s w ith the reduction o f  its debt burden and the recovery in the national 
economy, the increasingly com petitive nature o f  the  m arket environm ent w ithin w hich 
Telecom  E ireann operated  led the com pany to becom e m ore com m ercially m inded than
ever.
Y et ironically the increasing industrial developm ent orientation o f  telephone service forced 
the state to  re-exam ine its social role and thus saw  the beginnings o f  a  m ore coherent 
understanding o f  the question o f  universal service. G erry  C ollins’ querying o f  the rationale 
for funding social services in 1972 raised the question o f  why an institution tha t w as a) 
explicitly required to  run its finances along com m ercial lines and  b) increasingly a  fac to r 
in the developm ent o f  the national economy should also fund a  loss-m aking socially- 
oriented service. The D argan  report too w ould argue th a t explicitly socially-oriented 
services should no t be considered part o f  the service obligations o f  the sem i-state body 
tha t w ould replace the Telephone Section. Furtherm ore, argued the report, should the 
G overnm ent require tha t body to  operate such services, “ it should be com pensated 
specifically for so doing.”2lS The D epartm ent o f  Social W elfare decision to subsidise free 
telephone rental fo r Old Age Pensioners from  1977 effectively anticipated this 
recom m endation by p lacing the burden o f  financing the schem e in the hands o f  the 
D epartm ent o f  Social W elfare. In effect, then, the explicit recognition o f  the telephone’s 
social role and thus o f  the policy m ost readily identified as universal service-oriented, w as 
indirectly caused by a  change in the overall direction o f  the economy.
In sum, fo r the firs t h a lf  o f  the period covered by this research there appears to have been 
little recognition th a t the im pact o f  telecom m unication w as not lim ited to  its use as a 
business tool. The idea th a t investm ent in telecom m unication infrastructure  m ight 
constitute part o f  the basis for economic grow th only em erged in the wake o /eco n o m ic  
grow th during the 1960s and 1970s. Since then, how ever, it has been an article o f  faith 
am ongst successive governm ents that telecom m unication investm ent is a  prerequisite for 
any econom ic developm ent, especially in the  light o f  the prom otion o f  the notion 
(discussed in m ore detail in chapter ten) th a t the Irish econom y in the 1990s is m oving into 
an inform ation economy. T hus ju s t  as electricity had previously been identified as the 
critical in frastructu ra l tool for developing a  m anufacturing base so telecom m unications 
had been identified here as the in frastructure  o f  the international inform ation and services
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cconomy. In effect the period since the 1960s has increasingly established econom ic ra ther 
than  social developm ent as the role o f  the telecom m unications service provider.
9.4 .4  Political influences.
G iven th a t the operation o f  the Irish telephone service has lain in the hands o f  one o f  tw o 
states for the bulk o f  its existence, political factors have clearly had an enorm ous influence 
in the developm ent o f  the service over tha t time. T hus an understanding o f  the Irish 
political process, Irish  political culture and the specific circum stances o f  the D epartm ent 
o f  Posts and T elegraphs/C om m unications is critical to  understanding the developm ent o f  
universal service policy  in Ireland.
U nder B ritish rule, the P ost O ffice w as required to be financially  self-sustain ing as an 
overall institution. W hilst losses could be to lerated in som e areas (as w as the case w ith 
regard to  the T elegraph service from  the 1880s), this w as limited by the extent to w hich 
they could be cross-subsidised from others. W ith regard to the telephone service, then, the 
prior existence o f  a  cheap, efficient and ubiquitous public com m unications system  based 
around the postal and telegraphs services m ade it a luxury that the Post O ffice (or perhaps 
m ore accurately  the T reasury) w as unw illing to  subsidise. This conception o f  the 
telephone service as a  com m ercial operation w as reflected by the m inim al legal service 
provision obligations placed on the Post O ffice. Successive Postm aster G enerals (and 
indeed M inisters fo r Posts and Telegraphs) effectively faced no legal obligations o f  any 
kind w ith  regard  to  the provision o f  the telephone service. The critical legislation 
th roughout th is period - the T elegraph Act, 1869 - w as designed not to place any 
obligations on the Postm aster General bu t to  guaran tee his exclusive privilege to  transm it 
telegram s. W hen, follow ing the “Edison” case in 1880, the British High C ourt held that a 
telephone w as a  telegraph w ithin the m eaning o f  the T elegraph Acts 1863 and 1869, the 
Postm aster G eneral’s exclusive privilege sim ply expanded to include the telephone.
This w as the outlook o f  the service when the Irish D epartm ent o f  Posts and Telegraphs 
took over in 1922. T he essential conservatism  o f  the Irish and their political leaders a t this 
time, m eant the adm inistrative handover in 1922 did not engender any substantive 
alteration o f  the political institutions or services taken over. The sm oothness o f  the 
transfer o f  political pow er from  B ritain  to  Ireland, in 1921, m eant that the D epartm ent o f
28 Dargan Report, para 4.7, p. 17.
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Posts and Telegraphs did not question the existing adm inistrative fram ew ork or its 
priorities: the M inisters and Secretaries A ct 1924 sim ply allocated to the D epartm ent “the 
adm inistration and business generally o f  public services in connection w ith posts, 
telegraphs and telephones and all pow ers, duties and functions connected w ith the sam e.”29 
The Post O ffice as a  w hole would, as the nearest sta te  approach  to a  com m ercial 
operation, retain  the im perative to  be financially se lf  sustaining. Thus also adopting the 
perception th a t the telephone w as either a  business im plem ent o r a  luxury' in the home, the 
D epartm ent o f  Posts and Telegraphs w ould initially rule out the possibility  o f  any 
subsidisation o f  the telephone netw ork developm ent in this period. From the D epartm ent 
o f  Posts and T elegraphs’ perspective the telephone rem ained one o f  several 
com m unication options offered by the Post Office: there w as thus no pressing need fo r its 
development.
The politically  im posed need to be financially  self-sufficient w ould prove to be a  key 
influence on both the diffusion o f  the service and the w illingness o f  the D epartm ent o f  
Posts and T elegraphs to  pursue universal service-type polices. H ence during the 1920s 
when both the P o st Office and the telephone service consistently lost m oney, the 
D epartm ent refused to  perm it the extension o f  public Telephone Call Boxes into rural 
areas, w ithout a  strong expectation or actual guaran tee  that such provision w ould be 
financially self-supporting. As a  consequence call box provision, the single m ethod which 
perm itted non-subscribers access to the telephone, effectively ceased in rural areas in the 
m id-1930s w hen it becam e im possible to find any new locations tha t satisfied the financial 
requirem ent. Furtherm ore the Post O ffice’s one experim ent between 1924 and 1928 w ith 
expanding the service in anticipation o f  dem and (and thus profits) actually  saw  an increase 
in the scale o f  the deficits. This proved to  be a  critical lesson. It w as a  decade and a  h a lf  
before any concerted m ove to expand the netw ork would again be undertaken.
Conversely, w hen the service began to earn  a  p rofit in the 1930s, the D epartm ent began to 
engage in som e rate averaging, extending the free m ileage area to a  three m ile radius from 
the nearest exchanges. Even the telephone serv ice’s profitability, how ever, was not 
sufficient to  guarantee tha t the D epartm ent w ould actively develop the service. From  
having been a  service th a t could not be subsidised between 1880 and the 1930s, once the 
service did begin to earn  profits, these w ere identified as a  m eans o f  subsidising losses on
29 Ministers and Secretaries Act 1924, Section 1(IX).
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the other services which had an explicit social remit. As one secretary o f the Department 
noted:
“When I went to the Post Office and for some years afterwards, the postal and 
telephone services taken together paid their way; that is to say, taking one year 
with another an offsetting the eggs that the golden telephone goose had started to 
lay against the expensive labour-intensive postal m achine.”30
Only when both the Post Office and the Telephone service began to make unprecedented 
profits during the second world war was a serious development o f  the telephone system 
considered. The extra revenue resulting from the increased wartime call-traffic fed back 
into government policy-making convincing the Cabinet Committee on Economic Planning 
to recommend the abandonment o f the previous blanket policy that each individual element 
o f the telephone service be self-supporting, and to permit some subsidisation o f rural call 
boxes.
Table 9. 8: Annual Post Office Profit and Loss 1940 - 1945
Date Post Telegraphs Telephones Total
1940/41 (£115,257) (£130,203) £90,390 (£155,070)
1941/42 £91,465 (£115,573) £180,165 £157,057
1942/43 £52,803 (£103,917) £242,043 £190,929
1943/44 £114,621 (£73,685) £247,703 £288,639
1944/45 (£20,101) (£122,663) £267,289 £124,525
1945/46 £32,512 (£116,001) £298,004 £214,515
The profitability or otherwise of both the telephone section and the Post Office as a whole 
would remain a key influence on telephone development policy in the 1950s, Hence the 
Government’s willingness to adopt the Kamerbeek recommendations and thus lose an 
estimated £125,000 per annum in revenue, was again almost certainly coloured by the 
record profits earned by the telephone section in the last few years of the 1950s.
Only when telecommunications was ascribed a central role in the nation’s economic 
performance was the narrow profit and loss focus o f the Department o f  Posts and 
Telegraphs relaxed. Thereafter the cost o f developing the service was considered 
secondary to the overall economic cost to the country o f not developing the system. 
However the political identification o f the performance of the economy and the condition
30 Leon O ’Broin (1985), Just Like Yesterday. (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan), p. 163
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o f its telecommunications infrastructure, meant that industrial policy would increasingly 
influence telecommunications development.
One o f the side effects o f the political perception that the Post Office was essentially a 
commercial operation was to downgrade its status in cabinet, a fact made clear in the first 
Cumann na nGaedhael administration Ernest Blythe’s control o f the portfolio between 
1927 and 1932, whilst he was simultaneously the M inister for Finance, then as now one o f 
the most senior cabinet positions. Similarly in all three coalition administrations between 
1932 and 1980, the Ministry o f  Post and Telegraphs was assigned to a member o f the 
junior party. Again not until the telecommunications system ’s importance for the national 
economy became clear would Posts and Telegraphs or Communications be regarded as an 
important cabinet appointment.
The combination o f the perception that the Post Office and in particular the telephone 
service should be ran along commercial lines and the Departm ent’s relatively low cabinet 
status had unhappy implications for the Departm ent’s ability to access the capital essential 
for the expansion o f the network. Just as the British Treasury had limited the British Post 
Office’s freedom o f action with regard to the telephone service, the Department o f Finance 
consistently placed serious strictures on the Post Office’s telephone capital budget. Leon 
O ’Broin, Secretary o f the Department o f Posts and Telegraphs from the 1940s to the 
1960s has noted o f his Ministers that none
“were able to fight in the cabinet room or with the M inister for Finance who 
controlled the money supply. The Post Office always suffered from a shortage of 
capital for telephone development and with Ministers allowing themselves to be 
treated like small boys there was never any real hope o f catching up on the 
demand. The officials did the best they could with their opposite numbers in 
Finance but there was a limit to what they could do once the priorities had been 
fixed. The Post Office was always down towards the bottom of the list. We 
obviously did not count for much politically .”31
Again it was not until the external influence o f  the economy augmented the role of 
telecommunications that this situation was altered, as table 9.7 (below) suggests. The 
biographer o f Conor Cruise O ’Brien, M inister between 1973 and 1977 notes that “even in
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the days o f  the oil crisis, his department received more than its fair share and that is why 
his department was relatively peaceful.”32














A further consequence o f the perceived commercial status o f the Post Office and the 
telephone service was to seriously limit the extent to which it was considered an element of 
policy. O 'B roin again has noted o f his Ministers that they were for the “most part, modest 
men who came to the Post Office without much in the way o f ideas but who recognised 
that the best way to get results was to allow an old and well-tried machine to function 
efficiently.”33 Indeed O ’Broin suggests that Patrick Little, the Fianna Fail M inister in 
charge o f  the Department for most o f the 1940s was advised by then Taoiseach Eamon De 
Valera, on taking office to “concentrate on broadcasting, that the post office would look 
after itself.”34
In short there was little willingness on the part o f  politicians to engage in much long-term 
policy thinking with regard to the telephone service until its role became clear in the one 
area where strategic thinking had been applied since the close o f the 1950s - national 
economic development. In consequence a Post Office left to itself was effectively left in 
the hands o f  the civil service. However, as note above the Irish Civil Service had inherited 
from its British predecessor an unwillingness to engage in long-term thinking, favouring a 
focus on ensuring the day-to-day operation o f the various aspects o f the Irish 
administration. Furthermore, this approach has arguably persisted until the present day, as
31 Ibid..
32 Donald Hannan Akenson (1994), Conor. A Biography of Conor Cruise O ’Brien: Volume I. 
Nanative. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press), p. 396,
33 O’Broin, op. cit., p. 162.
34 O’Broin, op. cit., p. 170.
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the negative response to the public administrations reforms contained in the; Devlin Report 
suggests. The consequences this had for the telephone service should be obvious. Firstly 
there was a  lack o f any internal imperative to reconsider development policy on the part of 
either the civil service or indeed on the part o f their political masters. Furthermore, the 
focus on day-to-day thinking meant that any fundamental problems with the service had a 
tendency to be allowed develop until they precipitated a crisis. Policy then was only 
reconsidered in the face o f crisis or semi-crisis situations: hence the major development 
pushes o f the period between 1922 and 1984 (in 1924-1928, 1946-1959 and 1979-1984) 
would only occur in response to external developments relating to the telephone system 
rather than as a result o f proactive policy-making. Furthermore, once Ireland had literally 
and figuratively signed up to the EEC in 1973, the advent o f a European 
telecommunications policy was likely to have a determining effect on Irish 
telecommunications policy, notwithstanding the fact that, post-M aastricht, Ireland could 
legally invoke subsidiarity as means o f avoiding complete acceptance o f European policy. 
The ongoing tendency o f the Department o f Communications to react rather than to take 
pro-active measures, meant that in the absence o f any serious threats to the national 
service from European legislation, such legislation was likely to be adopted in full
Other influences on policy-making in general in Ireland have had implications for the 
development o f the telephone service. As noted in chapter three the predominance o f a 
clientalist or populist politics in Ireland has often militated against the development o f 
universalistic or national policies, favouring instead the short-term satisfaction o f different 
constituencies. Clearly this could hardly be conducive to the development o f  a 
geographically diffused telephone system. Nonetheless it is critical to understanding the 
immediate rationale behind the introduction o f the free telephone rental scheme in 1977. 
Although the logic advanced for the scheme at the time o f its introduction was that it 
would facilitate the access to ‘"a lifeline” for elderly people living alone, the telephone had 
arguably had this potential since its inception. At its most basic, the initial decision was, 
as part o f the most generous election manifesto in the history o f the state, a piece o f naked 
electioneering and a  classic example o f a populist political system in operation.
It should finally be noted with regard to the influence o f political factors on the 
development o f universal service in Ireland that the sudden leap from conceiving o f the 
service as a  market led organisation to one driven by the demands o f  industrial policy, 
undermined any possibility that the telephone’s social role might be given some serious
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thought. In consequence, the close o f the period under review was marked by the absence 
o f any clear philosophy amongst Irish communications policy-makers o f  the role o f  
communications in Ireland beyond the recognition o f its importance to a modern economy. 
This has had serious consequences for universal service policy. Although there has been a 
recognition o f the telephone’s social importance via the free telephone rental scheme, the 
practical import o f this has remained limited. Furthermore there has been no official 
recognition at all o f its political significance. As noted in chapter two, universal service in 
the U.S.
“derives its significance from a promise rooted in the nature o f the political 
system. All Americans are issued equal access to basic channels o f 
communications because the citizens o f a democracy need to be able to 
communicate in order to avail themselves o f the information necessary to make 
reasoned political choices.” 5
Arguably the Irish political system has accorded quite the same importance to the roles of 
communications and communication systems to the operation o f a democratic society. As 
noted in chapter three, Irish decision-making processes have tended to be centralised and 
secretive: it is indicative that the country 's first Freedom o f Information Act was only 
passed in 1997 and has in any case been described as embodying a passive rather than 
positive concept o f information freedom .36 Arguably, however, without such an 
understanding o f the political role o f communications, universal service policy in Ireland 
is unlikely to develop much beyond its current limits.
9.5 Conclusion
For the greatest part o f its history, the assumption on the part o f the various telephone 
service providers that the telephone service has been a commercial service meant that the 
development o f the Irish service occurred largely in response to demand. Furthermore its 
commercial orientation ensured that overall the service had to avoid losses: thus the
35 Jorge Reina Schement (1995), “Beyond universal service: Characteristics of Americans 
without telephone, 1980-1993”, Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 19, No. 6. pp. 4 77-485. p. 
484.
36 A positive concept of information freedom would state that "there will be 110 secrets except in 
cases A, B and C.” A passive concept on the other hand states that “there will be secrets except 
in the case of A, B and C.” Based on personal interview notes with Paul Daly, Labour Party 
Press Office.
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overall expansion o f  the network depended either on the overall profitability o f  the service 
or on the contribution that new technology could make to allowing the service to be 
extended cost-effectively. In short the diffusion o f the telephone was largely market led. 
This demand was initially led by business users but as the course o f  the 20th century wore 
on, changing social patterns generated residential demand so that by the 1960s, domestic 
subscribers accounted for the majority o f all subscribers. The telephone service would not 
be driven by a self-conscious developmental trajectory until the changing direction of the 
Irish economy in the 1960s emphasised the importance o f telecommunications for national 
economic development. Thereafter, the national telecommunications service was not 
merely proactively developed, but was heavily influenced by the requirements o f trade and 
commerce.
The development o f  universal service policies - considered here not ju s t to include 
socially-oriented programmes explicitly aimed at encouraging service but also the 
geographical expansion o f the network, rate-averaging, etc.- were thus influenced by a 
combination o f the factors above. As noted above the geographical expansion o f the 
network depended both on such expansion being financially viable and technologically 
feasible. Rate-averaging was generally only extended in the wake o f overall profitability. 
Critically, however, it was social change that prompted the development o f  the core 
universal service policy - the free telephone rental scheme. Although initially prompted by 
a  populist political impulse, the development o f  the scheme and the expansion o f the 
philosophy behind it were an acknowledgement that in modem society life is increasingly 




10.1 Introduction: The Future of Universal Service
As is argued in chapter two, the emergence o f universal service as a  policy debate in 
Europe and America since the 1970s has been largely prompted by the introduction o f 
competition into both national and international telecommunications markets. However it 
is impossible to ignore the influence that the emergence o f new information and 
communications technologies over the last 20 years has had on extending the parameters 
o f the debate. The convergence o f telecommunications with the previously separate 
industries o f computing and broadcasting promises the emergence o f a m ajor new 
technology platform, hugely expanding the existing functionality o f the 
telecommunications network. Together with the perception that information is increasingly 
the key resource in global markets, the potential development o f an information 
infrastructure has seen both the Clinton Administration in Am erica and the European 
Commission promote the notion that western society is poised on the cusp o f becoming an 
Information Society. This, they predict, will provoke societal change akin to that which 
followed the Industrial Revolution. Consequently, the possibility has been raised that the 
telephone may be supplanted as the basic electronic communications network by new 
telecommunications technologies. This raises obvious questions for the future o f universal 
service obligations: should they be applied to new technologies and if  so to which ones?
This chapter looks at the visions that drive international Information Society policy and 
how new versions o f the USO have been conceptualised in that context. It also argues, 
however, that the claims made for the social benefits universally accruing from an 
information society are unconvincing and that proposed future USO measures fall far 
short o f the previous conception o f USO. Furthermore, it suggests that before considering 
new versions o f USO, attention should be paid to the extent to which existing obligations 
are being fulfilled. W ith regard to the future o f universal service in Ireland it concludes 
that in the absence o f any coherent philosophy o f universal service, or even an explicit 
policy to achieve universal telephone service, universal service as a  telecommunications 
policy goal will remain a phantom and practically useless notion.
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10.2 Daniel Bell’s Information Society Theory
The idea o f an information society or information age is not a new one. Indeed, the single 
most influential theory o f the information society is largely derived from Daniel Bell’s 
“The Coming o f the Post-Industrial Society” 1 published in 1973. And since the influence 
o f Bell’s theory on both US and EU telecommunications policy is readily apparent, (see 
below), a  brief summation o f his hypothesis is necessary before exploring the policies that 
embody it.
Bell argues that western society is entering a new system, a post-industrial society, 
characterised by the “heightened presence and significance o f inform ation .”2 His typology 
o f societies is based on the predominant mode o f employment at any given stage. Thus in 
pre-industrial societies, agricultural labour is ubiquitous, whilst factory work is the norm 
in industrial societies. In post-industrial societies, however, it is service employment that 
predominates. Bell conceives o f service employment as “games between persons”3 in 
which information is the basic resource: bankers handle money transactions, therapists 
conduct dialogues with their clients, teachers communicate knowledge, etc.
Bell’s vision o f the post-industrial or information society4 is an extremely optimistic one. 
He argues that anarchy o f  the free market will not survive in an information society but 
that the pre-eminence o f professionals, or knowledge experts, will see such a society 
develop a more self-conscious developmental trajectory. Furthermore, argues Bell, an 
information society will be a more caring society: since the bulk o f employment will be in 
services, that is in “games between persons”, the quality o f  interpersonal relationships will 
come to the forefront. A people-oriented society will be a caring society: Thus a 
combination o f the propensity to plan along with the impulse to care will see the 
information society develop a new communal consciousness, promoting the welfare o f the 
community as a whole rather than that o f the individual. Thus community concerns such 
as the environment, care o f the elderly, education etc., will take precedence over concerns
1 Daniel Bell (1973), The Comitm of liic Post-Industrial Sociclv: A Venture in Social 
Forecasting, (Harinondsvvorth: Penguin).
2 Frank Webster (1995), Theories of the Information Society. (London: Routledge), p. 31.
3 Ibid., p. 127.
4 Although Bell’s original work originally referred to a "post-industrial” society, Frank Webster 
argues that Bell himself took to “substituting the words ‘information’ and ‘knowledge’ for the 
prefix ‘post-industrial’ around 1980 when a tidal wave of enthusiasm for futurology was swelled 
by interest in developments in computer and communications technologies.” Ibid., p. 30.
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with economic output and competitiveness, hi sum, Bell predicts a shift to a society that 
differs radically in both social and economic terms from the norms that prevail today.
Coming when it did, Bell’s work remained o f largely academic interest throughout the 
1970s. However, in the wake o f the microelectronic revolution o f  the early 1980s, Bell’s 
work was seized upon as offering both an explanation and a context for the rapidly 
changing technological environment.5 Yet it was a further ten years before western 
telecommunications policy began to reflect Bell’s vision. To understand why, it is 
necessary to understand the political-economic context within which such policy has 
developed.
10.2.1 European Union and NTIA Views on the Information Society/Global 
Information Infrastructure
The economic importance o f  telecommunications both as an industry in its own right, and 
as a service for other industries, has increased substantially over the last two decades. 
Revenues from the global trade in telecommunications equipment and services, which rose 
from US$500 billion in 1990 to almost US$800 billion in 1995, are expected to breach 
one trillion dollars by 1998.6 In terms of market capitalisation, telecommunications is now 
the w orld’s third largest industry after health care and banking.7 W ith regard to the 
importance o f telecommunications for other industries, there is also substantial evidence 
that telecommunications costs constitute an increasing portion o f business expenditure, 
despite a general downwards trend in telecommunications costs. According to ITU  figures, 
the average annual expenditure per telecommunications user rose by almost US$100 to 
US$905 between 1990 and 1995,8 whilst annual global increases in telecommunications 
expenditure have run at twice that o f global Gross Domestic Product since 1990.9 In 
short, not ju st are telecommunications services being used by more people, 10 but existing 
subscribers are making more intensive use o f such services.
5 Ibid., p. 30.
6 ITU World Telecommunication Indicators Database quoted in: ITU (1997), World 
Telecommunication Development Report 1996/97. (Geneva: ITU Publications).
7 Ibid., p. 4.
8 Ibid., p. 5.
9 Ibid.
10 38 million and 45 million new fixed lines were connected worldwide in 1994 and 1995 
respectively. Ibid., p. 4.
331
W hat has driven this expansion in the importance o f the role o f telecommunications is a 
complex and much debated question. W hat is critical for this research, however, is to 
understand that policy-makers both in the US and the EU member states have concluded 
that telecommunications is a (perhaps the) key determinant o f their economic future. 
Although, as this research has indicated, the telephone has been seen as a useful tool for 
business, the European Commission, for example, now argues that “com panies’ 
operations have become unthinkable without the use o f IC T s .” 11 (Italics added.) Allied to 
this is the key assumption that information will become an increasingly important resource 
for all industries ,and that as such, the quality o f national telecommunications services will 
have an enormous influence on the economic health o f a given nation. Hence the European 
Commission’s 1993 W hite Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment, identifies 
better access to information as critical for competing in an increasingly pressured 
marketplace:
“The jobs situation has generally remained more favourable in companies which 
have introduced microelectronics than in those companies that have not used this 
technology.. .To be able to compete worldwide, European industry must exploit 
all possible ways o f improving its competitiveness by making growing and 
effective use o f IC T s .” 12
The significance o f the issue is heightened by the increasing mobility o f trans-national 
corporations seeking lower labour costs. For national governments, anxious both to attract 
foreign investment and retain domestic business, the provision o f advanced 
telecommunications networks is a means o f establishing a competitive advantage. This is 
evidenced by Irish telecommunications policy, arguably since as early as the 1970s.
As a result, the developed world in particular has scrambled to develop strategies that will 
protect their share o f  both the telecommunications equipment and services market itself 
and o f those markets which rely on advanced telecommunications services: in particular 
those converging with telecommunications such as computing and media industries. The 
result has been the development and espousal by the EU and US o f their respective 
Information Society and Global Information Infrastructure policies. Thus since the early
11 CEC (1993), Growth. Competitiveness. Employment: The Challenges and Ways Forward 
into the 21st Century. (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities).
332
1990s, the Clinton Administration has used various international fora to push for the 
creation o f a Global Information Infrastructure - “networks o f distributed intelligence 
(which) will allow us to share information, to connect, and to communicate as a global 
community” 13 - based on the core principles o f US domestic telecommunications and 
information policy. At the M arch 1994 International Telecommunications Union 
Conference, US Vice-President A1 Gore enunciated those principles:
“ i) encourage private investment 
ii) promote competition
in) create a flexible regulatory framework that can keep pace with
rapid technological and market changes
iv) provide open access to telecommunications networks for all
information providers and
v) ensure universal services.” 14
As such these principles encapsulate the "free flow o f information” principles pursued by 
successive US administrations since the close o f the second world war, principles which 
have largely focused on ensuring access to global media and audio-visual markets for 
American companies. The European Union, meanwhile has sought to distance its policy 
from the United S tates’ GII strategy, criticising the use o f the term '‘information highway” 
as implying a “technology-based based appreciation o f what is happening.” 15 Instead the 
EU has adopted what it terms an “Information Society” strategy to reflect “European 
concerns with the broader social and organisational changes which will flow from the 
information and communications revolution.” 16 Nonetheless, there’s little o f  substance to 
distinguish EU policy from that o f  the US. W hilst EU documents argue that a “revolution 
in information and communications technologies” 17 will see Europe “steadily transformed 
into an essentially new society” 18 it is hard to avoid the conclusion that European 
documents usually use the term “Information Society” to refer to an Information economy
12 Ibid., p. 93.
13 A1 Gore (1994), “Forging a new Athenian Age of democracy”, Intermedia, Vol. 22, No. 2, 
pp. 4-7. The article is a shortened version of Gore’s inaugural speech to the ITU World 
Telecommunication Development Conference, in March 1994.
14 Ibid.
15 ISPO "Introduction to the Information Society the European way" from URL 
"http://www.ispo.cec.be/infosoc/backg/brochiire.html" last updated March 27, 1995, p. 1.
16 Ibid
17 Ibid. p. 1.
18 Ibid.
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The EU ’s 1994 W hite Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment, singling out 
the “information industries” 19 as key markets o f  the developing global economy, makes 
explicit the EU ’s interest in the economic aspects o f the Information Society:
“Turnover in what may be called the information society m arkets...in the EU 
reached EC U  313 billion in 1993, 5.4%  higher than the year before. Equivalent 
sales figures for the US and Japan were ECU 389 billion (+12.4%) and ECU 172 
billion (+ 4 .1% ).,!20 (Italics added)
Furthermore, the same W hite Paper has had a substantial influence on shaping subsequent 
EU Information Society policy. In effect a paper theoretically focused the future o f the 
European economy  has set the terms o f debate for subsequent discussions which are 
nominally on the future o f  European socie ty?1 Its influence on the agenda setting report, 
“Europe and the Global Information Society” (more commonly known as “The 
Bangemami Report”) is obvious.22 Despite the reference to society  in the report’s title, 
two-thirds o f the document is largely focused on the economic  importance o f new ICTs 
and related services:
“competitive suppliers o f networks and services from outside Europe are 
increasingly active in our m arkets... i f  Europe arrives late our suppliers of 
technologies and services will lack the commercial muscle to win a share o f the 
enormous global opportunities which lie ahead .”23
Nonetheless, it is impossible to deny the social dimension inherent in US and EU 
Information Society policies. The socially-oriented and highly alluring language used in 
the documents is highly reminiscent o f that o f Daniel Bell. The documents promise that the 
widespread diffusion o f new information and communications technologies will lead to the 
enhancement o f all three elements o f citizenship rights: political, civil and social. A1 Gore, 
for example, has argued that the creation o f such an infrastructure would lead to:
19 Ibid., p. 4.
20 Ibid.
21 For example, references to shifting the provision of services hitherto provided by the public 
sector to the market in the White Paper appear virtually verbatim in ISPO documents.
22 This is unsurprising given that the report was commissioned by the same December 1993 
European Council meeting which approved the White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and 
Employment.
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“robust and sustainable economic progress, strong democracies, better solutions 
to global and local environmental challenges, improved health care, and - 
ultimately - a greater sense o f shared stewardship o f our small planet.”24
Again the EU vision is virtually indistinguishable from that o f the US, emphasising that 
information and communication technologies have the potential to “ improve the quality o f 
life o f all Europeans.”25 M ore specifically the E U ’s Information Society Project Office 
(ISPO) points to:
“ 0 improved health care
il) teleworking allowing people to spend more time at home
111) better traffic management
iv) distance learning/education
v) videoconferencing permitting greater social interaction
vi) better consumer protection
vii) strengthened democracy due to better channels o f communication between 
governing and governed.” 26
Furthermore ISPO argues that access to “the riches o f knowledge” will be “so much 
easier” in the information society: “libraries and historical artefacts, technical data, expert 
judgement, entertainment, teaching - these and virtually every other store o f knowledge 
will be available electronically, on demand for individual use and m anipulation .”27
23 Members of the High Level Group on the Information Society (1994), Europe and the global 
information society (AKA The Bangemann Report). (Brussels: CEC), p. 7.
24 Ibid.
25 CEC (1994), Europe’s Way to the Information Society, Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament and the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of Regions, COM (94) 347 final.
26 ISPO "Introduction to the Information Society the European way" from URL 
"http://www.ispo.cec.be/infosoc/backg/brochure.html" last updated March 27, 1995, p. 2.
27 Ibid., p. 3.
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This claim that access to information will become easier is far from unproblematic 
however. Robin Mansell has written that in a modem society the:
“exchange o f social, cultural and business information often requires access to 
complex services based upon networks which combine advanced computing and 
telecommunication hardware and software.”28
Thus, Mansell at least partially agrees with the EU/NTIA claims on the growing social 
importance o f new ICTs. However, she also argues that public access to such technologies 
cannot be guaranteed with public (i.e. state) intervention:
“Public policy, whether through state provision o f telecommunications services or 
through public regulation o f private monopolies, has been necessary to promote 
access to basic telephone services, although the success o f such policies has 
varied considerably. The accessibility o f some o f the advanced intelligent 
networks services must be encouraged if  increasing numbers o f smaller firms and 
residential consumers are not to be excluded from the electronic communication 
environment in the coming decades.”29
In short, M ansell points to the risk o f social exclusion from the Information Society.
Significantly, there is at least an awareness o f the potential for such exclusion at both US 
and EU level. The Green Paper on social aspects o f the Information Society - “ Living and 
W orking in the Information Society: People First” stresses that new ICTs can only 
contribute to the European democratic process if  equal access is ensured:
“For true, inclusive, democracy to exist, the whole population must have equal 
access to information to make choices effectively and equitably. The information 
society can enhance democracy by ensuring equal and public access to the ICT 
infrastructure, to networked information services and to the skills required to 
access these services.”30
28 Robin Mansell (1993), The New Telecommunications. (London: Sage), p. x.
29 Ibid. p. XI
30 European Commission Living and working in the information society: People First. Green 
Paper, pp. 23-24.
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Both NTIA and European Commission documents generally sound a note o f  warning as to 
the potentially socially detrimental effects o f an Information Society, generally understood 
as the risk o f  creating “a  two-tier society o f haves and have-nots, in which only a part of 
the population has access to the new technology, is comfortable using it and can fully 
enjoy its benefits.”31 Thus even such pro-market documents as the Bangemann report 
argue that public authorities must ensure “fair access to the infrastructure” and “provision 
o f universal service, the definition o f  which m ust evolve in line with the technology.”32 In 
the US, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration goes even 
further:
“There are legitimate questions about linking universal service solely to telephone 
service in a  society where individuals' economic and social well-being 
increasingly depends on their ability to access, accumulate, and assimilate 
information. While a standard telephone line can be an individual's pathway to the 
riches o f  the Information Age, a personal computer and modem are rapidly 
becoming the keys to the vault. The robust growth recently experienced in Internet 
usage illustrates this promise as new and individual subscribers gravitate to on­
line services. This suggests a need to go beyond the traditional focus on telephone 
penetration as the barometer o f this nation's progress tow ard universal service.”33
hi sum, policy-makers in both the US and EU policy suggest that universal service, as it 
has been traditionally understood, may not fulfil the needs o f a modem society.
31 Members of the High Level Group 011 the Information Society (1994), Europe and the global 
information society (AKA The Bangemann Report,), (Brussels: CEC), p. 6.
32 Ibid.
33 National Telecommunication and Information Administration (1995), Falling Through the 
Net: A Survey of “Have Nots” in Rural and Urban America. (Washington D.C.: US Department 
of Commerce).
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10.2.2 Ireland’s Information Society Strategy
At national level, Ireland’s own strategy for an Information Society, expressed in a 
benchmark report by the Irish Information Society Steering Committee, rehearses that of 
the EU. The Committee takes it as a given that “ information and communications 
technologies (ICTs) will transform  Ireland’s economy and society over the next few 
years,”34 and acknowledges the global economic dimensions o f the debate, describing the 
Information Society as:
“a  global phenomenon, facilitated by a  global telecommunications infrastructure 
and the emergence o f a global economy, in turn creating an unprecedented global 
competitive challenge for all businesses.”35
Again as with US and EU documents, the Irish report, adverts to the possible benefits o f 
an Information Society, referring to the possibility o f a better quality o f life, greater access 
to government, more control o f  working lives and an outlet for individual creativity. Thus 
whilst the actual term “universal service” does not appear in the Steering Committee 
report, it nonetheless favours the provision o f “affordable access to information networks 
and services” to “every citizen and enterprise.”36 In short, with regard to not ju s t new 
ICTs but also the skills and technology necessary to utilise them, it appears to favour a 
more demanding public service obligation than has hitherto been applied to POTS.
10.2.3 New ICTs and USO -  From Universal Service to Universal Access?
Although, as noted above, there is a consensus that the universal service obligation may 
have to be redeveloped for an “information age”, actual implementation brings new 
obstacles. A key question is which technologies should the universal service obligation be 
applied to? For whilst the application o f USO has traditionally been limited to basic voice 
telephony, there are now a wide (and ever increasing) range o f  services which might 
potentially be offered over existing copper wire and developing broadband networks. 
Furthermore, the cost o f universal service in an information age may be quite different to 
the cost o f  traditional universal service provision. For example, NTIA literature frequently
34 Information Society Steering Committee (1997), Information Society Ireland: Strategy for 
Action. (Dublin: Forfas), p. iii.
35 Ibid., p. 4.
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points to the Internet as a major service that will sit upon the new national or global 
information infrastructure. Thus, universal service is extended to include access not 
merely to a telephone and a telephone line but also to the considerably more expensive 
personal computer, modem and an internet service provider. The expense o f  bringing such 
technologies to every home in America makes it impossible for the NTIA to favour 
subsidising it. Thus the NTIA acknowledges that “connectivity to all such households will 
not occur instantaneously.”37
As a consequence, both the NTIA and European Commission have developed a multi­
levelled approach to defining universal service in the information age. At the level o f 
infrastructure, both the 1996 US Telecommunications Act,38 and the 1995 ONP Voice 
Telephony Directive39 have called for the widest possible provision o f access to 
infrastructure permitting the use o f advanced services. This differs from the universal 
service obligation with regard to the telephone in so far as instead o f universal service it 
calls for advanced services to be universally accessible. However such accessibility will 
implicitly be subject to the ability o f the individual to afford the prerequisites for services 
(a PC, modem, etc.)
Thus the N TIA  argues that in the interim, public access to the information superhighway 
will be made available through the “traditional providers o f information access for die 
general public” - the public schools and libraries:
“These and other ‘community access centres' can provide, at least during an 
interim period, a means for electronic access to all those who might not otherwise 
have such access. Policy prescriptions that include public “safety nets” would
36 Ibid., p. vi.
37 National Telecommunication and Information Administration (1995), Falling Through the 
Net: A Survey of “Have Nots” in Rural and Urban America. (Washington D.C.: US Department 
of Commerce).
38 “ACCESS TO ADVANCED SERVICES: Access to advanced telecommunications and 
information services should be provided in all regions of the Nation.” 1996 US 
Telecommunications Act, Section 254(b)(2) on the principles for the preservation and 
advancement of universal service.
39 “National regulatory authorities shall ensure the provision, subject to technical feasibility and 
economic viability, of the facilities listed in Annex III (1)...” Article 9(l)Directive 95/62/EC of 
the European Parliament and the Council on the application of open network provision (ONP) to 
voice telephony. The first facility mentioned in Annex III is DTMF, a standard permitting fax 
and 9600 bps data transmission.
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complement the long-term strategy o f hooking up all those households who want 
to be connected to the N il .”40
Again this is reflected in Section 254 o f the US Telecommunications Act o f 1996 when it 
states that “Elementary and secondary schools and classrooms, health care providers, and 
libraries should have access to advanced telecommunications services...” The very fact 
that the Bill anticipates that access to the N il will occur via the traditional purveyors o f 
information in society - schools and libraries - appears to suggest that despite the rhetoric 
about new ICTs facilitating a revolutionary change in society, that in fact the N il is 
merely an extension o f existing public information services, albeit one with the potential to 
offer a  far greater range o f information.
Furthermore, as is the case in the US, the High Level Group o f Experts suggests that 
universal service with regard to “new information services” might be initially limited to 
“universal community service”, that is limiting the universal obligation to “educational, 
cultural, medical, social or economic institutions o f local communities.”41 As in the US. 
this suggests an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary increase in the level of 
information available to members o f  society
10. 2. 4 The Irish Version of USO in an Information Society
At national level, the specifics o f what universal service will entail in the context o f  an 
Information Society are less concrete. However, having favoured the provision o f 
“affordable access to information networks and services” to “every citizen and 
enterprise,”42 the Irish Information Society Steering Committee report envisages that this 
will be achieved by using “fiscal incentives” to encourage enterprises and households to 
acquire PCs/information appliances. Adopting the European approach again, it also 
envisages the deployment o f “appropriate access technology at convenient points in local
40 National Telecommunication and Information Administration (1995), Falling Through the 
Net: A Survey of “Have Nots” in Rural and Urban America, (Washington D.C. : US Department 
of Commerce).40
41 Article 9(1) Directive 95/62/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on the 
application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony, p. 3.
42 Information Society Steering Committee (1997), Information Society Ireland. Strategy for 
Action. (Dublin: Forfas), p. vi.
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communities”43 Furthermore, looking to the question o f infrastructure provision, it 
recommends the enhancement o f existing cable and wireless networks to provide 
interactive services with a view to providing “access to broadband services for the 
majority o f Irish households.44
10.2.5 The W eaknesses of Information Society Theory
The previous material notwithstanding, this research would argue that there are two m ajor 
flaws in theories underlying the pursuit o f Information Society policies - flaws which are 
sufficient to prompt a reconsideration o f whether there is yet any real value in 
reconceptualismg universal service to account for new ICTs. The two flaws are:
a) The problem o f the notion o f technological determinism
b) The validity o f  the concept o f  information poverty.
10.2.5.1 Technological Determinism
Daniel Bell’s post-industrial or information society thesis has long been subject to the 
criticism that his analysis is solely predicated on changes in the nature o f work. As Frank 
W ebster argues:
“There is no inherent reason why increases in professionals... should lead one to 
conclude that a new age is upon us. For instance, it seems perfectly reasonable to 
suppose that i f  say the pattern o f industrial ownership remained the same and the 
dynamic which drove the economy stayed constant, then the systems - occupations 
apart - would remain intact. No one has suggested, for example, the a country 
such as Switzerland, because it is heavily reliant on banking and finance is a 
fundamentally different society to, say, Norway or Spain where occupations are 
differently spread .”45
43 Information Society Steering Committee (1997), Information Society Ireland: Strategy for 
Action. (Dublin: Forfâs), p. vi.
44 Information Society Steering Committee (1997), Information Society Ireland: Strategy for 
Action. (Dublin: Forfâs), p. vii.
45 Frank Webster (1995), Theories of the Information Society. (London: Rontledge). p. 38.
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Furthermore, however, Bell argues that the move to a  post-industrial society occurs as a 
result o f  technology which permits increased productivity and thus creates the income that 
Bell assumes will be spent on services. In short Bell’s analysis is driven by technological 
determinism, a theory which, as W ebster argues, has long been considered “suspect”46 by 
the social sciences. Technological determinism argues that a) technologies alone are the 
decisive agents o f social changes but that b) despite this, technologies themselves are 
immune from any social shaping. As a result, technological determinism ignores the 
acknowledged influence o f “people, capital, politics, classes” etc., on the shape o f society. 
As W ebster puts it:
“Can it seriously be suggested that teclinologies are at once the motor o f  change 
and simultaneously untouched by social relations?”47
However, when one examines EU/NTIA conceptions o f the Information Society, one is 
struck by the intellectual conservatism manifested in the extent to which they take for 
granted the notion that technological advances alone will provoke societal change. 
EU/NTIA Information Society literature is virtually a case study o f technological 
determinism. For example, to take the first o f  the seven advances referred to section 10.2.2 
above, that ISPO predicts an Information Society will bring about: “improved health 
care.” The ISPO document simply assumes that because it is technologically feasible to 
create a medical system pervaded by new ICTS, that an unstoppable momentum will 
result in such advances. The question o f whether governments will allocate funds to 
facilitate such advances in health care is taken by the ISPO document to be a moot point. 
The spread o f  such technology is taken to be driven by an internal momentum for which 
public policy has no relevance.
Similarly, the suggestion that democracy will be strengthened by better channels o f 
communications between the governed and the government seems particularly fatuous, 
suggesting that only the existing (implicitly inefficient) communications system bars 
voters from communicating with and influencing their public representatives. Yet it might 
reasonably be argued that the postal system and the telephone would be sufficient to 
permit such effective communication, were it not for the fact that individual public 
representatives interpose gatekeepers between them and the public they represent: for
46 Ibid., p. 39.
47 Ibid.
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example the T D ’s secretary who answers the phone. The question o f why new channels of 
communications between voters and their representatives would lead the latter group 
listening to the former any more than is the case via letters and the telephone system is not 
addressed. Is there any reason to believe that gatekeepers would not also have a  role in “an 
information society”?
The “technologically determinist” argument can perhaps most easily be levelled at the 
Irish Information Society document. Considering the social impact o f  the Information 
Society, the Report predicts that once Ireland decides that access to skills and information 
will be universal and affordable, “many groups considered disadvantaged in the context o f 
Ireland’s present economic and social structures will find it considerably easier to 
participate in the economic benefits o f the Information Society.”48 The underlying issue 
however -  economic inequities in Ireland’s social structure -  is ignored in favour o f  a 
technological fix for the problem o f the “disadvantaged.” Furthermore, with regard to the 
political impact o f  an Information Society, the Report claims that “decision-making 
processes will be more localised, allowing community and regional democracy to 
flourish.”49 Again, technology is imbued with what in communications theory would be 
termed the hypodermic needle effect, suggesting that the “injection” o f technology will be 
sufficient overcome traditionally centralised and secretive decision-making processes. The 
fact that the potential inherent m the technology would need to be accompanied by a 
political willingness to decentralise power is ignored.
In short, the EU/NTIA Information Society vision is almost exclusively driven by the 
perceived socially transformative powers o f technology despite the fact that as at least one 
EU report (that o f  the Social Affairs Directorate-General’s High Level Group o f Experts 
on the Information Society) opportunities for:
“ renewed growth, higher welfare and quality o f  life depend crucially on what we 
would call the congruence between the technological, economic and social 
dimensions o f the Information Society .”50
48 Information Society Steering Committee (1997), Information Society Ireland: Strategy for 
Action. (Dublin: Forfâs), p. 10.
49 Ibid., p. 22.
50 High Level Group of Experts (1996), Building the European Information Soceity for Us All. 
(Brussels: DG V, European Commission), Letter of submission by Professor Luc Soete, 
Chairman of the Group.
343
That is, the introduction o f new technology alone is unlikely to lead to a new society, 
whilst existing patterns o f industrial ownership and social relations persist.
10.2.5.2 The Validity of the Concept of Information Poverty
As noted above (section 10.2.1), the key rationale underlying proposals to extend the 
universal service obligation to new ICTs is a concern that the Information Society will 
develop into a two-tier society, o f information haves and have-nots. As Brennon M.
M artin puts it: “ Someone who has a network connection in the home is said to be 
information rich relative to someone who does no t.”51 Yet as M artin again points out .this 
conceptualisation is inadequate since it:
“fails to recognise that there is nothing inherently informative about anything 
written, typed, spoken, drawn or photographed. Information is something 
intangible that must be mined from data in any form and put to use by whoever is 
doing the mining.”52
Arguably, with regard to accessing information over a new technology such as the 
internet, their are two levels o f accessibility. First there is the need to have access to the 
technology - PC, modem, etc. - but thereafter actual information, i.e. meaningful, useful 
data - can only be accessed if the reader is capable o f understanding what the author is 
trying to say. To illustrate the point M artin cites a hypothetical case o f two people living 
in the same town: a university student with access to college Internet access and an 
immigrant with no income and no English. By the traditional conception o f information 
poverty the student would clearly be far richer than the immigrant. However in the 
hypothetical scenario, the student loses his wallet and keys during the holidays, and is 
locked out o f  his home with no money. As night falls and the snow starts to fall the student 
has little choice but to roam the streets until the next morning when his housemates will 
return. M eanwhile however, the immigrant is sitting sipping warm soup in the local 
homeless shelter she has heard about from other indigent immigrants In this context, it is 
the immigrant who is information rich.
51 Brennon M. Martin (1996), Universal Service and Information Poverty: A New Look at an 
Old Problem, p. 3. Sourced from http://weber.ii. washington.edu/~brennon/htinl/papers/ 
tis96.html.
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The point is that information poverty is a situational condition and thus it is “ impossible to 
classify any one individual as being information rich or poor except in very specific 
instances.”53 As a result, a policy o f universal service which seeks to provide universal 
access to communications technologies may not alleviate specific instances o f information 
poverty.
However this does not necessarily rule out any role for a communications network in 
problem solving. M artin notes that a communications network might assist in this context 
“either by providing information from an outside source or by helping the community to 
produce its own information.”54
10.2.5.3 Back to the Future: the Case for Universal Service and POTS
In considering the future o f universal service, the interim report from the EU ’s High Level 
Group o f Experts on the Social and Societal Aspects o f the Information Society noted that 
“in the newly emerging Information Society the old basic provisions m ight no longer fulfil 
basic communication needs.”55 (Italics added) It went on to stress that, in considering the 
future o f  the universal service obligation, it is important not to “get lost in technical 
standards” but rather to consider “the 'functionality' of the services and alternative 
technologies.”56 Implicitly then, the Report acknowledged that the existing basic level of 
universal service might be sufficient to ensure full participation even in an information 
society.
Looked at in this light, the Information Society Ireland Report’s commitment to universal 
service with regard to new ICTs appears somewhat short-sighted. The Report consistently 
fails to offer any convincing rationale as to why universal service should be pursued with 
regard to new ICTs, beyond the implication that new ICTs will become so pervasive in an 
Information Society that those without access to them will become increasingly peripheral
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., p. 15.
54 Ibid.
55 High Level Group of Experts on the Social and Societal Aspects of the Information Society 
Building the European Information Society fo r  Us All, p 41.
56 Ibid.
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to the core o f society (which implicitly will increasingly be constituted by those with 
access to such technology).
Yet if  such a  rationale can be applied to new technologies which may or may not become 
widely diffused, is there not a far stronger case for applying it to  that information and 
communication technology that is already so pervasive in Ireland: the telephone?
Furthermore, the telephone is a  technology which is inherently better suited to satisfying 
the criteria laid down by M artin (above) for dealing with the possibility o f information 
poverty. M artin notes that access to new ICTs is not necessarily equivalent to accessing 
information. This is particularly the case with one-way ICTs which cannot easily be 
interrogated by the user. Furthermore, even new two-way communication technologies 
such as electronic mail do not offer the potential for clarification o f data that a 
telephonically-mediated dialogue, rich in the subtle nuances o f voice, can provide.
In short, before moving beyond POTS to consider new universal sendee obligations for 
ICTs, the argument can be made, using the terms o f the universal service with regard to 
new ICTs debate, for a return to the still unresolved question o f  universal service with 
regard to the telephone in Ireland.
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10. 3 The Future of the USO with Regard to POTS in Ireland
According to a M arch 1995 report from the Telephone Users’ Advisory Group (TUAG), 
the body established by then M inister for Communications, Brian Cowan, in the wake of 
the 1993 ta riff  change, set the specific objectives o f  rebalancing to:
- protect the revenue base o f Telecom Eireann
- improve business competitiveness by reducing costs
- promote more efficient use o f the telephone system through reducing the cost of 
short duration calls, charging a  “realistic rate” for long duration calls and shifting 
less essential calls to off-peak periods
- develop and extend the use o f the telephone system for social purposes by 
reducing very considerably the cost o f  using an under-utilised system during off- 
peak hours.
Looked at objectively, it appears that the rebalancing reversed Telecom Eireann's tariff 
structures almost overnight. Although Ireland has, since 1992, followed the general 
international trends towards lower international/long distance call rates and increased local 
call rates and line rental, it appears to have done so to an extreme degree. From having 
amongst the cheapest local calls in Europe immediately pre-rebalancing, as o f  M ay 1996 
(largely because the introduction o f local call timing in January 1992 occurred later than 
in most EU countries57), Ireland has the fifth most expensive peak rate local calls in the 
EU58. A t the same time, Ireland is among the three cheapest nations in Europe from which 
to make calls to the US and the rest o f  Europe.59
It has been impossible to accurately estimate the full impact o f  the 1993 changes on 
different categories o f  customers. Although the primary purpose o f the Telephone Users’ 
Advisory Group was to do precisely this, the Group itself acknowledges that in the 
absence o f  sufficient historical data prior to rebalancing, it has been forced to use a call
57 Telephone Users' Advisory Group Report of the Telephone Users' Advisory Group.
September 1996. (Dublin: TUAG, September 1996), p. 13,
58 Ibid., p. 52.
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basket based on an average telephone bill for a two week period in September 1993. Since 
this period coincided with the implementation o f the tariff changes, and thus a temporary 
but substantial decline in overall traffic levels, the resulting basket was clearly 
unrepresentative.60 Nonetheless, even using this basket, TIJAG concluded by M arch 1995 
that 60% o f  residential subscribers had subsequently experienced increases in their 
telephone bills. Indeed nearly a third o f residential customers experienced increments o f 
more than 10%.61 By contrast, some 78% of business subscribers experienced decreases, 
while in percentage terms, those businesses experiencing increases in their bills, 
experienced smaller increases than those typical o f  the residential subscriber. Yet despite 
this, in the longer term, the rebalancing has had no apparent im pact on the demand for 
residential lines, which rose from 75 per 100 homes in 1994 to 82 in 1996. Thus one o f 
the key universal service indicators survived the changes intact.
However, the pressures o f competition which led to the rebalancing have, if  anything, 
increased since 1993. This has been encouraged, not just by ongoing EU progress towards 
liberalization, but also by Ireland’s acceptance o f the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services when it signed the last GATT agreement in 1994.62 Thus, in Telecom Eireann’s 
1993/94 annual report, chairman Ron Bolger noted o f the launch o f several new 
competitive services that year, that while it was not Telecom E ireann’s first experience of 
competition, “the scale and intensity were new .”63 Telecom increasingly faces competition 
in virtually all o f its markets. Esat Telecom, first licensed in December to compete with 
Telecom Eireann over leased lines, announced plans in M arch 1995 to extend its network 
nation-wide, having previously focused on the Dublin m arket.64 A second mobile phone 
operator, Esat Digifone, was licensed in October 1995 and commenced operations in 
M arch 1997. Meanwhile, the provision o f leased line services in particular, and the ability 
o f service providers to set up 'closed user groups' has continued to enhance the capacity of
59 Ibid., pp. 55-58.
60 Ibid., p. 19. Serious doubts must be raised as to the validity of this assertion. Over 60% of TE 
subscribers were attached to digital exchanges by 1993, thus accurate data should exist for such 
customers prior to the changes.
61 Ibid., p. 20.
62 Drahos and Joseph note that the Appendix on Telecommunications attached to the GATS 
effectively requires the liberalisation of telecommunications services when states open up certain 
service sectors. Peter Drahos and Richard A. Joseph (1995). “Telecommunications and 
Investment in the Great Supranational Regulatory Game,” Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 19, 
No. 8, pp. 619-635.
63 Telecom Eireann (1994), Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ended 3 I March 1994. p. 
8.
64 Tom McEnaney, “Esat plans £25 million network”, Irish Times 31/3/95.
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major users o f  international telecommunications services to bypass Telecorn Eireann in 
order to obtain the most cost-effective services for international traffic. Call-back 
technology also continues to have an impact on Telecom Eireann's international traffic .65 
Furthermore, the liberalisation from July 1997 o f alternative infrastructures (such as those 
owned by other state utilities) will add yet another dimension to the already substantial 
competitive pressures faced by Telecom.
Telecom Eireann’s business market has proved vulnerable to cherry-picking from new 
m arket entrants: as o f September 1995, just 1,600 customers in the large corporate 
category account for £78.5 million o f Telecom Eireann's revenue. As TU AG pointed out 
at the time, the loss o f these customers, ju s t 0 .2% o f the entire customer base, would wipe 
out most o f Telecom Eireann's profitability. Furthermore, since 95% o f them were 
headquartered around Dublin city, they have been relatively easy targets for new market 
entrants.66 Thus, a second Irish-based leased lines operator, TCL, had. by January 1993, 
won almost 300 corporate customers from Telecom Eireann.
Given this, ongoing changes in Telecom’s pricing structure have clearly been designed to 
retain the largest possible share o f the business market. Noting in the com pany's 1995/96 
annual report that “our prices must fall considerably if  we are to remain competitive.” 
Telecom C hief Executive, Alfie Kane, also announced a £65 million package o f reductions 
in international and national trunk calls .67 Furthermore, as o f mid 1996, Telecom Eireann 
tariffs for international freefone calls were amongst the lowest in Europe and “a 
significant factor in attracting telemarketing and telesales companies to Ireland .”68
Telecom have consistently argued that their international tariffs were not merely 
uncompetitive but objectively oveipriced, and has cited EU pressures to move towards 
cost-oriented tariffs as requiring it to reduce its international tariffs. Yet it is unlikely that 
reductions seen in international and trunk call tariffs since 1993 will continue indefinitely 
without a further rebalancing, i.e. an increase in local rates. In a submission to the 
European Union, the Irish government has suggested that unit based call charging may be
65 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
66 Telecom Eireann Staff, The Future of the Telecommunications Industry in Ireland - a 
submission on behalf of the staff of Telecom Eireann. Cited in ibid., p. 38.
67 Ibid., p. 16.
68 Work Research Centre (1996), The Future of Dublin City: Employment through Telework 
and Telebusiness, (Dublin: WRC), p. 8.
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replaced by duration-based charges (i.e. calls timed by the second).69 Furthermore, the 
assertion in the same submission that connection and rental charges are loss-making for 
Telecom Eireann, along with the EU requirement that all tariffs be cost-oriented 
(emphasised in the Commission response), will see a mounting pressure for increases in 
these areas as well.70
Yet despite Telecom Eireann’s assertions, the company has yet to publish any factual data 
that would either confirm or refute its argument about its cost structures and the need to 
adjust them. This is a critical issue, however, since as TUAG has argued, the allocation of 
costs with regard to telecommunications is, far from being objective, to a large degree a 
political question:
“Operators have traditionally argued that rental and local call rates have been 
subsidised at the expense o f long distance and international rates and that the 
allocation o f costs where they lie will mean upward pressure on local rates. .The 
Group would like to note one caveat regarding the general idea o f  operators 
moving to cost-based tariffing. In telecommunications operations, a  high 
proportion o f costs is not directly attributable and there is considerable flexibility 
in allocation costs to various parts o f  the business. An operator has to allocate 
costs somewhere, and there could be substantial disagreement among different 
commentators as to how this should be done.”71
Given that Telecom faces competition in the business market, but has a monopoly in the 
residential market, it could be argued that it would be in the interest o f  the company to 
ascribe as much o f the cost o f  running the network as possible to those calls most 
associated with residential customers, i.e. local calls, with a view to using profits from the 
residential users to subsidise low prices in the competitive market. I f  such a practice were 
ongoing, the absence o f any obligation on the company to publish its cost structure means 
that the company could continue such a practice indefinitely.
69 CEC (1996), Commission Decision of 27 November 1996 concerning the additional 
implementation periods requested by Ireland for the implementation of Commission Directives 
90/388/EEC and 96/2/EC as regards full competition in the telecommunications markets,
(97/114/EC) OJ No. L 4/8-21.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., p. 34.
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Such would not be the case if  Telecom Eireann faced a defined and costed universal 
service objective. Yet whilst the driving influence o f European Union directives in 
promoting competition in the Irish market has clearly been felt, the EU has, as o f 1997, 
offered no corresponding directive on universal service. EU thinking on universal service, 
however, was if  anything made more critical for Ireland, when the possibility emerged in 
1996 that the EU might establish a  supranational telecommunications regulatory body, 
once the majority o f the EU members states fully liberalised their markets in 1998. In the 
ensuing debate over the pros and cons o f a supranational authority vis-a-vis an NRA 
(National Regulatory Authority), the principle o f  subsidiarity was inevitably raised, since 
the question basically came down to one o f whether such regulation could be sufficiently 
achieved at national level or whether it could be better dealt with at European level. As yet 
the issue remains to be fully resolved: nonetheless Cave and Crowther72 have offered four 
criteria - efficiency, equity, accountability and consistency with the single market - by 
which to judge where responsibility for telecommunications regulation should lie 
according to the subsidiarity concept. They concluded that some regulatory' functions 
would be better handled at Conun unity level rather than national level: for example, 
externalities would flow from placing licensing and spectrum allocation under the aegis o f 
a single pan-European telecommunications body .73 Conversely, however, the same 
authors have concluded, with regard to the regulation o f universal service in particular, 
that “accountability factors would strongly suggest that some fonn o f national regulation 
is most appropriate.”74 Furthermore, they noted that universal service could only be 
regulated at a European level if:
“Europe consisted o f a homogenous group o f people, all with identical preferences 
as to which services should be regarded as falling within a universal service 
obligation.”75
Since this was not the case (as this research argues), any European regulator seeking to 
impose universal service obligations would have to be “perfectly informed about different 
political pre-occupations and values in all the different Member S tates.”76 However since
72 Martin Cave and Peter Crowther (1996), '‘Determining the level of regulation in EU 
telecommunications,” Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 20. No. 10, pp. 725 -738.
73 Ibid., p. 730.




gathering such information would cost so much, the efficiency criterion would require that 
universal service regulation remain in national hands. Ultimately then Cave and Crowther 
argue that they can find “no compelling theoretical argum ents... in favour o f the institution 
o f an independent regulator,” suggesting instead that a set o f EU framework legislation 
would be sufficient.
In the interim, what activity there has been at EU level, on considering the future of 
universal service m a  competitive environment, appears to concur with Cave and 
Crowther’s logic. The M arch 1996 European Commission’s document on universal 
service: “Universal Service for Telecommunications in the Perspective o f a Fully 
Liberalised Environment,” offered a  framework definition o f universal service under the 
three headings o f scope, affordability and financing.
Scope referred to the “provision o f voice telephony via a fixed connection which will also 
allow a  fax and modem to operate, as well as the provision o f operator assistance, 
emergency and directory enquiry services...and the provision o f  public payphones.”77 
Users were also to have access to “published information about the cost and prices o f 
services78 as well as quality o f  service indicators. Users were to be given “the possibility 
o f accessing not only the defined voice telephony services but all services that can be 
provided over today's telecommunications networks”79 (e.g the internet). Affordability, 
although described as “crucial to the extension o f telecommunications servi ces to every 
citizen,” was nonetheless to be dealt with at a national level, “because it is so closely 
linked to specific national circum stances.”80 Finally, financmg also remained ill-defined 
beyond the assertion that any “financial burden associated with providing universal 
service be shared out amongst market players.”81 H ow ever the Communication did 
envisage payments being made into an independent universal service fund or directly to 
those operators providing universal service as an additional payment for interconnecting 
with their network .82
77 Universal Service for Telecommunications in ihe Perspcclivc of a Fnllv Liberalised 
Environment COM(96) 73 Final, 13th March 1996, p. 5.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., p. 6.
81 Ibid., p. 6.
82 Ibid., p. 6.
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Crucially, however, by placing the question o f affordability into national hands, the 
European Commission has returned responsibility for universal service to the hands o f the 
national regulators. Since 1983, the Department o f Communications has occupied the dual 
role o f sole shareholder and regulator o f the company, although as noted in chapter eight, 
there’s little evidence that it has actively fulfilled the latter role. However, in June 1996, 
the Government agreed the sale o f  35%  o f Telecom Eireann (characterised as “strategic 
alliance”) to a KPN/Telia consortium. This fact, combined with the introduction of 
competition into the mobile telecommunications market,83 required the government to pass 
the “Telecommunication (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill, 1996.” This bill permitted the 
transfer o f  shares in Telecom to KPN/Telia and transferred the regulatory function o f the 
M inister for Communications to the then unappointed Director o f  Telecommunications 
Regulation.84 Given that the Act defines the duties o f the regulator, it might have been 
expected that it would include some criteria by which the regulator could assess the 
performance o f companies competing in the Irish market (including Telecom Eireann). 
Instead, however, the Bill simply stated that any licence granted by the Director to a 
telecommunications company “shall include public service requirements,” 85 without 
offering any description o f  what these requirements might entail.
Yet, by late 1996, the absence o f such a requirement was becoming increasingly 
worrisome: although between 1984 and 1996, household penetration had increased at a 
steady pace, Telecom Eireann’s 1997 annual report noted that the level o f penetration had 
actually fallen from its figures o f 82 per 100 households in 1996 to 81 in 1997.86 It has 
been suggested that this decline might be partially accounted for by a boom in new house 
building, but figures presented to the European Commission by the Department o f 
Communications, as part o f a request for a derogation in the introduction o f competition 
into the Irish voice telephony market, suggested that as a result o f “a combination o f 
demographic and economic factors specific to Ireland there is actually no demand for 
further telephone lines by households.” 87 The paucity o f  the reasoning used to explain this
83 In March 1997, Esat Digifone, a private mobile phone system operator licenced by the state 
commenced operations.
84 Telecommunications (Miscellaneous Provisions ) Bill. 1996.
85 Ibid. p. 5.
86 Telecom Eireann (1997). Annual Report and Accounts for the Year endinu 3 April 1997. 
p.17.
87 CEC (1996), Commission Decision of 27 November 1996 concerning the additional 
implementation periods requested by Ireland for the implementation of Commission Directives 
90/388/EEC and 96/2/EC as regards full competition in the telecommunications markets, 
(97/114/EC) OJ No. L 4/8-21.
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(that larger household size in Ireland reduces the potential for additional residential 
penetration88) raises concerns that what is really missing is effective demand, that is, 
demand backed up by an ability to pay. The suggestion that one fifth o f  Irish households 
may simply not want a telephone, although not impossible, seems less plausible than the 
suggestion that demand is dropping because o f the rising cost o f residential telephony. 
Given this, there is if anything a greater need than ever before for a far more proactive 
version o f universal service than has been the case hitherto in Ireland.
Attention has been called to the absence o f “a clearly defined, transparent and publicly 
known policy concerning universal service obligations”89 by w hat remains the only 
detailed public examination to date in Ireland o f the question o f universal service: that 
contained within the M arch 1995 TUAG document “Future Trends as they Relate to 
Tariffs in the Telecommunications Sector.” Since the Advisory Group is the only Irish 
public body with a mandate from the M inister for Communications to consider social 
aspects o f Irish telecommunications policy, its conclusions represent the state o f the art so 
far as public thinking on universal service has gone in Ireland up to this point.
The key assumption underlying the report is that competitive pressures on Telecom 
Eireann will increase in the future, creating pressure for further rebalancing. However, in 
a veiled criticism o f the failure thus far on the part o f Telecom Eireann to provide any 
documented evidence that international calls are in fact subsidising local calls, the report 
argues that any further rebalancing could only occur if  there is transparent information 
about imbalances between costs and revenues for specific call categories. It further argues 
that the social impact o f  any rebalancing should be taken into account in deciding exactly 
how any future changes in charging structures will be put into effect.90
Furthermore, adverting to the fact that an increasing proportion o f Telecom Eireann’s 
investment in technology has been dedicated to the development o f advanced services 
aimed primarily at the business community, the Group argues that:
“these investments should be recovered through the tariffs for new services in line 
with the European Union's overall policy in relation to cost-based tariffs. The cost
88 Ibid.
89 Telephone Users' Advisory Group (March 1995), Future Trends as they relate to Tariffs in 
the Telecommunications Sector. (Dublin: TUAG), p. 42.
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o f new services should not, in particular, be levied on the existing public voice 
telephony services.”91
Moving to the financing o f universal service, the report recommends the establishment of 
an independent regulator to ensure that “costs in relation to universal service be shared 
equally” between companies operating in a fully competitive m arket.92 Considering the 
sourcing o f universal funds, the Group is adamant that in the event that the cost is 
included in the prices o f  services (as opposed to a universal service fund), the costs should 
not be borne by connection fees, rental charges and local call tariffs in isolation. Noting 
that international calls would be impossible without the prior existence o f the local loop, it 
argues that if, for example, international calls account for 20% o f  all call revenues, 
international calls tariffs should bear 20% o f the costs o f the universal service obligation.
In sum, the Group recommends that:
“A clearly defined, transparent and publicly known policy concerning universal 
service obligations should be established. This should ensure that the costs o f 
universal service are shared equally between both service providers and between 
services. In the latter context, it is emphasised that long distance and international 
call charges should include a reasonable element o f the costs o f  universal service. 
Access deficits which are recoverable through future rental charges and 
contributions from call revenues should not be included in the costs o f  universal 
service.”93
However, the group’s ultimate definition o f universal service remains relatively passive. 
Offering a working definition, the Group describes universal service objectives as “an 
obligation imposed on a telecommunications operator to serve all customers, regardless o f 
geographical location or social standing, at an affordable (common) price .”94 In effect 
then, the most detailed Irish public discussion o f  universal service still conceives o f  it as 
little more than common carriage.
90 Ibid., p. 6.
91 Ibid., p. 28.
92 Ibid., p. 32.
93 Ibid., p. 42
94 Ibid., p. 39.
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10.4 “The Citizenship Thesis” : The Future of Universal Service?
Despite the detail in which TUAG have considered the question o f  universal service, the 
fact remains that the G roup’s deliberations have remained focused on the question o f the 
“what” o f universal service. W hat is still missing from any Irish debate on the subject is 
the question o f  “why universal service'?” Although in the short term, the focus on ensuring 
that service costs remain affordable is logical, in the longer term, the absence o f  any 
coherent philosophy o f why the achievement o f  universal service is necessary may see its 
attainment undermined.
In the absence o f any external philosophy, this research proposes the pursuit o f  the 
“citizenship” approach to the concept outlined below. Encouragingly, given its agenda- 
setting influence, the European Commission’s most detailed consideration to date o f USO, 
“Universal Service for Telecommunications in the Perspective o f a Fully Liberalised 
Environment,” eschews the general tendency in EU telecommunications policy documents 
to refer to subscribers as consumers. Instead it refers to facilitating access to all citizens.
It similarly argues that too narrow a definition o f universal service might keep citizens 
“out o f full participation in society,”95 explicitly recognising the “citizenship thesis” o f 
universal service outlined below.
Anthony Giddens96 has argued that late capitalism/modernity is characterised by an 
increase in individual mobility and in spatial scales o f social as well as economic relations. 
Increasingly, workers (particularly in open economies such as Ireland) must be prepared 
to relocate internationally in the pursuit o f employment. This contributes to an even 
greater dispersal o f  family and friendship relations. Furthermore, the course o f the 20th 
century has seen our non-work lives become increasingly privatised and focused in 
intimate relations. In an age where limited mobility also limited the number o f people one 
was likely to encounter in a given day, there was less need for gradations o f intimacy. In a 
modern society, however, particularly an urbanised one where one may encounter many 
mdividuals on a daily working basis, the relative importance o f intimate relations in the 
private sphere increases. Hence, modernity sees a community-oriented way o f life 
increasingly undermined by a more individualistic, home-oriented way o f life. In this
95 Universal Service for Telecommunications in llic Perspective of a Fully Liberalised 
Environment COM(96) 73 Final, 13th March 1996, p. 8.
96 Anthony Giddens (1991), Sociology, (London: Sage).
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context, the telephone offers a means o f maintaining a virtual community between 
individuals.
Yet, whilst the private home increasingly becomes the focus o f modem existence, the 
average individual requires and has to process a very wide range o f  different types o f 
(often specialised) information. Individuals have to encounter and negotiate 
rights/entitlements with a wide range o f agencies and bureacracies. And (as chapter eight 
suggests) the assumption is made by these agencies themselves that access to the telephone 
on the part o f  the citizen is a given. Thus, the telephone acts as conduit between the public 
and private spheres. Yet public information (such as that provided by Social W elfare 
Agencies) ceases to be public (and in fact becomes a private commodity) if the means o f 
accessing that information (the telephone) is not available as a right. Thus, in a modem 
society, where the telephone has become a consumption norm, it becomes more and more 
important to have access to POTS in order to fully exercise one’s rights as a  citizen.
A politico-philosophical rationale would make the facilitation o f the exercise o f citizenship 
rights the primary aim o f any universal service objective. Yet it is not sufficient to argue 
for universal service in general terms, as the TUAG discussion above does, in the hope 
that the aims implicit in the politico-philosophical version o f universal service will be 
achieved. Unless they are put forward as explicit aims o f universal service, it is unlikely 
that they will be achieved: thus Telecom Eireann’s stated goal97 o f  100% household 
penetration by the year 2000 does not actually commit the company to achieving it and 
has in any case been undermined by the suggestion that having reached 80% household 
penetration thus far, there may be a substantial drop in effective demand thereafter. Thus, 
the social goal o f  universal service in Ireland remains limited to emergency prevention (via 
the free telephone rental scheme).
The cost objections raised to any suggestion that the social objectives o f universal service 
be extended to cover the population as a whole (that is to expand penetration via an 
expanded social welfare subsidy which targets not just pensioners livmg alone but any 
group unable to afford the telephone) reflect the fact that the telephone is still seen as a 
consumer good. But this conception should be open to question in a modem world. M ost 
international and national declarations o f human rights describe communication as a
97 Telecom Eireann (1996). Annual Report and Accounts for (lie Year ended 4 April 1996.
p . 18.
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fundamental right: however, in a society where communication is frequently mediated by 
communications technology, it can be argued that access to that technology should also be 
a right. From this perspective, access to the telephone is no less o f a basic right of 
citizenship than the right to vote. As such, questions of how to pay for those rights should 
be secondary rather than primary concerns.
Citizenship rights today (no more than in the past) are not fixed or pre-given, but they are 
defined and asserted in the process of political struggle and conflict. Universal service is 
but the latest site for that conflict. Before Ireland moves to consider the danger that a two- 
tier society may emerge with regard to access to new ICTS, it would be logical to first 
rectify the existing “two-tieredness” with regard to the most basic telecommunications 
technology - the telephone.
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; 1931 29. 42217
| 1932 30.835,s 27,288 5,285'"
[ 1933 31.48620 ;
j 1934 32.28421 t
[ 1935 35,820 29,873 5.947" .............................. ...................j
1936 37,712 31.052 6.6602'1 .......................... ... ................... !
! 1937 40,382 .......................... :
I 1938 42,521 22,000 - all in Dublin :
: 1939 44,260 24,000 - all in Dublin ::
! 1939
L




j 1942 49,621s '
1943 50,57828
I 1944 52,63129
I 1945 54.10530 :
[ 1946 56.356” }








103,79238 40,000 (approx.) in 
i provinces39
j 1954 I09J34 '1'’ ]
i 1955 116,224" i
| 1956 ___| 123,619^ :
11957... 129.553" :












1 1959 ¡45,88 Ï45
! 1959 (1/1) 131,657
i 1960 c. 150.000






[ 1972 328.48052 :
1974 372,81 1M
April-Dee
! 1974 372,8 l ì ”
! 1975 444,00056
! 1976 48Ö.ÖÖÖ5^
j Ï977 519.00058 .... E...... ....  3
I 1978 554,000s9










Date Area Company Exchanec |  Private Total
1880 Dublin fire 5
7/1881 Dublin UTC 2067 |
7/1881 Belfast STE 133 ™
1/L882 Dublin TCI 87 64 69 :
3or4/1882 Dublin TCI 166 11
6/1882 Dublin h TCI “Nearly
200”71
7/1882 Dublin TCI 206
...................................
jo ;: .........................
7/1882 Belfast NTC 207 in 73
8/1882 Dublin TCI 212 837/|
9/1882 Dublin TCI 229 j £ t ..........................
10/1882 Dublin TCI 244 9 176
11/1882 Dublin TCI 27177 957x
12/1882 Dublin TCI 275 95T'j
1/1883 Dublin TCI 301 105s0
2/1883 Dublin TCI 320 10881
3/1883 Dublin TCI 341 11382
4/1883 Dublin TCI 366 11783




6/1883 Dublin TCI 411 i 2786
9/1883 Dublin TCI 450s" 131™
10/1883 Belfast NTC 23 lK" . ........ ..........
12/1883 Dublin TCI 507 14190 647
6/1884 Dublin TCI 568 16891 736
10/1884 Dublin NTC 568®




12/1886 Dublin TCI 915”
1/1887 Belfast NTC 419 10196
6/1887 ?????? TCI 856
12/1887 TCI 93 697
1888 Dublin 500




1/1889 Cork TCI 24,iifl
4/1889 Cork TCI i 00U" i j
12/1889 Ireland TCI 1,309f 03
12/1889 Cork TCI 295 103 i
12/1890 Ireland TCI 1,47310/1
12/1892 Ireland TCI 1,538105
8/1891 TCI 809 1.... ....!
8/1892 TCI 878'°'
5/1893 Z TCI... ! 943"w
1/1893 TCI 1530""'. i
1894 TCI ¡550,,fl ___ ____ _ .. i
mnammmmmm
Date Arca Company Exchange Private Total
8/1909 700 in 
Cork"2

























1929 17.998'22 . •
1930 18,584123 I
: 1931 19,380124 6,750 auto - all 
Dublin125
















! 1940 25,896i3f> 31.8%
residence
59% auto137




27,471''40 32.5% res 
(20,213 
business /  
8,683
residentialMl)
61% auto M2 17,764 Dublin' 43
: 1943 28,676M4 31.4% 6 1 5 % '^ :





32.6% 60%ms (Of 839 exchanges in 
Ireland 732 offered only i 
restricted service hours 
to 5,900 subscribers, the : 
other 107 offered 
continuous service to 
27,300 subscribers) '49
| 1946 34,667 ! 32% 59%'50 j
i 1947 38,091 31% 59.5%im
........... .............. ................... i
! 1948 I 41,277 1 32% 59.5%,5 r~
I 1949 48,982 ! 33% 65%rff...
! 1950 54.972 ! 34.3% 66%'54












1952 65.495 36.2% 69% '56
1953 70,267 36.5% 69.5%'
1954 74,368 39% 70.5%'58
1955 79,166 39.5% 71%1'59
. ...
1956 85,043 40.8% 70.5%150
1957 89,896 42% 75.5%161
1958 96,291 43.7% 76.5%'62
1959 102,652 46.5% 76.5%'63























| 1971 238.000 126,000 
residence /
1 12,000 non- 
residence17-
1!J!




































j 1984/85 664,000'89 64%'90 96.8% '9'
! 1985/86 694,000 9 8%'92 30%'93
1986/87 746,000 100%'94 45%“95
1987/88 789,000'96 I............................................... j
1988/89 856,000 66%'97 50%'98
1989/90 916,000'" 56%200
1990/91 983,OOO201




1.113mta (Confusingly there are 
stated to be 758,000 
residential lines and 
325,000 business lines at j 
the end of 1992/93 
although this adds up to 
1.083m)205
{ 1993/94 1.17 m2116 67%207 I
i 1994/95 1.24iir08.
j 1995/96 1.31m '
k
........................................................................]
! 1925 -y y21 0
| 1930 1.032"
L 1935 .................................. 12-122...................................................................... ]
| 1940 15.52'3
i 1945 19.3 214





i 1/1/62 58.3“ °
1/1/63 64.2221
1/1/64 67.8"2
31/3/67 80 (telephone sels)
25/6/68 6.2% pop subscribers. # phones connected to j 









S 1979 172 (telephone sets)224
\ 1988 245225
1989 26()226
: 1996Um . - .. .'. .................. —-............. . 320“ 7
u m w ih ■ ■ ■ I vi> Der IM M aM iofchr*...............**
i Year i Number
1 Ï 936 Ï ¡22*
Í 1946 ! 1.7229
! 1961 1 8 230
! 1971 j 182*1
1 1984/85 1 48-i:
; 1985/86 ; 5Q2M
i 1986/87 \ 5423'1
! 1987/88 ; 5 ?-2ì:<
1 1988/89 Î 603-6
i 1989/90 I 64’37
[ 1990/91 Ì 672,s
! Ï 991/92 Î 702M
! 1992/93 Í 1\™
j 1993/94 ; 1524)
! 1994/95 ! 78~12 ;
Ì 1995/96 i 822'13 .......................... !............... .......... i
Anocntlfà VIH: itesltfoßital »hw e H ü i
; Year Percentage
1 ï 940 31.8%“'1’1
1 1941 32%:'1S
! 1942 32.5%2‘lr>















[ 1958 43.7% 2f>2
! 1959 46.5%20
i 1960 48.6%™





j 1988/89 j 6 6 %27"
n
AilDcndrt IX : N l H i l i ! inti lines jmiwnt 1‘tfll - 1096,
Year Number Other Info
1930 900
1931 200













..........................................................j 1945 1.295 I
j 1946 3,424
! 1947 3,186
! 1948 7,705 !
! 1949 5,990
1950 6,505 (Dublin 4,271, Provinces 2,234)
1951 6,637
1952 7,234
; 1953 7,601 (Dublin 5,060, Provinces 2,541)













1966/67 15.528 (financial year)
1967 19.125
1967/68 19,393 (financial year)
1968 21,669
1968/69 22,300 (financial year)
1970 23,700
1971/72 21,000
1972/73 27.000 ____  j
1974 30,700
1974/75 31,700
ü —  m  iH Ü W Ê Ê È m fë^Ê Ê Ê Ê M






1980 62,000:?l (24.500 in Dublin)





; 1987/88 78,000'^' 1




1993/94 120,5() ( )281 î
1994/95 147,OOP282__________I j
î 1995/96 163.000285...






























1988 8 i ,250'*^
1988/89 92,000:‘'"
1989/90 102,000®'
| 1990/91 1 ¿3,000292
I 1991/92 1 123,000’”
MtiagHrtif&Sa - Wm


















12/7/60 4,570 ............................................. 1-........... ........ m ................. !
31/12/60 5,330 I





; 14/4/64 13,198 (6,804 Dublin, 1,004 
Cork, 5390 Rest of 
Ireland)
4,536 waiting over one j 
year, 1,237 over two, ; 
379 over three and 29 1 
over four.
31/3/65 14,260 1965 (averaged): 13.460 !
I 31/3/66 13,300 1966 (averaged): 13.160 \
25/10/66 13,200
j 31/4/67 9,700 Ditto 1967 (averaged): 8.745
! 1967 7, 620 .1
; 31/3/68 7,585 1968 (averaged): 7,620 j
\
17/7/69 10,330 (4805 Dublin, 5,525 
rest of country) j
I 12/69 c. 11,000





! 1/72 20,500 (approx)
j 30/2/72 21.000 (6,000 in 01 area)
j 4/72 22,500 E












31/12/75 42,600 (30/6/75:20,500 in 
Dublin alone)
]
31/3/76 43,000 ........................................... !
31/12/76 40 000
1 31/3/77 40,600
■ ......... ",1Tn...  - i
! 4/78!
53,000 (Average waiting time \ 
13 months)
i 31/5/78 54,000




i 1/2/79 65,000 I
1 9/79 75.880 30,810 in '01' area.
I 9/80
L...........................................
94,000 40,000 approx in 
Dublin




1 15/7/82 c. 85.000
I 1/1/83 78 ,000^
j 28/4/83'
71.900 47,500 in Dublin*57 Of the Dublin 
applications 25,700 




60,000 46.000 in 01 area,
24.000 elsewhere.299
| 1/1/84 60,000*°° 46,000 in 01 area.
| 1/1/85 50,513301
S Mar 1985 40.0003“2 1
Mar 1986 30,000303 j




1989/90 6,000308 t  : t !
1991/92 1,5003-
s
\ Year # Local Calls
1 3/1882 200 daily (Dublin Exchange) 310
6/1882 1250 daily (Dublin Exchange) 3"
i 5/1883 4200 daily (Dublin Exchange)11"’
Hi 1*^ 23 -
{ Year Trunk Calls Local Calls
[......................................... Internal External
j 1923 880,000 67.000 10,000,000
! 1926 1,251,000 97,000 17,220,000
1929 1,710,000 130,000 20,142,000
1 1932 1,958,000 131.000 23,138,000
| 1935 2,159,000 140,000 27,269,000
! 1936 2,398,000 161,000 28,487,000
I
AitttctMitx Xlh-: (  aü \ j*>.2 3 . W M
j Year Trunk Calls Local Calls Total (where available)
j 1923 948,000 16,052,000
| 1924 1,067,000 16,699,000 ;
j 1925 1,162.000 17,158,000 *
I 1926 1.311,000 17.281.000
i 1927 1,481,000 17.345.000
:
| 1928 1,689,000 19,088,000
( 1929 1,839,000 20.166,000
1930 1,914.000 21.569.000
L 1931 2.069.000 22.499.000
1932 2.088,000 23,000.000
! 1933 2,073,000 24,250,000
! 1934 2,181,000 25.109,000
| 1935 2,299,000 29,901,000
! 1936 ......................... 2,568,000 28,864,000 |
i 1937 2,996,000 30,920,000
i 1938 3,297,000 31,321,000
! 1939 3,657,000 32,549,000
i 1940 4.039.000 32,646,000
j 1941 4,966,000 35,969,000




j 1944 6,565,000 42,412,000
1 1945 7,120,000 49,170,000
[ Ï946 7,450,000 52,880,000
| 1947 7,460,000 53,800,000 ...................... 1
! 1948 8.1 10,000 57,710,000
! 1949 8,340,000 62,610.000
! 1950 9,430,000 69,290.000
j 1951 10,120,000 75,530,000
! 1952 10,640,000 77,340,000
1953 11.770.000 80,320,000
j 1954 12.790.000 82. 420,000






1961 13.46m Î36iiv1h ■
1962 14.5m 144in3’5 :
1963 16.6m Ï53 m316 j
1964 18m 164in ‘ ' J.....i
1965 20.9m 177." W 1* î............................................. i
1966 22.7m I92.8m*f9 ! 1
1967 27.5m 226.5 m 254in
1968 32m 259m 291m
u
Year Trunk Calls Local Calls Total (where available)
1970/71 42 m 285m 327m
1972 46.9 m 32(1 mj2°
197.1 54m 35lmJ2'
1974 68m 421nvli2
1974 April-Dee 52m 346m32-
1975 70m 461 in324
1976 866 in*3*
(All figures above from 1926 to I960 from Litton, op. cit.. p. I OS)
v
! Year Operator Assisted Trunk Calls Local and STD Metered Units
I 1977 36in 988m326
1978 31m U 3 0 m ®
1 1979 22m 1.445m32“
1980 34m 1,622m329
1981 35m i ,694m®
1982 32.6m 1,698m331







I 1990 6.6tn 3474m339
| 1991 5.5m 4010m1'"'
1992 3.0m 4330m341
w








1942 April 1,50 1 347
j 1960 2,970348
! 1961 3,026349 1
[ 1962 3,09335ti
i Ï963 3,’l463M
! 1964 3,161352 1
j 1965 3,196353 3





j 1974 April-Dee 3,5893i*
; 1975 3,6553®




1980 4 12 7364 :
1981 4,4 1 5365
1982 4,4 5 2366
1983 4,644367
; 1984 4,727368 i
















j 1936 April 90w !
 ^ 1 9 3 7 99 :
1939 159 j
1942 April 1523S2
6/54 450 (Total) 200 250
! 1/59 720 (Total) 320 400
i 3/71 1.780 (Total) 500 1.280
[2/75 ............................. 2.530 (Total) 610 1.920
12/78 2,960 (Total) 700 2.260 Provinces
1 3/90 5,400 countrywide183 i
j 3/93 6,20Ö3*m :!.. j
y
ü w g  feAttutters
Year Number Other Information
00 00 0 1 ; 1 1
! 1888 3 in Dublin |
! 1900 '56m-
| 1907 89 67 NTC 7 22 Post Office386
1908 118 (85 NTC / 33 Post Office387
1918 212 (25 in Dublin3**
| 1922 192 Total normal service area extended to 2'/2%f 
the area of the country.389
[ 1926 444






[  1933 725 1
! 1934 732 :
1935 740 ......................................................................................... ]
1936 753
1937 774
1938 779 Total normal service area extended to 60% the ! 








1945 . . M ......................... 127 automatic / 732 manual



















1 Year Number Other Information
I 1964 l,0 ’97i94













j 1975 1,03 2406
[ 1976 1.031'107 ;

























































1941 £ i 92.00015,1


























tHisfendiv m m  < tiniui
Year Amount Expended Amount Projected
: 1968/69 £6.4 m
1 1969/70 £7.5m
1 1970/71 , £9.5m spent. £9.3 m projected
j 1971/72 £11.4m spent. £11.11m projected
, j 972/73 £13.73m
! 1972/73 , £16.6m spent £17.2 m projected
| 1973/74 £24m spent £24m projected
April - Dec 1974 , £23. lm spent £23m projected
i 1975 £44.6m spent £45.1 projected
1 1976 , £46.1 in spent £50m projected




| 1981 £220 million470
! 1982 £220 million471




i 1988/89 £136m474 \
j 1993/4 £164 m475
1994/5 £172m476
(Sources All 1960s figures from DD 324, p 1490, 27/11/80.
All figures from 1970-1980 excluding 1972/73 from DD 308, p. 385,17/10/78.)
Date Post Telegraphs Telephones Total
1922/23 (£656,210) (£406,036) (£46,014) (£1.108,260)
1923/24 (£403.756) (£344,328) (£25,665) (£773.749)
1924/25 (£290,119) (£178.507) (£3,348) (£471,974)
1925/26 (£216,548) (£163.443) (£33.976) (£413,967)
1926/27 (£170,260) (£165.305) (£44,191) (£379,756)
1927/28 (£71,307) ..... ........ (£142.212) (£49,255) (£262,774)
1928/29 (£8,683) (£147,955) (£34,719) (£191,357)
1929/30 (£19.392) (£127.231) (£16.055) (£162,678)
1930/31 £69.053 (£106.099) (£8.061) (£45.107) i
1931/32 £116,735 (£89,077) £39,289 £66,947'”  '
1932/33 £94,598 (£118,854) £41,613 £17,357
1933/34 £97,463 (£105,765) £44,009 £35,707
1934/35 £233,070 (£104,277) £78.067 £206.860
1935/36 £307,893 (£95,783) £105,702 £317,812
1936/37 £232,222 (£104,263) £73,833 £20 Ì ,792
1937/38 £154,117 (£121,820) £61.286 £93,583
1938/39 £115,431 (£129.737) £65,627 £51,321478
1939/40 £48,595 (£141.562) £80,519 (£12,449)
1940/41 (£115,257) (£130,203) £90,390 (£155,070)
1941/42 £91,465 (£115,573) £180,165 £157,057
1942/43 £52,803 (£103,917) £242,043 £190,929
1943/44 £114,621 (£73,685) £247,703 £288,639
i 1944/45 (£20,101) (£122,663) £267,289 £124.525
1 1945/46 £32,512 (£116.001) £298,004 £214.515
[ 1946/47 (£26,980) (£140,515) £253.430 £85.935
i 1947/48 (£14,134) (£250,805) £165,328 (£99.611)
1 1948/49 (£62,961) (£260.511) £122,860 £200.612
[ 1949/50 £2,077 (£282.827) £113,499 (£167,251)
1 i 950/5 i (£154,239) (£231,260) £67,733 (£317.766)
1951/52 (£368,889) (£403,397) (£68,376) (£840,662)
1952/53 (£171,151) (£300,085) (£33,522) (£504.758)
1 1953/54 (£101,592) (£351.715) £109,447 (£343.860)
1954/55 (£98.606) (£377.897) £228.102 (£248.404)
1955/56 (£264,617) (£238.299) £134,437 (£368.479)
1957/58 £104,999 (£177,556) £366,377 £293,820
1958/59 £4.672 (£140.144) £413,048 £277,576
1959/60479 £129.771 (£136,867) £396,179 £389,083
1960/61480 £91,291 (£149,525) £426,822 £368,588
I961/62'181 (£75,485) (£195.113) £281,634 £11,036
1962/63482 (£99,031) (£201.095) £346,734 £46,608
Ï963/64483 (£170,447) (£191.228) £197,111 (£164.564)
1964/654!M (£144.798) (£279.264) £356,783 (£67.279)
1965/66'*5 £38,659 (£192.145) £494,415 £340,929
1966/67'1sfi (£252.297) (£205,284) £26,859 (£430,722)
Í967/68',Sy (£585,557) (£244.707) £363.040 (£467,224)
Í968/69488 (£1,130,578) (£353,190) £660.368 (£823.400)
£892.857 £512.756 i
\noettdK W il l:  Annual Po<«< (H ike Pi«Ri .*nd 1 «ss 192?« !9?t2. <Co»t<U 1! .................... -  -----
1 Date Post Telegraphs Telephones Total
I 1970/71 (£1.608 in) (£261,000) £162.000 (£1.707 in)
1 1971/72 (£95,469) (£367,569) (£958,616) (£1.421 m)
[ 1972/73 (£774,292) (£275,205) (£2,506.561) (£3.556
I 1973/74 (£1,191,508) (£768,271) (£4,588,388) (£6.548 in)
I April-Dee '74 (£252.188) (£503,099) (£4,885,088) (£5.640m)
i 1975 (£1.191,177) (£1,065,783) (£14.338.998) (£16.595m)
[ 1976 £4.242,845 (£598.280) (£11.754.877) (£8.110m)
; 1977 £1.216,924 (£418.487) (£6.857,892) (£6.059m)
! 1978 (£2.565,100) (£802,499) (£14,404,413) (£17.772m))
1 1979 ; (£17,010,550) (£430.488) (£23,344,677) (£40.785m)
| 1980 ! (£17,764.420) (£861,052) (£21,511,657) (£39,137, 129)''^ \
L1981 j (£8.100,000) n/a (£28,372,000) (£3 7 m approx) I
| 1982 I £5,400,000 ii/a (£32.397,000) (£27m approx)'’®1 j
ff


























(Noie: 1926-1991 figures refer to 26 counties only)
hli
mmmMMMmmmgm
Date Free Telephone Rental 
Allowance
Electricity Television Licence
end 79 9,572 134.038 ] 79,484
end 80 12.112 i45.405 I 92,956s14
end 81 16,500 153,059 100,345
end 82 22,700 158. 840 105,840s1 '
end June 84 29,600 165,366 125.737*'*
end 85 40,747 170,343 ¡25.090SI 7
end 86 49,967 171.810 127.467 M 8
end 87 51,781 175,360 152.160519
end 88 65,284 170,393 154,962s20
end 89 73,091 175,307 ¡54, 947s21
end 90 78,515 178,486 164,946s22
end 91 94,804 180,875 169,361s23
end 92 105.443 184.146 171,552s24














(Inc. all other 
schemes)
[ 1981 1.137 11,760 3.021 28.024
! 1982 1,963 15,143 3,145 36, 344
| 1983 3.706 16,786 3.858 44.073
1984 3,840 18,646 4.433 49.034
1985 5.136 20.663 4.878 55.034
1986 6,710 22,024 6.397 60.756
1987 7.570 21,693 6.685 61,471
I 1988 ; 8.861 i 20.404 6,861 62,306
j 1989 1 10.333 j 20.384 6,972 63,813
: 1990 i 10.646 21.559 j 7,258526 65,6 j 8s27 ______ j
I 1991 i 13.674 22.769 7.369 72.190
1992 I 14,206 23.571 7,546528 ! 75.119
j 1993 j 15,984 24.171 8.449529 [ 78,374
jj
Other Information
! 1923 £15531 :
1964 £10532 (A reintroduction - since such 
fees had been phased out - don’t I 
know when).
j 1965 Advance rentals introduced.
I 1968 £15533 ]
1970 £25 Pre-decimal534
j 1971 £25535 Post-decimal
[ 1974 £40536 i





1 years advance rental 
requirement removed and 
connection fee payment split into ; 
£100 on signature and £80 on 
receipt of the initial account.5'"
1986 [ £120 ( Service was available for an 
initial deposit of £50, with the 
remaining £70 being paid off 
over the first year’s bills).542
kk
AiMHMEuih XXIV,»: KiDtttU itarm . w r  awnrni 1«$<I - 1<>9&
! Year Rental
i 1880 £20 per annum543
! 1880 Following a reduction of 25% in their rales, the STE offered service at rentals between £7 10s ; 
and £15 according to the facilities required.544
1886 TCI offered telephones to domestic subscribers at £10 rental545
1887 £15 exchange tariff in Belfast (NTC)'"’
1890 £12 - £ 15s47 (NTC rates)
1891
!
£10 for first line, £8 10s for second lines within a 1 mile radius of the nearest exchange. ' 
For each additional half-mile,the annual rental was increased by £2 10s.549 (NTC rales)
! 1897 Vi mile radial distance £8, % mile £9, one mile £10""
I 1899 £12 10s NTC Annual rental (unlimited local calls)551
I 1900 £3 7s NTC rental (Id per local call)
1 1900 Vi mile radial distance £7 10 and £1 5s for each additional 'A mile' (PO Office)
! 1902
s
£3 within Zi mile radial distance5 * (plus message rate introduced - Id for each local call, the 
subscriber guaranteeing to spend at least 30s per annum in respect of such calls. (Post 
Office)554 Therefore total cost at least £4 10s.
I 1907
iÏ
Minimum message rate up to £5 (included 500 free local calls). Unlimited rate totally 
withdrawn.555
i 1907 £4 up to 2m radial distance55'’
; 5/1907 PO & NTC agree £5 minimum annual rental (covering 500 local calls)
j 1914 £4 surcharge placed on all new applications '
: 4/1921.
Ef
Flat and measured rates abolished - all subscribers come under the measured rate , paying 
li/id per local call and an annual rent of £8 10s (London). £8 (Birmingham, Glasgow, 
Liverpool and Manchester) and £7 10s (Provinces - inc. Dublin)'




£6 10 Business, £5 Residence up to 1 mile radial distance.561 25/- per one-eighth mile 
(furlong) over (or £10 per mile). "These rentals apply only to exchanges open before the 
transfer of services in 1922. For Business and Private Residence lines at Exchanges opened | 







As above but free mileage increased to 3 miles,5’3 Beyond three miles, additional rental at the j 
rate of £10 per mile still applied. For Business and Private Residence lines at Exchanges 
opened subsequent to the transfer of services in 1922 the rental of £7 10s was reduced to £6 
10s for business lines and £5 for private residence lines.'’'64
Ì 1941 As above + 5% (£6 16s 6d business / £5 5s residence)565
! 1951 As 1936 +25% (£8 2s 6d business / £6 5s residence)'
j 1953 £10 business. £ 7 10 residence56’
[Ï962 £11 10 business, £9 residence.?
j i 964 £14 business. £12 residence56'1
1969 £14 10 business, £12 10 residence5 "
i 1970!
t!
£22 business, £20 residence £1.60 per annum per furlong charged for distance in excess of 3 j 
miles from exchange.571
! 1973 £7.67 per quarter (£30.68 p.a.) Business / £7.08 per quarter (£28.32 p.a.) Residence5 '
! 1975 £10.50 per quarter (£42 p.a.) Business / £9.69 per quarter (£38.76 p.a.) Residence5'3
j 1977 £52.48 business / £48.44 residence574
L i 979 £62.96 business / £58.12 575
1 1981 £89.32 (auto) business /£82.88 (auto) residence5'1’
1982 £109 (auto) business/£101.28 residence5.
j 1983____ £128 (auto) business/£118.16 (auto) residential' '






f i e n i  ¡il ...
£144.32 (auto), £107.24 (man) busine s s /£133.20 (auto)£99.04 (man) residence 
£36.08 (£144.32 p.a.) per quarter business / £33.30 (£132.80 p.a.) per quarter residential581 
£145.20 (ine VAT) £145.20 fine VAT)882"
mm
H Avitivfpd f ^ ' '" /
; At some very small exchanges (usually up to about eight lines) standard rentals had never applied and the i 
| rentals were based on the cost of providing the service. The rentals had varied enormously but in 
i November 1941, the following scale of fixed rentals was introduced for small or “Specially Assessed”
I exchanges.583
} No. of Subscribers' Lines at Exchange Annual Rental uer milewithin three miles
¡1 ................... £15. 15s. Od.
! 2 £11. 15s. Od.
! 3 £10. 5s. Od.
I 4 £9. 10s. Od.
! 5 .................................................................................. £9. Os. Od.
1 6 £8. 10s. Od.
r7 £8. Os. Od.
l 8 £7. 10s. Od.j 9 £7. Os. Od.
1 10 £6. 10s. Öd.4*4
n n
H — lililí:-- ;
Year 0-5m 5-VAm
Ï897 Flat Rate Flat Rate
! 1900 Flat Rate Flat Rate
S 1902 Id 2d
[ 1907 Id 2d
1 1922 II/2 3d
I 1925 VA 2d
1936 Id 2d
í 1941 as 1936 + 5% as 1936+5%
j 1951 as 1936 + 25% as 1936 + 25%
[ 1953 VA 3d585 !
1956 2d 2d
1 1959 2d (Local call area extended to 7'A miles),
11964 3d586
1968 4d587
1972................................................ . . J Ä 8!................................
j  1974 J e¿ü ....................................
[ 1975 2.36p'190 I
1976 3.2pwr
1978 4 P ..................................
'O oo o 4.84p-M
1980 5Ï85ps%
1982.............................  j 7-ip595 ! ... . .1
. 1986 11.17 p -
Í 1988 H.17pM ............................. Î
; 1991 1 11.42p :
0 0
f f p w i f •‘•2 - m t i
(In 1992 local call liming and peak/olT-peak units were introduced)
Month/Year Price Peak Unit: Off-peak Unit:
Jan '92 15 rains 30 mins
Mar '92™
.......................
11.78p 15 mins 30 mins
Jan '93 11.78p 15 mins 30 rains
Mar '93:599 12.28p i 15 mins 30 mins
Sepl '93 11.02p | 3 mins 15 mins
Apr ’94 11.5p i 3 mins 15 mins
Jan '95 _ !L 5 e_____________ ; 3 mins 15 mins
Irtvft l>vi










































































































































i Limerick 2685 180632 67.3 158,912 59.2 146,098 : 54.4














! MUNSTER 24,175 1331115 55.1 1173643 48.5 1076188 i[ 44.5
















' 9 7 5 4 1 ....
1 95 
; 50.5














Down 2,503 84,879.... 33.9 74170....... 29.6 65430 jI 26.1




































































. 84083 | 
“ 646932.....|
: 40
; 45.8  
i 36.5
! IRELAND j 83,911 5174836 ; 61.7 4704750 56.1 4468775 1 53.3
(Sources: Own calculations based on data from Census Returns - 1881, 1901, 1911)
qq
AoiK'iuliv XXV(i>* {Ntouhuioit In t 1^1! - IW »
1911 1926 1936
i Carlow 895 30,151 33 7 34,476 38.5 34,452 38.5
! Dublin 920 476909 518.4 505,654 549.6 586,925 638
34.3 57,892 34.2
31.6 51,540 30 50,109 29.2
Louth 820 68402 83.4 62,739 76.5 64,337 78.5
i Offaly (Kings) 1,999 56769 28.4 62,696 31.4 61,405 30.7
2,.14l 27.7 52,592 22.5 5 i ,308 21.9
54,706




j Antrim 3,105 478603 154.1
j Armagh 1,320 119625 90.6
82,452
j Deny 2,087 168420 80.7
i Donegal 4,841 304589 62.9 152,508 31.5 142,310 29.4
1 Down 2,503 61811 24.7
1,808 140621 77.8





1578572 70.9 300,091 37.2 280,269 34.7 i
i Galway 6,147 181686 29.6 169,366 27.6 168,198 27.4
: Leitrim 1,588 63557 40 55,907 35.2 50,908 32.1
i Mavo 5,585 191969 34.4 172,690 30.9 161,349 28.9
i Roscommon 2,546 93904 36.9 83,556 32.8 77,566 30.5



















Carlow 895 34.081 38 1 34,162 38.2 33,888 ! 37.9
! Dublin 920 636,193 691 5 693,022 753.3 705.781 i 767.2
i Kildare 1,693 64,849 38.3 66,437 39.2 65,915 i 38.9
; Kilkenny 2,060 66,712 32.4 65,235 31.7 64,089 j 31 1
i Laois (Queens) 1,718 49,697 28.9 48,430 28.2 47,087 1 27.4
i Longford 1.090 36,218 33.2 34,553 31.7 32,969 1 30 2
i Louth 820 66,194 80.7 68,771 83.9 69,194 i 84.4
: Offaly (Kings) 1,999 66,232 3.1 66,337 33.2 66,762 ; 33.4
; Meath 2,341 53,686 22.9 52,544 22.4 51,970 i 22.2
1 Westmeath 1,838 54,949 29.9 54,463 29.6 54,122 i 29.4
: Wexford 2,352 91,855 39.1 90,032 38.3 87,259 ! 37.1
i Wicklow 2,023 60,451 29.9 62,590 30.9 59,906 : 29.6
I LEINSTER 19,756 1,281,117 64.8 1,336,576 67.7 1,338,942 I 67.8
! Clare 3,147 85,064 27 81,329 25.8 77,176 j 24.5
; Cork 7,456 343,668 46.1 341,284 45.8 336.663 i 45.2
! Kerry.................. 4,745 133,893 28.2 126,644 26.7 122,072 : 25.7
Limerick 2685 142,559 53.1 141,239 52.6 137,881 ; 514
i Tipperary 4,302 136,014 31.6 133,313 31 129,415 I 30 1
i Waterford 1,836 76,108 41.5 75,061 40.9 74,031 j 40.3
1 MUNSTER 24,175 917,306 37.9 898,870 37.2 877,238 I 36.3
! Antrim 3,(05
I Armagh 1,320 .................
: Cavan 1,931 70,355 36.4 66,377 34.4 61,740 j 32
1 Derry 2,087 i
i Donegal 4,841 136,317 28.2 131,530 27.2 122,059 ! 25.2
! Down 2,503 . : s
i Fermanagh 1,808 ;
; Monaghan 1,294 57,215 44.2 55,345 42.8 52,064 i 40.2
; Tyrone 3,201 ................ :
i ULSTER(Three 
: coimlies)
8,066 263,887 32.7 253,252 31.4 235,863 i 29.2
;...............i
.^.. ' •
I Galway 6,147 165,201 26.9 160,204 26.1 155,553 j 25.3 j
I Leitrim [ 1,588 44,591 28.1 41,209 26 37,056...... jf'23.3....
I Mayo 1 5,585 i 148,120 | 26.5 141,867.... 25.4 " 133.052.... 1! 23.8
! Roscommon 1 2,546 72 ,5  ;o.....ji 28.5 68,102 26.7 1 63,710...... j 25
! Sligo ! 1,836 62’375'" 1 34 60,513 33 i 56,850...... jLa i i
I CONNAUGHT i 17,704 492,797 i 27.8 "471,8.95 ~1 26.7.......... 1P 446,22^ 1r 25.2....
■ ............ ....
IRELAND 83,911 2,955,107 i 35.2 2,960,593 35.3 2,898,264 ji 34.5....
ss
Anncndn W V fd: Irish Poimtatta« Ocnsin In Oxmtv 1961«- i*/?}
County A rea  in Sq. Ions 1961 1966 1971
Pop. D ensity 
Sq. kms
Pop. D ensity  
Sq. kms
Pop. D ensity j 
Sq. kms
; Carlow 895 33,342 37 3 33593 37.5 34025 38
Dublin 920 718,332 780.8 795047 864.2 849542 923.4
Kilkenny 2,060 61,668 29 9 60463 29 4 61811 30
Laois (Queens) 1,718 45,069 26.2 44595 26 45349 26.4
Longford 1,090 30,643 28.1 28989 26.6 28227 25.9
Louth 820 67,378 82.2 69519 84.8 74899 91.3
Offaly (Kings) 1,999 51,533 25.8 67323 33.7 71616 35.8
Meath 2,341 65,122 27.8 51717 22.1 f 51834 22 1
Westmeath 1,838 52,861 28.8 52900 28.8 53557 29.1
Wexford 2,352 83,308 35.4 83437 35.5 85892 36.5
Wicklow 2,023 58,473 28.9 60428 29.9 66270 32.8
LEINSTER 19,756 1.332,149 67.4 1414415 71.6 1494544 75.7
: : : : : : : : : : : :
Cork 7,456 330,443 44.3 339703 45 6 351735. 47.2
Kerry 4,745 116,458 24 5 112785 23.8 112941 23 8
Limerick 2685 133,339 49.7 137357 41.2 140370 52.3
Tipperary 4,302 123,822 28.8 122812 28.5 123196 28.6
Waterford 1,836 71,439 38.9 43238 23.6 45237 24.6





Cavan 1,931 56,594 29 3 54022 28 52674 27.3
i Derry 2,087
Donegal 4,841 113,842 23.5 108549 22.4 108000 22.3
1 Down 2,503
i Fermanagh 1,808




8,066 217,524 27 208303 25.8 2.06905 25.7
• Galway^ 6,147 149,887 24 4 148340 24.1 148220 24.1 
17 8
19,6
i Leitrim 1,588 33,470 21 1 30572 19.3 28313
; Mayo 5,585
SO 0 1 7
f Sligo 1,836 53,561 27.4
i CONNAUGHT 17,704 419,465 23.7 401950 22.7 | 389763 22
| .....................
IRELAND 83,911 2,818,341 33.6 2,884,002 34.4 I 2,971,230 35.4
tt
tmlaifcm PensU\ (aunn
County A rea  in St|. kms 1981 1986
Pop. D ensity 
S(j. kms
Pop. D ensity Sq. 
kms
Carlow 895 39,820 44.5 40988 45 8
Dublin 920 1,003,164 1090.4 1021449 1110.3
Kildare 1,693 104,122 615 116247 68.7
Kilkenny 2,060 70,806 34.4 73186 35.5
Laois (Queens) 1,718 ...51,171.......... 29.8 53284 31
Longford 1,090 31,140 28.6 31496 28.9
Louth 820 88,514 107.9 91810 112
Offaly (Kings) 1,999 95,419 47.7 103881 52
Meath 2,341 58,312 24,9 59835 25.6
Westmeath 1,838 61,523 33.5 63379 34.5
Wexford 2,352 99,081 42.1 102552 43.6
Wicklow 2,023 87,449 43.2 94542 46.7
[ LEINSTER 19,756 1,790,521 90.6 1852649 93.8
j ......................................
| c iare 3,147 87,567 27.8 91344 29
I Cork 7,456 402,465 54 412735 55.4
i  Kerry 4,745 122,770 25.9 124159 26.2.
i Limerick 2685 161,661 60.2 164569 61.3
1 Tipperary 4,302 135,261 31.4 136619 31.8
i Waterford 1,836 88,591 48.3 91151 49.6
1
§ MUNSTER 24,175 998,315 41.3 1020577 42.2,
i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
! Antrim 3,105
! Armagh 1,320
Cavan 1,931 53,855 27.9 53965 27.9
Derry 2,087
Donegal 4,841 125,112 25.8 \ 129664 26.8
Down 2,503 ....................... 1 .........................
Fermanagh 1,808




8,066 230,159 28.5 236008 29.3
Galway 6,147 172,018 28 1 178552 29
Leitrim 1,588 27,609 17.4 27.035 17
Mayo 5,585 114,766 20.5 t  115184 20.6
Roscommon 2,546....................... 54,534 21.4 |  54592 21 4
Sligo .................... 1,836 55,474 30.2 ]  56046 30.5
: CONNAUGHT 17,704 424,410 24 j 431409 24.4
" ....... . T
IRELAND 83,911 3,443,405 41 1 3504643 41.8
(Sources: Own calculations based on data from Census Returns 1 986)
1 SüM i
Year Average W eekly W age
| Male Female
! S » i s ..... ! D
P 938 58 3 ! 29 ! 10
i 1939 59 6 31... j 6
i 1940 61 4 ! 32 ! 7
| 1941 62 2 ! 32 ! 5
| 1942 64 4 : 31 i 11
j 1943«®* 68 8 I 35 - ! 3
j 1944601 73 4 i 38 : 4
i 1945fi02 76 1 | 40 ! 5
1946*” 81 7 j 44 j 10
1947® 97 9 I 52 I 0
1948605 107 1 i 56 i 4
j 949*6 111 9 j 59 ! 4
: 1950 114 7 61... i 9
1 1951 125 10 1 66 F T 57..... 1
! 1952 133 4 ! 71 ! 1
i 1953 142 2 76 1 3 !
j 1954 146 5 77.... [ W  !
| 1955 153 7 82... ; ¿6.0 |
! 1956 161 6 ! 86 : (jÄI 1 !
! 1957 166 8 88 j  | <il 2
1958 175 6 94 |St"3 ;
[1959 182 3 98.....1 8
[ I960 195 8 104 j 9
; 1961 ___  I 210 3 109 ; 3
j 1962 ............. j 230 3.......1 120 19...
1963 240 6 126 1
: 1964 266 2 137 5......... !
: l9.65,.... 276 5 141 1 !
1966 306 3 : 157 ; 3s"14 1




(N ote: In  1965 th e  C SO  s to p p e d  in c lu d in g  the b u ild in g  an d  co n stru c tio n  in d u s try  in  th e ir  ca lcu la tio n s  o f  
average  in d u s tr ia l wage. Thus w h ils t the f ig u r e  f o r  1965 above  d o es  in c lu d e  b u ild in g  a n d  construction ,
the f ig u r e s  below  (inc. 1965) do  no t.)
[ Y e a r S D ! S D
1 1965 265..... 10 ! 141 2
I 1966 2 9 4 '" i 10 i 156 1 ®
1 1967 309 8 I 162 8 633
[ 1968 (in  d ec im al) T7~2(> ! 8 .97
í m é ü H ü l l  c a r o ín a s :  in d « s ír i itx  « ftd  S ü  * M M  Í9í»9-l9W S
F rom  1969 on, the a vera g e  in d u s tr ia l w age w as c a lc u la te d  fr o m  a d u lt ra te s  only. P re v io u s ly  it  h a d  been  I 
ca lcu la ted  fr o m  the ea rn in g s  o f  18 yea rs o ld  a n d  upw ards. T h is co n tr ib u te d  to a s lig h tly  u n u su a l rise.
Y e a r M in in g  e t  a l M a n u f a c tu r in g S e rv ic e T o ta l T r a n s p o r ta b le  ! 
G o o d s  In d s
M F M 1 F ........M ......... F M F
1969 ! 20.95 ! 7 .60 ; 20 .67 j 9.76 18.64 8 .66
1970 : 22 .75 ! 9 .06 i 24 .00 ; 11.53 20.89 10.14
1971 I 2 7 .34 10.72.... 27.11 13.12 23.31 11.95
1972 ¡3 2 ,6 0 .... i 11.43 30.98 ! i 5 .08 N A 1 N A
1973 [  37 .78 i 15.93 36.96 18.69 32.21 p i T « ® * ....
Ï9 7 4 ¡4 2 .0 2 i 19.83
O O •'7CI









: 1 5 .¡y \ J O . l o
1 75.68
¿y. j o  
40 .09
NA N A
75 84 ! 40 .08
Ï9 7 8 86 37 .4 (1 9 4 86.00 47 .72 86*02.... 47.71
1979 96.68 i 51 .07 100.73 58.04 100.43 58.03
1980 1 116.46 i 55 .88 i 111.68 6 6 .45 .... 112.02 66 .43  !
XX
! Year Male Female Farm
Agricultural Servants
Labourers
£ s £ s
j 1925 15 14 9 17
j 1926 17 7 10 0
I 1927 14 12 9 14
j ¡928 14 10 10 7
j 1929 14 11 10 2
| 1930 14 7 10 0 ess
! 1931 14 1 9 ¡¿ BS>
! 1932 13 15 9 IlfiJSC j
| 1933 12 13 8 ! ‘> w i
| 1934 12 6 8 12r," y
j 1935 12 3 8 j 2«Si |
j Ì 93 6 12 11 8 16M2 j
! 1937 13 I 9 4
1938 16 0 9 17** !
1939 16 17 10
Ì (reí' h o u se  o r  «N iw ranve nt a n \  k in d
! Year S. D Year S .D Decimal Year L S.D Decimal
j 1925 26 3 1944 40 3 645 1963 122 6 6.13
! 1926 25 6 1945 40 364á 1964 145 3 7 .26
1 i 927 25 6 1946 45 1965 160 9 8 .04
S 1928 24 9 1947 51 361,8 1966 173 6 8.67
1 1929 25 0 1948 56 3 M‘‘ 1967 180 6 9.03
1930 24 6 1949 61 365ü 1968 195 9651 9.79
1931 24 3 1950 61 3fts" 1969 11.56
1932 23 6 s 5 1951 68 9 1970 13.07
1933 22 665a 1952 74 0 1971 I6 .2 7 'w
1934 2 Ï  Ö656 1953 81 6 657 4 .07 1972 17.77
1935 21 3 658 1954 85 6é5i 4 .27 1973 19.78ömj
1936 21 9661 1955 85 6 S^ 4 .27 1974 24.78
1937 [22 1 1956 96 9VæS 1 4.84 1975 3 0 .4 2 fiM
1938 27 3 :'i:' 1957 96 9fiw 4 .84 1976 .............. ! 3 3 .07
i' 1939 r 27 6ëSr "1 1958 96 9‘:<’>: 4 .84 1977 38.57
j 1940 F 30 3m  } 1959 [ " 1 0 2 ^ 1 5 .14 ! 1978 4 2 .57
["1941 30 3 .....  j 1960 106 9®^ ] 5 .34 1979 4 9 .94
! 1942 33 3 ; 1961 109 9 5 .49 1980 .... 6 1 .7 1 * *
j 1943 "3 6  3'gjy"1 1962 122 6 6.13
zz
À n s ie n d ù  X X X I; N unaO er o f  M í fes o í  T r u n k  T e lfw h o n c  lin e s  H I S  - íí>3Ü  \  '■
Y e a r P h y s ic a l 
C ir c u i t  
(1000s m iles)
C a r r i e r  
C irc u i t  
(1000  m iles)
T r u n k
M ile a g e (1 0 0 0 s
m iles)
i N u m b e r  o f 
C irc u i ts
1922 9.3 9.3
1923 9.4 9.4




! 1928 13.2 13.2
i 1929 13.4 13.4
i 1930 13.9 13.9 :
j 1931 14.5 14.5
1932 14.8 0.3 15.1
i 1933 14.9 0.3 15.2
i 1934 15.1 0.5 15.6
i 1935 15.2 0.8 16.0 L *
I 1936 15.4 1.3 16.7
! 1937 15.5 3.8 19.3 i
i 1938 15.8 4.7 20.5
1939 16.5 5.7 22.2 5
1940 16.8 7.0 23.8 i
1941 17.4 8.0 25.4
1942 17.9 8.6 26.5
1943 18.1 9.4 27.0 ; j
1944 18.7 11.9 28.1 : ï
1945 19.1 12.8 31.0
......... i
1946 20.0 19.2 32.8
....... ■* ....1
1947 u 20.5 20.2 39.7 i
1948 21.0 20.6 41.2
1949 21.6 20.6 42.2
1950 22.3 22.2 42.9
1951 28.6 35.3 50.8
1952 29.8 43.4 65.1 2,238. . , ........
1953 30.6 47.6 74.0 2,563
1954 37.7 54.2 85.3 2.882
1955 38.1 60.2 92.3 3.165
1956 40.9 64.1 101.1 3.420
1957 45.9 68.5 110.0 3 ,668
1958 47.0 77.1 115.5 3.936
1959 48.5 86.0 125.6 4.227
1960 49.5 90.7 137.4 4 ,560
1961 50.3 140.0 4,775
1961 j 2 2 .4 4 5 e74
1962 : 1 3 9 .9 7 2 ^ 1
1963 15S.46()',7í'
1964........ 171,495o77
1965 2 1S .648 ''7x
1966 j 2 6 0 ,8 8 7 r’19
( ■ » «< ! i WÊÊËËËËËÊm









i Number of 
i Circuits
i i 972 291.107a0
! 1973 571.5618*1
! 1974 
i Ap ril* 
: Dec










Year M i l e s
1/z/H) 10/12/4 1214/15 15/20 20/25 25/35 35/50 50/75 75/100 100/125 125/150 150/200 200/250 250/300 Over
300




8d 1/- 1/4 2/- up
140
miles
For every additional 40 miles or part 8d
Night 4d Half 
day rate
1922
Day 3d 4d 5d 7d 9d 1 /- 1/6 21- 2/6 31- 3/6 4/6 For every 50 miles or part 1/-
Night 3d 3d 3d 4d' 5d 6d 9d 1/- 1/3 1/6 1/9 2/3 Ditto 6d V
1925 1
Day 3d 4'/2d 6d 714 9d 11- 1/6 21- 2/6 31- 3/6 4/6 5/6 6/6 11-
Night 3d 4Vid 6d 6d Id 8d 9d 1 /- 1/3 1/6 1/9 For every 50 miles of part 6d
1936
Day 3d 4d 5d 7d 9d 1/- 1/3 1/6 1/9 21- 2/3 2/6 3/- 3/6 4/-
Night 3d 3d 3d 4d 5d 6d 9d 9d 1/- within State or 6 counlies. 1/6 to GB
1940 1936 charges increased by 5%
1951 1936 charges increased by 25%
1953
Day 4 '/2d 6d 9d l/- 1/4 1/9 2/3 31-
Night 4!/2d 6d 9d 9d 9d 1/3 1/6
1956
Day 6d lOd 1/2 1/6 21- 2/6 3/6





VAIlti 10/1214 1214/15 15/20 20/25 25/35 35/50 50/75 75/100 100/125 j 125/150 150/200 ! 200/250 250/300 Over
300
19591
Day Mr 2/- 31-
Night 8d I/- 21-
19642
Day 1 /- 2/3 31-
Night 9d 1/6 2/3
19683
Day 1 /- 2 /- i l ­ ' •
Night 8d 1/4 io
19714 ;.........
10p i
Night 3.33p 6.66p lOp
19735 ]
Day 6p l.?P 18p
Night 4P 8P............
1 Group Charging Introduced
2 Telephone (Amendment) Regulations, 1964. Statutory Instrument No. 153 of 1964.
3 Telephone (Amendment) Regulations, 1968. Statutory Instrument No 274 of 1968.
4 Telephone (Amendment) Regulations, 1971. Statutory Instrument No. 63 of 1971.
5 Telephone (Amendment) Regulations, 1973. Statutory Instrument No 193 of 1973.
Q.CLCl
Ycars | M iles
714/10 10/1214 1214/15 15/20 20/25 25/35 35/50 50/75 75/100 100/125 125/150 150/200 200/250 250/300 Over
300
19746
Day 9p 18p . 27.P.......
Night 6p ...12b ........ J.*p ........
1980
Dav 17.55p 35 .Ip 52.65p
Night 11.7p ..2.3,4p...... „35. Ip
19867
67.02p 100.53p *
Night 22.34p 44.68p 67.02p
1989s
Day 34p 67p £1.01
Night 22p ..Mp......... 67p
6 Telephone (Amendment) Regulations, 1974. Statutory Instrument No. 363 of 1974. From 1974 on the official designations for the calling areas were: 1) not exceeding 56 
kilometres, b) between 56 and 80 kilometres and c) over 80 kilometres. These distances were converted exactly from the mile areas (i.e. 56 kilometres = 35 miles).
7 Telephone (Amendment) Scheme, 1986. Statutory Instrument No. 78 of 1986.
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S 13906 SUBSIDIARY ORDERS MADE BY MIN, P&T
S 14234 JAMES EVERETT, MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENTS
S 14243 5TH GOVT, BIOGRAPHIES OF MINISTERS
S 14280 CALCULATION OF LIVING WAGE IN IRELAND
S 14494 TJ MONAGHAN: TRIBUTE
S 14536 MICHEÁL KEYES, MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENTS
S 14679A TELEPHONE TAPPING
S 14796C UNTECH ASSIST. SCHEME FOR UNDEDEVELOPED AREAS
S 14946 A/1 - A/2 TELEGRAPH ACT 1953
S 14946B REPORT OF TELEGRAPH RE-ORG C’TEE
S 14962B MIN, P&T. AGENCY ORDERS
S 15041 BIOGRAPHY OF 6TH GOVT
S 15045A TELEPHONE CHARGES, GENERAL FILE
S 15065 D,P&T, PROGRESS REPORTS
S 15118 TELEPHONE SERVICE, DELAYS
S 15124 TELEPHONE SYSTEMS
S 15211 TELEPHONE APPS, PRIORITY CLASSES
S 15669A 7TH DAIL, BIOGRAPHIES
S 16035A TELEPHONE DEVELOPMENT
D'TAOISEACH SUPPLEMENT LIST & INDEX




























S 8576 GOV-GEN, TELEPHONES, TELEGRAMS AND POSTAGE
S 8579A GOVT INFO BUREAU, PART FREE TELEPHONE
S 9471 TELEPHONE IN TAOISEACH PRIVATE RESIDENCE
S 9601 COUNCIL CHAMBER, TELEPHONE INDICATOR
S 9614A MINS&PARL SECRETARIES, TELEPHONES,
OFFICIAL & PRIVATE 
S 10352A PRESIDENT, TELEPHONES, TELGRAMS AND DICTAPHONES
S11445/12 D'P&T, SECURITY MEASURES DURING EMERGENCY




S 16224 P&T DEPARTMENT
S 14428 ITU
D'TAOSEACH 1993 RELEASE
S 14946 TELEPHONE CHARGES
S 16035 TELEPHONE DEVELOPMENT
D' TAOISEACH 1994 RELEASE
S 16024 TELEPHONE CAPITAL ACT 1963
S 16224 D'P&T
D’ TOURISM, TRANSPORT & COMMUNICATIONS 1948-1966
A6313/31 VOL 10 SELECTION BOARD FOR ASST, ENGINEERS '47
H 12186/35 VOL 6 SECRETARYS OFFICE, TELEPHONE SEC., RE-ORG
D 189/41, VOL 24A, S. 8(4) ENGINEERING BRANCH, TECH ADDRESSES
LETTER TO SECRETARY FOR MINISTER
H 7497/44 VOL 3-10 
R28312/45, VOL 4
TELECOMS & TELEPHONE BRANCH -STAFFING
ELECTRONICS AND POSTAL MECHANISATION 
FROM "TELECOMS ’62"




C'MIS ON RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT - 
POST OFFICE REPORT
O&M INSPECTION OF TELEPHONE CONTRACTS. 
SECTION SECRETARIES OFFICE, COMMENTS ON 
REPORT


















H1565/49, VOL 1-3 ECONOMIC CO-OP ADMIN PARTICIPATION OF P&T 1949-57
IN SCHEME FOR PROVING TECHNICAL ASSITANCE 
AND TRAINING
H843150 VOL 5
H7433/51, VOL 1 
H 8652/51, VOL 2
H8652/51, VOL2A 
H 8642/51, VOL 3
RESERVE FORCE FOR HQ OFFICES, ENG. BRANCH, 1951-56
REVISON BASED ON STATISTICS FOR 1950, 1951 
AND 1952
ENG. BRANCH, PAY CONDITIONS, PRIVILEGES ETC 1951-52
ENG, BRANCH PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER EST 1946-59
COMMENCES '45. ENDS '59
ENG. BRANCH, STAFFING OF HIGHER POSTS
WESTERN TRUNK CABLE, PROPOSED EST OF 
MAIN LINES AND TRANSMISSION SECTION.




H3735/53, VOL 1 DAIL QUESTION 1 )TERMINATION OF SERVICES OF 
D'P&T INDUSTRIAL CONSULTANT 2) EMPLOYMENT 




IRISH PO CONTROLLING OFFICERS ASSOC. 1954-60
REQUEST BY INSTITUTE OF SCI AND TECH AT 1948-56
KEVIN'S ST FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF ENGINEERING 
STUDENTS ATTENDING THAT COLLEGE.
H 20586/57 VOL 1-6 (S.8(4)) RELATING TO THE REQUEST TO THE I’TU 
FOR TECH ASSISTANCE UNDER THE UN 
PROGRAMME FOR TECH ASSISTANCE.
A20753/57, VOL 4 ENGINEERS ASSOC - REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING 
THE CHAIRMANS STATEMENT AT THE ANNUAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE IRISH PO ENGINEERING UNION 
RELATING TO STAFFING
TR22632/57 GERAN PROPOSAL TO AFFORD TECH TRAINING TO IRISH 
TECHNICIANS UNDER UN TECH ASSIST, PROG.
A26437/58, VOL 3, S. 8 (4) PRECAUTIONS AGAINST BANDIT ATTACKS 1959-61 
ON SUB POST OFFJCS. QUESTION OF 
INSTALLATION OF TELEPHONES IN ALL S.O.
H29437/59 D’TAOISEACH - REQUEST FOR OBSERVATIONS ON 1959 
REPORT OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC ADVISORY 
GROUP OF ENGINEERS ASSOC
B29545/59, VOL 1 TELEPHONE DEVELOPMENT - STANDARD 1954-64
2 2
ENGINEERING STRUCTURES
D' TOURISM, TRANSPORT D' TOURISM, TRANSPORT & COMMUNICATIONS 
(GREEN BOOK)
H 1438/34 VOL 1 
H 1438/34 VOL 2 
R 28312/45 VOL 4
TELEPHONE ORG. REPORT ON OPERATION AND STAFFING 
TELEPHONE ORG - RECOMMENDATIONS
ELECTRONIC AND POSTAL MECHANISATION - EXTRACT FROM 
"TELECOMMUNICATIONS 1962" 1923
M 1437/ 52 VOL 3 TELEPHONE RESTRICTIONS DUE TO STORES SHORTAGE
H 10716/56 VOL 1 S.8(4)(C) RURAL AUTOMATIC SCHEME - BMPS. 1938-57
REMUNERATIONS AT MALAHIDE,
DONABATE, RUSH AND LUSK S.O.S
B 13103/56 SHANNON ELECTRICITY SUPPLY ACT 1925
H 20586/57 VOL 1 S.8(4) REQUEST TO ITU FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE UNDER
THE UN PROGRAMME FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
H 20586/57 VOL 3 S.8(4) ITU ASSISTANCE - DUTCH TELECOMS EXPORTS VISITS
THIS ADMINISTRATION TO ADVISE ON TELEPHONE 
DEVELOPMENT (THERE ARE 8 VOLUMES IN THIS FILE, 
ALL OF POSSIBLE USE)
1094/4 3:
1094/12 2
P TO G/SECRET ARI AT, RE: AMALGAMATION OF JUL 23
GOVT COMMUNICATIONS WITH CITY COMMUNICATIONS
"ECONOMIC MAY (?) 1923" - UNDER 22 HEADS 
COVERING CURRENCY, EDUCATION, TRANSPORT, 
INDUSTRY, NAVY, DIPLOMATIC SERVICE, CIVIL 
SERVICE COMMISSION, ARMY, ETC.
1923
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SERVICES 1993 RELEASE
GIS 1/22 NEIL BLANEY 1957-61
GIS 1/45 JOSEPH BRENNAN 1965-69
GIS 1/57 ERSKINE CHILDERS 1951-54
GIS 1/58 ERSKINE CHILDERS 1954-57
GIS 1/65 ERSKINE CHILDERS 1965-66
GIS 1/66 ERSKINE CHILDERS 1967-68
GIS 1/67 ERSKINE CHILDERS 1968-69
GIS 1/90 GERARD COLLINS 1970-73
GIS 1/150 PADRA1G FAULKNER 1977-79
GIS 1/156 TOM FITZPATRICK (PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY) 1977-79
GIS 1/188 MICHAEL HILLIARD 1958-61
GIS 1.203 MICHAEL KEYES 1951-54
GIS 1/204 MICHAEL KEYES 1954-57
GIS 1/207 PJ LALOR 1965-69
GIS 1/285 CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN 1973-77
GIS 1/319 SEAN ORMONDE 1957-59
23
